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meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-connectivity/wolfssl/files/CVE-2026-6291.patch
T
Ankur Tyagi 91aa2a8e57 wolfssl: patch CVE-2026-6291 
Details:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-6291

Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@oss.qualcomm.com>
2026-09-15 10:13:40 +05:30

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From 3aab2df7436240515c608971ca9b899c37f93f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sean Parkinson <sean@wolfssl.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2026 10:13:43 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #10203 from Frauschi/pkcs7_fixes
PKCS#7 fixes
(cherry picked from commit 936f8e54230b11dee50e82bcc5a2247ea9d9c91c)
CVE: CVE-2026-6291
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/commit/936f8e54230b11dee50e82bcc5a2247ea9d9c91c]
Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com>
---
.wolfssl_known_macro_extras | 1 +
src/ssl_p7p12.c | 28 +-
tests/api.c | 707 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/api/test_ossl_p7p12.c | 454 +++++++++++++++++++++
tests/api/test_ossl_p7p12.h | 4 +
tests/api/test_pkcs7.c | 356 +++++++++++++++--
tests/api/test_pkcs7.h | 25 +-
wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c | 633 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_encrypt.h | 3 +
9 files changed, 2154 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.wolfssl_known_macro_extras b/.wolfssl_known_macro_extras
index ba5e47ef6..3e411ca86 100644
--- a/.wolfssl_known_macro_extras
+++ b/.wolfssl_known_macro_extras
@@ -825,6 +825,7 @@ WOLFSSL_NO_KCAPI_HMAC_SHA256
WOLFSSL_NO_KCAPI_HMAC_SHA384
WOLFSSL_NO_KCAPI_HMAC_SHA512
WOLFSSL_NO_KCAPI_SHA224
+WOLFSSL_NO_KTRI_ORACLE_WARNING
WOLFSSL_NO_OCSP_DATE_CHECK
WOLFSSL_NO_OCSP_ISSUER_CHAIN_CHECK
WOLFSSL_NO_OCSP_OPTIONAL_CERTS
diff --git a/src/ssl_p7p12.c b/src/ssl_p7p12.c
index ee48d700a..a07f018b2 100644
--- a/src/ssl_p7p12.c
+++ b/src/ssl_p7p12.c
@@ -269,24 +269,42 @@ WOLFSSL_STACK* wolfSSL_PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7* pkcs7, WOLFSSL_STACK* certs,
WOLFSSL_X509* x509 = NULL;
WOLFSSL_STACK* signers = NULL;
WOLFSSL_PKCS7* p7 = (WOLFSSL_PKCS7*)pkcs7;
+ byte* signerCert;
+ word32 signerCertSz;
if (p7 == NULL)
return NULL;
- /* Only PKCS#7 messages with a single cert that is the verifying certificate
- * is supported.
- */
if (flags & PKCS7_NOINTERN) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("PKCS7_NOINTERN flag not supported");
return NULL;
}
+ /* Prefer the certificate that actually verified the signature. Falling
+ * back to singleCert (cert[0]) would let an attacker that bundles a
+ * trusted cert ahead of their own attacker cert have the trusted cert
+ * reported as the signer even though it did not produce the signature.
+ *
+ * Copy the chosen pointer into a local before passing its address to
+ * wolfSSL_d2i_X509; d2i_X509 advances *in by the DER length, and if
+ * we handed it the address of the struct field directly it would
+ * permanently corrupt the field, producing a heap-OOB read on the
+ * next use (pointer advanced, singleCertSz unchanged). */
+ if (p7->pkcs7.verifyCert != NULL && p7->pkcs7.verifyCertSz > 0) {
+ signerCert = p7->pkcs7.verifyCert;
+ signerCertSz = p7->pkcs7.verifyCertSz;
+ }
+ else {
+ signerCert = p7->pkcs7.singleCert;
+ signerCertSz = p7->pkcs7.singleCertSz;
+ }
+
signers = wolfSSL_sk_X509_new_null();
if (signers == NULL)
return NULL;
- if (wolfSSL_d2i_X509(&x509, (const byte**)&p7->pkcs7.singleCert,
- p7->pkcs7.singleCertSz) == NULL) {
+ if (wolfSSL_d2i_X509(&x509, (const byte**)&signerCert,
+ signerCertSz) == NULL) {
wolfSSL_sk_X509_pop_free(signers, NULL);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/tests/api.c b/tests/api.c
index ad5f84573..78fcf13ce 100644
--- a/tests/api.c
+++ b/tests/api.c
@@ -34990,6 +34990,706 @@ static int test_pkcs7_ori_oversized_oid(void)
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}
+/* ORI callback that flags if oriValueSz looks like an underflow (>= 0x80000000) */
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC)
+static int test_ori_underflow_cb(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* oriType,
+ word32 oriTypeSz, byte* oriValue,
+ word32 oriValueSz, byte* decryptedKey,
+ word32* decryptedKeySz, void* ctx)
+{
+ int* called = (int*)ctx;
+ (void)pkcs7; (void)oriType; (void)oriTypeSz;
+ (void)oriValue; (void)decryptedKey; (void)decryptedKeySz;
+ if (called != NULL)
+ *called = (int)oriValueSz; /* record what we received */
+ return -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Test: PKCS#7 ORI must reject when OID consumption exceeds the [4] implicit
+ * SEQUENCE length (integer underflow in oriValueSz computation).
+ *
+ * With implicit tagging, [4] CONSTRUCTED replaces the SEQUENCE tag, so
+ * wc_PKCS7_DecryptOri reads seqSz directly from the [4] length field.
+ * We set [4] length = 5 while the OID inside consumes 22 bytes
+ * (tag + length + 20 content), triggering oriValueSz = 5 - 22 = underflow.
+ *
+ * The buffer includes a dummy EncryptedContentInfo after the RecipientInfos
+ * so the total message is large enough for the PKCS7 streaming code (which
+ * requests the full remaining message before parsing the ORI). */
+static int test_pkcs7_ori_seqsz_underflow(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC)
+ wc_PKCS7* p7 = NULL;
+ byte out[256];
+ int cbCalled = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Byte layout (all outer lengths match actual byte counts on wire):
+ *
+ * OID inside [4]: 06 14 <20 bytes> = 22 bytes
+ * [4] (declared len 5, actual content 22):
+ * a4 05 <22 bytes> = 24 bytes on wire
+ * SET: 31 18 <24 bytes> = 26 bytes on wire
+ * version: 02 01 00 = 3 bytes
+ * EncryptedContentInfo (filler, never parsed):
+ * 30 0b { 06 09 <9 bytes OID> } = 13 bytes on wire
+ * EnvelopedData: 30 2a <3+26+13=42 bytes> = 44 bytes on wire
+ * [0] EXPLICIT: a0 2c <44 bytes> = 46 bytes on wire
+ * OID(envelopedData): 06 09 <9 bytes> = 11 bytes on wire
+ * ContentInfo: 30 39 <11+46=57 bytes> = 59 bytes total
+ */
+ static const byte poc[] = {
+ /* ContentInfo SEQUENCE (length 57) */
+ 0x30, 0x39,
+ /* contentType = envelopedData 1.2.840.113549.1.7.3 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
+ /* [0] EXPLICIT (length 44) */
+ 0xa0, 0x2c,
+ /* EnvelopedData SEQUENCE (length 42) */
+ 0x30, 0x2a,
+ /* version = 0 */
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,
+ /* RecipientInfos SET (length 24) */
+ 0x31, 0x18,
+ /* [4] CONSTRUCTED = ORI implicit SEQUENCE, declared len 5 */
+ /* Actual OID is 22 bytes -> exceeds declared 5 */
+ 0xa4, 0x05,
+ /* OID: tag=06, len=0x14(20), content=20 bytes = 22 total */
+ 0x06, 0x14,
+ 0x2a, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09,
+ 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11,
+ 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15,
+ /* EncryptedContentInfo SEQUENCE (length 11) - filler so
+ * streaming has enough data; never actually parsed because
+ * DecryptOri fails before we get here */
+ 0x30, 0x0b,
+ /* contentType = data 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07,
+ 0x01
+ };
+
+ p7 = wc_PKCS7_New(NULL, INVALID_DEVID);
+ ExpectNotNull(p7);
+ if (p7 != NULL) {
+ wc_PKCS7_SetOriDecryptCb(p7, test_ori_underflow_cb);
+ wc_PKCS7_SetOriDecryptCtx(p7, &cbCalled);
+
+ /* Must return an error before the callback sees an underflowed size */
+ ExpectIntLT(wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(p7, (byte*)poc, sizeof(poc),
+ out, sizeof(out)), 0);
+
+ /* The callback must NOT have been invoked with a wrapped oriValueSz.
+ * cbCalled == 0 means the callback was never reached (ideal).
+ * cbCalled < 0 would indicate the underflow was passed through. */
+ ExpectIntGE(cbCalled, 0);
+
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(p7);
+ }
+#endif
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
+/* Test: PKCS#7 ORI must reject when seqSz extends oriValue past input buffer.
+ *
+ * The first ORI bounds check (OID exceeds SEQUENCE boundary) is covered by
+ * test_pkcs7_ori_seqsz_underflow. This test covers the *second* check:
+ * oriValue region extends past the end of the input buffer. We craft a
+ * message where the [4] SEQUENCE length is valid relative to the OID
+ * (OID fits inside it), but the remaining oriValue portion extends past
+ * the end of the actual input buffer.
+ *
+ * To bypass GetLength's own bounds validation, we set the outer lengths
+ * (EnvelopedData SEQUENCE, RecipientInfos SET) to match the [4] claim,
+ * but truncate the actual buffer we pass to DecodeEnvelopedData. */
+static int test_pkcs7_ori_orivalue_overflow(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC)
+ wc_PKCS7* p7 = NULL;
+ byte out[256];
+
+ /* EnvelopedData with [4] ORI whose seqSz (40) is valid for the OID
+ * (6 bytes consumed) but oriValueSz (34) extends past the truncated
+ * input buffer.
+ *
+ * Layout:
+ * ContentInfo SEQUENCE
+ * OID envelopedData
+ * [0] EXPLICIT
+ * EnvelopedData SEQUENCE
+ * version = 0
+ * RecipientInfos SET
+ * [4] CONSTRUCTED (seqSz = 40)
+ * OID (tag 06, len 04, 4 content bytes = 6 total)
+ * oriValue should be 34 bytes but input is truncated
+ * EncryptedContentInfo (filler for streaming)
+ *
+ * We pass the full array to DecodeEnvelopedData, but the actual
+ * input ends before [4]'s declared 40 bytes are consumed.
+ */
+ static const byte poc[] = {
+ /* ContentInfo SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x43,
+ /* contentType = envelopedData 1.2.840.113549.1.7.3 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
+ /* [0] EXPLICIT */
+ 0xa0, 0x36,
+ /* EnvelopedData SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x34,
+ /* version = 0 */
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,
+ /* RecipientInfos SET (len = 44 covers [4] tag+len+40) */
+ 0x31, 0x2c,
+ /* [4] CONSTRUCTED = ORI implicit SEQUENCE, seqSz = 40 */
+ 0xa4, 0x28,
+ /* OID: tag=06, len=04, 4 content bytes = 6 total */
+ 0x06, 0x04, 0x2a, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05,
+ /* Only 4 bytes of oriValue here, but seqSz claims 34 more */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ /* EncryptedContentInfo SEQUENCE (filler) */
+ 0x30, 0x0b,
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07,
+ 0x01
+ };
+
+ p7 = wc_PKCS7_New(NULL, INVALID_DEVID);
+ ExpectNotNull(p7);
+ if (p7 != NULL) {
+ wc_PKCS7_SetOriDecryptCb(p7, test_dummy_ori_cb);
+
+ /* Must return error - oriValue extends past input buffer */
+ ExpectIntLT(wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(p7, (byte*)poc, sizeof(poc),
+ out, sizeof(out)), 0);
+
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(p7);
+ }
+#endif
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
+/* Test: PKCS#7 KTRI must not match recipient when SKID length differs
+ * from expected keyIdSize.
+ *
+ * The fix adds a `length == keyIdSize` check before comparing the SKID
+ * bytes. Without this check, XMEMCMP could compare against data beyond
+ * the SKID content. This test crafts a KTRI RecipientInfo where the
+ * [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier has length 5 instead of KEYID_SIZE (20).
+ * The decode must return an error (no matching recipient). */
+static int test_pkcs7_ktri_skid_length_mismatch(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC)
+ wc_PKCS7* p7 = NULL;
+ byte out[256];
+
+ /* Minimal EnvelopedData with KTRI using version=2 (SKID path).
+ * The SKID [0] has length 5 instead of 20.
+ *
+ * ContentInfo SEQUENCE
+ * OID envelopedData
+ * [0] EXPLICIT
+ * EnvelopedData SEQUENCE
+ * version = 2
+ * RecipientInfos SET
+ * KTRI SEQUENCE
+ * version = 2
+ * [0] SKID (5 bytes, should be 20)
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier (RSA OID)
+ * OCTET STRING (fake encrypted key)
+ * EncryptedContentInfo (filler)
+ */
+ static const byte poc[] = {
+ /* ContentInfo SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x46,
+ /* contentType = envelopedData 1.2.840.113549.1.7.3 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
+ /* [0] EXPLICIT */
+ 0xa0, 0x39,
+ /* EnvelopedData SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x37,
+ /* version = 2 (triggers SKID-based recipient identification) */
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
+ /* RecipientInfos SET */
+ 0x31, 0x21,
+ /* KTRI SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x1f,
+ /* version = 2 (SKID) */
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
+ /* [0] IMPLICIT SubjectKeyIdentifier, length = 5 (wrong!) */
+ 0x80, 0x05, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05,
+ /* AlgorithmIdentifier: RSA 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 */
+ 0x30, 0x0d,
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL params */
+ /* encryptedKey OCTET STRING (2 bytes fake) */
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0xAA, 0xBB,
+ /* EncryptedContentInfo SEQUENCE (filler) */
+ 0x30, 0x0b,
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07,
+ 0x01
+ };
+
+ p7 = wc_PKCS7_New(NULL, INVALID_DEVID);
+ ExpectNotNull(p7);
+ if (p7 != NULL) {
+ /* Decode without a cert - SKID will never match, and the
+ * mismatched SKID length must not cause out-of-bounds reads */
+ ExpectIntLT(wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(p7, (byte*)poc, sizeof(poc),
+ out, sizeof(out)), 0);
+
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(p7);
+ }
+#endif
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
+/* Test: PKCS#7 KARI must reject BIT STRING with length < 2 in
+ * OriginatorPublicKey.
+ *
+ * The fix adds `if (length < 2) return ASN_PARSE_E` after parsing
+ * the BIT STRING tag and length. A BIT STRING must have at least
+ * the unused-bits byte plus one byte of content. This test crafts
+ * a KARI [1] RecipientInfo where the OriginatorPublicKey's BIT STRING
+ * has length 1 (degenerate). The PKCS7 object is initialized with a
+ * real ECC cert so that KariParseRecipCert succeeds and parsing reaches
+ * the BIT STRING validation. */
+static int test_pkcs7_kari_degenerate_bitstring(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && defined(HAVE_ECC) && defined(HAVE_X963_KDF) && \
+ !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC)
+ wc_PKCS7* p7 = NULL;
+ byte out[256];
+ byte* eccCert = NULL;
+ byte* eccPrivKey = NULL;
+ word32 eccCertSz = 0;
+ word32 eccPrivKeySz = 0;
+#if !defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_256) && !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM)
+ XFILE f = XBADFILE;
+#endif
+
+ /* Minimal EnvelopedData with KARI [1] containing a degenerate
+ * BIT STRING (length 1) in OriginatorPublicKey.
+ *
+ * ContentInfo SEQUENCE
+ * OID envelopedData
+ * [0] EXPLICIT
+ * EnvelopedData SEQUENCE
+ * version = 2
+ * RecipientInfos SET
+ * [1] CONSTRUCTED (KARI)
+ * version = 3
+ * [0] CONSTRUCTED (OriginatorIdentifierOrKey)
+ * [1] CONSTRUCTED (OriginatorPublicKey)
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier (ECDSAk)
+ * BIT STRING length=1 (degenerate!)
