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meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-gevent/CVE-2023-41419.patch
Narpat Mali 6432fee6d0 python3-gevent: fix CVE-2023-41419 
An issue in Gevent Gevent before version 23.9.1 allows a remote attacker
to escalate privileges via a crafted script to the WSGIServer component.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41419
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7m3-jprg-wc5g

Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali <narpat.mali@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
2023-10-17 08:44:46 -04:00

674 lines
28 KiB
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From f80ee15e27b67b6fdd101d5f91cf584d19b2b26e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Madden <jamadden@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2023 12:41:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gevent.pywsgi: Much improved handling of chunk trailers.
Validation is much stricter to the specification.
Fixes #1989
CVE: CVE-2023-41419
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gevent/gevent/commit/2f53c851eaf926767fbac62385615efd4886221c]
Signed-off-by: Narpat Mali <narpat.mali@windriver.com>
---
docs/changes/1989.bugfix | 26 ++++
src/gevent/pywsgi.py | 229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
src/gevent/subprocess.py | 7 +-
src/gevent/testing/testcase.py | 2 +-
src/gevent/tests/test__pywsgi.py | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 390 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 docs/changes/1989.bugfix
diff --git a/docs/changes/1989.bugfix b/docs/changes/1989.bugfix
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ce4a93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/changes/1989.bugfix
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+Make ``gevent.pywsgi`` comply more closely with the HTTP specification
+for chunked transfer encoding. In particular, we are much stricter
+about trailers, and trailers that are invalid (too long or featuring
+disallowed characters) forcibly close the connection to the client
+*after* the results have been sent.
+
+Trailers otherwise continue to be ignored and are not available to the
+WSGI application.
+
+Previously, carefully crafted invalid trailers in chunked requests on
+keep-alive connections might appear as two requests to
+``gevent.pywsgi``. Because this was handled exactly as a normal
+keep-alive connection with two requests, the WSGI application should
+handle it normally. However, if you were counting on some upstream
+server to filter incoming requests based on paths or header fields,
+and the upstream server simply passed trailers through without
+validating them, then this embedded second request would bypass those
+checks. (If the upstream server validated that the trailers meet the
+HTTP specification, this could not occur, because characters that are
+required in an HTTP request, like a space, are not allowed in
+trailers.) CVE-2023-41419 was reserved for this.
+
+Our thanks to the original reporters, Keran Mu
+(mkr22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn) and Jianjun Chen
+(jianjun@tsinghua.edu.cn), from Tsinghua University and Zhongguancun
+Laboratory.
diff --git a/src/gevent/pywsgi.py b/src/gevent/pywsgi.py
index 0ebe095..078398a 100644
--- a/src/gevent/pywsgi.py
+++ b/src/gevent/pywsgi.py
@@ -1,13 +1,28 @@
# Copyright (c) 2005-2009, eventlet contributors
# Copyright (c) 2009-2018, gevent contributors
"""
-A pure-Python, gevent-friendly WSGI server.
+A pure-Python, gevent-friendly WSGI server implementing HTTP/1.1.
The server is provided in :class:`WSGIServer`, but most of the actual
WSGI work is handled by :class:`WSGIHandler` --- a new instance is
created for each request. The server can be customized to use
different subclasses of :class:`WSGIHandler`.
+.. important::
+ This server is intended primarily for development and testing, and
+ secondarily for other "safe" scenarios where it will not be exposed to
+ potentially malicious input. The code has not been security audited,
+ and is not intended for direct exposure to the public Internet. For production
+ usage on the Internet, either choose a production-strength server such as
+ gunicorn, or put a reverse proxy between gevent and the Internet.
+.. versionchanged:: NEXT
+ Complies more closely with the HTTP specification for chunked transfer encoding.
+ In particular, we are much stricter about trailers, and trailers that
+ are invalid (too long or featuring disallowed characters) forcibly close
+ the connection to the client *after* the results have been sent.
+ Trailers otherwise continue to be ignored and are not available to the
+ WSGI application.
