`unix://$PATH` as listen argument will bind aptly to a unix domain socket
rather than TCP.
This allows binding the API to a UDS rather than a port.
Since aptly has no concept of authentication or any amount of high level
API hardening one needs to bottle it up in some other manner. Binding
to a localhost port is often a step in the right direction, ultimately is
still a scary insecure setup as any user on that host getting compromised
would mean that the entire archive is compromised as well.
UDS on the other hand are basically files and have their access managed
by regular file permission. As such, binding to a socket is in fact
the least insecure way to listen as you'd have to explicitly open up the
socket permissions to an access qualified group. In the most conservative
scenario that means no one but the aptly user can talk to the API, in a
more practical setup apache might get access as well and proxy the UDS
with authentication or limited to GET operations.
Using UDS allows reducing the attack surface of the API server while
preserving all the flexibility.
Now that there's an official Go AWS SDK from Amazon, use that instead of
goamz. goamz isn't getting much love these days.
Implement support for STS credentials, as in assumed roles and EC2
instance profiles. The configuration is extended to support a session
token, though I'm not sure why anyone would put temporary credentials in
a configuration file. More likely, no credentials will be explicitly
configured at all, and they will be discovered through the standard SDK
mechanisms described at
<https://blogs.aws.amazon.com/security/post/Tx3D6U6WSFGOK2H/A-New-and-Standardized-Way-to-Manage-Credentials-in-the-AWS-SDKs>.
Resolves#342.
After the first API request, the database was locked as long as the API
server is running. This prevents a user to also use the command-line
client. This commit adds a new flag `-no-lock` that will close the
database after each API request.
Closes#234