kas: corstone-1000: Pin Yocto layer dependencies for CORSTONE1000-2024.11 release

The SHA of the dependent community layers are set to the tested SHA from the `styhead` branch of each layer. Signed-off-by: Hugues KAMBA MPIANA <hugues.kambampiana@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
kas: corstone-1000: Update the SHA of the Yocto layer dependencies for the CORSTONE1000-2024.11 release.
2026-07-18 04:27:08 +00:00 · 2024-12-05 12:00:12 -05:00 · 2024-12-05 12:00:12 -05:00 · 2024-12-05 12:00:12 -05:00 · 2024-12-02 06:00:12 -05:00 · 2024-11-18 10:34:03 -05:00
622 changed files with 21202 additions and 39903 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-image: ${MIRROR_GHCR}/siemens/kas/kas:5.2
+image: ${MIRROR_GHCR}/siemens/kas/kas:4.4

 variables:
  # These are needed as the k8s executor doesn't respect the container
@@ -9,16 +9,18 @@ variables:
  CPU_REQUEST: ""
  # The default machine tag for the build jobs
  DEFAULT_TAG: ""
-  # The directory to use as the persistent cache (the root for DL_DIR,
-  # SSTATE_DIR, etc). The default is the build tree which will not be
-  # persistent, so this should be set in the runner.
-  CACHE_DIR: $CI_PROJECT_DIR
+  # The machine tag for the ACS test jobs
+  ACS_TAG: ""
+  # The directory to use as the persistent cache (the root for DL_DIR, SSTATE_DIR, etc)
+  CACHE_DIR: $CI_BUILDS_DIR/persist
  # The container mirror to use
  MIRROR_GHCR: ghcr.io
+  # Whether to run the SystemReady ACS tests
+  ACS_TEST: 0
  # The list of extra Kas fragments to be used when building
  EXTRA_KAS_FILES: ""
-  # Whether warnings should be fatal (0/1)
-  FATAL_WARNINGS: 0
+  # The NVD API key to use when fetching CVEs
+  NVDCVE_API_KEY: ""

 stages:
  - prep
@@ -31,22 +33,29 @@ stages:
  stage: build
  interruptible: true
  variables:
-    KUBERNETES_CPU_REQUEST: $CPU_REQUEST
    KAS_WORK_DIR: $CI_PROJECT_DIR/work
    KAS_BUILD_DIR: $KAS_WORK_DIR/build
-    # Set this in the environment to enable local repository caches
-    KAS_REPO_REF_DIR: ""
+    KAS_REPO_REF_DIR: $CACHE_DIR/repos
    SSTATE_DIR: $CACHE_DIR/sstate
    DL_DIR: $CACHE_DIR/downloads
    BB_LOGCONFIG: $CI_PROJECT_DIR/ci/logging.yml
+    TOOLCHAIN_DIR: $CACHE_DIR/toolchains
    IMAGE_DIR: $KAS_BUILD_DIR/tmp/deploy/images
+    TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR: $KAS_BUILD_DIR/toolchains
  before_script:
+    - echo KAS_WORK_DIR = $KAS_WORK_DIR
+    - echo SSTATE_DIR = $SSTATE_DIR
+    - echo DL_DIR = $DL_DIR
    - rm -rf $KAS_WORK_DIR
-    - mkdir --verbose --parents $KAS_WORK_DIR $KAS_REPO_REF_DIR $SSTATE_DIR $DL_DIR
+    - mkdir --verbose --parents $KAS_WORK_DIR $KAS_REPO_REF_DIR $SSTATE_DIR $DL_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR
+    # Must do this here, as it's the only way to make sure the toolchain is installed on the same builder
+    - ./ci/get-binary-toolchains $DL_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR

 # Generalised fragment to do a Kas build
 .build:
  extends: .setup
+  variables:
+    KUBERNETES_CPU_REQUEST: $CPU_REQUEST
  rules:
    # Don't run MR pipelines
    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
@@ -63,19 +72,16 @@ stages:
    # Catch all for everything else
    - if: '$KERNEL != "linux-yocto-dev"'
  script:
-    - |
-      KASFILES=$(./ci/jobs-to-kas "$CI_JOB_NAME" $EXTRA_KAS_FILES):lockfile.yml
-      echo KASFILES=$KASFILES
-      kas dump --update --force-checkout --resolve-refs --resolve-env $KASFILES
-      kas build $KASFILES
-      if [ $FATAL_WARNINGS -ne 0 ]; then
-        ./ci/check-warnings $KAS_BUILD_DIR/warnings.log
-      fi
-      kas shell ci/base.yml:lockfile.yml --command "$CI_PROJECT_DIR/ci/junit.sh $KAS_WORK_DIR/build"
+    - KASFILES=$(./ci/jobs-to-kas "$CI_JOB_NAME" $EXTRA_KAS_FILES):lockfile.yml
+    - echo KASFILES=$KASFILES
+    - kas dump --update --force-checkout --resolve-refs --resolve-env $KASFILES
+    - kas build $KASFILES
+    - ./ci/check-warnings $KAS_BUILD_DIR/warnings.log
+    - kas shell ci/base.yml:lockfile.yml --command "$CI_PROJECT_DIR/ci/junit.sh $KAS_WORK_DIR/build"
+
  artifacts:
    name: "logs"
-    when: on_failure
-    expire_in: 1 week
+    when: always
    paths:
      - $KAS_BUILD_DIR/tmp*/work*/**/temp/log.do_*.*
      - $KAS_BUILD_DIR/tmp*/work*/**/testimage/*
@@ -93,45 +99,46 @@ update-repos:
    exit_codes: 128
  script:
    - |
-      exit_code=0
-
-      # Dump the environment for reference
-      printenv
-
-      # Update the reference repositories if needed
-      if [ -n "$KAS_REPO_REF_DIR" ]; then
-        flock --verbose --timeout 60 $KAS_REPO_REF_DIR --command ./ci/update-repos || exit_code=$?
-        # Exit now if that failed, unless the status was 128 (fetch failed)
-        test $exit_code != 0 -a $exit_code != 128 && exit 1
-      fi
-
+      flock --verbose --timeout 60 $KAS_REPO_REF_DIR ./ci/update-repos
      # Only generate if doesn't already exist, to allow feature branches to drop one in.
      if test -f lockfile.yml; then
        echo Using existing lockfile.yml
      else
        # Be sure that this is the complete list of layers being fetched
-        kas dump --lock --update ci/qemuarm64.yml:ci/meta-openembedded.yml:ci/clang.yml | tee lockfile.yml
+        kas dump --lock --update ci/qemuarm64.yml:ci/meta-openembedded.yml:ci/clang.yml:ci/meta-virtualization.yml | tee lockfile.yml
      fi
-      exit $exit_code
  artifacts:
    name: "lockfile"
-    when: always
    paths:
      - lockfile.yml

 #
 # Build stage, the actual build jobs
 #
-# Available options for building are (VIRT _must_ be last for ssh override)
+# Available options for building are
 #  DISTRO: [poky, poky-altcfg, poky-tiny]
-#  KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-dev]
-#  TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
+#  KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-dev, linux-yocto-rt]
+#  TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang, external-gccarm]
 #  TCLIBC: [glibc, musl]
 #  FIRMWARE: [u-boot, edk2]
 #  TS: [none, trusted-services]
+#  VIRT: [none, xen]
 #  TESTING: testimage
 #  SECUREDEBUG: [none, secure-debug]

+arm-systemready-ir-acs:
+  extends: .build
+  timeout: 12h
+  parallel:
+    matrix:
+      # arm-systemready-ir-acs must be specified after fvp-base for ordering
+      # purposes for the jobs-to-kas output. It is not enough to just have it
+      # in the job name because fvp-base.yml overwrites the target.
+      - PLATFORM: [fvp-base, corstone1000-fvp]
+        ARM_SYSTEMREADY_IR_ACS: arm-systemready-ir-acs
+  tags:
+    - ${ACS_TAG}
+
 # Validate layers are Yocto Project Compatible
 check-layers:
  extends: .setup
@@ -150,6 +157,7 @@ corstone1000-fvp:
        TESTING: [testimage, tftf]
      - FIRMWARE: none
        TESTING: testimage
+      - SYSTEMREADY_FIRMWARE: arm-systemready-firmware

 corstone1000-mps3:
  extends: .build
@@ -160,15 +168,6 @@ corstone1000-mps3:
      - FIRMWARE: none
        SECUREDEBUG: [none, secure-debug]

-corstone1000-a320-fvp:
-  extends: .build
-  parallel:
-    matrix:
-      - FIRMWARE: corstone1000-firmware-only
-        TESTING: [testimage, tftf]
-      - FIRMWARE: none
-        TESTING: testimage
-
 documentation:
  extends: .setup
  script:
@@ -200,11 +199,7 @@ fvp-base:
        TESTING: testimage
      - FIRMWARE: [u-boot, edk2]
        TESTING: testimage
-      - LTS: lts-revisions
-        TESTING: testimage
-      - KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev
-        LATEST: latest-revisions
-        TESTING: testimage
+      - SYSTEMREADY_FIRMWARE: arm-systemready-firmware

 fvps:
  extends: .build
@@ -249,11 +244,6 @@ musca-s1:

 pending-updates:
  extends: .setup
-  # Only run this job for the default branch (master), or if forced with
-  # BUILD_FORCE_PENDING_UPDATES.
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH
-    - if: $BUILD_FORCE_PENDING_UPDATES != null
  artifacts:
    paths:
      - update-report
@@ -262,17 +252,22 @@ pending-updates:
    # This configuration has all of the layers we need enabled
    - kas shell --update --force-checkout ci/qemuarm64.yml:ci/meta-openembedded.yml:ci/meta-secure-core.yml:lockfile.yml --command \
      "$CI_PROJECT_DIR/scripts/machine-summary.py -t report -o $CI_PROJECT_DIR/update-report $($CI_PROJECT_DIR/ci/listmachines.py meta-arm meta-arm-bsp)"
+  # Do this on x86 whilst the compilers are x86-only
+  tags:
+    - x86_64

 qemuarm64-secureboot:
  extends: .build
  parallel:
    matrix:
-      - TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
-        FIRMWARE: [u-boot, edk2]
+      - KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-rt]
+        TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
        TCLIBC: [glibc, musl]
        TS: [none, qemuarm64-secureboot-ts]
        TESTING: testimage
-      - UEFISB: [none, uefi-secureboot]
+      - TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
+        TS: [none, qemuarm64-secureboot-ts]
+        UEFISB: [none, uefi-secureboot]
        TESTING: testimage
      - KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev
        TESTING: testimage
@@ -281,18 +276,26 @@ qemuarm64:
  extends: .build
  parallel:
    matrix:
-      - DISTRO: poky-tiny
+      - DISTRO: poky
+        KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-rt]
+        TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
        FIRMWARE: [u-boot, edk2]
        TESTING: testimage
+      - DISTRO: poky-tiny
+        TESTING: testimage
+      - VIRT: xen
+      - KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev
+        TESTING: testimage

 qemuarm-secureboot:
  extends: .build
  parallel:
    matrix:
-      - TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
+      - KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-rt]
+        TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
        TCLIBC: [glibc, musl]
        TESTING: testimage
-      - DISTRO: [poky, poky-altcfg]
+      - TOOLCHAINS: external-gccarm
        TESTING: testimage
      - KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev
        TESTING: testimage
@@ -301,38 +304,33 @@ qemuarm:
  extends: .build
  parallel:
    matrix:
-      - TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
+      - DISTRO: poky
+        KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-rt]
+        TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
+        FIRMWARE: [u-boot, edk2]
        TESTING: testimage
      - DISTRO: poky-tiny
        TESTING: testimage
+      - VIRT: xen
+      - KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev
+        TESTING: testimage

 qemuarmv5:
  extends: .build
  parallel:
    matrix:
      - DISTRO: poky
-        KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-dev]
+        KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-dev, linux-yocto-rt]
        TESTING: testimage
      - DISTRO: poky-tiny
        TESTING: testimage

-rdn2:
-  extends: .build
-  parallel:
-    matrix:
-      - TESTING: testimage
-
-rdv2:
-  extends: .build
-  parallel:
-    matrix:
-      - TESTING: testimage
-
 sbsa-ref:
  extends: .build
  parallel:
    matrix:
-      - TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
+      - KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-rt]
+        TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
        TESTING: testimage
      - DISTRO: poky-altcfg
        TESTING: testimage
@@ -345,5 +343,8 @@ selftest:
    - KASFILES=./ci/qemuarm64.yml:./ci/selftest.yml:lockfile.yml
    - kas shell --update --force-checkout $KASFILES -c 'oe-selftest --num-processes 2 --select-tag meta-arm --run-all-tests'