+ * EncryptedContentInfo (filler)
+ */
+ static const byte poc[] = {
+ /* ContentInfo SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x44,
+ /* contentType = envelopedData 1.2.840.113549.1.7.3 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
+ /* [0] EXPLICIT */
+ 0xa0, 0x37,
+ /* EnvelopedData SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x35,
+ /* version = 2 */
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
+ /* RecipientInfos SET */
+ 0x31, 0x1f,
+ /* [1] CONSTRUCTED (KARI implicit) */
+ 0xa1, 0x1d,
+ /* version = 3 */
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x03,
+ /* [0] CONSTRUCTED (OriginatorIdentifierOrKey) */
+ 0xa0, 0x18,
+ /* [1] CONSTRUCTED (OriginatorPublicKey) */
+ 0xa1, 0x16,
+ /* AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x13,
+ /* OID: id-ecPublicKey 1.2.840.10045.2.1 */
+ 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01,
+ /* OID: prime256v1 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 */
+ 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03,
+ 0x01, 0x07,
+ /* BIT STRING with length 1 - degenerate! */
+ 0x03, 0x01, 0x00,
+ /* EncryptedContentInfo SEQUENCE (filler) */
+ 0x30, 0x0b,
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07,
+ 0x01
+ };
+
+ /* Load ECC cert and key so KariParseRecipCert succeeds and
+ * parsing reaches the BIT STRING check */
+#ifdef USE_CERT_BUFFERS_256
+ eccCertSz = (word32)sizeof_cliecc_cert_der_256;
+ ExpectNotNull(eccCert = (byte*)XMALLOC(eccCertSz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ if (eccCert != NULL)
+ XMEMCPY(eccCert, cliecc_cert_der_256, eccCertSz);
+ eccPrivKeySz = (word32)sizeof_ecc_clikey_der_256;
+ ExpectNotNull(eccPrivKey = (byte*)XMALLOC(eccPrivKeySz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ if (eccPrivKey != NULL)
+ XMEMCPY(eccPrivKey, ecc_clikey_der_256, eccPrivKeySz);
+#elif !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM)
+ eccCertSz = FOURK_BUF;
+ ExpectNotNull(eccCert = (byte*)XMALLOC(eccCertSz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ ExpectTrue((f = XFOPEN("./certs/client-ecc-cert.der", "rb")) != XBADFILE);
+ ExpectTrue((eccCertSz = (word32)XFREAD(eccCert, 1, eccCertSz, f)) > 0);
+ if (f != XBADFILE) {
+ XFCLOSE(f);
+ f = XBADFILE;
+ }
+ eccPrivKeySz = FOURK_BUF;
+ ExpectNotNull(eccPrivKey = (byte*)XMALLOC(eccPrivKeySz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ ExpectTrue((f = XFOPEN("./certs/ecc-client-key.der", "rb")) != XBADFILE);
+ ExpectTrue((eccPrivKeySz = (word32)XFREAD(eccPrivKey, 1, eccPrivKeySz,
+ f)) > 0);
+ if (f != XBADFILE)
+ XFCLOSE(f);
+#else
+ eccCert = NULL;
+ eccCertSz = 0;
+ eccPrivKey = NULL;
+ eccPrivKeySz = 0;
+#endif
+
+ p7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID);
+ ExpectNotNull(p7);
+ if (p7 != NULL && eccCert != NULL) {
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(p7, eccCert, eccCertSz), 0);
+ if (p7 != NULL) {
+ p7->privateKey = eccPrivKey;
+ p7->privateKeySz = eccPrivKeySz;
+ }
+
+ /* Must return error - BIT STRING length < 2 is invalid */
+ ExpectIntLT(wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(p7, (byte*)poc, sizeof(poc),
+ out, sizeof(out)), 0);
+
+ if (p7 != NULL) {
+ p7->privateKey = NULL;
+ p7->privateKeySz = 0;
+ }
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(p7);
+ }
+ else if (p7 != NULL) {
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(p7);
+ }
+
+ XFREE(eccCert, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ XFREE(eccPrivKey, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+#endif
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
+/* Test: PKCS#7 EncryptedData must reject when encryptedContentSz exceeds
+ * the remaining input buffer.
+ *
+ * The fix adds `encryptedContentSz > (int)(pkiMsgSz - idx)` to the
+ * existing `encryptedContentSz <= 0` check in stage 6. This test crafts
+ * a minimal EncryptedData where the [0] IMPLICIT content length claims
+ * 0x200 (512) bytes but only 32 bytes of ciphertext are present. */
+static int test_pkcs7_encrypted_content_size_overflow(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(NO_AES) && defined(HAVE_AES_CBC) && \
+ defined(WOLFSSL_AES_256) && !defined(NO_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA) && \
+ !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC)
+ wc_PKCS7* p7 = NULL;
+ byte key[32];
+ byte out[256];
+
+ /* EncryptedData with [0] content claiming 512 bytes but only 32 present.
+ *
+ * ContentInfo SEQUENCE
+ * OID encryptedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.6)
+ * [0] EXPLICIT
+ * EncryptedData SEQUENCE
+ * version = 0
+ * EncryptedContentInfo SEQUENCE
+ * OID data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1)
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier
+ * OID AES-256-CBC (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42)
+ * OCTET STRING IV (16 zero bytes)
+ * [0] IMPLICIT content (claimed len=0x200, actual=32 bytes)
+ */
+ static const byte poc[] = {
+ /* ContentInfo SEQUENCE (len covers entire message) */
+ 0x30, 0x50,
+ /* OID encryptedData 1.2.840.113549.1.7.6 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06,
+ /* [0] EXPLICIT */
+ 0xa0, 0x43,
+ /* EncryptedData SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x41,
+ /* version = 0 */
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,
+ /* EncryptedContentInfo SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x3c,
+ /* OID data 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07,
+ 0x01,
+ /* AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x1d,
+ /* OID AES-256-CBC 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x01,
+ 0x2a,
+ /* IV: OCTET STRING (16 zero bytes) */
+ 0x04, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ /* [0] IMPLICIT encryptedContent - claims 512 bytes!
+ * Only 16 bytes of fake ciphertext follow. */
+ 0x80, 0x82, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA,
+ 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA
+ };
+
+ XMEMSET(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+
+ p7 = wc_PKCS7_New(NULL, INVALID_DEVID);
+ ExpectNotNull(p7);
+ if (p7 != NULL) {
+ p7->encryptionKey = key;
+ p7->encryptionKeySz = sizeof(key);
+
+ /* Must return error - content extends past input buffer */
+ ExpectIntLT(wc_PKCS7_DecodeEncryptedData(p7, (byte*)poc, sizeof(poc),
+ out, sizeof(out)), 0);
+
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(p7);
+ }
+#endif
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
+/* Test: PKCS#7 SignedData must reject when the signature field is not
+ * an OCTET STRING.
+ *
+ * The fix adds `else if (ret == 0) { ret = ASN_PARSE_E; }` so that
+ * when the tag at the signature position is not ASN_OCTET_STRING,
+ * parsing returns an error instead of silently continuing with no
+ * signature. This test encodes a valid SignedData, then corrupts
+ * the signature OCTET STRING tag and verifies that decode fails. */
+static int test_pkcs7_signed_bad_sig_tag(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(NO_SHA256) && \
+ !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC)
+ PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;
+ WC_RNG rng;
+ byte encoded[FOURK_BUF];
+ int encodedSz = 0;
+ int i;
+ byte* rsaCert = NULL;
+ byte* rsaPrivKey = NULL;
+ word32 rsaCertSz = 0;
+ word32 rsaPrivKeySz = 0;
+#if !defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_2048) && !defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_1024) && \
+ !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM)
+ XFILE f = XBADFILE;
+#endif
+
+ const byte data[] = "Test signed data";
+
+ XMEMSET(&rng, 0, sizeof(WC_RNG));
+
+ /* Load RSA cert and key */
+#if defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_2048)
+ rsaCertSz = (word32)sizeof_client_cert_der_2048;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaCert = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaCertSz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ if (rsaCert != NULL)
+ XMEMCPY(rsaCert, client_cert_der_2048, rsaCertSz);
+ rsaPrivKeySz = (word32)sizeof_client_key_der_2048;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaPrivKey = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaPrivKeySz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ if (rsaPrivKey != NULL)
+ XMEMCPY(rsaPrivKey, client_key_der_2048, rsaPrivKeySz);
+#elif defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_1024)
+ rsaCertSz = (word32)sizeof_client_cert_der_1024;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaCert = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaCertSz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ if (rsaCert != NULL)
+ XMEMCPY(rsaCert, client_cert_der_1024, rsaCertSz);
+ rsaPrivKeySz = (word32)sizeof_client_key_der_1024;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaPrivKey = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaPrivKeySz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ if (rsaPrivKey != NULL)
+ XMEMCPY(rsaPrivKey, client_key_der_1024, rsaPrivKeySz);
+#elif !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM)
+ rsaCertSz = FOURK_BUF;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaCert = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaCertSz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ ExpectTrue((f = XFOPEN("./certs/client-cert.der", "rb")) != XBADFILE);
+ ExpectTrue((rsaCertSz = (word32)XFREAD(rsaCert, 1, rsaCertSz, f)) > 0);
+ if (f != XBADFILE) { XFCLOSE(f); f = XBADFILE; }
+ rsaPrivKeySz = FOURK_BUF;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaPrivKey = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaPrivKeySz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ ExpectTrue((f = XFOPEN("./certs/client-key.der", "rb")) != XBADFILE);
+ ExpectTrue((rsaPrivKeySz = (word32)XFREAD(rsaPrivKey, 1,
+ rsaPrivKeySz, f)) > 0);
+ if (f != XBADFILE) XFCLOSE(f);
+#else
+ rsaCert = NULL; rsaCertSz = 0;
+ rsaPrivKey = NULL; rsaPrivKeySz = 0;
+#endif
+
+ if (rsaCert == NULL || rsaPrivKey == NULL) {
+ XFREE(rsaCert, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ XFREE(rsaPrivKey, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ return TEST_SKIPPED;
+ }
+
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_InitRng(&rng), 0);
+
+ /* Encode a valid SignedData */
+ ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, rsaCert, rsaCertSz), 0);
+ if (pkcs7 != NULL) {
+ pkcs7->content = (byte*)data;
+ pkcs7->contentSz = (word32)sizeof(data);
+ pkcs7->contentOID = DATA;
+ pkcs7->hashOID = SHA256h;
+ pkcs7->encryptOID = RSAk;
+ pkcs7->privateKey = rsaPrivKey;
+ pkcs7->privateKeySz = rsaPrivKeySz;
+ pkcs7->rng = &rng;
+ }
+
+ ExpectIntGT(encodedSz = wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData(pkcs7, encoded,
+ sizeof(encoded)), 0);
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
+ pkcs7 = NULL;
+
+ /* Find the signature OCTET STRING tag (0x04) near the end of the
+ * encoded message and corrupt it. The signature is the last large
+ * OCTET STRING in the SignerInfo. Search backwards for 0x04 followed
+ * by a length that looks like an RSA signature (>= 64 bytes).
+ * This heuristic depends on the signature being the last large
+ * OCTET STRING; the found==1 assertion below guards against
+ * silent false passes if encoding changes. */
+ if (EXPECT_SUCCESS()) {
+ int found = 0;
+ for (i = encodedSz - 10; i > 10; i--) {
+ if (encoded[i] == 0x04) {
+ int len = 0, lbytes = 0;
+ if (encoded[i+1] < 0x80) {
+ len = encoded[i+1]; lbytes = 1;
+ }
+ else if (encoded[i+1] == 0x81) {
+ len = encoded[i+2]; lbytes = 2;
+ }
+ else if (encoded[i+1] == 0x82) {
+ len = (encoded[i+2] << 8) | encoded[i+3]; lbytes = 3;
+ }
+ /* RSA signature is typically >= 128 bytes */
+ if (len >= 64 && i + 1 + lbytes + len <= encodedSz) {
+ /* Corrupt the OCTET STRING tag to INTEGER */
+ encoded[i] = 0x02; /* ASN_INTEGER instead of OCTET STRING */
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ExpectIntEQ(found, 1);
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the corrupted SignedData - must fail */
+ if (EXPECT_SUCCESS()) {
+ ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, NULL, 0), 0);
+ ExpectIntLT(wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData(pkcs7, encoded,
+ (word32)encodedSz), 0);
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
+ pkcs7 = NULL;
+ }
+
+ DoExpectIntEQ(wc_FreeRng(&rng), 0);
+ XFREE(rsaCert, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ XFREE(rsaPrivKey, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+#endif
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
+/* Test: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData must reject when encryptedContentTotalSz
+ * exceeds the remaining input buffer.
+ *
+ * The fix adds a bounds check under NO_PKCS7_STREAM, but the same
+ * crafted message should also be properly handled in streaming mode.
+ * This test crafts an EnvelopedData where the [0] content length
+ * claims 512 bytes but only minimal data follows. */
+static int test_pkcs7_enveloped_content_size_overflow(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC) && !defined(NO_RSA)
+ wc_PKCS7* p7 = NULL;
+ byte out[256];
+
+ /* EnvelopedData with KTRI where the EncryptedContentInfo [0] claims
+ * 512 bytes but only 16 are present.
+ *
+ * The outer structure is valid enough to reach the content parsing:
+ * ContentInfo -> EnvelopedData -> version=0 ->
+ * RecipientInfos (empty SET) -> EncryptedContentInfo ->
+ * contentType + AlgorithmIdentifier + [0] oversized content */
+ static const byte poc[] = {
+ /* ContentInfo SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x50,
+ /* OID envelopedData 1.2.840.113549.1.7.3 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
+ /* [0] EXPLICIT */
+ 0xa0, 0x43,
+ /* EnvelopedData SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x41,
+ /* version = 0 */
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,
+ /* RecipientInfos SET (empty - no recipients) */
+ 0x31, 0x00,
+ /* EncryptedContentInfo SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x3c,
+ /* OID data 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07,
+ 0x01,
+ /* AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE */
+ 0x30, 0x1d,
+ /* OID AES-256-CBC 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x01,
+ 0x2a,
+ /* IV: OCTET STRING (16 zero bytes) */
+ 0x04, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ /* [0] IMPLICIT encryptedContent - claims 512 bytes! */
+ 0x80, 0x82, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA,
+ 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA
+ };
+
+ p7 = wc_PKCS7_New(NULL, INVALID_DEVID);
+ ExpectNotNull(p7);
+ if (p7 != NULL) {
+ /* With an empty RecipientInfos SET, the function may fail at
+ * the recipient matching stage before reaching the content-size
+ * bounds check. The ExpectIntLT assertion ensures the
+ * oversized content does not cause a buffer over-read. */
+ ExpectIntLT(wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(p7, (byte*)poc, sizeof(poc),
+ out, sizeof(out)), 0);
+
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(p7);
+ }
+#endif
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
/* Dilithium verify_ctx_msg must reject absurdly large msgLen */
static int test_dilithium_hash(void)
{
@@ -35936,6 +36636,13 @@ TEST_CASE testCases[] = {
TEST_DECL(test_ed448_rejects_identity_key),
TEST_DECL(test_pkcs7_decode_encrypted_outputsz),
TEST_DECL(test_pkcs7_ori_oversized_oid),
+ TEST_DECL(test_pkcs7_ori_seqsz_underflow),
+ TEST_DECL(test_pkcs7_ori_orivalue_overflow),
+ TEST_DECL(test_pkcs7_ktri_skid_length_mismatch),
+ TEST_DECL(test_pkcs7_kari_degenerate_bitstring),
+ TEST_DECL(test_pkcs7_encrypted_content_size_overflow),
+ TEST_DECL(test_pkcs7_signed_bad_sig_tag),
+ TEST_DECL(test_pkcs7_enveloped_content_size_overflow),
TEST_DECL(test_pkcs7_padding),
#if defined(WOLFSSL_SNIFFER) && defined(WOLFSSL_SNIFFER_CHAIN_INPUT)
diff --git a/tests/api/test_ossl_p7p12.c b/tests/api/test_ossl_p7p12.c
index c92b80ee5..03590a3ad 100644
--- a/tests/api/test_ossl_p7p12.c
+++ b/tests/api/test_ossl_p7p12.c
@@ -446,6 +446,460 @@ int test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_sign(void)
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}
+/* Regression test for CMS SignedData signer-identity forgery.
