fix: update flatted to 3.4.2 to fix prototype pollution (GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh)

* block checking out fork pr for some events

* address copilot and reviewer feedback

* run prettier formatting

* build

* update urls

* update readme

* update description and url again

* edit url one more time

__test__/input-helper.test.ts

@@ -12,24 +12,15 @@ const gitHubWorkspace = path.resolve('/checkout-tests/workspace')
 // Inputs for mock @actions/core
 let inputs = {} as any
 
-// Replicate @actions/core getInput behavior: it trims whitespace by default
-// (String.prototype.trim(), which strips characters such as a leading U+FEFF BOM)
-// unless trimWhitespace is explicitly set to false.
-const getInputImpl = (name: string, options?: {trimWhitespace?: boolean}) => {
-  const val = inputs[name] ?? ''
-  if (options && options.trimWhitespace === false) {
-    return val
-  }
-  return typeof val === 'string' ? val.trim() : val
-}
-
 // Shallow clone original @actions/github context
 let originalContext = {...github.context}
 
 describe('input-helper tests', () => {
   beforeAll(() => {
     // Mock getInput
-    jest.spyOn(core, 'getInput').mockImplementation(getInputImpl as any)
+    jest.spyOn(core, 'getInput').mockImplementation((name: string) => {
+      return inputs[name]
+    })
 
     // Mock error/warning/info/debug
     jest.spyOn(core, 'error').mockImplementation(jest.fn())
@@ -160,86 +151,8 @@ describe('input-helper tests', () => {
     expect(settings.commit).toBeFalsy()
   })
 
-  it('does not reclassify a ref as sha when a BOM is prefixed', async () => {
-    // A fork branch named "<U+FEFF>" + 40 hex chars. core.getInput trims the
-    // BOM by default, which previously collapsed this into a bare SHA and
-    // bypassed the unsafe fork PR checkout guard.
-    inputs.ref = '\uFEFF522d932fae5296da51fdf431934425ecf891c6a2'
-    const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
-    expect(settings.commit).toBeFalsy()
-    expect(settings.ref).toBe('522d932fae5296da51fdf431934425ecf891c6a2')
-  })
-
-  it('does not reclassify a sha-256 ref as sha when a BOM is prefixed', async () => {
-    inputs.ref =
-      '\uFEFF1111111111222222222233333333334444444444555555555566666666667777'
-    const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
-    expect(settings.commit).toBeFalsy()
-    expect(settings.ref).toBe(
-      '1111111111222222222233333333334444444444555555555566666666667777'
-    )
-  })
-
-  it('treats a sha surrounded by ascii whitespace as a commit', async () => {
-    // ASCII whitespace can only come from the workflow author's YAML (git ref
-    // names cannot contain it), so trimming it and treating the value as a
-    // commit is safe.
-    inputs.ref = '  1111111111222222222233333333334444444444  '
-    const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
-    expect(settings.ref).toBeFalsy()
-    expect(settings.commit).toBe('1111111111222222222233333333334444444444')
-  })
-
   it('sets workflow organization ID', async () => {
     const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
     expect(settings.workflowOrganizationId).toBe(123456)
   })
-
-  describe('unsafe PR checkout guard', () => {
-    const forkPayload = {
-      repository: {id: 100},
-      pull_request: {
-        head: {
-          sha: '1234567890123456789012345678901234567890',
-          repo: {id: 200, full_name: 'attacker/fork'}
-        },
-        merge_commit_sha: 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa'
-      }
-    }
-
-    it('allows the default self-checkout on a fork pull_request_target', async () => {
-      const originalEvent = github.context.eventName
-      const originalPayload = github.context.payload
-      const originalSha = github.context.sha
-      try {
-        github.context.eventName = 'pull_request_target'
-        github.context.payload = forkPayload as any
-        // Simulate a rebase/fast-forward merge where the base tip (event SHA)
-        // equals the PR head SHA. The default self-checkout must still succeed.
-        github.context.sha = '1234567890123456789012345678901234567890'
-        const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
-        expect(settings.commit).toBe('1234567890123456789012345678901234567890')
-      } finally {
-        github.context.eventName = originalEvent
-        github.context.payload = originalPayload
-        github.context.sha = originalSha
-      }
-    })
-
-    it('refuses an explicit fork repository on pull_request_target', async () => {
-      const originalEvent = github.context.eventName
-      const originalPayload = github.context.payload
-      try {
-        github.context.eventName = 'pull_request_target'
-        github.context.payload = forkPayload as any
-        inputs.repository = 'attacker/fork'
-        await expect(inputHelper.getInputs()).rejects.toThrow(
-          /Refusing to check out fork pull request code/
-        )
-      } finally {
-        github.context.eventName = originalEvent
-        github.context.payload = originalPayload
-      }
-    })
-  })
 })

