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python3-django: Fix for CVE-2023-43665 and CVE-2023-46695
CVE-2023-43665: In Django 3.2 before 3.2.22, 4.1 before 4.1.12, and 4.2 before 4.2.6, the django.utils.text.Truncator chars() and words() methods (when used with html=True) are subject to a potential DoS (denial of service) attack via certain inputs with very long, potentially malformed HTML text. The chars() and words() methods are used to implement the truncatechars_html and truncatewords_html template filters, which are thus also vulnerable. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2019-14232. CVE-2023-46695: An issue was discovered in Django 3.2 before 3.2.23, 4.1 before 4.1.13, and 4.2 before 4.2.7. The NFKC normalization is slow on Windows. As a consequence, django.contrib.auth.forms.UsernameField is subject to a potential DoS (denial of service) attack via certain inputs with a very large number of Unicode characters. References: https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2023/oct/04/security-releases/ https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2023/nov/01/security-releases/ Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali <narpat.mali@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
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committed by
Armin Kuster
parent
8a042b540d
commit
fee5560548
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
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From 32bc7fa517be1d50239827520cc13f3112d3d748 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Mariusz Felisiak <felisiak.mariusz@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 12:49:41 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fixed CVE-2023-46695 -- Fixed potential DoS in
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UsernameField on Windows.
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Thanks MProgrammer (https://hackerone.com/mprogrammer) for the report.
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CVE: CVE-2023-46695
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/django/django/commit/f9a7fb8466a7ba4857eaf930099b5258f3eafb2b]
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Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali <narpat.mali@windriver.com>
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---
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django/contrib/auth/forms.py | 10 +++++++++-
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docs/releases/2.2.28.txt | 14 ++++++++++++++
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tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py | 8 +++++++-
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3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/django/contrib/auth/forms.py b/django/contrib/auth/forms.py
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index e6f73fe..26d3ca7 100644
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--- a/django/contrib/auth/forms.py
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+++ b/django/contrib/auth/forms.py
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@@ -68,7 +68,15 @@ class ReadOnlyPasswordHashField(forms.Field):
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class UsernameField(forms.CharField):
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def to_python(self, value):
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- return unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', super().to_python(value))
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+ value = super().to_python(value)
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+ if self.max_length is not None and len(value) > self.max_length:
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+ # Normalization can increase the string length (e.g.
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+ # "ff" -> "ff", "½" -> "1⁄2") but cannot reduce it, so there is no
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+ # point in normalizing invalid data. Moreover, Unicode
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+ # normalization is very slow on Windows and can be a DoS attack
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+ # vector.
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+ return value
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+ return unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", value)
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class UserCreationForm(forms.ModelForm):
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diff --git a/docs/releases/2.2.28.txt b/docs/releases/2.2.28.txt
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index 6a38e9c..c653cb6 100644
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--- a/docs/releases/2.2.28.txt
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+++ b/docs/releases/2.2.28.txt
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@@ -76,3 +76,17 @@ filters, which were thus also vulnerable.
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The input processed by ``Truncator``, when operating in HTML mode, has been
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limited to the first five million characters in order to avoid potential
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performance and memory issues.
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+
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+Backporting the CVE-2023-46695 fix on Django 2.2.28.
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+
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+CVE-2023-46695: Potential denial of service vulnerability in ``UsernameField`` on Windows
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+=========================================================================================
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+
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+The :func:`NFKC normalization <python:unicodedata.normalize>` is slow on
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+Windows. As a consequence, ``django.contrib.auth.forms.UsernameField`` was
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+subject to a potential denial of service attack via certain inputs with a very
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+large number of Unicode characters.
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+
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+In order to avoid the vulnerability, invalid values longer than
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+``UsernameField.max_length`` are no longer normalized, since they cannot pass
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+validation anyway.
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diff --git a/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py b/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py
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index bed23af..e73d4b8 100644
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--- a/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py
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+++ b/tests/auth_tests/test_forms.py
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ from django import forms
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from django.contrib.auth.forms import (
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AdminPasswordChangeForm, AuthenticationForm, PasswordChangeForm,
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PasswordResetForm, ReadOnlyPasswordHashField, ReadOnlyPasswordHashWidget,
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- SetPasswordForm, UserChangeForm, UserCreationForm,
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+ SetPasswordForm, UserChangeForm, UserCreationForm, UsernameField,
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)
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from django.contrib.auth.models import User
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from django.contrib.auth.signals import user_login_failed
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@@ -132,6 +132,12 @@ class UserCreationFormTest(TestDataMixin, TestCase):
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self.assertNotEqual(user.username, ohm_username)
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self.assertEqual(user.username, 'testΩ') # U+03A9 GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA
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+ def test_invalid_username_no_normalize(self):
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+ field = UsernameField(max_length=254)
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+ # Usernames are not normalized if they are too long.
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+ self.assertEqual(field.to_python("½" * 255), "½" * 255)
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+ self.assertEqual(field.to_python("ff" * 254), "ff" * 254)
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+
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def test_duplicate_normalized_unicode(self):
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"""
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To prevent almost identical usernames, visually identical but differing
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--
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2.40.0
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