+ *
+ * The embedded DER is a CMS SignedData message crafted so that the
+ * certificates SET contains two certificates:
+ * cert[0] = certs/ca-cert.pem (trusted wolfSSL CA; attacker does NOT hold
+ * its private key)
+ * cert[1] = a self-signed "attacker" P-256 certificate (attacker holds
+ * the private key)
+ * The signerInfo sid names the attacker certificate, and the signature
+ * was produced with the attacker's key over "Hello World".
+ *
+ * The bug that was present: wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() iterated all bundled
+ * certificates trying each public key against the signature. When the
+ * attacker's key verified, it still reported cert[0] (the trusted CA cert,
+ * via singleCert) as the signer, and chain validation therefore succeeded
+ * on an unrelated trusted cert - a full signer-identity forgery.
+ *
+ * The expected, correct behavior: the CMS message is rejected because the
+ * signer certificate named by the sid (the attacker cert) does not chain
+ * to any certificate in the trust store. */
+int test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify_signer_forgery(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_ALL) && defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(NO_BIO) && \
+ !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && !defined(NO_RSA) && defined(HAVE_ECC)
+ static const byte forgedSignedData[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x07, 0x9c, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
+ 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x82, 0x07, 0x8d, 0x30, 0x82, 0x07, 0x89, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x31, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01,
+ 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x30, 0x1b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x0c, 0x48, 0x65,
+ 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x20, 0x57, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x82,
+ 0x06, 0xab, 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xff, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0x03,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x14, 0x3f, 0x29, 0x11, 0x20, 0x57, 0x71, 0xe7,
+ 0x8e, 0xf9, 0x18, 0x0d, 0xca, 0x70, 0x4d, 0x5b, 0x15, 0x2a, 0x43, 0xd6,
+ 0x24, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06,
+ 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x07, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x61,
+ 0x6e, 0x61, 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x0c,
+ 0x07, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x53, 0x61, 0x77, 0x74, 0x6f,
+ 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0b,
+ 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67,
+ 0x31, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x0f, 0x77,
+ 0x77, 0x77, 0x2e, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x66, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x63,
+ 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
+ 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x10, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x40,
+ 0x77, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x66, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x30,
+ 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x35, 0x31, 0x31, 0x31, 0x33, 0x32, 0x30, 0x34,
+ 0x31, 0x31, 0x31, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x38, 0x30, 0x38, 0x30, 0x39,
+ 0x32, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x31, 0x31, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x81, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0b,
+ 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31,
+ 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x07, 0x4d, 0x6f,
+ 0x6e, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
+ 0x04, 0x07, 0x0c, 0x07, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x31,
+ 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x53, 0x61,
+ 0x77, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x55, 0x04, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x74,
+ 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x31, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03,
+ 0x0c, 0x0f, 0x77, 0x77, 0x77, 0x2e, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x66, 0x73, 0x73,
+ 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a,
+ 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x10, 0x69, 0x6e,
+ 0x66, 0x6f, 0x40, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x66, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x63,
+ 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86,
+ 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01,
+ 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xbf,
+ 0x0c, 0xca, 0x2d, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x1e, 0x84, 0x42, 0x5b, 0xcd, 0x38, 0x1f,
+ 0x4a, 0xf2, 0x4d, 0x75, 0x10, 0xf1, 0xb6, 0x35, 0x9f, 0xdf, 0xca, 0x7d,
+ 0x03, 0x98, 0xd3, 0xac, 0xde, 0x03, 0x66, 0xee, 0x2a, 0xf1, 0xd8, 0xb0,
+ 0x7d, 0x6e, 0x07, 0x54, 0x0b, 0x10, 0x98, 0x21, 0x4d, 0x80, 0xcb, 0x12,
+ 0x20, 0xe7, 0xcc, 0x4f, 0xde, 0x45, 0x7d, 0xc9, 0x72, 0x77, 0x32, 0xea,
+ 0xca, 0x90, 0xbb, 0x69, 0x52, 0x10, 0x03, 0x2f, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0x95, 0xc5,
+ 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x62, 0x56, 0x1b, 0xef, 0x67, 0x6f, 0xa4, 0x10, 0x41, 0x95,
+ 0xad, 0x0a, 0x9b, 0xe3, 0xa5, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xd2, 0x70, 0x76, 0x50, 0x30,
+ 0x5b, 0xa8, 0xe8, 0x08, 0x2c, 0x7c, 0xed, 0xa7, 0xa2, 0x7a, 0x8d, 0x38,
+ 0x29, 0x1c, 0xac, 0xc7, 0xed, 0xf2, 0x7c, 0x95, 0xb0, 0x95, 0x82, 0x7d,
+ 0x49, 0x5c, 0x38, 0xcd, 0x77, 0x25, 0xef, 0xbd, 0x80, 0x75, 0x53, 0x94,
+ 0x3c, 0x3d, 0xca, 0x63, 0x5b, 0x9f, 0x15, 0xb5, 0xd3, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x2f,
+ 0x19, 0xd1, 0x3c, 0xdb, 0x76, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0xb8, 0x7d, 0xc9, 0xe5, 0xc2,
+ 0xd7, 0xda, 0x40, 0x6f, 0xd8, 0x21, 0xdc, 0x73, 0x1b, 0x42, 0x2d, 0x53,
+ 0x9c, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0xfc, 0x7d, 0xab, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x3f, 0x98, 0xde, 0x84,
+ 0x7c, 0x05, 0x67, 0xce, 0x6a, 0x14, 0x38, 0x87, 0xa9, 0xf1, 0x8c, 0xb5,
+ 0x68, 0xcb, 0x68, 0x7f, 0x71, 0x20, 0x2b, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0x63, 0xf5, 0x56,
+ 0x2f, 0xa3, 0x26, 0xd2, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xb1, 0x5a, 0x17, 0xd7, 0x38, 0x99,
+ 0x08, 0xfe, 0x93, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xfe, 0xc3, 0x13, 0x49, 0x08, 0x16, 0x0b,
+ 0xa7, 0x4d, 0x67, 0x00, 0x52, 0x31, 0x67, 0x23, 0x4e, 0x98, 0xed, 0x51,
+ 0x45, 0x1d, 0xb9, 0x04, 0xd9, 0x0b, 0xec, 0xd8, 0x28, 0xb3, 0x4b, 0xbd,
+ 0xed, 0x36, 0x79, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x82, 0x01, 0x45,
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04,
+ 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x27, 0x8e, 0x67, 0x11, 0x74, 0xc3, 0x26, 0x1d, 0x3f,
+ 0xed, 0x33, 0x63, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0xd8, 0x1d, 0x30, 0xe5, 0xe8, 0xd5, 0x30,
+ 0x81, 0xd4, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x81, 0xcc, 0x30, 0x81,
+ 0xc9, 0x80, 0x14, 0x27, 0x8e, 0x67, 0x11, 0x74, 0xc3, 0x26, 0x1d, 0x3f,
+ 0xed, 0x33, 0x63, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0xd8, 0x1d, 0x30, 0xe5, 0xe8, 0xd5, 0xa1,
+ 0x81, 0x9a, 0xa4, 0x81, 0x97, 0x30, 0x81, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x10, 0x30,
+ 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x07, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74,
+ 0x61, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07,
+ 0x0c, 0x07, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30,
+ 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x53, 0x61, 0x77, 0x74,
+ 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04,
+ 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6e,
+ 0x67, 0x31, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x0f,
+ 0x77, 0x77, 0x77, 0x2e, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x66, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x2e,
+ 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x10, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x66, 0x6f,
+ 0x40, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x66, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d,
+ 0x82, 0x14, 0x3f, 0x29, 0x11, 0x20, 0x57, 0x71, 0xe7, 0x8e, 0xf9, 0x18,
+ 0x0d, 0xca, 0x70, 0x4d, 0x5b, 0x15, 0x2a, 0x43, 0xd6, 0x24, 0x30, 0x0c,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff,
+ 0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x11, 0x04, 0x15, 0x30, 0x13, 0x82,
+ 0x0b, 0x65, 0x78, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d,
+ 0x87, 0x04, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d,
+ 0x25, 0x04, 0x16, 0x30, 0x14, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05,
+ 0x07, 0x03, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x03,
+ 0x02, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0f, 0xae, 0x89,
+ 0xd5, 0x68, 0xe4, 0x41, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0xe0, 0xc5, 0x61, 0x06, 0x57, 0xff,
+ 0xa0, 0x92, 0x0f, 0xb2, 0xed, 0xd3, 0x99, 0x5b, 0x99, 0x5e, 0x32, 0x7e,
+ 0x97, 0xc7, 0xaf, 0x6c, 0xfe, 0x8c, 0xa6, 0xae, 0x32, 0xa1, 0x0d, 0xca,
+ 0xcd, 0xfc, 0x18, 0xe5, 0xd1, 0xf8, 0x20, 0x5b, 0x5a, 0x38, 0x81, 0x46,
+ 0x5b, 0x48, 0x87, 0xa5, 0x3f, 0x3b, 0x7b, 0xc7, 0xea, 0xf5, 0x35, 0x29,
+ 0x31, 0x15, 0x39, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x48, 0xe6, 0x01, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x5e, 0x7c,
+ 0x10, 0xf5, 0x16, 0xe3, 0x59, 0xaf, 0x44, 0xc8, 0xb5, 0x8d, 0xc1, 0x32,
+ 0x23, 0xb3, 0xb8, 0x12, 0x6e, 0x5c, 0x8d, 0xe6, 0xc2, 0xd2, 0x41, 0x03,
+ 0xeb, 0x17, 0x42, 0xe2, 0x7f, 0xbc, 0x00, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x31, 0xef, 0xc6,
+ 0x48, 0xee, 0xdb, 0xcc, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0x56, 0xf5, 0xd4, 0xca, 0x45, 0xa1,
+ 0x59, 0xb5, 0xe4, 0xd7, 0x60, 0x9c, 0x57, 0xe0, 0xa7, 0x5a, 0xf2, 0x35,
+ 0x1e, 0xa0, 0x22, 0xdb, 0x5e, 0x1c, 0x0c, 0x61, 0xbd, 0xa1, 0xc5, 0x7b,
+ 0x9f, 0x69, 0xf2, 0xd5, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xbc, 0x52, 0xb9, 0x1d, 0x9c, 0x2c,
+ 0xda, 0xb6, 0x73, 0x75, 0x4a, 0x84, 0xe5, 0x94, 0xb8, 0x19, 0x4d, 0xdd,
+ 0x70, 0xbd, 0x7f, 0x4c, 0xb9, 0x17, 0x6a, 0x58, 0x16, 0x89, 0x22, 0x44,
+ 0x37, 0x57, 0x55, 0x26, 0x42, 0xe3, 0xb7, 0xe5, 0xc7, 0x2b, 0x40, 0x0c,
+ 0xe9, 0xe4, 0x7f, 0x52, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x06, 0xc9, 0xfb, 0x01, 0x44, 0x34,
+ 0xac, 0x20, 0x3c, 0xb4, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x3e, 0xef, 0x85, 0x38, 0x96, 0x5b,
+ 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x25, 0x86, 0x18, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x06, 0x70, 0x06, 0x6a, 0xc8,
+ 0x4b, 0x6f, 0x5f, 0xc4, 0x05, 0x1f, 0x03, 0x62, 0x30, 0x11, 0x61, 0xbc,
+ 0xc1, 0x40, 0x31, 0x66, 0xdc, 0x64, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x6b, 0xb9, 0xec, 0xc8,
+ 0x29, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xa4, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x49, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x14, 0x62, 0x4d, 0x11, 0x9c, 0xcf, 0x5d, 0xe5, 0x71,
+ 0xa2, 0x82, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0xe0, 0x04, 0xb8, 0x5f, 0x0e, 0x4d, 0x07, 0xad,
+ 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02,
+ 0x30, 0x27, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c,
+ 0x08, 0x61, 0x74, 0x74, 0x61, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x72, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30,
+ 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x09, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x72,
+ 0x75, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x36, 0x30,
+ 0x34, 0x32, 0x31, 0x31, 0x31, 0x31, 0x36, 0x32, 0x38, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d,
+ 0x33, 0x36, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x38, 0x31, 0x31, 0x31, 0x36, 0x32, 0x38,
+ 0x5a, 0x30, 0x27, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03,
+ 0x0c, 0x08, 0x61, 0x74, 0x74, 0x61, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x72, 0x31, 0x12,
+ 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x09, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x74,
+ 0x72, 0x75, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf7,
+ 0x3b, 0x7e, 0x82, 0x88, 0xfc, 0x1a, 0xfb, 0x86, 0x56, 0x83, 0x03, 0xdd,
+ 0x05, 0x14, 0x79, 0x51, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x86, 0x85, 0x2d, 0xeb, 0x18, 0x17,
+ 0x20, 0x3b, 0x37, 0x6f, 0x7f, 0x78, 0x19, 0x3b, 0xf6, 0x71, 0xad, 0xc9,
+ 0x65, 0x81, 0x7e, 0xe0, 0xa9, 0x29, 0xdd, 0xfd, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x04, 0x7d,
+ 0x5a, 0x59, 0xd6, 0x6c, 0xe2, 0xde, 0xc5, 0xd5, 0xb6, 0x1f, 0x69, 0xd9,
+ 0x33, 0xa3, 0x53, 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e,
+ 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xf7, 0xab, 0x3f, 0x49, 0xcf, 0x7d, 0x48, 0x9c,
+ 0x04, 0x49, 0x1a, 0xac, 0x8f, 0x26, 0x16, 0x09, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0x74, 0xf5,
+ 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80,
+ 0x14, 0xf7, 0xab, 0x3f, 0x49, 0xcf, 0x7d, 0x48, 0x9c, 0x04, 0x49, 0x1a,
+ 0xac, 0x8f, 0x26, 0x16, 0x09, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0x74, 0xf5, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06,
+ 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x05, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04,
+ 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x49, 0x00, 0x30, 0x46, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0x8d, 0xbf,
+ 0x36, 0xe5, 0x51, 0x9a, 0xde, 0xf4, 0x7f, 0xbf, 0xbd, 0x7f, 0x71, 0x66,
+ 0xc1, 0x67, 0xfa, 0x71, 0x0d, 0x79, 0xc6, 0x60, 0x3a, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x43,
+ 0xc3, 0xf2, 0x5e, 0xe8, 0x74, 0xb6, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xfa, 0xdb, 0x40,
+ 0x47, 0x72, 0xf0, 0x15, 0x52, 0xc1, 0x78, 0x11, 0x6b, 0x76, 0xc5, 0x1f,
+ 0xcf, 0xb6, 0x09, 0x6d, 0x8f, 0xcb, 0x92, 0x2f, 0x1b, 0x3c, 0xc3, 0x28,
+ 0x48, 0x61, 0x0f, 0x60, 0x71, 0x31, 0x81, 0xa8, 0x30, 0x81, 0xa5, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x3f, 0x30, 0x27, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x61, 0x74, 0x74, 0x61, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x65,
+ 0x72, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x09,
+ 0x75, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x72, 0x75, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x02, 0x14, 0x62,
+ 0x4d, 0x11, 0x9c, 0xcf, 0x5d, 0xe5, 0x71, 0xa2, 0x82, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0xe0,
+ 0x04, 0xb8, 0x5f, 0x0e, 0x4d, 0x07, 0xad, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60,
+ 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08,
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x04, 0x46, 0x30, 0x44,
+ 0x02, 0x20, 0x22, 0x4a, 0x99, 0xb1, 0xbc, 0xa9, 0xee, 0x24, 0x60, 0x81,
+ 0xb9, 0x64, 0xba, 0x86, 0x00, 0xae, 0xb5, 0xd7, 0xb8, 0x72, 0xb9, 0x8c,
+ 0xb3, 0xe7, 0x78, 0x29, 0xdb, 0xa8, 0x27, 0xf7, 0x30, 0xf0, 0x02, 0x20,
+ 0x19, 0x2d, 0xd3, 0x17, 0x9a, 0xc1, 0xf9, 0xd2, 0x63, 0x92, 0x8e, 0x78,
+ 0xcc, 0xa4, 0x0b, 0x91, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xb2, 0xbc, 0x35, 0x87, 0x8e, 0x33,
+ 0xa7, 0xe0, 0x5e, 0xab, 0x95, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0xf4
+ };
+ PKCS7* p7 = NULL;
+ X509_STORE* store = NULL;
+ X509* caCert = NULL;
+ WOLFSSL_BIO* caBio = NULL;
+ const byte* p = forgedSignedData;
+ const char* ca = "./certs/ca-cert.pem";
+
+ /* Load the same CA into the trust store that the attacker bundled at
+ * cert[0] in the forged message. */
+ ExpectNotNull(caBio = BIO_new_file(ca, "r"));
+ ExpectNotNull(caCert = PEM_read_bio_X509(caBio, NULL, 0, NULL));
+ ExpectNotNull(store = X509_STORE_new());
+ ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, caCert), 1);
+
+ /* Parse the forged message. d2i_PKCS7 internally runs
+ * wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData, which must NOT accept the attacker's
+ * signature under any bundled cert other than the one named by the
+ * signerInfo sid. Since the sid names the attacker cert (which does
+ * not chain to the trusted CA), the parse may succeed but verification
+ * against the trust store must fail. */
+ ExpectNotNull(p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)sizeof(forgedSignedData)));
+
+ /* PKCS7_verify() MUST fail: the only certificate in the trust store
+ * is the wolfSSL CA - it is bundled at cert[0] but did NOT sign this
+ * message. The actual signer (the attacker's self-signed cert at
+ * cert[1]) cannot chain to any trust anchor. */
+ ExpectIntEQ(PKCS7_verify(p7, NULL, store, NULL, NULL, 0),
+ WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WOLFSSL_FAILURE));
+
+ PKCS7_free(p7);
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ X509_free(caCert);
+ BIO_free(caBio);
+#endif
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
+/* Exercise the SignerInfo-sid binding enforcement end-to-end.
