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dnsmasq: upgrade 2.92 -> 2.93
ChangeLog: https://dnsmasq.org/CHANGELOG - Update checksum - Remove obsolete patches - Verified build and runtime functionality Security fixes (included upstream in 2.93) : - CVE-2026-2291 - CVE-2026-4890 - CVE-2026-4891 - CVE-2026-4892 - CVE-2026-4893 - CVE-2026-5172 - Removed patches corresponding to the above CVEs as fixes are now part of upstream release Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <khem.raj@oss.qualcomm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Abhishek Bachiphale
committed by
Khem Raj
Khem Raj
parent
b2b319eef3
commit
44ec3710d5
+1
-7
@@ -15,14 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/${@['archive/', ''][float(d.getV
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file://dnsmasq-resolvconf.service \
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file://dnsmasq-resolvconf.service \
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file://dnsmasq-noresolvconf.service \
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file://dnsmasq-noresolvconf.service \
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file://dnsmasq-resolved.conf \
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file://dnsmasq-resolved.conf \
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file://CVE-2026-2291.patch \
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file://CVE-2026-4890.patch \
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file://CVE-2026-4891.patch \
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file://CVE-2026-4892.patch \
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file://CVE-2026-4893.patch \
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file://CVE-2026-5172.patch \
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"
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"
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SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fd908e79ff37f73234afcb6d3363f78353e768703d92abd8e3220ade6819b1e1"
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SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "cc967771abdafeb43d10db18932d6b59fd4bed2c69c22acf8cb96aff6920d55f"
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inherit pkgconfig update-rc.d systemd
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inherit pkgconfig update-rc.d systemd
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@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
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commit ec2fbfbbdaa7d7db1c707dce26ce1a37cfe09660
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Fri Apr 10 16:29:31 2026 +0100
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Fix buffer overflow in struct bigname. CVE-2026-2291
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All buffers capable of holding a domain name should be
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at least MAXDNAME*2 + 1 bytes long, where MAXDNAME is the maximum
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size of a domain name. The accounts for the trailing zero and the
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fact that some characters are escaped in the internal representation
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of a domain name in dnsmasq.
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The declaration of struct bigname get this wrong, with the effect
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that a remote attacker capable of asking DNS queries or answering DNS
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queries can cause a large OOB write in the heap.
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This was first spotted by Andrew S. Fasano.
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CVE: CVE-2026-2291
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Upstream-Status: Backport [ https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=014e909f787e808bb35daa546d3f8f3663918de2 ]
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Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
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diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
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index 254bacd..58be09f 100644
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--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
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+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
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@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ struct interface_name {
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};
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union bigname {
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- char name[MAXDNAME];
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+ char name[(2*MAXDNAME) + 1];
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union bigname *next; /* freelist */
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};
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@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
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commit 4fdb707633afe8028118bcaf39b4882f634b5999
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Fri Apr 10 16:24:02 2026 +0100
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Fix NSEC bitmap parsing infinite loop. CVE-2026-4890
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Report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>.
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Location: dnssec.c:1290-1306, dnssec.c:1450-1463
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The bitmap window iteration advances by p[1] instead of p[1]+2
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(missing the 2-byte window header). With bitmap_length=0, both rdlen and p are
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unchanged, causing an infinite loop and dnsmasq stops responding to all queries.
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Reachable before RRSIG validation
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(confirmed by the source comment at line 2125), so no valid
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DNSSEC signatures are needed.
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CVE: CVE-2026-4890
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Upstream-Status: Backport [ https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=7b151eb60609a0139474918222806f9bcfb4fe71 ]
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Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
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diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
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index 4bb0495..3951620 100644
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--- a/src/dnssec.c
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+++ b/src/dnssec.c
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@@ -1348,8 +1348,8 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
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break; /* finished checking */
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}
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- rdlen -= p[1];
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- p += p[1];
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+ rdlen -= p[1] + 2;
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+ p += p[1] + 2;
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}
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return 0;
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@@ -1512,8 +1512,8 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
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break; /* finished checking */
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}
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- rdlen -= p[1];
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- p += p[1];
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+ rdlen -= p[1] + 2;
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+ p += p[1] + 2;
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}
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return 1;
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@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
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commit 2cacea42e4d45717bd0ce3ccfe8e78960245e5da
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Wed Mar 25 23:04:08 2026 +0000
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Verify rdlen field in RRSIG packets. CVE-2026-4891
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Bug report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
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This avoids crafted packets which give a value for rdlen _less_
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then the space taken up by the fixed data and the signer's name
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and engender a negative calculated length for the signature.