+sgi575:
+  extends: .build
+
 toolchains:
  extends: .build
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
+
+header:
+  version: 11
+  includes:
+    - kas/arm-systemready-firmware.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
+
+header:
+  version: 11
+  includes:
+    - kas/arm-systemready-ir-acs.yml
+
+env:
+  ACS_TEST: "0"
+
+local_conf_header:
+  testimage: |
+    TESTIMAGE_AUTO = "${ACS_TEST}"
+
+target:
+  - arm-systemready-ir-acs
+  - arm-systemready-linux-distros-debian
+  - arm-systemready-linux-distros-opensuse
+  - arm-systemready-linux-distros-fedora
@@ -7,41 +7,36 @@ distro: poky

 defaults:
  repos:
-    branch: master
+    branch: styhead

 repos:
-  bitbake:
-    url: https://git.openembedded.org/bitbake
-    layers:
-      bitbake: disabled
-
-  core:
-    url: https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core
-    layers:
-      meta:
-
-  meta-yocto:
-    url: https://git.yoctoproject.org/meta-yocto
-    layers:
-      meta-poky:
-
  meta-arm:
    layers:
      meta-arm:
      meta-arm-bsp:
      meta-arm-toolchain:

+  poky:
+    url: https://git.yoctoproject.org/git/poky
+    layers:
+      meta:
+      meta-poky:
+
 env:
  BB_LOGCONFIG: ""
-  BB_HASHSERVE: "auto"
+  TOOLCHAIN_DIR: ""

 local_conf_header:
  base: |
    CONF_VERSION = "2"
    BB_SERVER_TIMEOUT = "300"
+  setup: |
+    PACKAGE_CLASSES = "package_ipk"
+    PACKAGECONFIG:remove:pn-qemu-system-native = "gtk+ sdl"
+    PACKAGECONFIG:append:pn-perf = " coresight"
    INHERIT += "rm_work"
  extrapackages: |
-    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "perf"
+    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "perf opencsd"
    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:append:aarch64 = " gator-daemon"

 machine: unset
@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
 header:
  version: 14

+repos:
+  meta-clang:
+    url: https://github.com/kraj/meta-clang
+
 local_conf_header:
  toolchain: |
-    PREFERRED_TOOLCHAIN_TARGET = "clang"
+    TOOLCHAIN = "clang"
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
+
+header:
+  version: 14
+
+local_conf_header:
+  cve: |
+    INHERIT += "cve-check"
+
+    # Allow the runner environment to provide an API key
+    NVDCVE_API_KEY = "${@d.getVar('BB_ORIGENV').getVar('NVDCVE_API_KEY') or ''}"
+
+    # Just show the warnings for our layers
+    CVE_CHECK_SHOW_WARNINGS = "0"
+    CVE_CHECK_SHOW_WARNINGS:layer-arm-toolchain = "1"
+    CVE_CHECK_SHOW_WARNINGS:layer-meta-arm = "1"
+    CVE_CHECK_SHOW_WARNINGS:layer-meta-arm-bsp = "1"
+    CVE_CHECK_SHOW_WARNINGS:layer-meta-arm-systemready = "1"
+
+    # Ignore the kernel, we sometime carry kernels in meta-arm
+    CVE_CHECK_SHOW_WARNINGS:pn-linux-yocto = "0"
@@ -5,5 +5,5 @@ header:

 # Add universally helpful features when testing boards
 local_conf_header:
-  rootlogin: |
-    EXTRA_IMAGE_FEATURES:append = " allow-empty-password empty-root-password allow-root-login"
+  debug: |
+    EXTRA_IMAGE_FEATURES:append = " debug-tweaks"
@@ -13,5 +13,5 @@ local_conf_header:
    EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "edk2-firmware"
    EFI_PROVIDER ?= "grub-efi"

-    QB_DEFAULT_BIOS ??= "QEMU_EFI.fd"
+    QB_DEFAULT_BIOS = "QEMU_EFI.fd"
    WKS_FILE ?= "efi-disk.wks.in"
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
+
+header:
+  version: 14
+
+local_conf_header:
+  cc: |
+    SKIP_RECIPE[gcc-cross-arm] = "Using external toolchain"
+    TCMODE = "external-arm"
+    EXTERNAL_TOOLCHAIN = "${TOPDIR}/toolchains/${TARGET_ARCH}"
+    # Disable ptest as this pulls target compilers, which don't
+    # work with external toolchain currently
+    DISTRO_FEATURES:remove = "ptest"
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
-
-header:
-  version: 14
-  includes:
-    - ci/fvp-base-ts.yml
-    - ci/meta-secure-core.yml
-
-repos:
-  meta-secure-core:
-    layers:
-      meta-tpm2:
-
-local_conf_header:
-  remove_secureboot: |
-    BBMASK += "efi-secure-boot"
-
-  ftpm_sp_test: |
-    # Include tpm2 related packages
-    IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " tpm2-tools-tests tpm2-abrmd tpm2-tss"
-    # Use systemd as the init system, which is required for the tpm2 self-tests
-    INIT_MANAGER = "systemd"
-    IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " systemd util-linux"
-
-  ts_ftpm_sp: |
-    MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " ts-ftpm"
-    RUN_TPM2_TESTS = "1"
@@ -5,24 +5,23 @@ header:
  includes:
    - ci/fvp-base.yml
    - ci/meta-openembedded.yml
+    - ci/testimage.yml

 local_conf_header:
  trusted_services: |
    # Enable the needed test suites
-    TEST_SUITES:append = " trusted_services"
+    TEST_SUITES = " ping ssh trusted_services"
    # Include all Secure Partitions into the image
    MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " arm-ffa ts-crypto ts-storage ts-its"
    MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " ts-attestation ts-smm-gateway optee-spmc-test"
-    MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " ts-block-storage ts-fwu ts-logging"
-    MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " arm-branch-protection"
-    SMMGW_AUTH_VAR = "1"
+    MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " ts-block-storage ts-fwu"
    # Include TS demo/test tools into image
    IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " packagegroup-ts-tests"
    # Include TS PSA Arch tests into image
    IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " packagegroup-ts-tests-psa"
    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "optee-test"
    # Set the TS environment
-    TS_ENV = "sp"
+    TS_ENV="sp"
    # Enable and configure semihosting
    FVP_CONFIG[cluster0.cpu0.semihosting-cwd] = "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}"
    FVP_CONFIG[cluster0.cpu1.semihosting-cwd] = "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}"
@@ -7,9 +7,3 @@ local_conf_header:
  testimagefvp: |
    LICENSE_FLAGS_ACCEPTED += "Arm-FVP-EULA"
    IMAGE_CLASSES += "fvpboot"
-  networking_failing_tests: |
-    # These tests currently fail as the wrong IP for the build host is used
-    TEST_SUITES:remove = "opkg dnf"
-
-target:
-  - core-image-base
@@ -17,33 +17,10 @@ local_conf_header:

 target:
  # Target packages to test aarch64
-  # Nativesdk to test x86-64
-
-  # Architecture Envelope Models (AEM) FVPs
  - fvp-base-a-aem
-  - nativesdk-fvp-base-a-aem
-
-  # Arm Lumex CSS (Total Compute) FVPs
-  # These are x86 only... :(
-  - nativesdk-fvp-tc3
-
-  # Automotive FVPs
-  - fvp-rd1-ae
-  - nativesdk-fvp-rd1-ae
-
-  # Infrastructure FVPs
-  - fvp-rdv3-r1
-  - nativesdk-fvp-rdv3-r1
-  - fvp-rdv2
-  - nativesdk-fvp-rdv2
-  - fvp-rdn2
-  - nativesdk-fvp-rdn2
-
-  # IoT FVPs
  - fvp-corstone1000
+  # Nativesdk to test x86-64
+  - nativesdk-fvp-base-a-aem
  - nativesdk-fvp-corstone1000
-  - fvp-corstone1000-a320
-  - nativesdk-fvp-corstone1000-a320
-
-  # Morello FVPs
-  # TBD
+  - nativesdk-fvp-n1-edge
+  - nativesdk-fvp-sgi575
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 header:
  version: 14

-#NOTE: This is the default.  This is only being added for completeness/clarity
+#NOTE: This is the default for poky.  This is only being added for completeness/clarity
 local_conf_header:
  toolchain: |
-    PREFERRED_TOOLCHAIN_TARGET = "gcc"
+    TOOLCHAIN = "gcc"
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ header:
    - ci/base.yml

 repos:
-  meta-yocto:
+  poky:
    layers:
      meta-yocto-bsp:

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+set -u -e
+
+BASENAME=arm-gnu-toolchain
+VER=${VER:-13.3.rel1}
+HOST_ARCH=${HOST_ARCH:-$(uname -m)}
+
+# Use the standard kas container locations if nothing is passed into the script
+DOWNLOAD_DIR="${1:-/builds/persist/downloads/}"
+TOOLCHAIN_DIR="${2:-/builds/persist//toolchains/}"
+TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR="${3:-build/toolchains/}"
+
+# These should be already created by .gitlab-ci.yml, but do here if run outside of that env
+mkdir -p $DOWNLOAD_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR
+
+download() {
+	TRIPLE=$1
+	URL=https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/downloads/gnu/$VER/binrel/$BASENAME-$VER-$HOST_ARCH-$TRIPLE.tar.xz
+	wget -P $DOWNLOAD_DIR -nc $URL
+}
+
+if [ $HOST_ARCH = "aarch64" ]; then
+	# AArch64 Linux hosted cross compilers
+
+	# AArch32 target with hard float
+	download arm-none-linux-gnueabihf
+elif [ $HOST_ARCH = "x86_64" ]; then
+	# x86_64 Linux hosted cross compilers
+
+	# AArch32 target with hard float
+	download arm-none-linux-gnueabihf
+
+	# AArch64 GNU/Linux target
+	download aarch64-none-linux-gnu
+else
+	echo "ERROR - Unknown build arch of $HOST_ARCH"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+for i in arm aarch64; do
+	if [ ! -d $TOOLCHAIN_DIR/$BASENAME-$VER-$HOST_ARCH-$i-none-linux-gnu*/ ]; then
+		if [ ! -f $DOWNLOAD_DIR/$BASENAME-$VER-$HOST_ARCH-$i-none-linux-gnu*.tar.xz ]; then
+			continue
+		fi
+
+		tar -C $TOOLCHAIN_DIR -axvf $DOWNLOAD_DIR/$BASENAME-$VER-$HOST_ARCH-$i-none-linux-gnu*.tar.xz
+	fi
+
+	# Setup a link for the toolchain to use local to the building machine (e.g., not in a shared location)
+	ln -s $TOOLCHAIN_DIR/$BASENAME-$VER-$HOST_ARCH-$i-none-linux-gnu* $TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR/$i
+done
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
-
-header:
-  version: 14
-
-local_conf_header:
-  latest_revisions: |
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_scp-firmware ?= "git"
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-a ?= "git"
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-m ?= "git"
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-client ?= "git"
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-examples ?= "git"
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-os-tadevkit ?= "git"
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-os ?= "git"
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-test ?= "git"
-    PREFERRED_PROVIDER_u-boot = "u-boot:class-devupstream"
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
-
-header:
-  version: 14
-
-local_conf_header:
-  latest_revisions: |
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-a ?= "2.14.%"
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_tf-a-tests ?= "2.14.%"
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-m ?= "2.2.%"
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-m-scripts-native ?= "2.2.%"
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
+
+header:
+  version: 14
+  includes:
+    - ci/meta-openembedded.yml
+
+repos:
+  meta-virtualization:
+    url: https://git.yoctoproject.org/meta-virtualization
@@ -6,11 +6,6 @@ header:
    - ci/base.yml
    - ci/meta-openembedded.yml

-local_conf_header:
-  version_for_ci: |
-    # For better CI coverage, use the LTS version of tf-m
-    PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-m ?= "2.2.%"
-
 machine: musca-s1

 target:
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ machine: qemuarm64-secureboot

 target:
  - core-image-base
-  - hafnium

 local_conf_header:
  optee: |
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
-
-header:
-  version: 14
-  includes:
-    - ci/base.yml
-    - ci/fvp.yml
-
-local_conf_header:
-  sshpregen: |
-    # Allow the use of the pregen keys as this is CI so safe
-    COMPATIBLE_MACHINE:pn-ssh-pregen-hostkeys:rdn2 = "rdn2"
-
-machine: rdn2
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
-
-header:
-  version: 14
-  includes:
-    - ci/base.yml
-    - ci/fvp.yml
-
-local_conf_header:
-  sshpregen: |
-    # Allow the use of the pregen keys as this is CI so safe
-    COMPATIBLE_MACHINE:pn-ssh-pregen-hostkeys:rdv2 = "rdv2"
-
-machine: rdv2
@@ -7,4 +7,3 @@ local_conf_header:
  setup: |
    BB_LOGCONFIG = ""
    SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS = ""
-    INHERIT:remove = "rm_work"
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
 header:
  version: 14
  includes:
-    - ci/corstone1000-fvp.yml
+    - ci/base.yml