+ *
+ * For both supported sid encodings (v1 = IssuerAndSerialNumber, v3 =
+ * SubjectKeyIdentifier), this builds a valid CMS SignedData message with
+ * two certificates in the bundle:
+ * cert[0] = ca-cert (extra, non-signing)
+ * cert[1] = server-cert (actual signer)
+ * and checks that:
+ * - parsing + signature verification succeeds,
+ * - chain validation against a trust store containing ca-cert succeeds,
+ * - PKCS7_get0_signers() returns the *signer* (server-cert), not the
+ * extra cert at cert[0] - which would be the pre-fix behavior and the
+ * core of the signer-identity forgery bug. */
+int test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify_sid_binding(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_ALL) && defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(NO_BIO) && \
+ !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && !defined(NO_RSA)
+ const char* signerCertFile = "./certs/server-cert.pem";
+ const char* signerKeyFile = "./certs/server-key.pem";
+ const char* caFile = "./certs/ca-cert.pem";
+ const byte content[] = "sid-binding test content";
+ /* Build both variants: default v1 (IssuerAndSerialNumber) and v3
+ * (SubjectKeyIdentifier). */
+ const int sidTypes[2] = { CMS_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_NUMBER, CMS_SKID };
+ int variant;
+
+ BIO* signerCertBio = NULL;
+ BIO* caBio = NULL;
+ X509* signerCertX509 = NULL;
+ X509* caX509 = NULL;
+ byte* signerCertDer = NULL;
+ byte* caDer = NULL;
+ byte* signerKey = NULL;
+ int signerCertDerSz = 0;
+ int caDerSz = 0;
+ size_t signerKeySz = 0;
+ XFILE keyFile = XBADFILE;
+ WC_RNG rng;
+ int rngInited = 0;
+
+ /* ---- Load signer cert + key and the CA cert. ---- */
+ ExpectNotNull(signerCertBio = BIO_new_file(signerCertFile, "r"));
+ ExpectNotNull(signerCertX509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(signerCertBio, NULL, 0,
+ NULL));
+ ExpectIntGT(signerCertDerSz = i2d_X509(signerCertX509, &signerCertDer), 0);
+
+ ExpectNotNull(caBio = BIO_new_file(caFile, "r"));
+ ExpectNotNull(caX509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(caBio, NULL, 0, NULL));
+ ExpectIntGT(caDerSz = i2d_X509(caX509, &caDer), 0);
+
+ /* Slurp the DER private key straight from a PEM->DER round-trip via
+ * wc_KeyPemToDer. The test only needs the bytes in a form
+ * wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData can consume. */
+ {
+ long filePemLen = 0;
+ byte* keyPem = NULL;
+ int derLen = 0;
+
+ ExpectTrue((keyFile = XFOPEN(signerKeyFile, "rb")) != XBADFILE);
+ if (keyFile != XBADFILE) {
+ (void)XFSEEK(keyFile, 0, XSEEK_END);
+ filePemLen = XFTELL(keyFile);
+ (void)XFSEEK(keyFile, 0, XSEEK_SET);
+ ExpectIntGT(filePemLen, 0);
+ keyPem = (byte*)XMALLOC((size_t)filePemLen, NULL,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ ExpectNotNull(keyPem);
+ if (keyPem != NULL) {
+ ExpectIntEQ(XFREAD(keyPem, 1, (size_t)filePemLen, keyFile),
+ (size_t)filePemLen);
+ /* First call sizes the output buffer. */
+ derLen = wc_KeyPemToDer(keyPem, (word32)filePemLen, NULL, 0,
+ NULL);
+ ExpectIntGT(derLen, 0);
+ if (derLen > 0) {
+ signerKey = (byte*)XMALLOC((size_t)derLen, NULL,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ ExpectNotNull(signerKey);
+ if (signerKey != NULL) {
+ derLen = wc_KeyPemToDer(keyPem, (word32)filePemLen,
+ signerKey, (word32)derLen,
+ NULL);
+ ExpectIntGT(derLen, 0);
+ signerKeySz = (size_t)derLen;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ XFREE(keyPem, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ XFCLOSE(keyFile);
+ keyFile = XBADFILE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_InitRng(&rng), 0);
+ if (EXPECT_SUCCESS())
+ rngInited = 1;
+
+ for (variant = 0; variant < 2; variant++) {
+ wc_PKCS7* p7Enc = NULL;
+ byte encoded[4096];
+ int encodedSz = 0;
+ PKCS7* p7Ver = NULL;
+ X509_STORE* store = NULL;
+ const byte* encodedPtr = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509)* signers = NULL;
+ X509* reportedSigner = NULL;
+ byte* reportedSignerDer = NULL;
+ int reportedSignerDerSz = 0;
+ X509* caForStore = NULL;
+ BIO* caForStoreBio = NULL;
+
+ /* ---- Encode: signer=server-cert, extra bundle cert=ca. ---- */
+ ExpectNotNull(p7Enc = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID));
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_Init(p7Enc, HEAP_HINT, INVALID_DEVID), 0);
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(p7Enc, signerCertDer,
+ (word32)signerCertDerSz), 0);
+ /* wc_PKCS7_AddCertificate prepends to the cert list - the encoded
+ * SET therefore ends up [ca, signer], putting the actual signer
+ * at index 1 and exercising the sid-selection path (cert[0] is
+ * NOT the signer and must be skipped). */
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_AddCertificate(p7Enc, caDer, (word32)caDerSz), 0);
+
+ if (p7Enc != NULL) {
+ p7Enc->content = (byte*)content;
+ p7Enc->contentSz = (word32)sizeof(content);
+ p7Enc->encryptOID = RSAk;
+ p7Enc->hashOID = SHA256h;
+ p7Enc->privateKey = signerKey;
+ p7Enc->privateKeySz = (word32)signerKeySz;
+ p7Enc->rng = &rng;
+ }
+
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_SetSignerIdentifierType(p7Enc, sidTypes[variant]),
+ 0);
+
+ ExpectIntGT((encodedSz = wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData(p7Enc, encoded,
+ sizeof(encoded))),
+ 0);
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(p7Enc);
+ p7Enc = NULL;
+
+ /* ---- Parse + verify through the OpenSSL compat layer. ---- */
+ encodedPtr = encoded;
+ ExpectNotNull(p7Ver = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &encodedPtr, encodedSz));
+
+ /* Trust store holds only ca-cert. Reload it rather than reusing
+ * caX509, since X509_STORE_free takes ownership-like semantics. */
+ ExpectNotNull(caForStoreBio = BIO_new_file(caFile, "r"));
+ ExpectNotNull(caForStore = PEM_read_bio_X509(caForStoreBio, NULL, 0,
+ NULL));
+ ExpectNotNull(store = X509_STORE_new());
+ ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, caForStore), 1);
+
+ ExpectIntEQ(PKCS7_verify(p7Ver, NULL, store, NULL, NULL, 0), 1);
+
+ /* Snapshot the singleCert / verifyCert pointers and sizes after
+ * PKCS7_verify has finished re-parsing the message. A buggy
+ * implementation that passes &p7->pkcs7.singleCert (or verifyCert)
+ * directly to wolfSSL_d2i_X509 permanently advances the struct
+ * field, which corrupts it for any subsequent use - producing a
+ * heap-OOB read on the next call since the size isn't advanced.
+ * These pointers must stay exactly where they are across repeated
+ * get0_signers calls. */
+ if (p7Ver != NULL) {
+ wc_PKCS7* wcP7 = &((WOLFSSL_PKCS7*)p7Ver)->pkcs7;
+ byte* singleBefore = wcP7->singleCert;
+ word32 singleSzBefore = wcP7->singleCertSz;
+ byte* verifyBefore = wcP7->verifyCert;
+ word32 verifySzBefore = wcP7->verifyCertSz;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Call get0_signers repeatedly. Each invocation must return
+ * the correct cert and must not mutate singleCert/verifyCert.
+ * Three iterations so the "second call reads past the end"
+ * pattern (the exact OOB the reporter hit) is exercised. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ ExpectNotNull(signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(p7Ver, NULL, 0));
+ ExpectIntEQ(sk_X509_num(signers), 1);
+ ExpectNotNull(reportedSigner = sk_X509_value(signers, 0));
+ ExpectIntGT(reportedSignerDerSz = i2d_X509(reportedSigner,
+ &reportedSignerDer), 0);
+ /* DER-compare: reportedSigner must equal server-cert and
+ * must NOT equal ca-cert (the pre-fix signer-confusion
+ * outcome). */
+ ExpectIntEQ(reportedSignerDerSz, signerCertDerSz);
+ if (reportedSignerDer != NULL && signerCertDer != NULL) {
+ ExpectIntEQ(XMEMCMP(reportedSignerDer, signerCertDer,
+ (size_t)signerCertDerSz), 0);
+ if (reportedSignerDerSz == caDerSz) {
+ ExpectIntNE(XMEMCMP(reportedSignerDer, caDer,
+ (size_t)caDerSz), 0);
+ }
+ }
+ XFREE(reportedSignerDer, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_OPENSSL);
+ reportedSignerDer = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(signers, NULL);
+ signers = NULL;
+
+ /* Struct fields must survive every call unchanged. */
+ ExpectPtrEq(wcP7->singleCert, singleBefore);
+ ExpectIntEQ(wcP7->singleCertSz, singleSzBefore);
+ ExpectPtrEq(wcP7->verifyCert, verifyBefore);
+ ExpectIntEQ(wcP7->verifyCertSz, verifySzBefore);
+ }
+ }
+
+ PKCS7_free(p7Ver);
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ X509_free(caForStore);
+ BIO_free(caForStoreBio);
+ }
+
+ if (rngInited)
+ wc_FreeRng(&rng);
+
+ XFREE(signerKey, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ XFREE(signerCertDer, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_OPENSSL);
+ XFREE(caDer, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_OPENSSL);
+ X509_free(signerCertX509);
+ X509_free(caX509);
+ BIO_free(signerCertBio);
+ BIO_free(caBio);
+#endif
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
int test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_SIGNED_new(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
diff --git a/tests/api/test_ossl_p7p12.h b/tests/api/test_ossl_p7p12.h
index 58aa9dd12..6704ab51e 100644
--- a/tests/api/test_ossl_p7p12.h
+++ b/tests/api/test_ossl_p7p12.h
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
int test_wolfssl_PKCS7(void);
int test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_certs(void);
int test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_sign(void);
+int test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify_signer_forgery(void);
+int test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify_sid_binding(void);
int test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_SIGNED_new(void);
int test_wolfSSL_PEM_write_bio_PKCS7(void);
int test_wolfSSL_PEM_write_bio_encryptedKey(void);
@@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ int test_wolfSSL_PKCS12(void);
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_p7", test_wolfssl_PKCS7), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_p7", test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_certs), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_p7", test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_sign), \
+ TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_p7", test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify_signer_forgery), \
+ TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_p7", test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify_sid_binding), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_p7", test_wolfSSL_PKCS7_SIGNED_new), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_p7", test_wolfSSL_PEM_write_bio_PKCS7), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_p7", test_wolfSSL_PEM_write_bio_encryptedKey), \
diff --git a/tests/api/test_pkcs7.c b/tests/api/test_pkcs7.c
index 3c8b59fb8..69b463160 100644
--- a/tests/api/test_pkcs7.c
+++ b/tests/api/test_pkcs7.c
@@ -1118,6 +1118,229 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_EnvelopedData_KTRI_RSA_PSS(void)
#endif
+/*
+ * Bleichenbacher padding-oracle regression: wc_PKCS7_DecryptKtri must not
+ * return a distinguishable error when RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 unwrap of the
+ * encrypted CEK fails vs. when it succeeds with a wrong key. The
+ * mitigation substitutes a deterministic pseudo-random CEK on RSA failure
+ * so content decryption fails indistinguishably. This test corrupts the
+ * encryptedKey in a valid EnvelopedData and asserts the error matches
+ * content corruption rather than surfacing an RSA/recipient-level code.
+ * Runs for AES-128 and AES-256 because the fake CEK is a fixed 32 bytes:
+ * AES-128 (key size 16) exercises the path where the fake size differs
+ * from the real CEK size.
