dnsmasq: upgrade 2.92 -> 2.93

- Update package checksum
- Remove obsolete upstreamed patches
- Verify successful build and runtime functionality

Include upstream security fixes:
- CVE-2026-2291
- CVE-2026-4890

Remove following patches as fixes are now included upstream:
- CVE-2026-4891
- CVE-2026-4892
- CVE-2026-4893
- CVE-2026-5172

Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@oss.qualcomm.com>

meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.93.bb

@@ -15,12 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/${@['archive/', ''][float(d.getV
            file://dnsmasq-resolvconf.service \
            file://dnsmasq-noresolvconf.service \
            file://dnsmasq-resolved.conf \
-           file://CVE-2026-4891.patch \
-           file://CVE-2026-4892.patch \
-           file://CVE-2026-4893.patch \
-           file://CVE-2026-5172.patch \
 "
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fd908e79ff37f73234afcb6d3363f78353e768703d92abd8e3220ade6819b1e1"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "cc967771abdafeb43d10db18932d6b59fd4bed2c69c22acf8cb96aff6920d55f"
 
 inherit pkgconfig update-rc.d systemd
 

meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2026-4891.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-commit 2cacea42e4d45717bd0ce3ccfe8e78960245e5da
-Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date:   Wed Mar 25 23:04:08 2026 +0000
-
-Verify rdlen field in RRSIG packets. CVE-2026-4891
-    
-Bug report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
-    
-This avoids crafted packets which give a value for rdlen _less_
-then the space taken up by the fixed data and the signer's name
-and engender a negative calculated length for the signature.
-
-CVE: CVE-2026-4891
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [ https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=788b4e0f6c05217981b512bed4e5fea6f8855d01 ]
-
-Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
-
-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 0860daa..4bb0495 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -546,10 +546,14 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
- 
- 	   *ttl_out = ttl;
- 	 }
--       
-+
-+      /* Don't trust rdlen not to be too small and give us a negative sig_len
-+	 It has already been checked that it doesn't run us off the end
-+	 of the packet. */
-+      if ((sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav)) <= 0)
-+	return STAT_BOGUS;
-+
-       sig = p;
--      sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav);
--              
-       nsigttl = htonl(orig_ttl);
-       
-       hash->update(ctx, 18, psav);

meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2026-4892.patch

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-commit 011a36c51438c986535a7248ed2e7f424f8e1078
-Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date:   Wed Mar 25 23:16:35 2026 +0000
-
-Fix buffer overflow in helper.c with large CLIDs. CVE-2026-4892
-    
-Bug reported bt Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
-    
-Location: helper.c:265-270
-DHCPv6 CLIDs can be up to 65535 bytes. When --dhcp-script is configured,
-the helper hex-encodes raw CLID bytes via sprintf("%.2x") into daemon->packet (5131 bytes).
-A 1000-byte CLID writes ~3000 bytes. The helper process retains root privileges.
-    
-Note: log6_packet() correctly caps CLID to 100 bytes for logging, but the helper code path was missed.
-
-CVE: CVE-2026-4892
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [ https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=10e6b5b83e80749cba7b090d7780b29f908f0571 ]
-
-Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
-
-diff --git a/src/helper.c b/src/helper.c
-index 72f81fe..2c12801 100644
---- a/src/helper.c
-+++ b/src/helper.c
-@@ -261,8 +261,8 @@ int create_helper(int event_fd, int err_fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, long max_fd)
- 		      data.hostname_len + data.ed_len + data.clid_len, RW_READ))
- 	continue;
- 
--      /* CLID into packet */
--      for (p = daemon->packet, i = 0; i < data.clid_len; i++)
-+      /* CLID into packet: limit to 100 bytes to avoid overflowing buffer. */
-+      for (p = daemon->packet, i = 0; i < data.clid_len && i < 100; i++)
- 	{
- 	  p += sprintf(p, "%.2x", buf[i]);
- 	  if (i != data.clid_len - 1) 

meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2026-4893.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-commit 434d68f2eb1a58744470698483a3ae09b5a9a870
-Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date:   Wed Mar 25 23:22:37 2026 +0000
-
-Fix broken client subnet validation. CVE-2026-4893
-    
-Bug report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
-    
-Location: forward.c:713, edns0.c:421
-    
-With --add-subnet enabled, process_reply() passes the OPT record
-length (~23 bytes) instead of the packet length to check_source().
-All internal bounds checks fail, and the function always returns 1.
-ECS source validation per RFC 7871 Section 9.2 is completely bypassed.
-
-CVE: CVE-2026-4893
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [ https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=e3a26d092e47bf1d18aeadb758e4ca35c83b5f2d ]
-
-Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
-
-diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
-index e2f64c0..208480d 100644
---- a/src/forward.c
-+++ b/src/forward.c
-@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header *header, time_t now, struct server
-       /* Get extended RCODE. */
-       rcode |= sizep[2] << 4;
-       
--      if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && !check_source(header, plen, pheader, query_source))
-+      if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && !check_source(header, n, pheader, query_source))
- 	{
- 	  my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("discarding DNS reply: subnet option mismatch"));
- 	  return 0;

meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2026-5172.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-commit fa3c8ddef6712b52f562813317e6a997e1210123
-Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date:   Mon Mar 30 16:24:33 2026 +0100
-
-Fix buffer overflow vulnerability in extract_addresses() CVE-2026-5172
-    
-Thanks to Hugo Martinez Ray for spotting this.
-    
-The value of rdlen for an RR can be a lie, allowing the
-call to extract_name() at rfc1025.c:952 to advance the value of p1
-past the calculated end of the record. The makes the calculation
-of bytes remaining in the RR underflow to a huge number and results
-in a massive heap OOB read and certain crash.
-
-CVE: CVE-2026-5172
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [ https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=073082ddc0aba7b8efa15a688d6183463b65effa ]
-
-Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
-
-diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
-index f0e1082..7e05fb5 100644
---- a/src/rfc1035.c
-+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
-@@ -943,7 +943,8 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
- 			      /* Name, extract it then re-encode. */
- 			      int len;
- 			      
--			      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
-+			      /* rdlen may lie, and extract_name() advances p1 past where it says the record ends. */
-+			      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0) || (p1 > endrr))
- 				{
- 				  blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
- 				  return 2;