-machine: corstone1000-a320-fvp
+machine: sgi575
@@ -5,5 +5,7 @@ header:

 local_conf_header:
  sstate_mirror: |
+    BB_HASHSERVE_UPSTREAM = "wss://hashserv.yoctoproject.org/ws"
+    SSTATE_MIRRORS = "file://.* http://cdn.jsdelivr.net/yocto/sstate/all/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
+    BB_HASHSERVE = "auto"
    BB_SIGNATURE_HANDLER = "OEEquivHash"
-    OE_FRAGMENTS += "core/yocto/sstate-mirror-cdn"
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ local_conf_header:
  testimage: |
    IMAGE_CLASSES += "testimage"
    TESTIMAGE_AUTO = "1"
-    # Don't testimage initramfs
-    TESTIMAGE_AUTO:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "0"
  kvm: |
    QEMU_USE_KVM = ""
  slirp: |
@@ -19,3 +17,5 @@ local_conf_header:
    IMAGE_FEATURES += "ssh-server-dropbear"
  sshkeys: |
    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "ssh-pregen-hostkeys"
+  universally_failing_tests: |
+    TEST_SUITES:remove = "opkg"
@@ -23,28 +23,15 @@ local_conf_header:
    WKS_FILE = "efi-disk.wks.in"
    KERNEL_IMAGETYPE = "Image"

-    MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " efi uefi-secureboot uefi-http-boot uefi-capsule-updates"
+    MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " efi uefi-secureboot"

    EFI_PROVIDER = "systemd-boot"

    # Use systemd as the init system
    INIT_MANAGER = "systemd"
+    DISTRO_FEATURES:append = " systemd"
+    DISTRO_FEATURES_NATIVE:append = " systemd"

    IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " systemd systemd-boot util-linux coreutils"

-    TEST_SUITES:append = " uefi_secureboot uki"
-
-    IMAGE_CLASSES += "uki"
-
-    IMAGE_CLASSES += "sbsign"
-    UKI_SB_KEY = "${SBSIGN_KEY}"
-    UKI_SB_CERT = "${SBSIGN_CERT}"
-    IMAGE_BOOT_FILES:remove = "Image"
-
-    INITRAMFS_IMAGE = "core-image-initramfs-boot"
-    # not for initramfs image recipe
-    IMAGE_CLASSES:remove:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "uki"
-    IMAGE_CLASSES:remove:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "sbsign"
-    IMAGE_CLASSES:remove:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "testimage"
-    IMAGE_FEATURES:remove:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "ssh-server-dropbear"
-    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:remove:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "ssh-pregen-hostkeys"
+    TEST_SUITES:append = " uefi_secureboot"
@@ -20,8 +20,10 @@ def repo_shortname(url):
            .replace('*', '.'))

 repositories = (
-    "https://git.yoctoproject.org/poky",
+    "https://git.yoctoproject.org/git/poky",
    "https://git.openembedded.org/meta-openembedded",
+    "https://git.yoctoproject.org/git/meta-virtualization",
+    "https://github.com/kraj/meta-clang",
 )

 if __name__ == "__main__":
@@ -42,7 +44,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
        if repodir.exists():
            try:
                print("Updating %s..." % repo)
-                subprocess.run(["git", "-C", repodir, "-c", "gc.autoDetach=false", "fetch", repo], check=True)
+                subprocess.run(["git", "-C", repodir, "-c", "gc.autoDetach=false", "fetch"], check=True)
            except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
                print(e)
                failed = True
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
+
+header:
+  version: 14
+  includes:
+    - ci/meta-virtualization.yml
+
+local_conf_header:
+  meta-virt: |
+    DISTRO_FEATURES:append = " virtualization xen"
+
+target:
+  - xen-image-minimal
@@ -28,13 +28,6 @@ Note that currently meta-arm's `scripts` directory isn't in `PATH`, so a full pa

 `runfvp` will automatically start terminals connected to each of the serial ports that the machine specifies.  This can be controlled by using the `--terminals` option, for example `--terminals=none` will mean no terminals are started, and `--terminals=tmux` will start the terminals in [`tmux`][tmux] sessions.  Alternatively, passing `--console` will connect the serial port directly to the current session, without needing to open further windows.