+ */
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(NO_SHA256) && \
+ !defined(NO_AES) && defined(HAVE_AES_CBC) && defined(WOLFSSL_AES_128) && \
+ defined(WOLFSSL_AES_256) && !defined(NO_HMAC) && \
+ !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC) && \
+ (defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_2048) || defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_1024) || \
+ !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM))
+static int pkcs7_ktri_bad_pad_case(int encryptOID, byte* rsaCert,
+ word32 rsaCertSz, byte* rsaPrivKey,
+ word32 rsaPrivKeySz, byte* encrypted,
+ word32 encryptedCap, byte* decoded,
+ word32 decodedCap)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+ PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;
+ byte data[] = "PKCS7 KTRI bad-RSA-padding regression payload.";
+ int encryptedSz = 0;
+ int badKeyRet = 0;
+ int badContentRet = 0;
+ byte savedKeyByte = 0;
+ byte savedContentByte = 0;
+ word32 i;
+ word32 encryptedKeyOff = 0;
+ static const byte rsaEncOid[] = {
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x01
+ };
+
+ ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, rsaCert, rsaCertSz), 0);
+ if (pkcs7 != NULL) {
+ pkcs7->content = data;
+ pkcs7->contentSz = (word32)sizeof(data);
+ pkcs7->contentOID = DATA;
+ pkcs7->encryptOID = encryptOID;
+ }
+ ExpectIntGT(encryptedSz = wc_PKCS7_EncodeEnvelopedData(pkcs7,
+ encrypted, encryptedCap), 0);
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
+ pkcs7 = NULL;
+
+ /* Locate the KTRI encryptedKey OCTET STRING. After the rsaEncryption
+ * OID there are NULL algorithm parameters (05 00), then a 256-byte
+ * OCTET STRING (tag 04, long-form length 82 01 00 for RSA-2048). */
+ for (i = 0; (int)(i + sizeof(rsaEncOid)) < encryptedSz; i++) {
+ if (XMEMCMP(&encrypted[i], rsaEncOid, sizeof(rsaEncOid)) == 0) {
+ word32 p = i + (word32)sizeof(rsaEncOid);
+ if (p + 2 < (word32)encryptedSz &&
+ encrypted[p] == 0x05 && encrypted[p + 1] == 0x00) {
+ p += 2;
+ }
+ if (p + 4 < (word32)encryptedSz && encrypted[p] == 0x04) {
+ if (encrypted[p + 1] == 0x82) {
+ encryptedKeyOff = p + 4;
+ }
+ else if (encrypted[p + 1] == 0x81) {
+ encryptedKeyOff = p + 3;
+ }
+ else {
+ encryptedKeyOff = p + 2;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ExpectIntGT(encryptedKeyOff, 0);
+ ExpectIntLT(encryptedKeyOff + 32, (word32)encryptedSz);
+
+ /* Case 1: corrupt a byte inside the RSA ciphertext, decode, restore. */
+ savedKeyByte = encrypted[encryptedKeyOff + 16];
+ encrypted[encryptedKeyOff + 16] ^= 0xA5;
+
+ ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, rsaCert, rsaCertSz), 0);
+ if (pkcs7 != NULL) {
+ pkcs7->privateKey = rsaPrivKey;
+ pkcs7->privateKeySz = rsaPrivKeySz;
+ }
+ badKeyRet = wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(pkcs7, encrypted,
+ (word32)encryptedSz, decoded, decodedCap);
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
+ pkcs7 = NULL;
+ encrypted[encryptedKeyOff + 16] = savedKeyByte;
+
+ /* Case 2: corrupt a byte in the second-to-last AES ciphertext block.
+ * In CBC mode this deterministically XOR-flips the corresponding byte
+ * in the last plaintext block, invalidating the PKCS#7 padding
+ * (original pad byte 0x01 becomes 0x01^0xA5 = 0xA4 > blockSz).
+ * Corrupting the last ciphertext block directly would randomize the
+ * entire last plaintext block, giving ~1/256 chance of accidentally
+ * valid padding and intermittent test failures. */
+ savedContentByte = encrypted[encryptedSz - 17];
+ encrypted[encryptedSz - 17] ^= 0xA5;
+
+ ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, rsaCert, rsaCertSz), 0);
+ if (pkcs7 != NULL) {
+ pkcs7->privateKey = rsaPrivKey;
+ pkcs7->privateKeySz = rsaPrivKeySz;
+ }
+ badContentRet = wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(pkcs7, encrypted,
+ (word32)encryptedSz, decoded, decodedCap);
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
+ pkcs7 = NULL;
+ encrypted[encryptedSz - 17] = savedContentByte;
+
+ /* Case 2 must always fail: the CBC-chain corruption deterministically
+ * invalidates the PKCS#7 padding. */
+ ExpectIntLT(badContentRet, 0);
+ /* Bad-key must NOT leak as an RSA- or recipient-level error. */
+ ExpectIntNE(badKeyRet, WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(PKCS7_RECIP_E));
+ ExpectIntNE(badKeyRet, WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(RSA_PAD_E));
+ ExpectIntNE(badKeyRet, WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(RSA_BUFFER_E));
+ ExpectIntNE(badKeyRet, WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_PADDING_E));
+ /* Case 1 (bad RSA key) decrypts content with a random fake CEK,
+ * producing fully random plaintext. With ~1/256 probability the
+ * PKCS#7 padding accidentally looks valid, causing a positive
+ * garbage-length return instead of an error. This does not leak
+ * RSA key information, so it is acceptable. When both cases do
+ * fail, verify they fail at the same content-decryption layer. */
+ if (badKeyRet < 0) {
+ ExpectIntEQ(badKeyRet, badContentRet);
+ }
+
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
+int test_wc_PKCS7_EnvelopedData_KTRI_BadRsaPad(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+ byte encrypted[FOURK_BUF];
+ byte decoded[FOURK_BUF];
+ byte* rsaCert = NULL;
+ byte* rsaPrivKey = NULL;
+ word32 rsaCertSz = 0;
+ word32 rsaPrivKeySz = 0;
+#if !defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_1024) && !defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_2048) && \
+ !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM)
+ XFILE f = XBADFILE;
+#endif
+
+ /* Load RSA cert and key */
+#if defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_1024)
+ rsaCertSz = (word32)sizeof_client_cert_der_1024;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaCert = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaCertSz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ if (rsaCert != NULL)
+ XMEMCPY(rsaCert, client_cert_der_1024, rsaCertSz);
+ rsaPrivKeySz = (word32)sizeof_client_key_der_1024;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaPrivKey = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaPrivKeySz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ if (rsaPrivKey != NULL)
+ XMEMCPY(rsaPrivKey, client_key_der_1024, rsaPrivKeySz);
+#elif defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_2048)
+ rsaCertSz = (word32)sizeof_client_cert_der_2048;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaCert = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaCertSz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ if (rsaCert != NULL)
+ XMEMCPY(rsaCert, client_cert_der_2048, rsaCertSz);
+ rsaPrivKeySz = (word32)sizeof_client_key_der_2048;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaPrivKey = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaPrivKeySz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ if (rsaPrivKey != NULL)
+ XMEMCPY(rsaPrivKey, client_key_der_2048, rsaPrivKeySz);
+#elif !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM)
+ rsaCertSz = FOURK_BUF;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaCert = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaCertSz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ ExpectTrue((f = XFOPEN("./certs/client-cert.der", "rb")) != XBADFILE);
+ ExpectTrue((rsaCertSz = (word32)XFREAD(rsaCert, 1, rsaCertSz, f)) > 0);
+ if (f != XBADFILE) {
+ XFCLOSE(f);
+ f = XBADFILE;
+ }
+ rsaPrivKeySz = FOURK_BUF;
+ ExpectNotNull(rsaPrivKey = (byte*)XMALLOC(rsaPrivKeySz, HEAP_HINT,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER));
+ ExpectTrue((f = XFOPEN("./certs/client-key.der", "rb")) != XBADFILE);
+ ExpectTrue((rsaPrivKeySz = (word32)XFREAD(rsaPrivKey, 1,
+ rsaPrivKeySz, f)) > 0);
+ if (f != XBADFILE)
+ XFCLOSE(f);
+#endif
+
+ if (rsaCert == NULL || rsaPrivKey == NULL) {
+ XFREE(rsaCert, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ XFREE(rsaPrivKey, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ return TEST_SKIPPED;
+ }
+
+ /* AES-128: 32-byte fake CEK larger than real CEK size (16 bytes). */
+ ExpectIntEQ(pkcs7_ktri_bad_pad_case(AES128CBCb, rsaCert, rsaCertSz,
+ rsaPrivKey, rsaPrivKeySz, encrypted, sizeof(encrypted),
+ decoded, sizeof(decoded)), TEST_SUCCESS);
+#ifdef WOLFSSL_AES_192
+ /* AES-192: fake CEK (32) vs real CEK (24) - another size mismatch. */
+ ExpectIntEQ(pkcs7_ktri_bad_pad_case(AES192CBCb, rsaCert, rsaCertSz,
+ rsaPrivKey, rsaPrivKeySz, encrypted, sizeof(encrypted),
+ decoded, sizeof(decoded)), TEST_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+ /* AES-256: fake CEK size matches real CEK size (32 bytes). */
+ ExpectIntEQ(pkcs7_ktri_bad_pad_case(AES256CBCb, rsaCert, rsaCertSz,
+ rsaPrivKey, rsaPrivKeySz, encrypted, sizeof(encrypted),
+ decoded, sizeof(decoded)), TEST_SUCCESS);
+
+ XFREE(rsaCert, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ XFREE(rsaPrivKey, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+} /* END test_wc_PKCS7_EnvelopedData_KTRI_BadRsaPad */
+#endif
+
+
/*
* Testing wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData_ex() and wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_ex()
*/
@@ -2397,7 +2620,8 @@ static int myCEKwrapFunc(PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* cek, word32 cekSz, byte* keyId,
HAVE_AES_KEYWRAP */
-#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && defined(ASN_BER_TO_DER) && !defined(NO_RSA)
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && defined(ASN_BER_TO_DER) && !defined(NO_RSA) && \
+ !defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
#define MAX_TEST_DECODE_SIZE 6000
static int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_stream_decrypt_cb(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7,
const byte* output, word32 outputSz, void* ctx) {
@@ -2430,7 +2654,8 @@ static int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_stream_decrypt_cb(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7,
int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_stream(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
-#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && defined(ASN_BER_TO_DER) && !defined(NO_RSA)
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && defined(ASN_BER_TO_DER) && !defined(NO_RSA) && \
+ !defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;
int ret = 0;
XFILE f = XBADFILE;
@@ -2486,6 +2711,72 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_stream(void)
} /* END test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_stream() */
+/*
+ * Regression test: a PKCS#7 EnvelopedData with a forged RecipientInfo SET
+ * length (parsed via GetSet_ex with NO_USER_CHECK) must not drive an
+ * uncapped heap allocation through wc_PKCS7_GrowStream(). The decoder
+ * must reject the oversized allocation rather than attempting it.
+ */
+int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_forgedRecipientSetLen(void)
+{
+ EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
+ /* Crafted ContentInfo/EnvelopedData header. All lengths use the
+ * 4-byte long form for clarity. The RecipientInfo SET length is
+ * forged to 0x01000001 (16 MB + 1), which exceeds the default
+ * WOLFSSL_PKCS7_MAX_STREAM_ALLOC cap and should be rejected before
+ * any allocation succeeds. The body after the SET header is never
+ * consumed because the decoder fails at the GrowStream() cap. */
+ static const byte forged[] = {
+ /* ContentInfo SEQUENCE, body length 0x01000021 */
+ 0x30, 0x84, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21,
+ /* OID 1.2.840.113549.1.7.3 (id-envelopedData) */
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D,
+ 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
+ /* [0] EXPLICIT content, body length 0x01000016 */
+ 0xA0, 0x84, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x16,
+ /* EnvelopedData SEQUENCE, body length 0x01000010 */
+ 0x30, 0x84, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10,
+ /* version INTEGER 0 */
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,
+ /* Forged RecipientInfo SET header: length = 0x01000001 */
+ 0x31, 0x84, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ /* Padding so that header-parsing states can buffer their
+ * required lookahead without returning WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E.
+ * These bytes are never interpreted. */
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+ };
+ PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;
+ byte out[32];
+ int ret;
+
+ ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, (byte*)client_cert_der_2048,
+ sizeof_client_cert_der_2048), 0);
+ ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_SetKey(pkcs7, (byte*)client_key_der_2048,
+ sizeof_client_key_der_2048), 0);
+
+ ret = wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(pkcs7, (byte*)forged,
+ (word32)sizeof(forged), out, (word32)sizeof(out));
+ /* Must NOT return WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E (which would imply the
+ * oversized allocation succeeded and the decoder is waiting for
+ * the around 16 MB of SET body). Must NOT return 0 / positive length.
+ * Expected: BUFFER_E from the GrowStream cap. */
+ ExpectIntEQ(ret, WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BUFFER_E));
+
+ wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
+#endif
+ return EXPECT_RESULT();
+} /* END test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_forgedRecipientSetLen() */
+
+
/*
* Testing wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData with streaming
*/
@@ -2501,6 +2792,8 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_multiple_recipients(void)
bytes */
size_t testDerBufferSz = 0;
byte decodedData[8192];
+ byte serverDecodedData[8192];
+ int serverRet = 0;
ExpectTrue((f = XFOPEN(testFile, "rb")) != XBADFILE);
if (f != XBADFILE) {
@@ -2520,12 +2813,13 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_multiple_recipients(void)
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_SetKey(pkcs7, (byte*)server_key_der_2048,
sizeof_server_key_der_2048), 0);
- ret = wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(pkcs7, testDerBuffer,
- (word32)testDerBufferSz, decodedData, sizeof(decodedData));
+ serverRet = wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(pkcs7, testDerBuffer,
+ (word32)testDerBufferSz, serverDecodedData,
+ sizeof(serverDecodedData));
#if defined(NO_AES) || defined(NO_AES_256)
- ExpectIntEQ(ret, ALGO_ID_E);
+ ExpectIntEQ(serverRet, ALGO_ID_E);
#else
- ExpectIntGT(ret, 0);
+ ExpectIntGT(serverRet, 0);
#endif
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
pkcs7 = NULL;
@@ -2551,7 +2845,14 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_multiple_recipients(void)
pkcs7 = NULL;
}
- /* test with ca cert recipient (which should fail) */
+ /* Test with ca cert recipient. The ca cert is not a listed recipient,
+ * so RSA unwrap fails. The Bleichenbacher mitigation substitutes a
+ * pseudo-random fake CEK on unwrap failure, so the call normally
+ * returns a negative error when content decryption rejects the
+ * resulting garbage padding - but around 1/256 of the time the random
+ * CEK yields plaintext with accidentally-valid PKCS#7 padding and the
+ * call returns a non-negative "decrypted" size. That case must not
+ * produce the real plaintext. */
ExpectNotNull(pkcs7 = wc_PKCS7_New(HEAP_HINT, testDevId));
if (pkcs7) {
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert(pkcs7, (byte*)ca_cert_der_2048,
@@ -2560,9 +2861,15 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_multiple_recipients(void)
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_SetKey(pkcs7, (byte*)ca_key_der_2048,
sizeof_ca_key_der_2048), 0);
+ XMEMSET(decodedData, 0, sizeof(decodedData));
ret = wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(pkcs7, testDerBuffer,
(word32)testDerBufferSz, decodedData, sizeof(decodedData));
- ExpectIntLT(ret, 0);
+ #if defined(NO_AES) || defined(NO_AES_256)
+ ExpectIntEQ(ret, ALGO_ID_E);
+ #else
+ ExpectTrue(ret < 0 || ret != serverRet ||
+ XMEMCMP(decodedData, serverDecodedData, (size_t)ret) != 0);
+ #endif
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
pkcs7 = NULL;
}
@@ -2579,7 +2886,7 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_EncodeDecodeEnvelopedData(void)
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7)
PKCS7* pkcs7 = NULL;
-#ifdef ASN_BER_TO_DER
+#if defined(ASN_BER_TO_DER) && !defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
int encodedSz = 0;
#endif
#ifdef ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT
@@ -2761,6 +3068,11 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_EncodeDecodeEnvelopedData(void)
AES128CBCb, AES128_WRAP, dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme,
eccCert, eccCertSz, eccPrivKey, eccPrivKeySz},
#endif
+ #if defined(WOLFSSL_SHA224) && defined(WOLFSSL_AES_128)
+ {(byte*)input, (word32)(sizeof(input)/sizeof(char)), DATA,
+ AES128CBCb, AES128_WRAP, dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme,
+ eccCert, eccCertSz, eccPrivKey, eccPrivKeySz},
+ #endif
#if !defined(NO_SHA256) && defined(WOLFSSL_AES_256)
{(byte*)input, (word32)(sizeof(input)/sizeof(char)), DATA,
AES256CBCb, AES256_WRAP, dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme,
@@ -2784,7 +3096,7 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_EncodeDecodeEnvelopedData(void)
testSz = (int)sizeof(testVectors)/(int)sizeof(pkcs7EnvelopedVector);
for (i = 0; i < testSz; i++) {
- #ifdef ASN_BER_TO_DER
+ #if defined(ASN_BER_TO_DER) && !defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
encodeSignedDataStream strm;
/* test setting stream mode, the first one using IO callbacks */
@@ -2950,17 +3262,11 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_EncodeDecodeEnvelopedData(void)
pkcs7->singleCert = NULL;
}
#ifndef NO_RSA
- #if defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
- /* when none streaming mode is used and PKCS7 is in bad state buffer error
- * is returned from kari parse which gets set to bad func arg */
- ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(pkcs7, output,
- (word32)sizeof(output), decoded, (word32)sizeof(decoded)),
- WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
- #else
+ /* With corrupted singleCert, decode should fail with a parse error.