+
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import
@@ -22,10 +37,7 @@ import time
import traceback
from datetime import datetime
-try:
- from urllib import unquote
-except ImportError:
- from urllib.parse import unquote # python 2 pylint:disable=import-error,no-name-in-module
+from urllib.parse import unquote
from gevent import socket
import gevent
@@ -53,29 +65,52 @@ __all__ = [
MAX_REQUEST_LINE = 8192
# Weekday and month names for HTTP date/time formatting; always English!
-_WEEKDAYNAME = ["Mon", "Tue", "Wed", "Thu", "Fri", "Sat", "Sun"]
-_MONTHNAME = [None, # Dummy so we can use 1-based month numbers
+_WEEKDAYNAME = ("Mon", "Tue", "Wed", "Thu", "Fri", "Sat", "Sun")
+_MONTHNAME = (None, # Dummy so we can use 1-based month numbers
"Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun",
- "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"]
+ "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec")
# The contents of the "HEX" grammar rule for HTTP, upper and lowercase A-F plus digits,
# in byte form for comparing to the network.
_HEX = string.hexdigits.encode('ascii')
+# The characters allowed in "token" rules.
+
+# token = 1*tchar
+# tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*"
+# / "+" / "-" / "." / "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~"
+# / DIGIT / ALPHA
+# ; any VCHAR, except delimiters
+# ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-z
+_ALLOWED_TOKEN_CHARS = frozenset(
+ # Remember we have to be careful because bytestrings
+ # inexplicably iterate as integers, which are not equal to bytes.
+
+ # explicit chars then DIGIT
+ (c.encode('ascii') for c in "!#$%&'*+-.^_`|~0123456789")
+ # Then we add ALPHA
+) | {c.encode('ascii') for c in string.ascii_letters}
+assert b'A' in _ALLOWED_TOKEN_CHARS
+
+
# Errors
_ERRORS = {}
_INTERNAL_ERROR_STATUS = '500 Internal Server Error'
_INTERNAL_ERROR_BODY = b'Internal Server Error'
-_INTERNAL_ERROR_HEADERS = [('Content-Type', 'text/plain'),
- ('Connection', 'close'),
- ('Content-Length', str(len(_INTERNAL_ERROR_BODY)))]
+_INTERNAL_ERROR_HEADERS = (
+ ('Content-Type', 'text/plain'),
+ ('Connection', 'close'),
+ ('Content-Length', str(len(_INTERNAL_ERROR_BODY)))
+)
_ERRORS[500] = (_INTERNAL_ERROR_STATUS, _INTERNAL_ERROR_HEADERS, _INTERNAL_ERROR_BODY)
_BAD_REQUEST_STATUS = '400 Bad Request'
_BAD_REQUEST_BODY = ''
-_BAD_REQUEST_HEADERS = [('Content-Type', 'text/plain'),
- ('Connection', 'close'),
- ('Content-Length', str(len(_BAD_REQUEST_BODY)))]
+_BAD_REQUEST_HEADERS = (
+ ('Content-Type', 'text/plain'),
+ ('Connection', 'close'),
+ ('Content-Length', str(len(_BAD_REQUEST_BODY)))
+)
_ERRORS[400] = (_BAD_REQUEST_STATUS, _BAD_REQUEST_HEADERS, _BAD_REQUEST_BODY)
_REQUEST_TOO_LONG_RESPONSE = b"HTTP/1.1 414 Request URI Too Long\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-length: 0\r\n\r\n"
@@ -204,23 +239,32 @@ class Input(object):
# Read and return the next integer chunk length. If no
# chunk length can be read, raises _InvalidClientInput.
- # Here's the production for a chunk:
- # (http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec3.html)
- # chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-extension ] CRLF
- # chunk-data CRLF
- # chunk-size = 1*HEX
- # chunk-extension= *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
- # chunk-ext-name = token
- # chunk-ext-val = token | quoted-string
-
- # To cope with malicious or broken clients that fail to send valid
- # chunk lines, the strategy is to read character by character until we either reach
- # a ; or newline. If at any time we read a non-HEX digit, we bail. If we hit a
- # ;, indicating an chunk-extension, we'll read up to the next
- # MAX_REQUEST_LINE characters
- # looking for the CRLF, and if we don't find it, we bail. If we read more than 16 hex characters,
- # (the number needed to represent a 64-bit chunk size), we bail (this protects us from
- # a client that sends an infinite stream of `F`, for example).