-The tool attempts to automatically select a suitable terminal type. To see which terminal type is selected by default in your environment, run `runfvp --help`.
-
-`runfvp` determines availability by checking for required executables in your PATH as well as environment variables specific to each terminal type. If any of these checks fail, the corresponding terminal type is disabled.
-The --help output also lists all currently available terminal types.
-
-When using `-terminals=screen`, `runfvp` must be launched from within an existing [`screen`][screen] session. Normally, screen sets the `STY` environment variable to reference the current session. However, if the session is renamed or if `kas` is started from within the screen session, this value may become invalid or be lost. In such cases, `STY` must be set manually. Use `screen -ls` to view the list of currently attached sessions.
-
 The default terminal can also be configured by writing a [INI-style][INI] configuration file to `~/.config/runfvp.conf`:

 ```
@@ -66,16 +59,6 @@ There are recipes for common FVPs in meta-arm already, and writing new recipes i

 If `FVP_PROVIDER` is not set then it is assumed that `FVP_EXE` is installed on the host already.

-### `FVP_BINDIR`
-
-Optional parameter to configure the path of the FVP binary. For example, `fvp-base` uses path from the build host by default. This path can be customized by configuring like below.
-
-```
-FVP_BINDIR ?= "utilities/fvp/usr/bin"
-```
-
-Potential use case for this parameter configuration is to execute `runfvp` script without the need for bitbake environment initialization.
-
 ### `FVP_CONFIG`

 Parameters passed to the FVP with the `--parameter`/`-C` option.  These are expressed as variable flags so individual parameters can be altered easily. For example:
@@ -146,4 +129,3 @@ FVP_ENV_PASSTHROUGH = "ARMLMD_LICENSE_FILE FM_TRACE_PLUGINS"
 [FVP]: https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fixed-virtual-platforms
 [tmux]: https://tmux.github.io/
 [INI]: https://docs.python.org/3/library/configparser.html
-[screen]: https://www.gnu.org/software/screen/
@@ -5,27 +5,21 @@ in `meta-arm/recipes-security/trusted-services`

 ## Secure Partitions recipes

-We define dedicated recipes for all supported Trusted Services (TS) Secure Partitions, which produce executables and
-manifest binaries (DT files) for SPs.
-
-The Secure Partitions are compatible with any SPMC implementation that complies with the FF-A specification. Meta-arm
-currently supports OP-TEE SPMC, and when enabled, the Secure Partition binaries are automatically included in the
-optee-os image based on the defined MACHINE_FEATURES. For more details bout OP-TEE SPMC please refer to the
-[OP-TEE documentation][^6].
+We define dedicated recipes for all supported Trusted Services (TS) Secure Partitions.
+These recipes produce ELF and DTB files for SPs.
+These files are automatically included into optee-os image accordingly to defined MACHINE_FEATURES.

 ### How to include TS SPs

-To include TS SPs into the firmware image add the corresponding feature flags to the MACHINE_FEATURES variable for each
-[Secure Partition][^2] you would like to include :
+To include TS SPs into optee-os image you need to add into MACHINE_FEATURES
+features for each [Secure Partition][^2] you would like to include:

 | Secure Partition  | MACHINE_FEATURE |
 | ----------------- | --------------- |
 | Attestation       | ts-attesation   |
 | Crypto            | ts-crypto       |
-| Firmware Update   | ts-fwu          |
-| fTPM              | ts-ftpm         |
+| Firmware Update   | ts-fwu
 | Internal Storage  | ts-its          |
-| Logging           | ts-logging      |
 | Protected Storage | ts-storage      |
 | se-proxy          | ts-se-proxy     |
 | smm-gateway       | ts-smm-gateway  |
@@ -52,15 +46,6 @@ Other steps depend on your machine/platform definition:
 4. Trusted Services supports an SPMC agonistic binary format. To build SPs to this format the `TS_ENV` variable is to be
   set to `sp`. The resulting SP binaries should be able to boot under any FF-A v1.1 compliant SPMC implementation.

-### Example configurations
-
-The `meta-arm/ci` directory contains various TS focused [KAS][^7] configuration files:
-
-| File name | Description |
-|-----------|-------------|
-| ci/fvp-base-ts-ftpm.yml        |Enabling the fTPM SP on the fvp-base machine|
-| ci/fvp-base-ts.yml             |TS config for the fvp-base machine|
-| ci/qemuarm64-secureboot-ts.yml |TS config for quemuarm64-secureboot machine|

 ## Normal World applications

@@ -69,67 +54,9 @@ Optionally for testing purposes you can add `packagegroup-ts-tests` into your im

 ## OEQA Trusted Services tests

-meta-arm also includes Trusted Service OEQA tests which can be used for automated testing.
+  meta-arm also includes Trusted Service OEQA tests which can be used for automated testing.
 See `ci/trusted-services.yml` for an example how to include them into an image.

-## Configuration options
-
-Some TS recipes support yocto variables to set build configuration. These variables can be set in .conf files (machine
-specific or local.conf), or .bbappend files. 
-
-### SmmGW SP
-
-The recipe supports the following configuration variables
-
-| Variable name         | Type | Description                                                                                            |
-|-----------------------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-| SMMGW_AUTH_VAR        | Bool | Enable Authenticated variable support                                                                  |
-| SMMGW_INTERNAL_CRYPTO | Bool | Use MbedTLS build into SmmGW for authentication related crypto operations. Depends on SMMGW_AUTH_VAR=1 |
-
-fTPM tests are supported by OEQA but are disabled by default due to their lengthy execution time. To enable them, set the RUN_TPM2_TESTS
-variable e.g. in local.conf.
-
-The list of supported test cases can be found in the `tests` array in the `meta-arm/recipes-tpm/tpm2-tools/files/tpm2-test-all` script.
-These can be ran one-by-one, but currently running all of them by calling `tpm2-test-all` results in a failure of the `tpm2-abmrd` tool.
-
-The tests not supported are listed in the same script under the `Failing tests:` line.
-
-This script was created to meet the needs of the Trusted Services project, but in the future it should be updated to be configurable to
-support generic usage. The aforementioned issue shall also be solved, so the supported tests could run together.
-
-### fTPM SP
-
-The fTPM SP is an experimental feature. Please refer to the [TS documentation][^5] for details on limitations. 
-
-The current integration enables the fTPM Secure Partition and supports running tpm2-tools tests to verify correct
-functionality. Secure Boot and other features that leverage TPM capabilities are not enabled currently.
-
-Configuration variables of the recipe:
-
-| Variable name         | Type | Description                                                                                            |
-|-----------------------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-| RUN_TPM2_TESTS        | Bool | Enable automatic execution of TPM tests from OEQA to verify the TS fTPM SP                             |
-
-The current integration targeting the fvp-base machine enables fTPM SP and allows running the tests. To reproduce the
-build please use `ci/fvp-base-ts-ftpm.yml`. This configuration:
-
-   - deploys the SP in the SWd
-   - amends the Linux kernel configuration:
-      - enables the tpm-crb driver
-      - add a patch to allow DTB based discovery
-   - deploys user-space components (tpm2-tss, tpm2-abrmd, tmp2-tools)
-   - configures the initialization system to start tpm2-abrmd.
-
-The configuration leverages tpm2 components form meta-secure-core layer. 
-
-Validation can be performed by running the script located at `meta-arm/recipes-tpm/tpm2-tools/files/tpm2-test-all`. This
-script runs a subset of tpm2 tests. While all tpm2 test pass when executed individually, executing the entire test suite
-in a sequence leads to a failure of the `tpm2-abmrd` tool. As a workaround some test cases are disabled in the script.
-You can find the list of disabled tests marked under the `Failing tests` section of the script.
-
-Note: tpm2 tests was designed to validate the tpm2 reference stack. Its use for verifying the fTPM SP is not fully
-aligned with this intent. As such, the current validation approach is considered “best effort” and is suitable for
-development purposes. A more appropriate and comprehensive test suite should be selected for future validation.

 ------
 [^1]: https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/integration/overview/index.html
@@ -139,9 +66,3 @@ development purposes. A more appropriate and comprehensive test suite should be
 [^3]: https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/integration/deployments/test-executables.html

 [^4]: https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/gits/optee_test.html
-
-[^5]: https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/integration/services/tpm-service-description.html
-
-[^6]: https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/architecture/spmc.html
-
-[^7]: https://kas.readthedocs.io
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+header:
+  version: 13
+
+repos:
+  meta-arm:
+    layers:
+      meta-arm-systemready:
+
+distro: nodistro
+
+target:
+  - arm-systemready-firmware
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+header:
+  version: 13
+  includes:
+    - kas/arm-systemready-firmware.yml
+
+env:
+  TESTIMAGE_AUTO: "1"
+  # The full testimage run typically takes around 12-24h on fvp-base.
+  TEST_OVERALL_TIMEOUT: "${@ 24*60*60}"
+
+target:
+  - arm-systemready-ir-acs
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+header:
+  version: 13
+  includes:
+    - kas/arm-systemready-firmware.yml
+
+target:
+  - arm-systemready-linux-distros-debian
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+header:
+  version: 16
+  includes:
+    - kas/arm-systemready-firmware.yml
+    - kas/arm-systemready-linux-distros-unattended-installation.yml
+
+target:
+  - arm-systemready-linux-distros-fedora
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+header:
+  version: 13
+  includes:
+    - kas/arm-systemready-firmware.yml
+    - kas/arm-systemready-linux-distros-unattended-installation.yml
+
+target:
+  - arm-systemready-linux-distros-opensuse
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+header:
+  version: 16
+
+env:
+  DISTRO_UNATTENDED_INST_TESTS:
+  # The full testimage run typically takes around 12-24h on fvp-base.
+  TEST_OVERALL_TIMEOUT: "${@ 24*60*60}"
+  
+local_conf_header:
+  systemready-unattended-inst: |
+    TESTIMAGE_AUTO = "${@oe.utils.vartrue("DISTRO_UNATTENDED_INST_TESTS", "1", "", d)}"
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-header:
-  version: 14
-  includes:
-    - kas/corstone1000-base.yml
-    - kas/corstone1000-image-configuration.yml
-    - kas/corstone1000-firmware-only.yml
-    - kas/fvp-eula.yml
-
-env:
-  DISPLAY:
-  WAYLAND_DISPLAY:
-  XAUTHORITY:
-
-local_conf_header:
-  testimagefvp: |
-    IMAGE_CLASSES += "fvpboot"
-
-  mass-storage: |
-    # Ensure the Mass Storage device is absent
-    FVP_CONFIG[board.msd_mmc.p_mmc_file] = "invalid.dat"
-
-machine: corstone1000-a320-fvp
@@ -5,33 +5,25 @@ distro: poky

 defaults:
  repos:
-    branch: master
+    branch: styhead

 repos:
-  bitbake:
-    url: https://git.openembedded.org/bitbake
-    layers:
-      bitbake: disabled
-
-  core:
-    url: https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core
-    layers:
-      meta:
-
-  meta-yocto:
-    url: https://git.yoctoproject.org/meta-yocto
-    layers:
-      meta-poky:
-
  meta-arm:
    layers:
      meta-arm:
      meta-arm-bsp:
      meta-arm-toolchain:

+  poky:
+    url: https://git.yoctoproject.org/git/poky
+    commit: 5465094be9a61a1639e1dab6d2b4ebea2bee7440
+    layers:
+      meta:
+      meta-poky:
+
  meta-openembedded:
    url: https://git.openembedded.org/meta-openembedded
-    # commit: 461d85a1831318747af5abe86da193bcde3fd9b4
+    commit: 461d85a1831318747af5abe86da193bcde3fd9b4
    layers:
      meta-oe:
      meta-python:
@@ -39,7 +31,7 @@ repos:

  meta-secure-core:
    url: https://github.com/wind-river/meta-secure-core.git
-    # commit: 59d7e90542947c342098863b9998693ac79352b0
+    commit: 59d7e90542947c342098863b9998693ac79352b0
    layers:
      meta-secure-core-common:
      meta-signing-key:
@@ -4,6 +4,3 @@ header:
 local_conf_header:
  extsys: |
    MACHINE_FEATURES += "corstone1000-extsys"
-
-    # external system firmware
-    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:firmware += "external-system-elf"
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ local_conf_header:
    OVERRIDES .= ":firmware"

    # Need to ensure we build with a small libc
-    TCLIBC = "musl"
+    TCLIBC="musl"

  mass-storage: |
    # Ensure the Mass Storage device is absent
@@ -4,5 +4,5 @@ header:
  version: 14

 local_conf_header:
-  multicore: |
-    MACHINE_FEATURES += "corstone1000_smp"
+  fvp-multicore: |
+    MACHINE_FEATURES += "corstone1000_fvp_smp"
@@ -23,11 +23,6 @@ local_conf_header:
    INIT_MANAGER:firmware = "mdev-busybox"
    VIRTUAL-RUNTIME_init_manager:firmware = "busybox"

-    # This guarantees module auto-loading support at boot
-    # by adding /etc/init.d/modutils.sh and /etc/rcS.d/ files
-    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:append = " modutils-initscripts"
-    DISTRO_FEATURES:append = " sysvinit"
-
    # prevent the kernel image from being included in the intramfs rootfs
    PACKAGE_EXCLUDE:firmware += "kernel-image-*"

@@ -45,8 +40,10 @@ local_conf_header:
    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "packagegroup-ts-tests-psa"
    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:firmware += "packagegroup-ts-tests-psa"

+    # external system firmware
+    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:firmware += "external-system-elf"
+
  capsule: |
-    # These variables are set here since they are not defined in the arm-systemready-firmware recipe or under multiconfig mode.
    CAPSULE_EXTENSION = "uefi.capsule"
-    CAPSULE_VERSION = "6"
-    CAPSULE_NAME = "${MACHINE}-v${CAPSULE_VERSION}"
+    CAPSULE_FW_VERSION = "6"
+    CAPSULE_NAME = "${MACHINE}-v${CAPSULE_FW_VERSION}"
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-header:
-  version: 14
-  includes:
-    - ci/debug.yml
-
-local_conf_header:
-  sshd: |
-    IMAGE_FEATURES += "ssh-server-dropbear"
-  fvp_sshkeys: |
-    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:append = " ssh-pregen-hostkeys"
-
-target:
-  - core-image-minimal
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ BBFILE_COLLECTIONS += "meta-arm-bsp"
 BBFILE_PATTERN_meta-arm-bsp = "^${LAYERDIR}/"
 BBFILE_PRIORITY_meta-arm-bsp = "5"

-LAYERSERIES_COMPAT_meta-arm-bsp = "wrynose"
+LAYERSERIES_COMPAT_meta-arm-bsp = "styhead"

 LAYERDEPENDS_meta-arm-bsp = "core meta-arm"
 # This won't be used by layerindex-fetch, but works everywhere else
@@ -20,8 +20,11 @@ LAYERDEPENDS_meta-arm-bsp:append:musca-s1 = " meta-python"
 # Additional license directories.
 LICENSE_PATH += "${LAYERDIR}/custom-licenses"

+BBFILES_DYNAMIC += " \
+    meta-arm-systemready:${LAYERDIR}/dynamic-layers/meta-arm-systemready/*/*/*.bb \
+    meta-arm-systemready:${LAYERDIR}/dynamic-layers/meta-arm-systemready/*/*/*.bbappend \
+"
+
 WARN_QA:append:layer-meta-arm-bsp = " patch-status"

 addpylib ${LAYERDIR}/lib oeqa
-
-IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_ARGS ?= ""
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-#@TYPE: Machine
-#@NAME: corstone1000-a320-fvp machine
-#@DESCRIPTION: Machine configuration for Corstone1000 64-bit FVP with A320 CPU
