meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/files/CVE-2026-48522.patch

From f369d32169410b17717d2a9c00d5bf3ac655c85d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Padilla?= <jpadilla@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 14:11:10 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Bundle security fixes and hardening into 2.13.0
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Security:
- `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` rejects JWK JSON documents passed as raw
  HMAC secrets to close an algorithm-confusion gap not covered by the
  existing PEM/SSH guard. Reported by @aradona91 in GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx.
- Bind the JWT header `alg` to `PyJWK.algorithm_name` during verification
  so the caller's `algorithms` allow-list cannot be bypassed when decoding
  with a `PyJWK` / `PyJWKClient` key. Reported by @sushi-gif in
  GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f.
- Skip the unconditional base64 decode of the compact-form payload
  segment when `b64=false` is set, and require that segment to be empty
  (RFC 7515 Appendix F detached form). Closes an unauthenticated DoS
  amplifier. Reported by @thesmartshadow in GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39.
- `PyJWKClient` rejects any URI whose scheme is not `http` or `https` so
  attacker-influenced URIs cannot read local files or reach unintended
  schemes via urllib's default `file://` / `ftp://` / `data:` handlers.
  Reported by @KEIJOT in GHSA-993g-76c3-p5m4.
- Preserve the cached JWK Set on fetch errors in `PyJWKClient.fetch_data`.
  The previous `finally`-block `put(None)` pattern cleared the cache on
  any transient outage. Reported by @eddieran in GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8.

Fixes:
- Reject empty HMAC keys outright in `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` with
  `InvalidKeyError` instead of accepting them with only a warning.
  Hardening prompted by reports from @SnailSploit and @spartan8806.
- Forward per-call `options` (including `enforce_minimum_key_length`)
  from `PyJWT.decode` through to `PyJWS._verify_signature`. Thanks to
  @WLUB.
- RFC 7797 §3 compliance for `b64=false`: encoder auto-adds `"b64"` to
  `crit`; decoder rejects tokens that set `b64=false` without listing
  it in `crit`. Thanks to @MachineLearning-Nerd.

CVE: CVE-2026-48522
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81]

Backport Changes:
- Split out the PyJWKClient URI-scheme validation because the upstream
  commit bundles multiple CVEs.
- Omitted CHANGELOG.rst because it conflicted and is release documentation.
- Omitted the 2.13.0 version bump and other bundled fixes; applicable CVE
  fixes are carried in separate patches.

(cherry picked from commit 95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81)
Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
---
 jwt/jwks_client.py        | 11 +++++++++++
 tests/test_jwks_client.py | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)

diff --git a/jwt/jwks_client.py b/jwt/jwks_client.py
index b81e8f4..8d1b0c4 100644
--- a/jwt/jwks_client.py
+++ b/jwt/jwks_client.py
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from functools import lru_cache
 from ssl import SSLContext
 from typing import Any
 from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 from .api_jwk import PyJWK, PyJWKSet
 from .api_jwt import decode_complete as decode_token
@@ -69,6 +70,16 @@ class PyJWKClient:
         """
         if headers is None:
             headers = {}
+        # urllib's default OpenerDirector also handles file://, ftp://, and
+        # data: URIs. Reject anything that isn't http(s) eagerly so a caller
+        # passing an attacker-influenced URL (e.g. taken from a `jku` token
+        # header) can't read local files or reach other unintended schemes.
+        scheme = urlparse(uri).scheme.lower()
+        if scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+            raise PyJWKClientError(
+                f"Invalid JWKS URI scheme {scheme!r}: only 'http' and 'https' "
+                f"are supported."
+            )
         self.uri = uri
         self.jwk_set_cache: JWKSetCache | None = None
         self.headers = headers
diff --git a/tests/test_jwks_client.py b/tests/test_jwks_client.py
index ceee672..d6793cc 100644
--- a/tests/test_jwks_client.py
+++ b/tests/test_jwks_client.py
@@ -344,6 +344,36 @@ class TestPyJWKClient:
             jwks_client = PyJWKClient(url, lifespan=-1)
             assert jwks_client is None
 
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "uri",
+        [
+            "file:///etc/passwd",
+            "ftp://example.org/keys.json",
+            'data:application/json,{"keys":[]}',
+            "/etc/passwd",  # urlparse gives scheme="" — also rejected
+            "ldap://internal.test/jwks",
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_pyjwkclient_rejects_non_http_schemes(self, uri: str) -> None:
+        # urllib's default OpenerDirector handles file://, ftp://, and data:
+        # URIs. PyJWKClient must reject these so callers can't be tricked
+        # into reading attacker-controlled local files or other unintended
+        # schemes via a manipulated URI.
+        with pytest.raises(PyJWKClientError, match="Invalid JWKS URI scheme"):
+            PyJWKClient(uri)
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "uri",
+        [
+            "http://localhost/jwks.json",
+            "https://example.test/jwks.json",
+            "HTTPS://Example.Test/jwks.json",  # case-insensitive
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_pyjwkclient_accepts_http_https_schemes(self, uri: str) -> None:
+        # Construction succeeds; no fetch is made until get_jwk_set().
+        PyJWKClient(uri)
+
     def test_get_jwt_set_timeout(self) -> None:
         url = "https://dev-87evx9ru.auth0.com/.well-known/jwks.json"
         jwks_client = PyJWKClient(url, timeout=5)