From 8afa1293bde9c7964998761410a6fbdba9b1b35d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ankur Tyagi Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2026 07:33:57 +1300 Subject: [PATCH] pjproject: patch CVE-2026-84975 Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-84975 (cherry picked from commit a003f0bb5accff83fdd52df110360fae360a2272) Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi Signed-off-by: Khem Raj --- .../pjproject/pjproject/CVE-2026-84975.patch | 87 +++++++++++++++++++ .../pjproject/pjproject_2.17.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-multimedia/recipes-multimedia/pjproject/pjproject/CVE-2026-84975.patch diff --git a/meta-multimedia/recipes-multimedia/pjproject/pjproject/CVE-2026-84975.patch b/meta-multimedia/recipes-multimedia/pjproject/pjproject/CVE-2026-84975.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..007096a6ff --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-multimedia/recipes-multimedia/pjproject/pjproject/CVE-2026-84975.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +From f00f023079d0f9a74477da47056bfce76374b2a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: sauwming +Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 16:46:33 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Merge commit from fork + +SubjectAltName entries from the OpenSSL and GnuTLS backends were copied +with pj_strdup2(), which re-derives the length with strlen() and thus +discards the length already returned by ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8() / +gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject_alt_name(). A DNS SAN such as +"victim.example\0.attacker" was therefore truncated to "victim.example". + +sip_transport_tls.c disables socket-layer verification and performs its +own length-aware identity match against subj_alt_name, so the truncated +prefix compared equal to the target host and a crafted certificate was +accepted for the prefix hostname (server identity / hostname verification +bypass; OpenSSL's own X509_check_host() rejects the same certificate). + +Copy the SAN using its explicit length via pj_strset()/pj_strdup_with_null() +so embedded NULs are preserved and no longer truncated. The mbedTLS backend +already copied with a length-bearing pj_str_t and was not affected. + +Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 +(cherry picked from commit 43d3bd77bb6833eab4c493503b8d564a754ddfdd) + +CVE: CVE-2026-84975 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pjsip/pjproject/commit/43d3bd77bb6833eab4c493503b8d564a754ddfdd] + +Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi +--- + pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_gtls.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- + pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_ossl.c | 14 +++++++++++--- + 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_gtls.c b/pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_gtls.c +index 68ceea3f3..ee977116b 100644 +--- a/pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_gtls.c ++++ b/pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_gtls.c +@@ -1072,9 +1072,22 @@ static void tls_cert_get_info(pj_pool_t *pool, pj_ssl_cert_info *ci, + + if (len && type != PJ_SSL_CERT_NAME_UNKNOWN) { + ci->subj_alt_name.entry[ci->subj_alt_name.cnt].type = type; +- pj_strdup2(pool, ++ if (type == PJ_SSL_CERT_NAME_IP) { ++ pj_strdup2(pool, + &ci->subj_alt_name.entry[ci->subj_alt_name.cnt].name, +- type == PJ_SSL_CERT_NAME_IP ? buf : out); ++ buf); ++ } else { ++ /* Preserve the reported length instead of using strlen(), ++ * so a DNS SAN containing an embedded NUL is not truncated ++ * at the NUL (which would allow a crafted cert to be ++ * accepted for the prefix hostname; identity bypass). ++ */ ++ pj_str_t tmp; ++ pj_strset(&tmp, out, len); ++ pj_strdup_with_null(pool, ++ &ci->subj_alt_name.entry[ci->subj_alt_name.cnt].name, ++ &tmp); ++ } + ci->subj_alt_name.cnt++; + } + } +diff --git a/pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_ossl.c b/pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_ossl.c +index 30b4eeaee..ceb6bca5b 100644 +--- a/pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_ossl.c ++++ b/pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_ossl.c +@@ -2270,9 +2270,17 @@ static void get_cert_info(pj_pool_t *pool, pj_ssl_cert_info *ci, X509 *x, + &ci->subj_alt_name.entry[ci->subj_alt_name.cnt].name, + buf); + } else { +- pj_strdup2(pool, +- &ci->subj_alt_name.entry[ci->subj_alt_name.cnt].name, +- (char*)p); ++ /* Preserve the explicit ASN.1 string length instead of ++ * treating the data as a NUL-terminated C string. A DNS ++ * SAN such as "host.example\0.attacker" would otherwise be ++ * truncated at the embedded NUL, letting a crafted cert be ++ * accepted for the prefix hostname (identity bypass). ++ */ ++ pj_str_t tmp; ++ pj_strset(&tmp, (char*)p, len); ++ pj_strdup_with_null(pool, ++ &ci->subj_alt_name.entry[ci->subj_alt_name.cnt].name, ++ &tmp); + OPENSSL_free(p); + } + ci->subj_alt_name.cnt++; diff --git a/meta-multimedia/recipes-multimedia/pjproject/pjproject_2.17.bb b/meta-multimedia/recipes-multimedia/pjproject/pjproject_2.17.bb index 89763b3011..893559090f 100644 --- a/meta-multimedia/recipes-multimedia/pjproject/pjproject_2.17.bb +++ b/meta-multimedia/recipes-multimedia/pjproject/pjproject_2.17.bb @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/pjsip/pjproject.git;protocol=https;branch=master;tag file://CVE-2026-57165.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57166.patch \ file://CVE-2026-77396.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-84975.patch \ " SRCREV = "5a457451fa2712ba18e12b01738e8ff3af2b26fd"