-
-require conf/machine/include/corstone1000-a320.inc
-require conf/machine/corstone1000-fvp.conf
-
-# Ethos-U85 FVP configuration
-ETHOSU_NUM_MACS ?= "256"
-FVP_CONFIG[host.ethosu.num_macs] = "${ETHOSU_NUM_MACS}"
-
-# Reuse FVP recipe overrides
-MACHINEOVERRIDES .= ":corstone1000-fvp"
-
-# Override FVP executable provider and executable name.
-FVP_PROVIDER:corstone1000-a320-fvp ??= "fvp-corstone1000-a320-native"
-FVP_EXE:corstone1000-a320-fvp = "FVP_Corstone-1000-A320"
@@ -3,17 +3,10 @@
 #@DESCRIPTION: Machine configuration for Corstone1000 64-bit FVP
 require conf/machine/include/corstone1000.inc

-require ${@bb.utils.contains('MACHINE_FEATURES', 'corstone1000-extsys', \
-    'conf/machine/include/corstone1000-extsys.inc', '', d)}
-
 TFA_TARGET_PLATFORM = "fvp"

 TFM_PLATFORM_IS_FVP = "TRUE"

-CORSTONE_1000_TYPE = "CORSTONE_1000_TYPE_CORTEX_A35_FVP"
-
-WKS_FILE:firmware ?= "corstone1000-flash-firmware-fvp.wks.in"
-
 # testimage config
 TEST_TARGET = "OEFVPTarget"
 TEST_TARGET_IP = "127.0.0.1:2222"
@@ -25,12 +18,13 @@ FVP_EXE ?= "FVP_Corstone-1000"
 FVP_CONSOLES[default] = "host_terminal_0"
 FVP_CONSOLES[tf-a] = "host_terminal_1"
 FVP_CONSOLES[se] = "secenc_terminal"
+FVP_CONSOLES[extsys] = "extsys_terminal"

 #Disable Time Annotation
 FASTSIM_DISABLE_TA = "0"

 # FVP Parameters
-FVP_CONFIG[se.trustedBootROMloader.fname] ?= "trusted-firmware-m/bl1.bin"
+FVP_CONFIG[se.trustedBootROMloader.fname] ?= "bl1.bin"
 FVP_CONFIG[board.xnvm_size] ?= "64"
 FVP_CONFIG[se.trustedSRAM_config] ?= "6"
 FVP_CONFIG[se.BootROM_config] ?= "3"
@@ -47,11 +41,14 @@ FVP_CONFIG[se.cryptocell.USER_OTP_FILTERING_DISABLE] ?= "1"
 # Boot image
 FVP_DATA ?= "board.flash0=corstone1000-flash-firmware-image-${MACHINE}.wic@0x68000000"

+# External system (cortex-M3)
+FVP_CONFIG[extsys_harness0.extsys_flashloader.fname] ?= "es_flashfw.bin"

 # FVP Terminals
 FVP_TERMINALS[host.host_terminal_0] ?= "Normal World Console"
 FVP_TERMINALS[host.host_terminal_1] ?= "Secure World Console"
 FVP_TERMINALS[se.secenc_terminal] ?= "Secure Enclave Console"
+FVP_TERMINALS[extsys0.extsys_terminal] ?= "Cortex M3"

 # MMC card configuration
 FVP_CONFIG[board.msd_mmc.card_type] ?= "SDHC"
@@ -60,7 +57,7 @@ FVP_CONFIG[board.msd_mmc.diagnostics] ?= "0"
 FVP_CONFIG[board.msd_mmc.p_max_block_count] ?= "0xFFFF"
 FVP_CONFIG[board.msd_config.pl180_fifo_depth] ?= "16"
 FVP_CONFIG[board.msd_mmc.support_unpadded_images] ?= "true"
-FVP_CONFIG[board.msd_mmc.p_mmc_file] ?= "${IMAGE_LINK_NAME}.wic"
+FVP_CONFIG[board.msd_mmc.p_mmc_file] ?= "${IMAGE_NAME}.wic"

 # MMC2 card configuration
 FVP_CONFIG[board.msd_mmc_2.card_type] ?= "SDHC"
@@ -6,9 +6,4 @@ require conf/machine/include/corstone1000.inc

 TFA_TARGET_PLATFORM = "fpga"

-# Unlike the FVP, MPS3 supports CoreSight
-MACHINE_FEATURES += "coresight"
-
-CORSTONE_1000_TYPE = "CORSTONE_1000_TYPE_CORTEX_A35_MPS3"
-
-WKS_FILE:firmware ?= "corstone1000-flash-firmware-mps3.wks.in"
+PLATFORM_IS_FVP = "FALSE"
@@ -4,13 +4,7 @@
 #@NAME: Armv8-A Base Platform FVP machine
 #@DESCRIPTION: Machine configuration for Armv8-A Base Platform FVP model

-require conf/machine/include/arm/arch-armv8-5a.inc
-
-# Set variables here to make it easier to change Instruction Set Architectures
-# on the FVP Base machine, which should make it easier to test both the tunes
-# and the virtual hardware.  These variables are set via the DEFAULT_TUNE
-ARM_ISA_MAJOR = "${@int(d.getVar('ARMPKGARCH').split('v')[1][0])}"
-ARM_ISA_MINOR = "${@int(d.getVar('ARMPKGARCH')[d.getVar('ARMPKGARCH').find('-')+1]) if '-' in d.getVar('ARMPKGARCH') else 0 }"
+require conf/machine/include/arm/arch-armv8-4a.inc

 ARM_SYSTEMREADY_FIRMWARE = "trusted-firmware-a:do_deploy"
 ARM_SYSTEMREADY_ACS_CONSOLE = "default"
@@ -23,6 +17,8 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES += "wic"
 WKS_FILE ?= "efi-disk.wks.in"

 SERIAL_CONSOLES = "115200;ttyAMA0"
+# FIXME -  This is being upstreamed.  Remove once that has occurred.
+KERNEL_CONSOLE ?= "${@','.join(d.getVar('SERIAL_CONSOLES').split(' ')[0].split(';')[::-1]) or 'ttyS0'}"

 PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel ?= "linux-yocto"
 KERNEL_DTB_NAME = "fvp-base-revc.dtb"
@@ -58,15 +54,12 @@ FVP_CONFIG[cluster0.check_memory_attributes] ?= "0"
 FVP_CONFIG[cluster1.check_memory_attributes] ?= "0"
 FVP_CONFIG[cluster0.stage12_tlb_size] ?= "1024"
 FVP_CONFIG[cluster1.stage12_tlb_size] ?= "1024"
-FVP_CONFIG[bp.secureflashloader.fname] ?= "trusted-firmware-a/bl1.bin"
-FVP_CONFIG[bp.flashloader0.fname] ?= "trusted-firmware-a/fip.bin"
-FVP_CONFIG[bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path] ?= "${IMAGE_LINK_NAME}.wic"
-
-# FVP Base default is 8.0, so there is no has_arm_v8-0 for it.  However, this is needed for every version after.  So set this accordingly
-FVP_EXTRA_ARGS = "--parameter cluster0.has_arm_v${ARM_ISA_MAJOR}-${ARM_ISA_MINOR}=1 --parameter cluster1.has_arm_v${ARM_ISA_MAJOR}-${ARM_ISA_MINOR}=1"
-FVP_EXTRA_ARGS += "${@bb.utils.contains('TUNE_FEATURES', 'sve', '--parameter cluster0.has_sve=1 --parameter cluster1.has_sve=1', '', d)}"
-FVP_EXTRA_ARGS += "${@bb.utils.contains('TUNE_FEATURES', 'sve2', '--parameter cluster0.sve.has_sve2=1 --parameter cluster1.sve.has_sve2=1', '', d)}"
-
+FVP_CONFIG[bp.secureflashloader.fname] ?= "bl1-fvp.bin"
+FVP_CONFIG[bp.flashloader0.fname] ?= "fip-fvp.bin"
+FVP_CONFIG[bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path] ?= "${IMAGE_NAME}.wic"
+# Set the baseline to ARMv8.4, as the default is 8.0.
+FVP_CONFIG[cluster0.has_arm_v8-4] = "1"
+FVP_CONFIG[cluster1.has_arm_v8-4] = "1"
 FVP_CONSOLES[default] = "terminal_0"
 FVP_TERMINALS[bp.terminal_0] ?= "Console"
 FVP_TERMINALS[bp.terminal_1] ?= ""
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-# Cortex-A320 variant of the Corstone-1000 platform.
-MACHINEOVERRIDES =. "corstone1000-a320:"
-MACHINE_FEATURES += "cortexa320"
-OVERRIDES .= ":cortexa320"
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-
-FVP_CONSOLES[extsys] = "extsys_terminal"
-
-FVP_CONFIG[extsys_harness0.extsys_flashloader.fname] = "es_flashfw.bin"
-
-FVP_TERMINALS[extsys0.extsys_terminal] = "Cortex M3"
@@ -1,24 +1,20 @@
-TUNE_FILE = "conf/machine/include/arm/armv8a/tune-cortexa35.inc"
-TUNE_FILE:cortexa320 = "conf/machine/include/arm/arch-armv9-2a.inc"
-require ${TUNE_FILE}
+require conf/machine/include/arm/armv8a/tune-cortexa35.inc

 MACHINEOVERRIDES =. "corstone1000:"

 # TF-M
-PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-m ?= "2.2.%"
-PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-m-scripts-native ?= "2.2.%"
+PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-m ?= "2.1.%"

 # TF-A
 TFA_PLATFORM = "corstone1000"
-PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-a ?= "2.14.%"
-PREFERRED_VERSION_tf-a-tests ?= "2.14.%"
+PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-a ?= "2.11.%"
+PREFERRED_VERSION_tf-a-tests ?= "2.10.%"

 TFA_BL2_BINARY = "bl2-corstone1000.bin"
 TFA_FIP_BINARY = "fip-corstone1000.bin"

 # optee
-PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-os ?= "4.9.%"
-PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-client ?= "4.9.%"
+PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-os ?= "4.2.%"

 # Trusted Services
 TS_PLATFORM = "arm/corstone1000"
@@ -26,8 +22,8 @@ TS_SP_SE_PROXY_CONFIG = "corstone1000"
 # Include smm-gateway and se-proxy SPs into optee-os binary
 MACHINE_FEATURES += "ts-smm-gateway ts-se-proxy"

-# U-Boot
-PREFERRED_VERSION_u-boot ?= "2025.10"
+# u-boot
+PREFERRED_VERSION_u-boot ?= "2023.07%"
 MACHINE_FEATURES += "efi"
 EFI_PROVIDER ?= "grub-efi"

@@ -38,7 +34,7 @@ IMAGE_CMD:wic[vardeps] += "GRUB_LINUX_APPEND"

 # Linux kernel
 PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel ?= "linux-yocto"
-PREFERRED_VERSION_linux-yocto ?= "6.19%"
+PREFERRED_VERSION_linux-yocto ?= "6.10.%"
 KERNEL_IMAGETYPE = "Image"
 KERNEL_IMAGETYPE:firmware = "Image.gz"
 # add FF-A support in the kernel
@@ -53,6 +49,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES += "wic"
 # Need to clear the suffix so TESTIMAGE_AUTO works
 IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX = ""
 WKS_FILE ?= "efi-disk-no-swap.wks.in"
+WKS_FILE:firmware ?= "corstone1000-flash-firmware.wks.in"

 # making sure EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS will be used while creating the image
 WKS_FILE_DEPENDS:append = " ${EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS}"
@@ -66,11 +63,3 @@ ARM_SYSTEMREADY_FIRMWARE = "${FIRMWARE_DEPLOYMENT}:do_deploy \
                            corstone1000-esp-image:do_image_complete \
                           "
 ARM_SYSTEMREADY_ACS_CONSOLE ?= "default"
-
-# Workaround IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE being ignored when images are repacked
-IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_ARGS += "--extra-filesystem-space ${@${IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE}}K"
-
-# Enable Authenticated variable support in SmmGW
-SMMGW_AUTH_VAR = "1"
-# Use MbedTLS build into SmmGW for authentication related crypto operations.
-SMMGW_INTERNAL_CRYPTO = "1"
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ TUNE_FEATURES = "aarch64"

 require conf/machine/include/arm/arch-armv8a.inc

-MACHINE_FEATURES = "usbhost usbgadget alsa screen wifi bluetooth optee pci coresight"
+MACHINE_FEATURES = "usbhost usbgadget alsa screen wifi bluetooth optee pci"

 KERNEL_IMAGETYPE = "Image.gz"
 KERNEL_DEVICETREE = "arm/juno.dtb arm/juno-r1.dtb arm/juno-r2.dtb"
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-# Configuration for Arm Neoverse N2 Reference Design development board
-
-#@TYPE: Machine
-#@NAME: RD N2
-#@DESCRIPTION: Machine configuration for RD N2
-
-require conf/machine/include/arm/armv9a/tune-neoversen2.inc
-
-EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "virtual/control-processor-firmware"
-EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "trusted-firmware-a"
-
-KERNEL_IMAGETYPE ?= "Image"
-PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel = "linux-yocto"
-SERIAL_CONSOLES = "115200;ttyAMA2"
-EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "edk2-firmware"
-
-EFI_PROVIDER ?= "${@bb.utils.contains("DISTRO_FEATURES", "systemd", "systemd-boot", "grub-efi", d)}"
-MACHINE_FEATURES += "efi"
-
-IMAGE_FSTYPES:forcevariable = "cpio.gz wic"
-IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX = ""
-IMAGE_CLASSES += "fvpboot"
-
-WKS_FILE ?= "efi-disk.wks.in"
-WKS_FILE_DEPENDS:append = " ${EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS}"
-
-# testimage config
-TEST_TARGET = "OEFVPTarget"
-TEST_TARGET_IP = "127.0.0.1:2222"
-DEFAULT_TEST_SUITES:append = " fvp_boot fvp_devices"
-TEST_FVP_DEVICES ?= "watchdog networking"
-
-# FVP Config
-FVP_PROVIDER ?= "fvp-rdn2-native"
-FVP_EXE ?= "FVP_RD_N2"
-
-FVP_DATA ?= "css.scp.armcortexm7ct=scp-firmware/scp_ramfw.bin@0x0BD80000 \
-             css.mcp.armcortexm7ct=scp-firmware/mcp_ramfw.bin@0x0BF80000"
-
-FVP_CONFIG[css.gic_distributor.ITS-device-bits] ?= "20"
-FVP_CONFIG[css.mcp.ROMloader.fname] ?= "scp-firmware/mcp_romfw.bin"
-FVP_CONFIG[css.scp.ROMloader.fname] ?= "scp-firmware/scp_romfw.bin"
-FVP_CONFIG[css.trustedBootROMloader.fname] ?= "trusted-firmware-a/bl1.bin"
-FVP_CONFIG[board.flashloader0.fname] ?= "trusted-firmware-a/fip.bin"
-
-FVP_CONFIG[board.dram_size] ?= "0x200000000"
-
-# Virtio configuration
-FVP_CONFIG[board.virtio_net.enabled] ?= "1"
-FVP_CONFIG[board.virtio_net.hostbridge.userNetworking] ?= "1"
-FVP_CONFIG[board.virtio_net.hostbridge.userNetPorts] = "2222=22"
-FVP_CONFIG[board.virtioblockdevice.image_path] ?= "${IMAGE_LINK_NAME}.wic"
-
-FVP_CONSOLES[default] = "terminal_ns_uart_ap"
-FVP_TERMINALS[css.scp.terminal_uart_scp] ?= "SCP Console"
-FVP_TERMINALS[css.mcp.terminal_uart_mcp] ?= "MCP Console"
-FVP_TERMINALS[css.terminal_ns_uart_ap] ?= "NS Console"
-FVP_TERMINALS[css.terminal_s_uart_ap] ?= "S Console"
-
-# Seeing intermittent test timeout errors in CI where the boot is almost
-# complete.  Lengthen the timeout to allow for more opportunity to
-# complete successfully.
-TEST_FVP_LINUX_BOOT_TIMEOUT = "900"
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-# Configuration for Arm Neoverse V2 Reference Design development board
-
-#@TYPE: Machine
-#@NAME: RD V2
-#@DESCRIPTION: Machine configuration for RD V2
-
-#FIXME - doesn't boot with armv9 tunes
-#require conf/machine/include/arm/arch-armv9a.inc
-require conf/machine/include/arm/arch-armv8a.inc
-
-EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "virtual/control-processor-firmware"
-EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "trusted-firmware-a"
-
-KERNEL_IMAGETYPE ?= "Image"
-PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel = "linux-yocto"
-SERIAL_CONSOLES = "115200;ttyAMA2"
-EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "edk2-firmware"
-
-EFI_PROVIDER ?= "${@bb.utils.contains("DISTRO_FEATURES", "systemd", "systemd-boot", "grub-efi", d)}"
-MACHINE_FEATURES += "efi"
-
-IMAGE_FSTYPES:forcevariable = "cpio.gz wic"
-IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX = ""
-IMAGE_CLASSES += "fvpboot"
-
-WKS_FILE ?= "efi-disk.wks.in"
-WKS_FILE_DEPENDS:append = " ${EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS}"
-
-# testimage config
-TEST_TARGET = "OEFVPTarget"
-TEST_TARGET_IP = "127.0.0.1:2222"
-DEFAULT_TEST_SUITES:append = " fvp_boot fvp_devices"
-TEST_FVP_DEVICES ?= "watchdog networking"
-
-# FVP Config
-FVP_PROVIDER ?= "fvp-rdv2-native"
-FVP_EXE ?= "FVP_RD_V2"
-
-FVP_DATA ?= "css.scp.armcortexm7ct=scp-firmware/scp_ramfw.bin@0x0BD80000 \
-             css.mcp.armcortexm7ct=scp-firmware/mcp_ramfw.bin@0x0BF80000"
-
-FVP_CONFIG[css.gic_distributor.ITS-device-bits] ?= "20"
-FVP_CONFIG[css.mcp.ROMloader.fname] ?= "scp-firmware/mcp_romfw.bin"
-FVP_CONFIG[css.scp.ROMloader.fname] ?= "scp-firmware/scp_romfw.bin"
-FVP_CONFIG[css.trustedBootROMloader.fname] ?= "trusted-firmware-a/bl1.bin"
-FVP_CONFIG[board.flashloader0.fname] ?= "trusted-firmware-a/fip.bin"
-
-FVP_CONFIG[board.dram_size] ?= "0x200000000"
-
-# Virtio configuration
-FVP_CONFIG[board.virtio_net.enabled] ?= "1"
-FVP_CONFIG[board.virtio_net.hostbridge.userNetworking] ?= "1"
-FVP_CONFIG[board.virtio_net.hostbridge.userNetPorts] = "2222=22"
-FVP_CONFIG[board.virtioblockdevice.image_path] ?= "${IMAGE_LINK_NAME}.wic"
-
-FVP_CONSOLES[default] = "terminal_ns_uart_ap"
-FVP_TERMINALS[css.scp.terminal_uart_scp] ?= "SCP Console"
-FVP_TERMINALS[css.mcp.terminal_uart_mcp] ?= "MCP Console"
-FVP_TERMINALS[css.terminal_ns_uart_ap] ?= "NS Console"
-FVP_TERMINALS[css.terminal_s_uart_ap] ?= "S Console"
-
-# Seeing intermittent test timeout errors in CI where the boot is almost
-# complete.  Lengthen the timeout to allow for more opportunity to
-# complete successfully.
-TEST_FVP_LINUX_BOOT_TIMEOUT = "900"
@@ -26,20 +26,17 @@ EFI_PROVIDER ?= "${@bb.utils.contains("DISTRO_FEATURES", "systemd", "systemd-boo
 SERIAL_CONSOLES ?= "115200;ttyAMA0 115200;hvc0"

 EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "edk2-firmware"
-#FIXME - in 2.15.0, new logic for pen hold the SMP cores was added, which breaks this platform.  Hold this back until it can be resolved.
-PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-a ?= "2.14.%"

 QB_SYSTEM_NAME = "qemu-system-aarch64"
 QB_MACHINE = "-machine sbsa-ref"
 QB_CPU = "-cpu neoverse-n2"
-QB_SMP = "-smp 4"
 QB_MEM = "-m 1024"
 QB_DEFAULT_FSTYPE = "wic.qcow2"
-QB_NETWORK_DEVICE = "-device e1000e,netdev=net0,mac=@MAC@"
+QB_NETWORK_DEVICE = "-device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0,mac=@MAC@"
 QB_DRIVE_TYPE = "/dev/hd"
 QB_ROOTFS_OPT = "-drive file=@ROOTFS@,if=ide,format=qcow2"
 QB_DEFAULT_KERNEL = "none"
-QB_OPT_APPEND = "-device usb-tablet -device usb-kbd -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,readonly=on,file=@DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE@/SBSA_FLASH0.fd -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,readonly=on,file=@DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE@/SBSA_FLASH1.fd"