dist/index.js

@@ -2059,23 +2059,6 @@ function getInputs() {
             `${github.context.repo.owner}/${github.context.repo.repo}`.toUpperCase();
         // Source branch, source version
         result.ref = core.getInput('ref');
-        // core.getInput()'s default trim strips a range of Unicode characters such as a
-        // leading BOM (U+FEFF) or NBSP (U+00A0). Those are valid in a git ref name, so
-        // a fork branch named "<BOM>" + 40 hex chars would trim down to a bare SHA and
-        // be silently reclassified as a commit, bypassing the unsafe fork PR checkout
-        // guard.
-        //
-        // The trim below strips only the ASCII whitespace characters which are all forbidden
-        // in a git branch name.
-        //   \t  U+0009  horizontal tab   - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
-        //   \n  U+000A  line feed        - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
-        //   \v  U+000B  vertical tab     - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
-        //   \f  U+000C  form feed        - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
-        //   \r  U+000D  carriage return  - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
-        //   ' ' U+0020  space            - forbidden in ref names
-        const asciiTrimmedRef = core
-            .getInput('ref', { trimWhitespace: false })
-            .replace(/^[\t\n\v\f\r ]+|[\t\n\v\f\r ]+$/g, '');
         if (!result.ref) {
             if (isWorkflowRepository) {
                 result.ref = github.context.ref;
@@ -2088,8 +2071,8 @@ function getInputs() {
             }
         }
         // SHA?
-        else if (asciiTrimmedRef.match(/^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64})$/)) {
-            result.commit = asciiTrimmedRef;
+        else if (result.ref.match(/^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64})$/)) {
+            result.commit = result.ref;
             result.ref = '';
         }
         core.debug(`ref = '${result.ref}'`);
@@ -2167,19 +2150,12 @@ function getInputs() {
             (core.getInput('allow-unsafe-pr-checkout') || 'false').toUpperCase() ===
                 'TRUE';
         core.debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`);
-        // The default self-checkout (this repository with no explicit ref) always
-        // resolves to the trusted ref/commit GitHub set for the triggering event, so
-        // the fork-checkout guard only needs to run when the caller customized the
-        // repository or ref.
-        const isDefaultCheckout = isWorkflowRepository && !core.getInput('ref');
-        if (!isDefaultCheckout) {
-            unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
-                qualifiedRepository,
-                ref: result.ref,
-                commit: result.commit,
-                allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
-            });
-        }
+        unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
+            qualifiedRepository,
+            ref: result.ref,
+            commit: result.commit,
+            allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
+        });
         return result;
     });
 }
@@ -2857,9 +2833,9 @@ function assertSafePrCheckout(input) {
     throw new Error(`Refusing to check out fork pull request code from a '${eventName}' workflow. ` +
         `This workflow runs with the base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch ` +
         `cache scope, and runner access. Fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted ` +
-        `context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. To opt in, review the risks ` +
-        `at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target and set 'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' ` +
-        `on the actions/checkout step.`);
+        `context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. To opt in after reviewing ` +
+        `the risks at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target, set ` +
+        `'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' on the actions/checkout step.`);
 }
 function pushIfSha(target, value) {
     if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0) {