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CVE: CVE-2026-4891
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Upstream-Status: Backport [ https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=788b4e0f6c05217981b512bed4e5fea6f8855d01 ]
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Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
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diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
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index 0860daa..4bb0495 100644
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--- a/src/dnssec.c
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+++ b/src/dnssec.c
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@@ -546,10 +546,14 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
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*ttl_out = ttl;
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}
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-
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+
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+ /* Don't trust rdlen not to be too small and give us a negative sig_len
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+ It has already been checked that it doesn't run us off the end
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+ of the packet. */
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+ if ((sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav)) <= 0)
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+ return STAT_BOGUS;
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+
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sig = p;
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- sig_len = rdlen - (p - psav);
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-
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nsigttl = htonl(orig_ttl);
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hash->update(ctx, 18, psav);
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@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
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commit 011a36c51438c986535a7248ed2e7f424f8e1078
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Wed Mar 25 23:16:35 2026 +0000
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Fix buffer overflow in helper.c with large CLIDs. CVE-2026-4892
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Bug reported bt Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
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Location: helper.c:265-270
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DHCPv6 CLIDs can be up to 65535 bytes. When --dhcp-script is configured,
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the helper hex-encodes raw CLID bytes via sprintf("%.2x") into daemon->packet (5131 bytes).
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A 1000-byte CLID writes ~3000 bytes. The helper process retains root privileges.
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Note: log6_packet() correctly caps CLID to 100 bytes for logging, but the helper code path was missed.
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CVE: CVE-2026-4892
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Upstream-Status: Backport [ https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=10e6b5b83e80749cba7b090d7780b29f908f0571 ]
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Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
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diff --git a/src/helper.c b/src/helper.c
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index 72f81fe..2c12801 100644
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--- a/src/helper.c
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+++ b/src/helper.c
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@@ -261,8 +261,8 @@ int create_helper(int event_fd, int err_fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, long max_fd)
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data.hostname_len + data.ed_len + data.clid_len, RW_READ))
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continue;
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- /* CLID into packet */
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- for (p = daemon->packet, i = 0; i < data.clid_len; i++)
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+ /* CLID into packet: limit to 100 bytes to avoid overflowing buffer. */
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+ for (p = daemon->packet, i = 0; i < data.clid_len && i < 100; i++)
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{
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p += sprintf(p, "%.2x", buf[i]);
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if (i != data.clid_len - 1)
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@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
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commit 434d68f2eb1a58744470698483a3ae09b5a9a870
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Wed Mar 25 23:22:37 2026 +0000
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Fix broken client subnet validation. CVE-2026-4893
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Bug report from Royce M <royce@xchglabs.com>
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Location: forward.c:713, edns0.c:421
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With --add-subnet enabled, process_reply() passes the OPT record
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length (~23 bytes) instead of the packet length to check_source().
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All internal bounds checks fail, and the function always returns 1.
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ECS source validation per RFC 7871 Section 9.2 is completely bypassed.
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CVE: CVE-2026-4893
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Upstream-Status: Backport [ https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=e3a26d092e47bf1d18aeadb758e4ca35c83b5f2d ]
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Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
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diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
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index e2f64c0..208480d 100644
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--- a/src/forward.c
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+++ b/src/forward.c
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@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header *header, time_t now, struct server
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/* Get extended RCODE. */
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rcode |= sizep[2] << 4;
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- if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && !check_source(header, plen, pheader, query_source))
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+ if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && !check_source(header, n, pheader, query_source))
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{
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my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("discarding DNS reply: subnet option mismatch"));
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return 0;
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@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
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commit fa3c8ddef6712b52f562813317e6a997e1210123
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Author: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Mon Mar 30 16:24:33 2026 +0100
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Fix buffer overflow vulnerability in extract_addresses() CVE-2026-5172
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Thanks to Hugo Martinez Ray for spotting this.
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The value of rdlen for an RR can be a lie, allowing the
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call to extract_name() at rfc1025.c:952 to advance the value of p1
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past the calculated end of the record. The makes the calculation
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of bytes remaining in the RR underflow to a huge number and results
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in a massive heap OOB read and certain crash.
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CVE: CVE-2026-5172
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Upstream-Status: Backport [ https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=073082ddc0aba7b8efa15a688d6183463b65effa ]
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Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <Abhishek.Bachiphale@windriver.com>
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diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
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index f0e1082..7e05fb5 100644
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--- a/src/rfc1035.c
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+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
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@@ -943,7 +943,8 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
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/* Name, extract it then re-encode. */
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int len;
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- if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
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+ /* rdlen may lie, and extract_name() advances p1 past where it says the record ends. */
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+ if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0) || (p1 > endrr))
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{
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blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
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return 2;
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