+ * State is properly reset on error so re-decode starts from scratch. */
ExpectIntEQ(wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(pkcs7, output,
(word32)sizeof(output), decoded, (word32)sizeof(decoded)),
WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(ASN_PARSE_E));
- #endif
#endif /* !NO_RSA */
if (pkcs7 != NULL) {
pkcs7->singleCert = tmpBytePtr;
@@ -3991,7 +4297,8 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_Degenerate(void)
} /* END test_wc_PKCS7_Degenerate() */
#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && \
- defined(ASN_BER_TO_DER) && !defined(NO_DES3) && !defined(NO_SHA)
+ defined(ASN_BER_TO_DER) && !defined(NO_DES3) && !defined(NO_SHA) && \
+ !defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
static byte berContent[] = {
0x30, 0x80, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03, 0xA0, 0x80, 0x30,
@@ -4182,7 +4489,7 @@ static byte berContent[] = {
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
};
#endif /* HAVE_PKCS7 && !NO_FILESYSTEM && ASN_BER_TO_DER &&
- * !NO_DES3 && !NO_SHA
+ * !NO_DES3 && !NO_SHA && !NO_PKCS7_STREAM
*/
/*
@@ -4197,7 +4504,7 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_BER(void)
char fName[] = "./certs/test-ber-exp02-05-2022.p7b";
XFILE f = XBADFILE;
byte der[4096];
-#ifndef NO_DES3
+#if !defined(NO_DES3) && !defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
byte decoded[2048];
#endif
word32 derSz = 0;
@@ -4242,8 +4549,9 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_BER(void)
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
pkcs7 = NULL;
-#ifndef NO_DES3
- /* decode BER content */
+#if !defined(NO_DES3) && !defined(NO_PKCS7_STREAM)
+ /* decode BER content - requires PKCS7 streaming to handle indefinite
+ * length encoding in the EnvelopedData structure */
ExpectTrue((f = XFOPEN("./certs/1024/client-cert.der", "rb")) != XBADFILE);
ExpectTrue((derSz = (word32)XFREAD(der, 1, sizeof(der), f)) > 0);
if (f != XBADFILE) {
@@ -4280,7 +4588,7 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_BER(void)
sizeof(berContent), decoded, sizeof(decoded)), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(NOT_COMPILED_IN));
#endif
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
-#endif /* !NO_DES3 */
+#endif /* !NO_DES3 && !NO_PKCS7_STREAM */
#endif
return EXPECT_RESULT();
} /* END test_wc_PKCS7_BER() */
diff --git a/tests/api/test_pkcs7.h b/tests/api/test_pkcs7.h
index 084744d43..f4aed161d 100644
--- a/tests/api/test_pkcs7.h
+++ b/tests/api/test_pkcs7.h
@@ -38,6 +38,14 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData_RSA_PSS(void);
!defined(NO_AES) && defined(HAVE_AES_CBC) && defined(WOLFSSL_AES_256)
int test_wc_PKCS7_EnvelopedData_KTRI_RSA_PSS(void);
#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(NO_SHA256) && \
+ !defined(NO_AES) && defined(HAVE_AES_CBC) && defined(WOLFSSL_AES_128) && \
+ defined(WOLFSSL_AES_256) && !defined(NO_HMAC) && \
+ !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC) && \
+ (defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_2048) || defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_1024) || \
+ !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM))
+int test_wc_PKCS7_EnvelopedData_KTRI_BadRsaPad(void);
+#endif
int test_wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData_ex(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_RSA(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_ECC(void);
@@ -57,6 +65,7 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_SetOriEncryptCtx(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_SetOriDecryptCtx(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeCompressedData(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_multiple_recipients(void);
+int test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_forgedRecipientSetLen(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_PKCS7ContentSeq(void);
int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB(void);
@@ -82,6 +91,18 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB(void);
#define TEST_PKCS7_RSA_PSS_ED_DECL
#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_PKCS7) && !defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(NO_SHA256) && \
+ !defined(NO_AES) && defined(HAVE_AES_CBC) && defined(WOLFSSL_AES_128) && \
+ defined(WOLFSSL_AES_256) && !defined(NO_HMAC) && \
+ !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC) && \
+ (defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_2048) || defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_1024) || \
+ !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM))
+#define TEST_PKCS7_KTRI_BADRSAPAD_DECL \
+ TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_EnvelopedData_KTRI_BadRsaPad),
+#else
+#define TEST_PKCS7_KTRI_BADRSAPAD_DECL
+#endif
+
#define TEST_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA_DECLS \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_InitWithCert), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sd", test_wc_PKCS7_EncodeData), \
@@ -100,6 +121,7 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB(void);
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_stream), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_EncodeDecodeEnvelopedData), \
TEST_PKCS7_RSA_PSS_ED_DECL \
+ TEST_PKCS7_KTRI_BADRSAPAD_DECL \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_SetAESKeyWrapUnwrapCb), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_GetEnvelopedDataKariRid), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_EncodeEncryptedData), \
@@ -108,7 +130,8 @@ int test_wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData_IndefLenOOB(void);
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeOneSymmetricKey), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_SetOriEncryptCtx), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_SetOriDecryptCtx), \
- TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_multiple_recipients)
+ TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_multiple_recipients), \
+ TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_ed", test_wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData_forgedRecipientSetLen)
#define TEST_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENCRYPTED_DATA_DECLS \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("pkcs7_sed", test_wc_PKCS7_signed_enveloped)
diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c b/wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c
index 8df3a2430..f2c98efe5 100644
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@
#include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/pkcs7.h>
#include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/hash.h>
+#ifndef NO_HMAC
+ #include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/hmac.h>
+#endif
#ifndef NO_RSA
#include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/rsa.h>
#endif
@@ -94,6 +97,7 @@ typedef enum {
/* holds information about the signers */
struct PKCS7SignerInfo {
int version;
+ int sidType; /* CMS_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_NUMBER or CMS_SKID */
byte *sid;
word32 sidSz;
};
@@ -109,6 +113,17 @@ struct PKCS7SignerInfo {
#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
+/* Hard upper bound on a single PKCS7 streaming buffer allocation. Guards
+ * wc_PKCS7_GrowStream against attacker-controlled ASN.1 lengths that were
+ * parsed with NO_USER_CHECK and would otherwise drive allocations up to
+ * around 2GB (e.g. via a forged RecipientInfo SET length). 16 MB is well above
+ * any legitimate RecipientInfo / encoded-attribute size but small enough
+ * that a forged length fails allocation on constrained targets and is
+ * rejected on larger ones. */
+#ifndef WOLFSSL_PKCS7_MAX_STREAM_ALLOC
+ #define WOLFSSL_PKCS7_MAX_STREAM_ALLOC (16 * 1024 * 1024)
+#endif
+
#define MAX_PKCS7_STREAM_BUFFER 256
struct PKCS7State {
byte* tmpCert;
@@ -207,10 +222,15 @@ static void wc_PKCS7_ResetStream(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7)
#endif
/* free any buffers that may be allocated */
+ if (pkcs7->stream->aad != NULL && pkcs7->stream->aadSz > 0)
+ ForceZero(pkcs7->stream->aad, pkcs7->stream->aadSz);
XFREE(pkcs7->stream->aad, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
XFREE(pkcs7->stream->tag, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
XFREE(pkcs7->stream->nonce, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
XFREE(pkcs7->stream->buffer, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ /* stream->key is always allocated with MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_SZ */
+ if (pkcs7->stream->key != NULL)
+ ForceZero(pkcs7->stream->key, MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_SZ);
XFREE(pkcs7->stream->key, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
pkcs7->stream->aad = NULL;
pkcs7->stream->tag = NULL;
@@ -265,6 +285,16 @@ static void wc_PKCS7_FreeStream(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7)
static int wc_PKCS7_GrowStream(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, word32 newSz)
{
byte* pt;
+
+ /* Guard against attacker-controlled ASN.1 lengths reaching this
+ * allocation. Several callers parse lengths with NO_USER_CHECK and
+ * pass them here unvalidated (e.g. wc_PKCS7_ParseToRecipientInfoSet
+ * on a forged RecipientInfo SET header). */
+ if (newSz > WOLFSSL_PKCS7_MAX_STREAM_ALLOC) {
+ WOLFSSL_MSG("PKCS7 streaming allocation exceeds maximum");
+ return BUFFER_E;
+ }
+
pt = (byte*)XMALLOC(newSz, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
if (pt == NULL) {
return MEMORY_E;
@@ -4275,6 +4305,94 @@ int wc_PKCS7_SetEccSignRawDigestCb(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, CallbackEccSignRawDigest cb)
#endif /* HAVE_ECC */
+#if !defined(NO_RSA) || defined(HAVE_ECC)
+/* Check whether the given decoded certificate matches the SignerIdentifier
+ * (sid) field of the currently parsed SignerInfo. Per RFC 5652 Section 5.3,
+ * the sid selects which certificate's public key must be used to verify the
+ * signature. Returns 1 on match, 0 on no match or when the sid is not
+ * available for comparison. */
+static int wc_PKCS7_CertMatchesSignerInfo(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, DecodedCert* dCert)
+{
+ PKCS7SignerInfo* signerInfo;
+
+ if (pkcs7 == NULL || dCert == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ signerInfo = pkcs7->signerInfo;
+ if (signerInfo == NULL || signerInfo->sid == NULL ||
+ signerInfo->sidSz == 0) {
+ /* No SID parsed, cannot perform an identity binding check. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (signerInfo->sidType == CMS_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_NUMBER) {
+ /* IssuerAndSerialNumber: SID blob stores the content of the outer
+ * SEQUENCE (issuer Name followed by INTEGER serialNumber). */
+ word32 idx = 0;
+ byte sidIssuerHash[KEYID_SIZE];
+ WC_DECLARE_VAR(sidSerial, mp_int, 1, pkcs7->heap);
+ WC_DECLARE_VAR(certSerial, mp_int, 1, pkcs7->heap);
+ int cmp;
+ int match = 0;
+
+ if (GetNameHash_ex(signerInfo->sid, &idx, sidIssuerHash,
+ (int)signerInfo->sidSz, dCert->signatureOID) < 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (XMEMCMP(sidIssuerHash, dCert->issuerHash, KEYID_SIZE) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ WC_ALLOC_VAR_EX(sidSerial, mp_int, 1, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER,
+ { return 0; });
+ WC_ALLOC_VAR_EX(certSerial, mp_int, 1, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER,
+ { WC_FREE_VAR_EX(sidSerial, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ return 0; });
+
+ if (mp_init(sidSerial) != MP_OKAY) {
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(sidSerial, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(certSerial, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (mp_init(certSerial) != MP_OKAY) {
+ mp_clear(sidSerial);
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(sidSerial, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(certSerial, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (GetInt(sidSerial, signerInfo->sid, &idx, signerInfo->sidSz) == 0 &&
+ mp_read_unsigned_bin(certSerial, dCert->serial,
+ (word32)dCert->serialSz) == MP_OKAY) {
+ cmp = mp_cmp(sidSerial, certSerial);
+ if (cmp == MP_EQ)
+ match = 1;
+ }
+
+ mp_clear(sidSerial);
+ mp_clear(certSerial);
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(sidSerial, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(certSerial, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ return match;
+ }
+ else if (signerInfo->sidType == CMS_SKID) {
+ /* SubjectKeyIdentifier: SID blob is the raw SKID octet string
+ * content. Normalize the same way the certificate side does so
+ * that comparisons between SHA-1 SKIDs and other lengths match. */
+ byte sidKid[KEYID_SIZE];
+
+ if (GetHashId(signerInfo->sid, (int)signerInfo->sidSz, sidKid,
+ HashIdAlg(dCert->signatureOID)) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (XMEMCMP(sidKid, dCert->extSubjKeyId, KEYID_SIZE) == 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !NO_RSA || HAVE_ECC */
+
#ifndef NO_RSA
/* returns size of signature put into out, negative on error */
@@ -4354,6 +4472,31 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_RsaVerify(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* sig, int sigSz,
continue;
}
+ /* If the SignerInfo sid was parsed, only try the certificate whose
+ * identity matches it. This binds the verifying public key to the
+ * signer identity advertised in the CMS message and prevents signer
+ * confusion when multiple certificates are embedded. */
+ if (pkcs7->signerInfo != NULL && pkcs7->signerInfo->sid != NULL &&
+ !wc_PKCS7_CertMatchesSignerInfo(pkcs7, dCert)) {
+ FreeDecodedCert(dCert);
+ wc_FreeRsaKey(key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Defense in depth: the sid-matched cert must actually carry an
+ * RSA-family key before we feed its SPKI to the RSA key decoder.
+ * Rejecting here avoids depending on wc_RsaPublicKeyDecode to reject
+ * wrong-type SPKIs. */
+ if (dCert->keyOID != RSAk
+ #ifdef WC_RSA_PSS
+ && dCert->keyOID != RSAPSSk
+ #endif
+ ) {
+ FreeDecodedCert(dCert);
+ wc_FreeRsaKey(key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (wc_RsaPublicKeyDecode(dCert->publicKey, &scratch, key,
dCert->pubKeySize) < 0) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("ASN RSA key decode error");
@@ -4464,6 +4607,24 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_RsaPssVerify(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* sig, int sigSz,
continue;
}
+ /* Only try the certificate identified by the SignerInfo sid (see
+ * matching comment in wc_PKCS7_RsaVerify). */
+ if (pkcs7->signerInfo != NULL && pkcs7->signerInfo->sid != NULL &&
+ !wc_PKCS7_CertMatchesSignerInfo(pkcs7, dCert)) {
+ FreeDecodedCert(dCert);
+ wc_FreeRsaKey(key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Defense in depth: reject non-RSA SPKIs before key decode. RSA
+ * rsaEncryption certs (keyOID=RSAk) are accepted for PSS signatures
+ * per RFC 8017 - a RSASSA-PSS cert is not required. */
+ if (dCert->keyOID != RSAk && dCert->keyOID != RSAPSSk) {
+ FreeDecodedCert(dCert);
+ wc_FreeRsaKey(key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
pkSz = dCert->pubKeySize;
if (pkSz > (MAX_RSA_INT_SZ + MAX_RSA_E_SZ))
pkSz = (MAX_RSA_INT_SZ + MAX_RSA_E_SZ);
@@ -4629,6 +4790,22 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_EcdsaVerify(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* sig, int sigSz,
continue;
}
+ /* Only try the certificate identified by the SignerInfo sid (see
+ * matching comment in wc_PKCS7_RsaVerify). */
+ if (pkcs7->signerInfo != NULL && pkcs7->signerInfo->sid != NULL &&
+ !wc_PKCS7_CertMatchesSignerInfo(pkcs7, dCert)) {
+ FreeDecodedCert(dCert);
+ wc_ecc_free(key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Defense in depth: reject non-ECDSA SPKIs before key decode. */
+ if (dCert->keyOID != ECDSAk) {
+ FreeDecodedCert(dCert);
+ wc_ecc_free(key);
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (wc_EccPublicKeyDecode(dCert->publicKey, &idx, key,
dCert->pubKeySize) < 0) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("ASN ECC key decode error");
@@ -5337,11 +5514,16 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_ParseSignerInfo(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
if (ret == 0) {
+ pkcs7->signerInfo->sidType = CMS_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_NUMBER;
ret = wc_PKCS7_SignerInfoSetSID(pkcs7, in + idx, length);
idx += (word32)length;
}
} else if (ret == 0 && version == 3) {
+ /* Default: SignerInfo version 3 carries SubjectKeyIdentifier.