+QB_OPT_APPEND = "-device usb-tablet -device usb-kbd -pflash @DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE@/SBSA_FLASH0.fd -pflash @DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE@/SBSA_FLASH1.fd"
 QB_SERIAL_OPT = "-device virtio-serial-pci -chardev null,id=virtcon -device virtconsole,chardev=virtcon"
 QB_TCPSERIAL_OPT = "-device virtio-serial-pci -chardev socket,id=virtcon,port=@PORT@,host=127.0.0.1 -device virtconsole,chardev=virtcon"
 # sbsa-ref is a true virtual machine so can't use KVM
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Configuration for Arm SGI575 development board
+
+#@TYPE: Machine
+#@NAME: SGI575
+#@DESCRIPTION: Machine configuration for SGI575
+
+require conf/machine/include/arm/armv8-2a/tune-cortexa75.inc
+
+EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "virtual/control-processor-firmware"
+
+EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "trusted-firmware-a"
+
+KERNEL_IMAGETYPE ?= "Image"
+PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel ?= "linux-yocto"
+SERIAL_CONSOLES = "115200;ttyAMA0"
+
+#grub-efi
+EFI_PROVIDER ?= "grub-efi"
+MACHINE_FEATURES += "efi"
+
+IMAGE_FSTYPES += "cpio.gz wic"
+
+WKS_FILE ?= "sgi575-efidisk.wks"
+WKS_FILE_DEPENDS:append = " ${EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS}"
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-version: 2
-build:
-  os: "ubuntu-22.04"
-  tools:
-    python: "3.9"
-sphinx:
-  configuration: meta-arm-bsp/documentation/corstone1000-a320/conf.py
-formats:
-  - pdf
-python:
-  install:
-    - requirements: meta-arm-bsp/documentation/requirements.txt
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: <text>Copyright 2026 Arm Limited and/or its
-# affiliates <open-source-office@arm.com></text>
-#
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-# Configuration file for the Sphinx documentation builder.
-#
-# This file only contains a selection of the most common options. For a full
-# list see the documentation:
-# https://www.sphinx-doc.org/en/master/usage/configuration.html
-
-# -- Path setup --------------------------------------------------------------
-
-# If extensions (or modules to document with autodoc) are in another directory,
-# add these directories to sys.path here. If the directory is relative to the
-# documentation root, use os.path.abspath to make it absolute, like shown here.
-#
-# sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath('.'))
-
-import os
-import re
-import sys
-
-import yaml
-
-# Append the documentation directory to the path, so we can import variables
-sys.path.append(os.path.dirname(__file__))
-
-_metadata_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'corstone-a320_metadata.yaml')
-with open(_metadata_path, encoding='utf-8') as metadata_file:
-    _metadata = yaml.safe_load(metadata_file) or {}
-
-_metadata_variables = {
-    item['name']: item['value']
-    for item in _metadata.get('variables', [])
-    if item.get('name') and item.get('value')
-}
-
-
-# -- Project information -----------------------------------------------------
-
-project = 'Corstone-1000 Armv9-A Edge-AI'
-copyright = '2026, Arm Limited'
-author = 'Arm Limited'
-
-
-# -- General configuration ---------------------------------------------------
-
-# Add any Sphinx extension module names here, as strings. They can be
-# extensions coming with Sphinx (named 'sphinx.ext.*') or your custom
-# ones.
-extensions = [
-    'myst_parser',
-    'sphinx_rtd_theme',
-]
-
-source_suffix = {
-    '.rst': 'restructuredtext',
-    '.md': 'markdown',
-}
-
-myst_enable_extensions = [
-    'colon_fence',
-]
-
-# Add any paths that contain templates here, relative to this directory.
-templates_path = ['_templates']
-
-# List of patterns, relative to source directory, that match files and
-# directories to ignore when looking for source files.
-# This pattern also affects html_static_path and html_extra_path.
-exclude_patterns = [
-    '_build',
-    'Thumbs.db',
-    '.DS_Store',
-    'docs/infra',
-    'corstone-a320_map.md',
-    'corstone-a320_metadata.yaml',
-]
-
-
-# -- Options for HTML output -------------------------------------------------
-
-# The theme to use for HTML and HTML Help pages.  See the documentation for
-# a list of builtin themes.
-#
-html_theme = 'sphinx_rtd_theme'
-html_theme_options = {
-    'flyout_display': 'attached',
-}
-
-# Define the canonical URL if you are using a custom domain on Read the Docs
-html_baseurl = os.environ.get("READTHEDOCS_CANONICAL_URL", "")
-
-# Tell Jinja2 templates the build is running on Read the Docs
-if os.environ.get("READTHEDOCS", "") == "True":
-    if "html_context" not in globals():
-        html_context = {}
-    html_context["READTHEDOCS"] = True
-
-
-# Add any paths that contain custom static files (such as style sheets) here,
-# relative to this directory. They are copied after the builtin static files,
-# so a file named "default.css" will overwrite the builtin "default.css".
-#html_static_path = ['_static']
-
-
-def _replace_metadata_variables(app, docname, source):
-    source[0] = re.sub(
-        r'\$([A-Za-z0-9_]+)',
-        lambda match: _metadata_variables.get(match.group(1), match.group(0)),
-        source[0],
-    )
-
-
-def setup(app):
-    app.connect('source-read', _replace_metadata_variables)
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
- topics/introducing.md
- topics/software-architecture.md
- topics/user-guide.md
- topics/tests.md
- topics/release-notes.md
- topics/change-log.md
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
---
-title: Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320
-subtitle: ""
-abstract: Arm Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 is a reference solution for IoT devices. It is part of Total Solution for IoT which consists of hardware and software reference implementation.
-author: Arm
-status: REL
-keywords: [IoT, software]
-bookpartno: 112000
-product: Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320
-product_type: Open Source Projects
-product_revision:
-  - prefix: Version
-    version: "0101"
-    version_label: "2026.02"
-output_type: "software"
-conformance_notice: "true"
-content_type: User Guide
-audience:
-  - Software Developers
-categories:
-  - IoT
-themes:
-  - IoT
-intended_audience: Software Developers
-terminology_review: new
-releases:
- - revision: 0100-01
-   date: 2026-05-01
-   change_summary: Update
-   permissions: nonconfidential
-
-variables:
- name: arm_developer_cs1000_website
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/Tools%20and%20Software/Corstone-1000%20Software'
- name: arm_developer_cs1000_search
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/search#q=corstone-1000'
- name: arm_developer_mhu_website
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ka005129/latest/#:~:text=An%20MHU%20is%20a%20device,that%20a%20message%20is%20available'
- name: arm_developer_secureboot_website
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/documentation/PRD29-GENC-009492/c/TrustZone-Software-Architecture/Booting-a-secure-system/Secure-boot'
- name: arm_architecture_security_features_platform_security
-  value: 'https://www.arm.com/architecture/security-features/platform-security'
- name: linux_repository
-  value: 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/'
- name: arm_trustzone_for_cortex_a_website
-  value: 'https://www.arm.com/technologies/trustzone-for-cortex-a'
- name: arm_fmw_framework_a_profile_pdf
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0077/latest'
- name: arm_fmw_framework_m_profile_pdf
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/architectures/Firmware%20Framework%20for%20M-Profile'
- name: platform_security_fwu_for_a_profile_pdf
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0118/a/'
- name: psa_firmware_update_ihi_0093_api_reference_website
-  value: 'https://arm-software.github.io/psa-api/fwu/1.0/api/api.html'
- name: edk2_capsule_generation_tool_repository
-  value: 'https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/BaseTools/Source/Python/Capsule/GenerateCapsule.py'
- name: psa_fwu_den0018_specification_website
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0118/latest/'
- name: ts_psa_fwu_service_website
-  value: 'https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/stable/services/fwu/psa-fwu-m.html'
- name: tfm_shim_layer_website
-  value: 'https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design_docs/services/tfm_fwu_service.html#shim-layer-between-fwu-and-bootloader'
- name: op_tee_os_repository
-  value: 'https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os'
- name: psa_certified_website
-  value: 'https://www.psacertified.org/'
- name: psa_l2_ready
-  value: 'https://www.psacertified.org/products/corstone-1000/'
- name: systemready_ir_certification
-  value: 'https://armkeil.blob.core.windows.net/developer/Files/pdf/certificate-list/arm-systemready-ve-arm-neoverse.pdf'
- name: trusted_board_boot_requirements_client_pdf
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0006/latest'
- name: trusted_firmware_m_website
-  value: 'https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m/'
- name: trusted_firmware_m_bl1_website
-  value: 'https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design_docs/booting/bl1.html'
- name: trusted_firmware_a_bl2_website
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/documentation/108028/0000/RD-TC22-software/Software-components/AP-firmware/Trusted-firmware-A-BL2'
- name: trusted_firmware_a_fip_guide
-  value: 'https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design/firmware-design.html#firmware-image-package-fip'
- name: trusted_services_website
-  value: 'https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/trusted-services/'
- name: trusted_services_uefi_smm_website
-  value: 'https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/integration/services/uefi-smm-services.html#'
- name: das_u_boot_repository
-  value: 'https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot.git'
- name: keil_rtx5_website
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/Tools%20and%20Software/Keil%20MDK/RTX5%20RTOS'
- name: ppa_website
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/documentation/102738/0100/Power--performance--and-area-analysis'
- name: mcuboot_website
-  value: 'https://docs.mcuboot.com/'
- name: arm_developer_fvp
-  value: 'https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/open-source-software/arm-platforms-software/arm-ecosystem-fvps'
- name: secure_debug_manager_repo_readme
-  value: 'https://github.com/ARM-software/secure-debug-manager/tree/master?tab=readme-ov-file#secure-debug-manager-psa-adac--sdc-600'
- name: secure_debug_manager_armds_integration
-  value: 'https://github.com/ARM-software/secure-debug-manager?tab=readme-ov-file#arm-development-studio-integration'
- name: meta_arm_repository_release_branch
-  value: 'https://docs.yoctoproject.org/next/migration-guides/migration-6.0.html'
- name: arm_ulink_pro_website
-  value: 'https://www.arm.com/products/development-tools/debug-probes/ulink-pro'
- name: arm_ds_website
-  value: 'https://www.arm.com/products/development-tools/embedded-and-software/arm-development-studio'
- name: edk2_repository
-  value: 'https://github.com/tianocore/edk2'
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-# Corstone-1000 Armv9-A Edge-AI
-
-```{toctree}
-:maxdepth: 2
-
-topics/introducing
-topics/software-architecture
-topics/user-guide
-topics/tests
-topics/release-notes
-topics/change-log
-```
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-# Change log {.chapter permissions=non-confidential}
-
-This document contains a summary of the new features, changes and fixes in each release of the Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 software stack.
-
-## Version 2026.05 {.reference}
-
-The following changes are present in this release:
-
- Continued Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 enablement across U-Boot, TF-A, TF-M, OP-TEE, and Linux with the split A320 device tree, GIC-700 support, Ethos-U85 DT alignment, and NPU reset via the external-system controller.
- Enabled and documented FVP SMP builds and platform-agnostic multicore support, including the errata override fixes for Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 and removal of the reboot workaround note.
- Split Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 FVP support into a dedicated machine configuration and standalone documentation.
-
-### Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 components versions {.reference}
-
-The following component versions are available:
-
-Table: Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 component versions
-
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| Component                              | Version                           |
-+========================================+===================================+
-| linux-yocto                            | 6.19                              |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| u-boot                                 | 2025.10                           |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| external-system                        | 0.1.0                             |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| optee-client                           | 4.9.0                             |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| optee-os                               | 4.9.0                             |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| trusted-firmware-a                     | 2.14.1                            |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| trusted-firmware-m                     | 2.2.2                             |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| libts                                  | v1.3.0                            |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| ts-sp-{se-proxy, smm-gateway}          | v1.3.0                            |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| ts-psa-{crypto, iat, its. ps}-api-test | 74dc6646ff                        |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-
-### Yocto distribution components versions {.reference}
-
-The following Yocto distribution components versions are available:
-
-Table: Yocto distribution component versions
-
-+-------------------+------------+
-| Component         | Version    |
-+===================+============+
-| meta-arm          | wrynose    |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| bitbake           | 22021758e6 |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| meta-openembedded | 9af4488d46 |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| openembedded-core | 06dd66e622 |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| meta-yocto        | 8251bdad5f |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| meta-secure-core  | 07a99ae241 |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| busybox           | 1.37.0     |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| musl              | 1.2.6      |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| gcc-arm-none-eabi | 15.2.rel1  |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| gcc-cross-aarch64 | 15.2.0     |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| openssl           | 3.5.6      |
-+-------------------+------------+
-
-## Version 2025.12 {.reference}
-
-The following changes are present in this release:
-
- Delivered end-to-end Cortex-A320 enablement across U-Boot, TF-A, TF-M, OP-TEE, Yocto machine layers, and documentation, including device-tree updates, MPIDR handling, and FVP model renaming.