+ # Here's the production for a chunk (actually the whole body):
+ # (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7230#section-4.1)
+
+ # chunked-body = *chunk
+ # last-chunk
+ # trailer-part
+ # CRLF
+ #
+ # chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
+ # chunk-data CRLF
+ # chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG
+ # last-chunk = 1*("0") [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
+ # trailer-part = *( header-field CRLF )
+ # chunk-data = 1*OCTET ; a sequence of chunk-size octets
+
+ # To cope with malicious or broken clients that fail to send
+ # valid chunk lines, the strategy is to read character by
+ # character until we either reach a ; or newline. If at any
+ # time we read a non-HEX digit, we bail. If we hit a ;,
+ # indicating an chunk-extension, we'll read up to the next
+ # MAX_REQUEST_LINE characters ("A server ought to limit the
+ # total length of chunk extensions received") looking for the
+ # CRLF, and if we don't find it, we bail. If we read more than
+ # 16 hex characters, (the number needed to represent a 64-bit
+ # chunk size), we bail (this protects us from a client that
+ # sends an infinite stream of `F`, for example).
buf = BytesIO()
while 1:
@@ -228,16 +272,20 @@ class Input(object):
if not char:
self._chunked_input_error = True
raise _InvalidClientInput("EOF before chunk end reached")
- if char == b'\r':
- break
- if char == b';':
+
+ if char in (
+ b'\r', # Beginning EOL
+ b';', # Beginning extension
+ ):
break
- if char not in _HEX:
+ if char not in _HEX: # Invalid data.
self._chunked_input_error = True
raise _InvalidClientInput("Non-hex data", char)
+
buf.write(char)
- if buf.tell() > 16:
+
+ if buf.tell() > 16: # Too many hex bytes
self._chunked_input_error = True
raise _InvalidClientInput("Chunk-size too large.")
@@ -257,11 +305,72 @@ class Input(object):
if char == b'\r':
# We either got here from the main loop or from the
# end of an extension
+ self.__read_chunk_size_crlf(rfile, newline_only=True)
+ result = int(buf.getvalue(), 16)
+ if result == 0:
+ # The only time a chunk size of zero is allowed is the final
+ # chunk. It is either followed by another \r\n, or some trailers
+ # which are then followed by \r\n.
+ while self.__read_chunk_trailer(rfile):
+ pass
+ return result
+
+ # Trailers have the following production (they are a header-field followed by CRLF)
+ # See above for the definition of "token".
+ #
+ # header-field = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
+ # field-name = token
+ # field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )
+ # field-content = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
+ # field-vchar = VCHAR / obs-text
+ # obs-fold = CRLF 1*( SP / HTAB )
+ # ; obsolete line folding
+ # ; see Section 3.2.4
+
+
+ def __read_chunk_trailer(self, rfile, ):
+ # With rfile positioned just after a \r\n, read a trailer line.
+ # Return a true value if a non-empty trailer was read, and
+ # return false if an empty trailer was read (meaning the trailers are
+ # done).
+ # If a single line exceeds the MAX_REQUEST_LINE, raise an exception.
+ # If the field-name portion contains invalid characters, raise an exception.
+
+ i = 0
+ empty = True
+ seen_field_name = False
+ while i < MAX_REQUEST_LINE:
+ char = rfile.read(1)
+ if char == b'\r':
+ # Either read the next \n or raise an error.
+ self.__read_chunk_size_crlf(rfile, newline_only=True)
+ break
+ # Not a \r, so we are NOT an empty chunk.
+ empty = False
+ if char == b':' and i > 0:
+ # We're ending the field-name part; stop validating characters.
+ # Unless : was the first character...