package-lock.json

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
         "@actions/github": "^6.0.0",
         "@actions/io": "^1.1.3",
         "@actions/tool-cache": "^2.0.1",
+        "flatted": "^3.4.2",
         "uuid": "^9.0.1"
       },
       "devDependencies": {
@@ -3590,10 +3591,10 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/flatted": {
-      "version": "3.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/flatted/-/flatted-3.3.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-X8cqMLLie7KsNUDSdzeN8FYK9rEt4Dt67OsG/DNGnYTSDBG4uFAJFBnUeiV+zCVAvwFy56IjM9sH51jVaEhNxw==",
-      "dev": true
+      "version": "3.4.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/flatted/-/flatted-3.4.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-PjDse7RzhcPkIJwy5t7KPWQSZ9cAbzQXcafsetQoD7sOJRQlGikNbx7yZp2OotDnJyrDcbyRq3Ttb18iYOqkxA==",
+      "license": "ISC"
     },
     "node_modules/for-each": {
       "version": "0.3.3",

package.json

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
     "@actions/github": "^6.0.0",
     "@actions/io": "^1.1.3",
     "@actions/tool-cache": "^2.0.1",
+    "flatted": "^3.4.2",
     "uuid": "^9.0.1"
   },
   "devDependencies": {

src/input-helper.ts

@@ -59,23 +59,6 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
 
   // Source branch, source version
   result.ref = core.getInput('ref')
-  // core.getInput()'s default trim strips a range of Unicode characters such as a
-  // leading BOM (U+FEFF) or NBSP (U+00A0). Those are valid in a git ref name, so
-  // a fork branch named "<BOM>" + 40 hex chars would trim down to a bare SHA and
-  // be silently reclassified as a commit, bypassing the unsafe fork PR checkout
-  // guard.
-  //
-  // The trim below strips only the ASCII whitespace characters which are all forbidden
-  // in a git branch name.
-  //   \t  U+0009  horizontal tab   - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
-  //   \n  U+000A  line feed        - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
-  //   \v  U+000B  vertical tab     - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
-  //   \f  U+000C  form feed        - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
-  //   \r  U+000D  carriage return  - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
-  //   ' ' U+0020  space            - forbidden in ref names
-  const asciiTrimmedRef = core
-    .getInput('ref', {trimWhitespace: false})
-    .replace(/^[\t\n\v\f\r ]+|[\t\n\v\f\r ]+$/g, '')
   if (!result.ref) {
     if (isWorkflowRepository) {
       result.ref = github.context.ref
@@ -89,8 +72,8 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
     }
   }
   // SHA?
-  else if (asciiTrimmedRef.match(/^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64})$/)) {
-    result.commit = asciiTrimmedRef
+  else if (result.ref.match(/^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64})$/)) {
+    result.commit = result.ref
     result.ref = ''
   }
   core.debug(`ref = '${result.ref}'`)
@@ -185,19 +168,12 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
     'TRUE'
   core.debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`)
 
-  // The default self-checkout (this repository with no explicit ref) always
-  // resolves to the trusted ref/commit GitHub set for the triggering event, so
-  // the fork-checkout guard only needs to run when the caller customized the
-  // repository or ref.
-  const isDefaultCheckout = isWorkflowRepository && !core.getInput('ref')
-  if (!isDefaultCheckout) {
-    unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
-      qualifiedRepository,
-      ref: result.ref,
-      commit: result.commit,
-      allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
-    })
-  }
+  unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
+    qualifiedRepository,
+    ref: result.ref,
+    commit: result.commit,
+    allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
+  })
 
   return result
 }

src/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper.ts

@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ export function assertSafePrCheckout(input: IUnsafePrCheckoutInput): void {
     `Refusing to check out fork pull request code from a '${eventName}' workflow. ` +
       `This workflow runs with the base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch ` +
       `cache scope, and runner access. Fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted ` +
-      `context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. To opt in, review the risks ` +
-      `at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target and set 'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' ` +
-      `on the actions/checkout step.`
+      `context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. To opt in after reviewing ` +
+      `the risks at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target, set ` +
+      `'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' on the actions/checkout step.`
   )
 }