+ * May be overridden below if the parser instead finds a
+ * SEQUENCE (IssuerAndSerialNumber fallback). */
+ pkcs7->signerInfo->sidType = CMS_SKID;
/* Get the sequence of SubjectKeyIdentifier */
if (idx + 1 > inSz)
ret = BUFFER_E;
@@ -5384,6 +5566,12 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_ParseSignerInfo(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
if (ret == 0 && GetSequence(in, &idx, &length, inSz) < 0)
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ /* v3 carrying IssuerAndSerialNumber fallback */
+ pkcs7->signerInfo->sidType =
+ CMS_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_NUMBER;
+ }
}
}
@@ -7029,6 +7217,9 @@ static int PKCS7_VerifySignedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, const byte* hashBuf,
idx += (word32)length;
}
+ else if (ret == 0) {
+ ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
+ }
pkcs7->content = content;
pkcs7->contentSz = (word32)contentSz;
@@ -7721,6 +7912,9 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_KariGenerateKEK(WC_PKCS7_KARI* kari, WC_RNG* rng,
secret = (byte*)XMALLOC(secretSz, kari->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
if (secret == NULL)
return MEMORY_E;
+#ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO
+ wc_MemZero_Add("wc_PKCS7_KariGenerateKEK secret", secret, secretSz);
+#endif
#if defined(ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT) && (!defined(HAVE_FIPS) || \
(!defined(HAVE_FIPS_VERSION) || (HAVE_FIPS_VERSION != 2))) && \
@@ -7756,6 +7950,7 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_KariGenerateKEK(WC_PKCS7_KARI* kari, WC_RNG* rng,
}
if (ret != 0) {
+ ForceZero(secret, secretSz);
XFREE(secret, kari->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return ret;
}
@@ -7768,7 +7963,7 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_KariGenerateKEK(WC_PKCS7_KARI* kari, WC_RNG* rng,
kdfType = WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA;
break;
#endif
- #ifndef WOLFSSL_SHA224
+ #ifdef WOLFSSL_SHA224
case dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme:
kdfType = WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA224;
break;
@@ -7790,6 +7985,7 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_KariGenerateKEK(WC_PKCS7_KARI* kari, WC_RNG* rng,
#endif
default:
WOLFSSL_MSG("Unsupported key agreement algorithm");
+ ForceZero(secret, secretSz);
XFREE(secret, kari->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
};
@@ -7802,6 +7998,7 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_KariGenerateKEK(WC_PKCS7_KARI* kari, WC_RNG* rng,
ret = NOT_COMPILED_IN;
#endif
+ ForceZero(secret, secretSz);
XFREE(secret, kari->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return ret;
}
@@ -9606,7 +9803,7 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_PwriKek_KeyUnWrap(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, const byte* kek,
cekLen = outTmp[0];
/* verify length */
- fail |= ctMaskGT(cekLen, (int)inSz);
+ fail |= ctMaskGT(cekLen, (int)inSz - 4);
/* verify check bytes */
fail |= ctMaskNotEq((int)(outTmp[1] ^ outTmp[4]), 0xFF);
fail |= ctMaskNotEq((int)(outTmp[2] ^ outTmp[5]), 0xFF);
@@ -9747,6 +9944,7 @@ int wc_PKCS7_AddRecipient_PWRI(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* passwd, word32 pLen,
(word32)kekKeySz);
if (ret < 0) {
XFREE(recip, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
XFREE(kek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
XFREE(encryptedKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return ret;
@@ -9758,6 +9956,7 @@ int wc_PKCS7_AddRecipient_PWRI(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* passwd, word32 pLen,
tmpIv, (word32)kekBlockSz, encryptOID);
if (ret < 0) {
XFREE(recip, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
XFREE(kek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
XFREE(encryptedKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return ret;
@@ -9782,6 +9981,7 @@ int wc_PKCS7_AddRecipient_PWRI(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* passwd, word32 pLen,
ret = wc_SetContentType(PWRI_KEK_WRAP, keyEncAlgoId, sizeof(keyEncAlgoId));
if (ret <= 0) {
XFREE(recip, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
XFREE(kek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
XFREE(encryptedKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return ret;
@@ -9813,6 +10013,7 @@ int wc_PKCS7_AddRecipient_PWRI(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* passwd, word32 pLen,
ret = wc_SetContentType(kdfOID, kdfAlgoId, sizeof(kdfAlgoId));
if (ret <= 0) {
XFREE(recip, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
XFREE(kek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
XFREE(encryptedKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return ret;
@@ -9838,6 +10039,7 @@ int wc_PKCS7_AddRecipient_PWRI(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* passwd, word32 pLen,
if (totalSz > MAX_RECIP_SZ) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("CMS Recipient output buffer too small");
XFREE(recip, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
XFREE(kek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
XFREE(encryptedKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return BUFFER_E;
@@ -9875,7 +10077,7 @@ int wc_PKCS7_AddRecipient_PWRI(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* passwd, word32 pLen,
XMEMCPY(recip->recip + idx, encryptedKey, encryptedKeySz);
idx += encryptedKeySz;
- ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekBlockSz);
+ ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
ForceZero(encryptedKey, encryptedKeySz);
XFREE(kek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
XFREE(encryptedKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
@@ -10580,6 +10782,81 @@ int wc_PKCS7_EncodeEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* output, word32 outputSz)
}
#ifndef NO_RSA
+#if !defined(NO_HMAC) && !defined(NO_SHA256)
+/* Bleichenbacher padding-oracle mitigation for PKCS#7/CMS KTRI: produce a
+ * WC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE-byte pseudo-random CEK derived from a fresh
+ * random seed and the encrypted-key ciphertext. The output is random per
+ * call (driven by the RNG seed); deriving via HMAC of the ciphertext
+ * simply gives the same value within one call regardless of where it is
+ * referenced. Called unconditionally so the work is in the timing path
+ * regardless of RSA padding validity. */
+static int wc_PKCS7_KtriFakeCEK(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, const byte* encryptedKey,
+ word32 encryptedKeySz, byte* out)
+{
+ int ret;
+ byte seed[WC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ WC_RNG* rng = NULL;
+ int ownRng = 0;
+ WC_DECLARE_VAR(localRng, WC_RNG, 1, pkcs7->heap);
+ WC_DECLARE_VAR(hmac, Hmac, 1, pkcs7->heap);
+
+ if (pkcs7 == NULL || encryptedKey == NULL || out == NULL) {
+ return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
+ }
+
+ WC_ALLOC_VAR_EX(hmac, Hmac, 1, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HMAC,
+ return MEMORY_E);
+
+ /* Prefer a caller-provided RNG to avoid paying a DRBG init/reseed cost
+ * on every decrypt (and to keep the timing envelope flatter on FIPS /
+ * HW-RNG builds). Fall back to a one-shot RNG when pkcs7->rng is not
+ * set. */
+ if (pkcs7->rng != NULL) {
+ rng = pkcs7->rng;
+ }
+ else {
+ WC_ALLOC_VAR_EX(localRng, WC_RNG, 1, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_RNG,
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(hmac, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HMAC);
+ return MEMORY_E);
+ ret = wc_InitRng_ex(localRng, pkcs7->heap, pkcs7->devId);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(localRng, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_RNG);
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(hmac, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HMAC);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ rng = localRng;
+ ownRng = 1;
+ }
+
+ ret = wc_RNG_GenerateBlock(rng, seed, (word32)sizeof(seed));
+
+ if (ownRng) {
+ wc_FreeRng(localRng);
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(localRng, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_RNG);
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(hmac, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HMAC);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = wc_HmacInit(hmac, pkcs7->heap, pkcs7->devId);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ret = wc_HmacSetKey(hmac, WC_SHA256, seed, (word32)sizeof(seed));
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ret = wc_HmacUpdate(hmac, encryptedKey, encryptedKeySz);
+ }
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ret = wc_HmacFinal(hmac, out);
+ }
+ wc_HmacFree(hmac);
+ }
+ ForceZero(seed, sizeof(seed));
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(hmac, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_HMAC);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* !NO_HMAC && !NO_SHA256 */
+
/* decode KeyTransRecipientInfo (ktri), return 0 on success, <0 on error */
static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKtri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
word32* idx, byte* decryptedKey,
@@ -10596,7 +10873,9 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKtri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
word32 pkiMsgSz = inSz;
byte tag;
-
+#ifndef WC_NO_RSA_OAEP
+ word32 outKeySz = 0;
+#endif
#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
word32 tmpIdx = *idx;
#endif
@@ -10755,15 +11034,17 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKtri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
if (GetLength(pkiMsg, idx, &length, pkiMsgSz) < 0)
return ASN_PARSE_E;
- if ((word32)keyIdSize > pkiMsgSz - (*idx))
+ /* Validate SKID container is within buffer */
+ if ((word32)length > pkiMsgSz - (*idx))
return BUFFER_E;
/* if we found correct recipient, SKID will match */
- if (XMEMCMP(pkiMsg + (*idx), pkcs7->issuerSubjKeyId,
+ if (length == keyIdSize &&
+ XMEMCMP(pkiMsg + (*idx), pkcs7->issuerSubjKeyId,
(word32)keyIdSize) == 0) {
*recipFound = 1;
}
- (*idx) += (word32)keyIdSize;
+ (*idx) += (word32)length;
}
if (GetAlgoId(pkiMsg, idx, &encOID, oidKeyType, pkiMsgSz) < 0)
@@ -10903,8 +11184,8 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKtri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
#ifndef WC_NO_RSA_OAEP
}
else {
- word32 outLen = (word32)wc_RsaEncryptSize(privKey);
- outKey = (byte*)XMALLOC(outLen, pkcs7->heap,
+ outKeySz = (word32)wc_RsaEncryptSize(privKey);
+ outKey = (byte*)XMALLOC(outKeySz, pkcs7->heap,
DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
if (!outKey) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("Failed to allocate out key buffer");
@@ -10918,9 +11199,9 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKtri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
}
keySz = wc_RsaPrivateDecrypt_ex(encryptedKey,
- (word32)encryptedKeySz, outKey, outLen, privKey,
- WC_RSA_OAEP_PAD,
- WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA, WC_MGF1SHA1, NULL, 0);
+ (word32)encryptedKeySz, outKey, outKeySz,
+ privKey, WC_RSA_OAEP_PAD, WC_HASH_TYPE_SHA,
+ WC_MGF1SHA1, NULL, 0);
}
#endif
}
@@ -10935,30 +11216,153 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKtri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
}
wc_FreeRsaKey(privKey);
+ #if !defined(NO_HMAC) && !defined(NO_SHA256)
+ {
+ /* Bleichenbacher padding-oracle mitigation: always compute
+ * a pseudo-random fallback CEK so timing and error
+ * behaviour do not depend on RSA padding validity. On
+ * unwrap failure we substitute the fallback and let
+ * content decryption fail indistinguishably from "unwrap
+ * succeeded but CEK is wrong". */
+ byte fakeKey[WC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ int fakeRet = wc_PKCS7_KtriFakeCEK(pkcs7, encryptedKey,
+ (word32)encryptedKeySz,
+ fakeKey);
+
+ if (fakeRet != 0) {
+ /* Fallback generation failed (e.g. RNG/HMAC error).
+ * Return the fallback-generation status, which does
+ * not depend on RSA padding validity, rather than the
+ * RSA status which would re-open the oracle. */
+ ForceZero(fakeKey, sizeof(fakeKey));
+ /* In the non-OAEP path RSA is decrypted in-place via
+ * wc_RsaPrivateDecryptInline, so encryptedKey holds
+ * the (possibly valid) plaintext CEK. Zero it before
+ * free. */
+ ForceZero(encryptedKey, (word32)encryptedKeySz);
+ XFREE(encryptedKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_WOLF_BIGINT);
+ WC_FREE_VAR_EX(privKey, pkcs7->heap,
+ DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ #ifndef WC_NO_RSA_OAEP
+ if (encOID == RSAESOAEPk) {
+ if (outKey != NULL) {
+ ForceZero(outKey, outKeySz);
+ XFREE(outKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
+ }
+ }
+ #endif
+ return fakeRet;
+ }
+
+ /* Constant-time select between fake and real CEK. On RSA
+ * failure outKey may be NULL or keySz may be <= 0; in
+ * both cases the mask selects fakeKey for every byte.
+ *
+ * To avoid data-dependent branches that leak realLen,
+ * copy the real key into a fixed-size zero-padded buffer
+ * first, then select byte-by-byte in constant time. */
+ {
+ word32 i;
+ byte useFake;
+ int realLen = keySz;
+ byte realPad[WC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+ XMEMSET(realPad, 0, sizeof(realPad));
+ /* Constant-time copy: avoid data-dependent branches
+ * that could leak whether RSA padding was valid.
+ * When outKey is NULL (inline RSA failure), use
+ * encryptedKey as a safe readable source; the mask
+ * will zero out all bytes anyway. Both encryptedKey
+ * and outKey (when non-NULL) are at least
+ * sizeof(realPad) bytes for any RSA key size.
+ *
+ * Use constant-time pointer selection to avoid
+ * branching on outKey nullity, which would leak
+ * whether RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding was valid. */
+ {
+ byte haveSrc = ctMaskGTE(realLen, 1);
+ const byte* srcTbl[2];
+ const byte* src;
+ word32 j = 0;
+ word32 safeJ = 0;
+
+ /* Select source without integer pointer synthesis.
+ * Some safety-oriented compilers (e.g. Fil-C) treat
+ * int-to-pointer reconstruction as a null-object
+ * pointer on dereference. */
+ srcTbl[0] = encryptedKey;
+ srcTbl[1] = outKey;
+ src = srcTbl[haveSrc & 1];
+
+ /* safeJ is clamped to max(0, realLen-1): it
+ * only advances while the next index would
+ * still be inside realLen, so src[safeJ] is
+ * always in bounds. Bytes at j >= realLen are
+ * masked to zero by inBounds anyway. */
+ for (j = 0; j < (word32)sizeof(realPad); j++) {
+ byte inBounds = ctMaskLT((int)j, realLen);
+ byte advance = ctMaskLT((int)(safeJ + 1),
+ realLen);
+ realPad[j] = src[safeJ] & haveSrc & inBounds;
+ safeJ += (word32)(advance & 1);
+ }
+ }
+ useFake = ctMaskLT(realLen, 1); /* 0xFF if realLen<=0 */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (word32)sizeof(fakeKey); i++) {
+ decryptedKey[i] = ctMaskSel(useFake, fakeKey[i],
+ realPad[i]);
+ }
+ /* Report the real key size on success; on RSA
+ * failure (realLen <= 0) report sizeof(fakeKey).
+ * Constant-time select avoids branching on RSA
+ * padding validity. */
+ *decryptedKeySz = (word32)ctMaskSelInt(useFake,
+ (int)sizeof(fakeKey), realLen);
+ ForceZero(realPad, sizeof(realPad));
+ }
+ ForceZero(fakeKey, sizeof(fakeKey));
+ /* In the non-OAEP path RSA is decrypted in-place via
+ * wc_RsaPrivateDecryptInline, so encryptedKey holds the
+ * plaintext CEK after the unwrap. Zero it before free. */
+ ForceZero(encryptedKey, (word32)encryptedKeySz);
+ }
+ #else /* NO_HMAC || NO_SHA256: mitigation unavailable */
+ #if !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_KTRI_ORACLE_WARNING)
+ #warning "PKCS7 KTRI Bleichenbacher mitigation requires HMAC " \
+ "and SHA256; build without them leaves the RSA unwrap " \
+ "error path observable to callers. " \
+ "Define WOLFSSL_NO_KTRI_ORACLE_WARNING to silence."