+ seen_field_name = True
+ if not seen_field_name and char not in _ALLOWED_TOKEN_CHARS:
+ raise _InvalidClientInput('Invalid token character: %r' % (char,))
+ i += 1
+ else:
+ # We read too much
+ self._chunked_input_error = True
+ raise _InvalidClientInput("Too large chunk trailer")
+ return not empty
+
+ def __read_chunk_size_crlf(self, rfile, newline_only=False):
+ # Also for safety, correctly verify that we get \r\n when expected.
+ if not newline_only:
char = rfile.read(1)
- if char != b'\n':
+ if char != b'\r':
self._chunked_input_error = True
- raise _InvalidClientInput("Line didn't end in CRLF")
- return int(buf.getvalue(), 16)
+ raise _InvalidClientInput("Line didn't end in CRLF: %r" % (char,))
+ char = rfile.read(1)
+ if char != b'\n':
+ self._chunked_input_error = True
+ raise _InvalidClientInput("Line didn't end in LF: %r" % (char,))
def _chunked_read(self, length=None, use_readline=False):
# pylint:disable=too-many-branches
@@ -294,7 +403,7 @@ class Input(object):
self.position += datalen
if self.chunk_length == self.position:
- rfile.readline()
+ self.__read_chunk_size_crlf(rfile)
if length is not None:
length -= datalen
@@ -307,9 +416,9 @@ class Input(object):
# determine the next size to read
self.chunk_length = self.__read_chunk_length(rfile)
self.position = 0
- if self.chunk_length == 0:
- # Last chunk. Terminates with a CRLF.
- rfile.readline()
+ # If chunk_length was 0, we already read any trailers and
+ # validated that we have ended with \r\n\r\n.
+
return b''.join(response)
def read(self, length=None):
@@ -532,7 +641,8 @@ class WSGIHandler(object):
elif len(words) == 2:
self.command, self.path = words
if self.command != "GET":
- raise _InvalidClientRequest('Expected GET method: %r' % (raw_requestline,))
+ raise _InvalidClientRequest('Expected GET method; Got command=%r; path=%r; raw=%r' % (
+ self.command, self.path, raw_requestline,))
self.request_version = "HTTP/0.9"
# QQQ I'm pretty sure we can drop support for HTTP/0.9
else:
@@ -1000,14 +1110,28 @@ class WSGIHandler(object):
finally:
try:
self.wsgi_input._discard()
- except (socket.error, IOError):
- # Don't let exceptions during discarding
+ except _InvalidClientInput:
+ # This one is deliberately raised to the outer
+ # scope, because, with the incoming stream in some bad state,
+ # we can't be sure we can synchronize and properly parse the next
+ # request.
+ raise
+ except socket.error
+ # Don't let socket exceptions during discarding
# input override any exception that may have been
# raised by the application, such as our own _InvalidClientInput.
# In the general case, these aren't even worth logging (see the comment
# just below)
pass
- except _InvalidClientInput:
+ except _InvalidClientInput as ex:
+ # DO log this one because:
+ # - Some of the data may have been read and acted on by the
+ # application;
+ # - The response may or may not have been sent;
+ # - It's likely that the client is bad, or malicious, and
+ # users might wish to take steps to block the client.
+ self._handle_client_error(ex)
+ self.close_connection = True
self._send_error_response_if_possible(400)
except socket.error as ex:
if ex.args[0] in self.ignored_socket_errors:
@@ -1054,17 +1178,22 @@ class WSGIHandler(object):
def _handle_client_error(self, ex):
# Called for invalid client input
# Returns the appropriate error response.
- if not isinstance(ex, ValueError):
+ if not isinstance(ex, (ValueError, _InvalidClientInput)):
# XXX: Why not self._log_error to send it through the loop's
# handle_error method?
+ # _InvalidClientRequest is a ValueError; _InvalidClientInput is an IOError.
traceback.print_exc()
if isinstance(ex, _InvalidClientRequest):
# No formatting needed, that's already been handled. In fact, because the
# formatted message contains user input, it might have a % in it, and attempting
# to format that with no arguments would be an error.
- self.log_error(ex.formatted_message)
+ # However, the error messages do not include the requesting IP
+ # necessarily, so we do add that.