- Rolled out the PSA Firmware Update (DEN0118) pipeline: U-Boot capsule parsing, Bootloader Abstraction Layer in TF-M, ESRT exposure, and Trusted Services IPC bridges replacing legacy capsule code.
- Hardened the new firmware update flow with EFI self-tests, metadata restructuring for partial and multi-image acceptance, and RSE-COMMS gating refinements.
- Upgraded key firmware components (TF-A 2.13.0, TF-M 2.2.1, Trusted Services 1.2.0, OP-TEE OS 4.7.0) and introduced targeted test skips plus integer-only build modes to keep validation green.
- Cleaned and renumbered downstream patch series across Trusted Services and TF-M while removing obsolete integrations to align with upstream baselines.
- Refreshed release material and architecture guides to describe the A320 profile, PSA FWU behavior, and updated software stack.
- Added KAS profiles, machine includes, and automated FVP selection logic to streamline developer workflows for the refreshed platform configuration.
-
-### Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 components versions {.reference}
-
-The following component versions are available:
-
-Table: Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 component versions
-
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| Component                              | Version                           |
-+========================================+===================================+
-| linux-yocto                            | 6.12.60                           |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| u-boot                                 | 2025.04                           |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| optee-client                           | 4.7.0                             |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| optee-os                               | 4.7.0                             |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| trusted-firmware-a                     | 2.13.0                            |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| trusted-firmware-m                     | 2.2.1                             |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| libts                                  | v1.2.0                            |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| ts-sp-{se-proxy, smm-gateway}          | v1.2.0                            |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-| ts-psa-{crypto, iat, its. ps}-api-test | 74dc6646ff                        |
-+----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
-
-### Yocto distribution components versions {.reference}
-
-The following Yocto distribution components versions are available:
-
-
-Table: Yocto distribution component versions
-
-+-------------------+------------+
-| Component         | Version    |
-+===================+============+
-| meta-arm          | whinlatter |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| bitbake           | 0dde1a3ff8 |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| meta-openembedded | fc0152e434 |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| openembedded-core | 4bd920ad7d |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| meta-yocto        | b3b6592635 |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| meta-secure-core  | 63209fb150 |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| meta-ethos        | aa2504a32f |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| meta-sca          | e68f1a9d17 |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| busybox           | 1.37.0     |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| musl              | 1.2.5      |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| gcc-arm-none-eabi | 13.3.rel1  |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| gcc-cross-aarch64 | 15.2.0     |
-+-------------------+------------+
-| openssl           | 3.5.4      |
-+-------------------+------------+
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# Introduction {.chapter permissions=non-confidential}
-
-Arm Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 is a reference solution for IoT devices
-based on Arm Corstone-1000, but with Cortex-A320 CPU, Ethos-U85 NPU and
-GIC700 (Generic Interrupt Controller). It is part of Total Solution
-for IoT which consists of hardware and software reference implementations.
-
-## Disclaimer {.reference}
-
-Arm reference solutions are Arm public example software projects that track and
-pull upstream components, incorporating their respective security fixes
-published over time. Arm partners are responsible for ensuring that the
-components they use contain all the required security fixes, if and when they
-deploy a product derived from Arm reference solutions.
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Release notes {.chapter permissions=non-confidential}
-
-You expressly assume all liabilities and risks relating to your use or operation
-of your software and hardware designed or modified using the Arm Tools,
-including without limitation, your software or hardware designed or
-intended for safety-critical applications. Should your software or hardware
-prove defective, you assume the entire cost of all necessary servicing, repair
-or correction.
-
-## Release notes - 2026.05 {.reference}
-
-The following knowns issues and limitations are present in this release:
-
- Crypto isolation is not supported in the Secure world of Corstone-1000. Additionally, clients in
-  the Normal world are not isolated from one another. Therefore, if an end user wants to add a new
-  Secure Partition (SP) (such as a software TPM) that accesses the Crypto service via the SE-Proxy,
-  they are responsible for implementing their own isolation mechanisms to ensure proper security boundaries.
- DSTREAM debug probe may experience unreliable USB connectivity when used with Arm DS for secure debug.
-  This issue is under active investigation, and we are working to identify and resolve compatibility issues in a future update.
-  As a more stable alternative, the ULINKpro debug probe is recommended for use with Corstone-1000 in secure debug scenarios.
-
-## Release notes - 2025.12 {.reference}
-
-The following knowns issues and limitations are present in this release:
-
- Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 FVP does not currently support Symmetric Multiprocessing
- Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 FVP becomes unresponsive when the Linux kernel driver for the Ethos-U85 NPU loads automatically after a software reboot.
- Crypto isolation is not supported in the Secure world of Corstone-1000. Additionally, clients in
-  the Normal world are not isolated from one another. Therefore, if an end user wants to add a new
-  Secure Partition (SP) (such as a software TPM) that accesses the Crypto service via the SE-Proxy,
-  they are responsible for implementing their own isolation mechanisms to ensure proper security boundaries.
- DSTREAM debug probe may experience unreliable USB connectivity when used with Arm DS for secure debug.
-  This issue is under active investigation, and we are working to identify and resolve compatibility issues in a future update.
-  As a more stable alternative, the ULINKpro debug probe is recommended for use with Corstone-1000 in secure debug scenarios.
-
-## Support {.reference}
-
-For technical support, email [Arm subsystem support](mailto:support-subsystem-iot@arm.com).
-
-For security issues, contact [Arm Security](mailto:psirt@arm.com).
@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
-# Software architecture {.chapter permissions=non-confidential}
-
-The combination of Corstone-1000 software and hardware reference solution is [PSA Level-2 ready certified]($psa_l2_ready) as well as [Arm SystemReady Devicetree certified]($systemready_ir_certification). Please rely on the Corstone-1000 platform for certification needs.
-
-More information on the Corstone-1000 subsystems product(s), variants and design can be
-found on [Arm Developer]($arm_developer_cs1000_website).
-
-This document explicitly focuses on the software part of the solution and
-provides internal details on the software components. The reference
-software package of the platform can be retrieved following instructions
-present in the user guide document.
-
-## Design overview {.reference}
-
-This variant of the Corstone-1000 platform replaces the Host System's Cortex-A35
-processor with a Cortex-A320. In this configuration, the optional External System
-(previously a Cortex-M3) is replaced by an Arm Ethos-U85 Neural Processing Unit (NPU).
-The Ethos-U85 runs in the direct drive configuration, where the Host System is
-responsible for managing the NPU directly.
-
-![Cortex-A320 subsystems](../images/CorstoneA320Subsystems.png)
-
-## Secure boot chain {.reference}
-
-For the security of a device, it is essential that only authorized
-software should run on the device.
-
-The Corstone-1000 boot uses a [Secure boot]($arm_developer_secureboot_website) chain process
-where an already authenticated image verifies and loads the following software in the chain.
-
-For the boot chain process to work, the start of the chain should be trusted, forming the
-Root of Trust (RoT) of the device. The RoT of the device is immutable in
-nature and encoded into the device by the device manufacturer before it
-is deployed into the field.
-In Corstone-1000, the content of the ROM and CC312 One Time Programmable (OTP) memory forms the RoT.
-
-Verification of an image can happen either by comparing the computed and stored hashes, or by
-checking the signature of the image if the image is signed.
-
-![Secure boot chain](../images/SecureBootChain.png)
-
-It is a lengthy chain to boot the software on Corstone-1000.
-
-### TF-M BL1\_1 {.reference}
-
-On power-up, the Secure Enclave begins execution from TF-M BL1\_1, which resides in ROM and serves as
-the Root of Trust (RoT) for the device.
-
-TF-M BL1\_1 is the immutable bootloader and is responsible for:
-
- Provisioning the device during the first boot
- Performing hardware initialization
- Verifying the integrity and authenticity of the next stage in the boot chain
-
-At boot time, TF-M BL1\_1:
-
- Copies the TF-M BL1\_2 image from OTP to RAM.
- Verifies the integrity of BL1\_2 by comparing its computed hash with the hash stored in OTP.
-
-### TF-M BL1\_2 {.reference}
-
-During provisioning, the TF-M BL1\_2 binary, along with its hashes and cryptographic keys, is stored
-in One-Time Programmable (OTP) memory.
-
-Once verified, TF-M BL1\_2:
-
- Takes control and verifies the next stage in the boot chain, which is TF-M BL2.
- Computes the hash of the BL2 image and compares it with the BL2 hash stored in OTP to ensure
-  integrity before transferring execution to BL2.
-
-The TF-M BL1 design details can be found in the [TF-M design documents]($trusted_firmware_m_bl1_website).
-
-:::note
-Corstone-1000 has some differences compared to this design due to memory (OTP/ROM) limitations:
-
- BL1\_1 code size is larger than needed because it handles most of the hardware initialization instead of the BL1\_2.
- BL1\_2 cannot be updated during provisioning time because the provisioning bundle that contains its code is located in the ROM.
- BL1\_2 does not use the post-quantum LMS verification.
- BL2 cannot be updated because it is verified by comparing the computed hash to the hash stored in the OTP.
-
-:::
-
-### TF-M BL2 {.reference}
-
-In this system, TF-M BL2 refers to MCUBoot.
-
-On the first boot, MCUBoot can provision additional cryptographic keys. It is responsible for authenticating both:
-
- TF-M (Trusted Firmware-M), and
- The initial bootloader of the Host system, [Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) BL2]($trusted_firmware_a_bl2_website)
-
-This authentication is done by verifying the digital signatures of the respective images.
-
-MCUBoot performs image verification in the following steps:
-
-1. Load the image from non-volatile memory into RAM.
-2. Validate the image's signature using the corresponding public key.
-
-:::note
-The public key present in the image header is validated by comparing with the hash. Depending on the image, the hash of the public key is either stored in the OTP or part of the software which is being already verified in the previous stages.
-:::
-
-The execution control is passed to TF-M after the verification.
-As the runtime executable of the Secure Enclave, TF-M initializes itself before
-bringing the Host system out of reset.
-
-### Host system authentication {.reference}
-
-The Host system follows the boot standard defined in [Trusted Board Boot Requirements Client]($trusted_board_boot_requirements_client_pdf)
-to authenticate the Secure and Non-secure software.
-
-The [Firmware Image Package (FIP)]($trusted_firmware_a_fip_guide) packs bootloader images and
-other payloads into a single archive.
-
-![FIPDiagram](../images/FIPDiagram.png)
-
-The FIP for Corstone-1000 contains:
-
- Trusted firmware-A BL2
- AP EL3 Runtime firmware, BL31 image
- AP Secure Payload, BL32 image
- AP Normal world firmware -U-boot, BL33 image
- Trusted OS Firmware configuration file used by Trusted OS (BL32), TOS_FW_CONFIG
- Key certificates
- Content certificates
-
-To load and validate TF-A BL2, TF-M BL2 first parses the GUID Partition Table (GPT)
-to locate the FIP. It then determines the offset of TF-A BL2 within the FIP.
-
-:::note
-TF-M does not check the FIP signature, it only checks the TF-A BL2's signature in the FIP.
-:::
-
-The implicitly trusted components are:
-
- A SHA-256 hash of the Root of Trust Public Key (ROTPK.) For development purposes, a development ROTPK is used and its hash embedded into the TF-A BL2 image. This public key is provided by the TF-A source code.
- TF-A BL2 image - it can be trusted because it has been verified by TF-M BL2 before starting TF-A.
-
-The remaining components in the Chain of Trust (CoT) are either certificates or bootloader images.
-
-#### Bootloader authentication {.reference}
-
-The FIP contains two types of certificates:
-
- Content Certificates used to store the hash of a bootloader image.
- Key Certificates used to verify public keys used to sign Content Certificates.
-
-The Host system bootloader images are authenticated by computing their hash and comparing it to the corresponding hash found in the Content Certificate.
-
-#### Certificates verification {.reference}
-
-The public keys defined in the Trusted Key Certificate are used to verify the later certificates in
-the CoT process. The Trusted Key Certificate is verified with the Root of Trust Public Key.
-
-#### UEFI authenticated variables {.reference}
-
-For UEFI Secure Boot, authenticated variables can be accessed from the secure flash.
-The feature has been integrated in U-Boot, which authenticates the images as per the UEFI
-specification before executing them.
-
-## Secure services {.reference}
-
-Corstone-1000 is unique in offering a secure environment for running trusted workloads.
-While the Host system includes TrustZone technology, the platform also features a hardware-isolated
-Secure Enclave, specifically designed to execute these secure workloads.
-
-In Corstone-1000, essential Secure Services—such as Cryptography, Protected Storage,
-Internal Trusted Storage, and Attestation—are provided through PSA Functional APIs implemented in TF-M.
-
-From the user's perspective, there is no difference when communicating with these services,
-whether they run in the Secure Enclave or in the Secure world of the Host system.
-The diagram below illustrates the data flow for such calls.
-
-![Secure services](../images/SecureServices.png)
-
-The Secure Enclave Proxy Secure Partition (SE Proxy SP) is a proxy managed by OP-TEE that forwards
