Debian co-signs each suite's InRelease with more than one archive key, so
gpgv reports a good signature from the key you trust and NO_PUBKEY for the
others, exiting 2. Both verifiers treat that as failure, which means
mirroring Debian requires importing every key Debian happens to sign with.
apt does not require this: it is fatal only when there is no good signature
or a BADSIG.
Adopt that rule for unknown signers. When gpgv exits non-zero the status
stream is parsed per NEWSIG block and the result is a success only when the
process exited, at least one block is a good signature from a held key, at
least one block is an unknown issuer (ERRSIG reason 9 with NO_PUBKEY), and
nothing else appears. BADSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG and REVKEYSIG from a held
key still fail, as does any unexplained failure. The exit-zero path is
unchanged.
KEYEXPIRED and KEYREVOKED are deliberately not disqualifiers: doc/DETAILS
notes KEYEXPIRED is emitted for an expired subkey even when that subkey was
not used, so treating it as a verdict rejects valid signatures.
checkDetachedSignature gets the equivalent change for the internal verifier.
These unit-tests cover operations via both PGP providers:
built-in `openpgp` and external `gpg`.
Next step is to run these tests for gpg1 & gpg2
as separate entities.
André Roth
Daniel Pinder
Lorenzo Bolla
Andrey Smirnov