+ self.log_error('(from %s) %s', self.client_address, ex.formatted_message)
else:
- self.log_error('Invalid request: %s', str(ex) or ex.__class__.__name__)
+ self.log_error('Invalid request (from %s): %s',
+ self.client_address,
+ str(ex) or ex.__class__.__name__)
return ('400', _BAD_REQUEST_RESPONSE)
def _headers(self):
diff --git a/src/gevent/subprocess.py b/src/gevent/subprocess.py
index 38c9bd3..8a8ccad 100644
--- a/src/gevent/subprocess.py
+++ b/src/gevent/subprocess.py
@@ -352,10 +352,11 @@ def check_output(*popenargs, **kwargs):
To capture standard error in the result, use ``stderr=STDOUT``::
- >>> print(check_output(["/bin/sh", "-c",
+ >>> output = check_output(["/bin/sh", "-c",
... "ls -l non_existent_file ; exit 0"],
- ... stderr=STDOUT).decode('ascii').strip())
- ls: non_existent_file: No such file or directory
+ ... stderr=STDOUT).decode('ascii').strip()
+ >>> print(output.rsplit(':', 1)[1].strip())
+ No such file or directory
There is an additional optional argument, "input", allowing you to
pass a string to the subprocess's stdin. If you use this argument
diff --git a/src/gevent/testing/testcase.py b/src/gevent/testing/testcase.py
index cd5db80..aa86dcf 100644
--- a/src/gevent/testing/testcase.py
+++ b/src/gevent/testing/testcase.py
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ class TestCaseMetaClass(type):
classDict.pop(key)
# XXX: When did we stop doing this?
#value = wrap_switch_count_check(value)
- value = _wrap_timeout(timeout, value)
+ #value = _wrap_timeout(timeout, value)
error_fatal = getattr(value, 'error_fatal', error_fatal)
if error_fatal:
value = errorhandler.wrap_error_fatal(value)
diff --git a/src/gevent/tests/test__pywsgi.py b/src/gevent/tests/test__pywsgi.py
index d2125a8..d46030b 100644
--- a/src/gevent/tests/test__pywsgi.py
+++ b/src/gevent/tests/test__pywsgi.py
@@ -25,21 +25,11 @@ from gevent import monkey
monkey.patch_all()
from contextlib import contextmanager
-try:
- from urllib.parse import parse_qs
-except ImportError:
- # Python 2
- from urlparse import parse_qs
+from urllib.parse import parse_qs
import os
import sys
-try:
- # On Python 2, we want the C-optimized version if
- # available; it has different corner-case behaviour than
- # the Python implementation, and it used by socket.makefile
- # by default.
- from cStringIO import StringIO
-except ImportError:
- from io import BytesIO as StringIO
+from io import BytesIO as StringIO
+
import weakref
import unittest
from wsgiref.validate import validator
@@ -156,6 +146,10 @@ class Response(object):
@classmethod
def read(cls, fd, code=200, reason='default', version='1.1',
body=None, chunks=None, content_length=None):
+ """
+ Read an HTTP response, optionally perform assertions,
+ and return the Response object.
+ """
# pylint:disable=too-many-branches
_status_line, headers = read_headers(fd)
self = cls(_status_line, headers)
@@ -716,7 +710,14 @@ class TestNegativeReadline(TestCase):
class TestChunkedPost(TestCase):
+ calls = 0
+
+ def setUp(self):
+ super().setUp()
+ self.calls = 0
+
def application(self, env, start_response):
+ self.calls += 1
self.assertTrue(env.get('wsgi.input_terminated'))
start_response('200 OK', [('Content-Type', 'text/plain')])
if env['PATH_INFO'] == '/a':
@@ -730,6 +731,8 @@ class TestChunkedPost(TestCase):
if env['PATH_INFO'] == '/c':
return list(iter(lambda: env['wsgi.input'].read(1), b''))
+ return [b'We should not get here', env['PATH_INFO'].encode('ascii')]
+
def test_014_chunked_post(self):
data = (b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\nConnection: close\r\n'
b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n'
@@ -797,6 +800,170 @@ class TestChunkedPost(TestCase):
fd.write(data)
read_http(fd, code=400)
+ def test_trailers_keepalive_ignored(self):
+ # Trailers after a chunk are ignored.