+ #endif
+
if (keySz <= 0 || outKey == NULL) {
ForceZero(encryptedKey, (word32)encryptedKeySz);
XFREE(encryptedKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_WOLF_BIGINT);
WC_FREE_VAR_EX(privKey, pkcs7->heap,
DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
- #ifndef WC_NO_RSA_OAEP
+ #ifndef WC_NO_RSA_OAEP
if (encOID == RSAESOAEPk) {
if (outKey) {
+ ForceZero(outKey, outKeySz);
XFREE(outKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
}
}
- #endif
+ #endif
return keySz;
- } else {
+ }
+ else {
*decryptedKeySz = (word32)keySz;
XMEMCPY(decryptedKey, outKey, (word32)keySz);
ForceZero(encryptedKey, (word32)encryptedKeySz);
}
+ #endif /* !NO_HMAC && !NO_SHA256 */
XFREE(encryptedKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_WOLF_BIGINT);
WC_FREE_VAR_EX(privKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
#ifndef WC_NO_RSA_OAEP
if (encOID == RSAESOAEPk) {
if (outKey) {
+ ForceZero(outKey, outKeySz);
XFREE(outKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
}
}
@@ -11040,6 +11444,14 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_KariGetOriginatorIdentifierOrKey(WC_PKCS7_KARI* kari,
if (GetLength(pkiMsg, idx, &length, pkiMsgSz) < 0)
return ASN_PARSE_E;
+ /* BIT STRING must have at least unused-bits byte + 1 byte of content */
+ if (length < 2)
+ return ASN_PARSE_E;
+
+ /* Validate BIT STRING content is within input buffer */
+ if (*idx > pkiMsgSz || (word32)length > pkiMsgSz - *idx)
+ return ASN_PARSE_E;
+
if (GetASNTag(pkiMsg, idx, &tag, pkiMsgSz) < 0)
return ASN_EXPECT_0_E;
@@ -11519,9 +11931,22 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptOri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
XMEMCPY(oriOID, pkiMsg + *idx, (word32)oriOIDSz);
*idx += (word32)oriOIDSz;
+ /* Validate OID did not consume more than the SEQUENCE declared */
+ if ((*idx - tmpIdx) > (word32)seqSz) {
+ WOLFSSL_MSG("ORI oriType OID exceeds SEQUENCE boundary");
+ return ASN_PARSE_E;
+ }
+
/* get oriValue, increment idx */
oriValue = pkiMsg + *idx;
oriValueSz = (word32)seqSz - (*idx - tmpIdx);
+
+ /* Validate oriValue region is within input buffer */
+ if (*idx > pkiMsgSz || oriValueSz > pkiMsgSz - *idx) {
+ WOLFSSL_MSG("ORI oriValue exceeds input buffer");
+ return ASN_PARSE_E;
+ }
+
*idx += oriValueSz;
/* pass oriOID and oriValue to user callback, expect back
@@ -11699,6 +12124,12 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptPwri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
return ASN_PARSE_E;
}
+ /* Validate IV is within input buffer */
+ if (*idx > pkiMsgSz || (word32)length > pkiMsgSz - *idx) {
+ XFREE(salt, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ return ASN_PARSE_E;
+ }
+
XMEMCPY(tmpIv, pkiMsg + (*idx), (word32)length);
*idx += (word32)length;
@@ -11718,6 +12149,12 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptPwri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
return ASN_PARSE_E;
}
+ /* Validate EncryptedKey is within input buffer */
+ if (*idx > pkiMsgSz || (word32)length > pkiMsgSz - *idx) {
+ XFREE(salt, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ return ASN_PARSE_E;
+ }
+
/* allocate temporary space for decrypted key */
cekSz = (word32)length;
cek = (byte*)XMALLOC(cekSz, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
@@ -11740,6 +12177,7 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptPwri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
iterations, kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
if (ret < 0) {
XFREE(salt, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
XFREE(kek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
XFREE(cek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return ASN_PARSE_E;
@@ -11752,7 +12190,9 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptPwri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
pwriEncAlgoId);
if (ret < 0) {
XFREE(salt, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
XFREE(kek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(cek, cekSz);
XFREE(cek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return ret;
}
@@ -11761,7 +12201,9 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptPwri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
if (*decryptedKeySz < cekSz) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("Decrypted key buffer too small for CEK");
XFREE(salt, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
XFREE(kek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(cek, cekSz);
XFREE(cek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
return BUFFER_E;
}
@@ -11770,7 +12212,9 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptPwri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
*decryptedKeySz = cekSz;
XFREE(salt, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(kek, (word32)kekKeySz);
XFREE(kek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ ForceZero(cek, cekSz);
XFREE(cek, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
/* mark recipFound, since we only support one RecipientInfo for now */
@@ -11804,7 +12248,7 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKekri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
byte* keyId = NULL;
const byte* datePtr = NULL;
byte dateFormat, tag;
- word32 keyIdSz, kekIdSz, keyWrapOID, localIdx;
+ word32 keyIdSz, kekIdSz, kekIdEnd, keyWrapOID, localIdx;
int ret = 0;
byte* pkiMsg = in;
@@ -11830,6 +12274,11 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKekri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
return ASN_PARSE_E;
kekIdSz = (word32)length;
+ kekIdEnd = *idx + kekIdSz;
+
+ /* Validate KEKIdentifier boundary is within input buffer */
+ if (kekIdEnd < *idx || kekIdEnd > pkiMsgSz)
+ return ASN_PARSE_E;
if (GetASNTag(pkiMsg, idx, &tag, pkiMsgSz) < 0)
return ASN_PARSE_E;
@@ -11840,6 +12289,10 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKekri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
if (GetLength(pkiMsg, idx, &length, pkiMsgSz) < 0)
return ASN_PARSE_E;
+ /* Validate keyIdentifier is within input buffer */
+ if (*idx > pkiMsgSz || (word32)length > pkiMsgSz - *idx)
+ return ASN_PARSE_E;
+
/* save keyIdentifier and length */
keyId = pkiMsg + *idx;
keyIdSz = (word32)length;
@@ -11847,13 +12300,15 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKekri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
/* may have OPTIONAL GeneralizedTime */
localIdx = *idx;
- if ((*idx < kekIdSz) && GetASNTag(pkiMsg, &localIdx, &tag,
+ if ((*idx < kekIdEnd) && GetASNTag(pkiMsg, &localIdx, &tag,
pkiMsgSz) == 0 && tag == ASN_GENERALIZED_TIME) {
- if (wc_GetDateInfo(pkiMsg + *idx, (int)pkiMsgSz, &datePtr,
- &dateFormat, &dateLen) != 0) {
+ if (wc_GetDateInfo(pkiMsg + *idx, (int)(pkiMsgSz - *idx),
+ &datePtr, &dateFormat, &dateLen) != 0) {
return ASN_PARSE_E;
}
- *idx += (word32)(dateLen + 1);
+ /* datePtr points to the start of the date value
+ * within pkiMsg; advance past the full TLV. */
+ *idx = (word32)(datePtr - pkiMsg) + (word32)dateLen;
}
if (*idx > pkiMsgSz) {
@@ -11862,7 +12317,7 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKekri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
/* may have OPTIONAL OtherKeyAttribute */
localIdx = *idx;
- if ((*idx < kekIdSz) && GetASNTag(pkiMsg, &localIdx, &tag,
+ if ((*idx < kekIdEnd) && GetASNTag(pkiMsg, &localIdx, &tag,
pkiMsgSz) == 0 && tag == (ASN_SEQUENCE |
ASN_CONSTRUCTED)) {
if (GetSequence(pkiMsg, idx, &length, pkiMsgSz) < 0)
@@ -11891,6 +12346,10 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_DecryptKekri(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
if (GetLength(pkiMsg, idx, &length, pkiMsgSz) < 0)
return ASN_PARSE_E;
+ /* Validate EncryptedKey is within input buffer */
+ if (*idx > pkiMsgSz || (word32)length > pkiMsgSz - *idx)
+ return ASN_PARSE_E;
+
#ifndef NO_AES
direction = AES_DECRYPTION;
#else
@@ -12644,6 +13103,22 @@ static int wc_PKCS7_ParseToRecipientInfoSet(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
NO_USER_CHECK) < 0)
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
+ /* GetSet_ex is called with NO_USER_CHECK, which skips the
+ * (idx + length > maxIdx) bounds check in GetLength_ex. In
+ * non-streaming mode, validate the SET length against the
+ * remaining input buffer; in streaming mode the length flows
+ * into pkcs7->stream->expected and then wc_PKCS7_GrowStream,
+ * where it is capped by WOLFSSL_PKCS7_MAX_STREAM_ALLOC. */
+ if (ret == 0 && length < 0)
+ ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
+ #ifdef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
+ if (ret == 0 &&
+ (*idx > pkiMsgSz ||
+ (word32)length > pkiMsgSz - *idx)) {
+ ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
+ }
+ #endif
+
if (ret < 0)
break;
@@ -12799,6 +13274,11 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
if (decryptedKey == NULL)
return MEMORY_E;
+ XMEMSET(decryptedKey, 0, MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_SZ);
+ #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO
+ wc_MemZero_Add("wc_PKCS7 decryptedKey", decryptedKey,
+ MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_SZ);
+ #endif
wc_PKCS7_ChangeState(pkcs7, WC_PKCS7_ENV_2);
tmpIdx = idx;
recipientSetSz = (word32)ret;
@@ -13018,6 +13498,14 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
}
+ #ifdef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
+ if (ret == 0 && encryptedContentTotalSz > (int)(pkiMsgSz - idx)) {
+ /* In non-streaming mode, ensure the content fits in the buffer.
+ * Streaming mode handles this via AddDataToStream. */
+ ret = BUFFER_E;
+ }
+ #endif
+
if (ret != 0)
break;
@@ -13033,10 +13521,18 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
wc_PKCS7_StreamStoreVar(pkcs7, encOID, expBlockSz, explicitOctet);
if (explicitOctet) {
- /* initialize decryption state in preparation */
+ /* initialize decryption state in preparation. Use
+ * contentSz (blockKeySz from the content algorithm) as
+ * the AES key size rather than aadSz (the unwrapped CEK
+ * length): the two are equal for well-formed messages,
+ * but using blockKeySz avoids BAD_FUNC_ARG on crafted
+ * messages where the CEK length does not match the
+ * content cipher, which would otherwise be a
+ * distinguishable error. */
if (pkcs7->decryptionCb == NULL) {
ret = wc_PKCS7_DecryptContentInit(pkcs7, encOID,
- pkcs7->stream->aad, pkcs7->stream->aadSz,
+ pkcs7->stream->aad,
+ (word32)pkcs7->stream->contentSz,
pkcs7->stream->tmpIv, expBlockSz,
pkcs7->devId, pkcs7->heap);
if (ret != 0)
@@ -13319,8 +13815,13 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
ret = (int)pkcs7->totalEncryptedContentSz - padLen;
#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
- pkcs7->stream->aad = NULL;
- pkcs7->stream->aadSz = 0;
+ /* decryptedKey (just freed) is the same buffer stream->aad
+ * aliases. Null the stream handle so ResetStream doesn't
+ * double-free it. */
+ if (pkcs7->stream != NULL) {
+ pkcs7->stream->aad = NULL;
+ pkcs7->stream->aadSz = 0;
+ }
wc_PKCS7_ResetStream(pkcs7);
#endif
wc_PKCS7_ChangeState(pkcs7, WC_PKCS7_START);
@@ -13333,6 +13834,16 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
if (ret < 0 && ret != WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_PKCS7_WANT_READ_E)) {
+ /* stream->aad aliases the MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_SZ decryptedKey
+ * buffer in this flow. ResetStream only zeros aadSz bytes, so
+ * explicitly zero and release the full buffer here to satisfy
+ * WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO and avoid leaking key material. */
+ if (pkcs7->stream != NULL && pkcs7->stream->aad != NULL) {
+ ForceZero(pkcs7->stream->aad, MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_SZ);
+ XFREE(pkcs7->stream->aad, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
+ pkcs7->stream->aad = NULL;
+ pkcs7->stream->aadSz = 0;
+ }
wc_PKCS7_ResetStream(pkcs7);
wc_PKCS7_ChangeState(pkcs7, WC_PKCS7_START);
if (pkcs7->cachedEncryptedContent != NULL) {
@@ -13343,6 +13854,9 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
}
}
#else
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ wc_PKCS7_ChangeState(pkcs7, WC_PKCS7_START);
+ }
if (decryptedKey != NULL && ret < 0) {
ForceZero(decryptedKey, MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_SZ);
XFREE(decryptedKey, pkcs7->heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_PKCS7);
@@ -14103,6 +14617,10 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeAuthEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
}
else {
XMEMSET(decryptedKey, 0, MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_SZ);
+ #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO
+ wc_MemZero_Add("wc_PKCS7 decryptedKey", decryptedKey,
+ MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_SZ);
+ #endif
}
#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
pkcs7->stream->key = decryptedKey;
@@ -14238,6 +14756,11 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeAuthEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
break;
}
pkiMsgSz = (pkcs7->stream->length > 0)? pkcs7->stream->length: inSz;
+
+ /* Restore encOID across WANT_READ re-entries so the nonce
+ * length validation below always sees the content-cipher
+ * algorithm parsed in AUTHENV_3. */
+ wc_PKCS7_StreamGetVar(pkcs7, &encOID, &blockKeySz, NULL);
#endif
/* get length of optional parameter sequence */
if (ret == 0 && GetLength(pkiMsg, &idx, &length, pkiMsgSz) < 0) {
@@ -14255,6 +14778,46 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeAuthEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
}
+ /* Enforce algorithm-specific nonce length bounds at the parser
+ * layer so malformed lengths (notably zero-length, which would
+ * catastrophically break AEAD uniqueness on HW backends that
+ * skip their own checks) cannot reach the cipher engine.
+ * - AES-GCM in CMS: RFC 5084 Sec. 3.2 mandates a 12-octet IV.
+ * - AES-CCM: RFC 3610 Sec. 2.3 requires 7..13 octets.
+ * Any other encOID here is a parser-state invariant violation. */
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ int nonceMin = 0, nonceMax = 0;
+ switch (encOID) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_AESGCM
+ case AES128GCMb:
+ case AES192GCMb:
+ case AES256GCMb:
+ nonceMin = GCM_NONCE_MID_SZ;
+ nonceMax = GCM_NONCE_MID_SZ;
+ break;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef HAVE_AESCCM
+ case AES128CCMb:
+ case AES192CCMb:
+ case AES256CCMb:
+ nonceMin = CCM_NONCE_MIN_SZ;
+ nonceMax = CCM_NONCE_MAX_SZ;
+ break;
+ #endif
+ default:
+ WOLFSSL_MSG(
+ "AuthEnvelopedData unexpected content cipher");
+ ret = ALGO_ID_E;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0 &&
+ (nonceSz < nonceMin || nonceSz > nonceMax)) {
+ WOLFSSL_MSG(
+ "AuthEnvelopedData nonce length invalid for cipher");
+ ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
+ }
+ }
+
if (ret == 0) {
XMEMCPY(nonce, &pkiMsg[idx], (word32)nonceSz);
idx += (word32)nonceSz;
@@ -14406,7 +14969,16 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeAuthEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
if (GetLength_ex(pkiMsg, &idx, &length, pkiMsgSz, 0) <= 0) {
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
}
- #ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
+
+ #ifdef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
+ /* In non-streaming mode, validate authenticatedAttributes
+ * length is within the input buffer. The streaming path
+ * handles this via wc_PKCS7_AddDataToStream instead. */
+ if (ret == 0 &&
+ (idx > pkiMsgSz || (word32)length > pkiMsgSz - idx)) {
+ ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
+ }
+ #else
pkcs7->stream->expected = (word32)length;
#endif
encodedAttribSz = (word32)length + (idx - encodedAttribIdx);
@@ -15274,6 +15846,12 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeEncryptedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
pkiMsgSz, NO_USER_CHECK) <= 0)
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
+#ifdef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
+ if (ret == 0 && encryptedContentSz > (int)(pkiMsgSz - idx)) {
+ ret = BUFFER_E;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (ret < 0)
break;
#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
@@ -15311,7 +15889,8 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeEncryptedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in, word32 inSz,
version = (int)pkcs7->stream->vers;
tmpIv = pkcs7->stream->tmpIv;
#endif
- if (encryptedContentSz <= 0) {
+ if (encryptedContentSz <= 0 ||
+ encryptedContentSz > (int)(pkiMsgSz - idx)) {
ret = BUFFER_E;
break;
}
diff --git a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_encrypt.h b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_encrypt.h
index da11b5392..7f1c48b63 100644
--- a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_encrypt.h
+++ b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_encrypt.h
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@
#ifndef CCM_NONCE_MIN_SZ
#define CCM_NONCE_MIN_SZ 7
#endif
+ #ifndef CCM_NONCE_MAX_SZ
+ #define CCM_NONCE_MAX_SZ 13
+ #endif
#endif
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