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nss-3.15.1: fix CVE-2013-1739

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Mozilla Network Security Services (NSS) before 3.15.2 does
not ensure that data structures are initialized before
read operations, which allows remote attackers to cause a
denial of service or possibly have unspecified other
impact via vectors that trigger a decryption failure.

http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-1739
(From OE-Core rev: 9b43af77d112e75fa9827a9080b7e94f41f9a116)

(From OE-Core rev: 4ce30ef254511ce39dd576b80134b9316f9fa06c)

Signed-off-by: yzhu1 <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jackie Huang <jackie.huang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

Conflicts:
	meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
This commit is contained in:
yzhu1
2014-06-18 05:41:30 -04:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent 1d04721fe8
commit 6780f20525
1 changed files with 81 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch
+81
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: yzhu1 <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
@@ -10509,7 +10509,7 @@ ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *pla
/* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */
t = plaintext->len;
t -= paddingLength+overhead;
- /* If len >= padding_length+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
+ /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
/* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
t = blockSize - (paddingLength+1);
@@ -10742,7 +10742,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
}
}
- good = (unsigned)-1;
+ good = ~0U;
minLength = crSpec->mac_size;
if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
/* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */
@@ -10756,14 +10756,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
/* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
* length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
if (cText->buf->len < minLength) {
- SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, record too small.",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
- /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
- ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
- SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
- /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */
- PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
- return SECFailure;
+ goto decrypt_loser;
}
if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
@@ -10831,11 +10824,18 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
return SECFailure;
}
+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+ ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) {
+ goto decrypt_loser;
+ }
+
/* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */
rv = crSpec->decode(
crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen);
- good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto decrypt_loser;
+ }
PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len));
@@ -10843,7 +10843,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
/* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */
if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
- const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->iv_size;
+ const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size;
const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size;
if (crSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
@@ -10899,10 +10899,11 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
}
if (good == 0) {
+decrypt_loser:
/* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
- SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: mac check failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);