+ data = (
+ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
+ b'Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
+ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
+ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
+ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk
+ # Normally the final CRLF would go here, but if you put in a
+ # trailer, it doesn't.
+ b'trailer1: value1\r\n'
+ b'trailer2: value2\r\n'
+ b'\r\n' # Really terminate the chunk.
+ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
+ b'Connection: close\r\n'
+ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
+ b'4\r\n bye\r\n'
+ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk
+ )
+ with self.makefile() as fd:
+ fd.write(data)
+ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
+ read_http(fd, body='oh bye')
+
+ self.assertEqual(self.calls, 2)
+
+ def test_trailers_too_long(self):
+ # Trailers after a chunk are ignored.
+ data = (
+ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
+ b'Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
+ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
+ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
+ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk
+ # Normally the final CRLF would go here, but if you put in a
+ # trailer, it doesn't.
+ b'trailer2: value2' # not lack of \r\n
+ )
+ data += b't' * pywsgi.MAX_REQUEST_LINE
+ # No termination, because we detect the trailer as being too
+ # long and abort the connection.
+ with self.makefile() as fd:
+ fd.write(data)
+ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
+ with self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed):
+ read_http(fd, body='oh bye')
+
+ def test_trailers_request_smuggling_missing_last_chunk_keep_alive(self):
+ # When something that looks like a request line comes in the trailer
+ # as the first line, immediately after an invalid last chunk.
+ # We detect this and abort the connection, because the
+ # whitespace in the GET line isn't a legal part of a trailer.
+ # If we didn't abort the connection, then, because we specified
+ # keep-alive, the server would be hanging around waiting for more input.
+ data = (
+ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
+ b'Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
+ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
+ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
+ b'0' # last-chunk, but missing the \r\n
+ # Normally the final CRLF would go here, but if you put in a
+ # trailer, it doesn't.
+ # b'\r\n'
+ b'GET /path2?a=:123 HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: a.com\r\n'
+ b'Connection: close\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ )
+ with self.makefile() as fd:
+ fd.write(data)
+ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
+ with self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed):
+ read_http(fd)
+
+ self.assertEqual(self.calls, 1)
+
+ def test_trailers_request_smuggling_missing_last_chunk_close(self):
+ # Same as the above, except the trailers are actually valid
+ # and since we ask to close the connection we don't get stuck
+ # waiting for more input.
+ data = (
+ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
+ b'Connection: close\r\n'
+ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
+ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
+ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk
+ # Normally the final CRLF would go here, but if you put in a
+ # trailer, it doesn't.
+ # b'\r\n'
+ b'GETpath2a:123 HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: a.com\r\n'
+ b'Connection: close\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ )
+ with self.makefile() as fd:
+ fd.write(data)
+ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
+ with self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed):
+ read_http(fd)
+
+ def test_trailers_request_smuggling_header_first(self):
+ # When something that looks like a header comes in the first line.
+ data = (
+ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
+ b'Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
+ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
+ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
+ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk, but only one CRLF
+ b'Header: value\r\n'
+ b'GET /path2?a=:123 HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: a.com\r\n'
+ b'Connection: close\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ )
+ with self.makefile() as fd:
+ fd.write(data)
+ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
+ with self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed):
+ read_http(fd, code=400)
+
+ self.assertEqual(self.calls, 1)
+
+ def test_trailers_request_smuggling_request_terminates_then_header(self):
+ data = (
+ b'POST /a HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: localhost\r\n'
+ b'Connection: keep-alive\r\n'
+ b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ b'2\r\noh\r\n'
+ b'4\r\n hai\r\n'
+ b'0\r\n' # last-chunk
+ b'\r\n'
+ b'Header: value'
+ b'GET /path2?a=:123 HTTP/1.1\r\n'
+ b'Host: a.com\r\n'
+ b'Connection: close\r\n'
+ b'\r\n'
+ )
+ with self.makefile() as fd:
+ fd.write(data)
+ read_http(fd, body='oh hai')
+ read_http(fd, code=400)
+
+ self.assertEqual(self.calls, 1)
+
class TestUseWrite(TestCase):
--
2.40.0
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