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qemu: Security fix for CVE-2020-29443
Source: Qemu.org MR: 109315 Type: Security Fix Disposition: Backport from https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=813212288970c39b1800f63e83ac6e96588095c6 ChangeID: c0296e285169cc937cc9758c9d84ac690297ee54 Description: (From OE-Core rev: 1765005f73303d9857f9fde93efb1cc8534964f1) Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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Richard Purdie
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@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
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file://CVE-2020-25624_1.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-25624_1.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-25624_2.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-25624_2.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-25625.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-25625.patch \
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file://CVE-2020-29443.patch \
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"
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"
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UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
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UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
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From 813212288970c39b1800f63e83ac6e96588095c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 13:09:26 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] ide: atapi: assert that the buffer pointer is in range
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A case was reported where s->io_buffer_index can be out of range.
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The report skimped on the details but it seems to be triggered
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by s->lba == -1 on the READ/READ CD paths (e.g. by sending an
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ATAPI command with LBA = 0xFFFFFFFF). For now paper over it
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with assertions. The first one ensures that there is no overflow
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when incrementing s->io_buffer_index, the second checks for the
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buffer overrun.
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Note that the buffer overrun is only a read, so I am not sure
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if the assertion failure is actually less harmful than the overrun.
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Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Message-id: 20201201120926.56559-1-pbonzini@redhat.com
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Reviewed-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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CVE: CVE-2020-29443
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Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
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---
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hw/ide/atapi.c | 2 ++
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/hw/ide/atapi.c b/hw/ide/atapi.c
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index 14a2b0bb2f..e79157863f 100644
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--- a/hw/ide/atapi.c
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+++ b/hw/ide/atapi.c
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@@ -276,6 +276,8 @@ void ide_atapi_cmd_reply_end(IDEState *s)
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s->packet_transfer_size -= size;
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s->elementary_transfer_size -= size;
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s->io_buffer_index += size;
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+ assert(size <= s->io_buffer_total_len);
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+ assert(s->io_buffer_index <= s->io_buffer_total_len);
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/* Some adapters process PIO data right away. In that case, we need
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* to avoid mutual recursion between ide_transfer_start
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--
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2.25.1
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