-Secure Service calls to the Secure Enclave. This communication uses the
-[RSE communication protocol](https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/platform/arm/rse/rse_comms.html).
-While the protocol supports shared memory and MHU interrupts as a doorbell mechanism between cores,
-in Corstone-1000, the entire message is currently transmitted through the MHU channels.
-Corstone-1000 implements Isolation Level 2 using the Cortex-M0+ Memory Protection Unit (MPU).
-
-Users can define their own secure services to run either in the Host system's Secure World or in
-the Secure Enclave. This choice involves a trade-off between latency and security.
-Services running in the Secure Enclave benefit from strong, hardware-enforced isolation,
-offering higher security but at the cost of increased latency. In contrast, services running in the
-Host Secure World experience lower latency, but rely on TrustZone technology for virtualized isolation,
-which offers comparatively less robust security.
-
-## PSA secure firmware update {.reference}
-
-The Corstone-1000 platform necessitates a robust, secure, and flexible firmware update mechanism
-including partial capsule update to ensure fielded devices can receive critical patches, feature enhancements,
-and security fixes without compromising system integrity. To meet these requirements, we have implemented the
-Platform Security Architecture (PSA) Firmware Update (FWU) framework on Corstone-1000, leveraging Trusted Firmware-M (TF-M)
-for the Secure Enclave, U-Boot as the host-side client on Cortex-A, and the UEFI capsule update mechanism for payload
-encapsulation. This design supports the Fixed Virtual Platform (FVP) target, providing consistent behavior across
-simulation-based deployments. The Corstone-1000 supports FWU
-which complies with the
-[Platform Security Firmware Update for the A-profile Arm Architecture]($platform_security_fwu_for_a_profile_pdf)
-and [PSA Firmware Update IHI 0093]($psa_firmware_update_ihi_0093_api_reference_website)
-specifications.
-
-To standardize and streamline capsule creation with multiple FMP payloads, the
-[EDK2 capsule generation tool]($edk2_capsule_generation_tool_repository)
-tool has been integrated into the meta-arm Yocto layer for Corstone-1000. This integration involves defining
-build rules for generating UEFI capsules as part of the firmware image build process. Configuration parameters
-exposed in the recipe allow developers to specify the number of FMP payloads, target image GUIDs, version numbers etc.
-This capsule ensures that all update payloads conform to the UEFI FMP specification and are ready for
-validation and delivery by U‑Boot.
-
-The FWU solution for Corstone-1000 is composed of three primary domains:
-
- Host System
- Trusted Services intermediary
- Secure Enclave
-
-Each domain has distinct responsibilities and communicates through standardized interfaces.
-
-![System architecture PSA firmware update](../images/SystemArchitecturePSAFirmwareUpdate.png)
-
-On the host side, U-Boot functions as the FWU client and orchestrates the update process from capsule retrieval to
-payload delivery based on [PSA FWU DEN0018 specification]($psa_fwu_den0018_specification_website)
-via Arm FF-A framework. The Trusted-Services SE Proxy secure partition serves as a gateway between the non-secure host
-environment and the Secure Enclave. The [PSA FWU service]($ts_psa_fwu_service_website) running in the Trusted Services
-implementation forwards the data to the Secure Enclave via MHU-based PSA calls. Within the Secure Enclave, the PSA FWU
-Agent, conforming to [PSA Firmware Update IHI 0093]($psa_firmware_update_ihi_0093_api_reference_website) specification,
-orchestrates the actual flash programming, metadata management, and rollback protection mechanisms. The agent relies on a
-bespoke [shim layer]($tfm_shim_layer_website) to abstract hardware‑specific flash operations and bootloader interactions.
-
-As defined in the specification, the external flash is divided into two banks: one bank holds the
-currently running images, while the other is used to stage new images.
-
-There are four updatable components: **BL2**, **TF-M**, **the FIP** and **the Kernel Image** (the initramfs bundle).
-New images are delivered and accepted in the form of UEFI capsules.
-
-![External flash](../images/ExternalFlash.png)
-
-When a FWU is initiated on Corstone-1000, the following sequence of operations takes place:
-
-1. Capsule Retrieval and Preparation
-
-   U-Boot on the host system retrieves the firmware capsule.
-   It validates the capsule header and parses the FMP (Firmware Management Protocol) descriptor list to identify the payloads to be updated.
-
-   For each FMP descriptor, U-Boot:
-
-   Splits the firmware payload into 4 KiB chunks.
-   Invokes the PSA_FWU_Update API for each chunk, transmitting the buffer address via the FF-A (Firmware Framework for Arm) shared memory interface.
-
-2. Secure Transmission and Forwarding
-
-   The PSA Firmware Update (FWU) service, running as part of Trusted Services, receives the chunks through Secure Partition Client (SPC) calls.
-   It forwards these chunks to the Secure Enclave using MHU-based PSA calls.
-
-3. Flashing Within the Secure Enclave
-
-   Inside the Secure Enclave, the PSA FWU Agent dispatches each chunk to the shim layer.
-
-   The shim layer:
-
-   Erases the corresponding sectors in the non-active flash bank.
-   Writes the received firmware chunks at the correct offsets.
-   During partial updates, it also copies static partitions from the active bank to the non-active one to maintain consistency.
-
-4. Finalization and Boot Preparation
-
-   After all chunks are successfully written:
-
-   The shim updates the firmware manifest and the EFI System Resource Table (ESRT) entries to reflect the new image version.
-   This step enables the bootloader to recognize the new firmware for a trial boot.
-   The platform then performs an automatic reset, booting into the non-active bank in trial mode.
-
-5. Trial Boot and Confirmation
-
-   In trial mode, U-Boot evaluates the new firmware and issues either an accept or reject command using the PSA FWU ABI.
-   These commands are sent to the Secure Enclave, instructing the shim to update the firmware metadata accordingly.
-
-6. Recovery and Fallback Mechanism
-
-   If the trial boot is successful, the host sends an acknowledgment, transitioning the firmware state from 'trial' to 'regular'.
-
-   If the system fails or becomes unresponsive:
-
-   A watchdog timer triggers a system reset.
-   The BL1 firmware in the Secure Enclave detects repeated failures and reverts to the previously known-good flash bank.
-   This rollback mechanism ensures the device remains operational and recoverable, even after a failed update.
-
-![Secure firmware update](../images/SecureFirmwareUpdate.png)
-
-## UEFI runtime support in U-Boot {.reference}
-
-The implementation of UEFI boot-time and runtime APIs requires persistent variable storage. In
-Corstone-1000, UEFI variables are stored using the Protected Storage (PS) service.
-
-The diagram below illustrates the data flow for storing UEFI variables. U-Boot's UEFI subsystem
-communicates with the Secure World using the U-Boot FF-A driver, which interfaces with the
-[UEFI System Management Mode (SMM) service]($trusted_services_uefi_smm_website).
-
-The SMM service provides support for the UEFI System Management Mode. This support is implemented by the SMM Gateway secure partition.
-The SMM service then uses the Proxy Protected Storage (PS) provided by the SE Proxy SP.
-These PS calls are forwarded to the Secure Enclave, following the communication path described earlier.
-
-![UEFI runtime support flow](../images/UEFISupport.png)
-
-## References {.reference}
-
-For more information, see:
-
- [Arm Developer]($arm_developer_cs1000_search)
- [Arm Security Architectures]($arm_architecture_security_features_platform_security)
@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
-# Build, flash and run {.chapter permissions=non-confidential}
-
-The Arm Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 software stack uses the Yocto Project to build a tiny Linux distribution suitable for the Arm Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 platform (kernel and initramfs filesystem less than 6 MB on the flash).
-
-The Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 software stack can be run on [Arm Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 FVP (Fixed Virtual Platform)](https://developer.arm.com/downloads/-/arm-ecosystem-fvps) and is built on top of Yocto Project's [Wrynose release]($meta_arm_repository_release_branch).
-
-The Yocto Project relies on the [BitBake](https://docs.yoctoproject.org/bitbake.html#bitbake-documentation) tool as its build tool. Please see the [Yocto Project documentation](https://docs.yoctoproject.org/) for more information.
-
-## Prerequisites {.reference}
-
-This guide assumes that your host machine is running Ubuntu 24.04 LTS (with `sudo` rights), with at least
-32GB of free disk space and 16GB of RAM as minimum requirement.
-
-The following prerequisites must be available on the host system:
-
- Git 2.39.2 or greater.
- Python 3.11.2 or greater.
- GNU Tar 1.34 or greater.
- GNU Compiler Collection 12.2 or greater.
- GNU Make 4.3 or greater.
- tmux 3.3 or greater.
-
-Please follow the steps described in the Yocto mega manual:
-
- [Compatible Linux Distribution](https://docs.yoctoproject.org/singleindex.html#compatible-linux-distribution)
- [Build Host Packages](https://docs.yoctoproject.org/singleindex.html#build-host-packages)
-
-## Software components {.reference}
-
-Within the Yocto Project, each component included in the Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 software stack is specified as
-a [BitBake recipe](https://docs.yoctoproject.org/bitbake/2.2/bitbake-user-manual/bitbake-user-manual-intro.html#recipes).
-The recipes specific to the Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 BSP are located at:
-`${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/`.
-
-`${WORKSPACE}` refers to the absolute path to your workspace where the `meta-arm` repository will be cloned. Consider exporting it (e.g., `export WORKSPACE=$(realpath .)`) if you're already in the workspace directory,
-so you can copy and paste the commands from this guide verbatim.
-
-The Yocto machine config files are at:
-
- `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/conf/machine/include/corstone1000-a320.inc`
- `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/conf/machine/corstone1000-a320-fvp.conf`
-
-:::note
-All the paths stated in this document are absolute paths.
-:::
-
-### Host processor components {.reference}
-
-This section describes the components used in the host processor.
-
-#### Trusted Firmware-A {.reference}
-
-The following [Trusted Firmware-A](https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git) components are used:
-
-Table: Trusted Firmware-A components
-
-| Type      | Path                                                                                                             |
-| --------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-bsp/trusted-firmware-a/trusted-firmware-a_%.bbappend`                |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-bsp/trusted-firmware-a/trusted-firmware-a_2.14.1.bb`                     |
-
-#### Trusted Services {.reference}
-
-The following [Trusted Services](https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html) components are used:
-
-Table: Trusted Services components
-
-| Type      | Path                                                                                                             |
-| --------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/trusted-services/libts_%.bbappend`                          |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-psa-crypto-api-test_%.bbappend`        |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-psa-iat-api-test_%.bbappend`           |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-psa-its-api-test_%.bbappend`           |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-psa-ps-api-test_%.bbappend`            |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-sp-se-proxy_%.bbappend`                |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-sp-smm-gateway_%.bbappend`             |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-security/trusted-services/libts_git.bb`                                  |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-psa-crypto-api-test_git.bb`                |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-psa-iat-api-test_git.bb`                   |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-psa-its-api-test_git.bb`                   |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-psa-ps-api-test_git.bb`                    |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-sp-smm-gateway_git.bb`                     |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-security/trusted-services/ts-sp-se-proxy_git.bb`                        |
-
-#### OP-TEE {.reference}
-
-The following [OP-TEE](https://git.trustedfirmware.org/OP-TEE/optee_os.git) components are used:
-
-Table: OP-TEE components
-
-| Type      | Path                                                                                                             |
-| --------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os_%.bbappend`                                 |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-security/optee/optee-os_4.9.0.bb`                                       |
-
-#### U-Boot {.reference}
-
-The following [U-Boot](https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot.git) components are used:
-
-Table: U-Boot components
-
-| Type      | Path                                                                                                             |
-| --------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_%.bbappend`                                           |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_%.bbappend`                                       |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2025.10.bb`                                       |
-
-#### Linux {.reference}
-
-The distribution is based on the [Poky](https://docs.yoctoproject.org/ref-manual/terms.html#term-Poky)
-distribution which is a Linux distribution stripped down to a minimal configuration.
-
-The provided distribution is based on [BusyBox](https://www.busybox.net/) and built using [musl libc](https://musl.libc.org/).
-
-The following Linux components are used:
-
-Table: Linux components
-
-| Type      | Path                                                                                                             |
-| --------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_%.bbappend`                                |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_6.19.bb`                                   |
-| defconfig | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/files/corstone1000/defconfig`                          |
-
-### Secure enclave components {.reference}
-
-This section describes the secure enclave components.
-
-#### Trusted Firmware-M {.reference}
-
-The following [Trusted Firmware-M](https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git) are used:
-
-Table: Trusted Firmware-M secure enclave components
-
-| Type      | Path                                                                                                             |
-| --------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| bbappend  | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm-bsp/recipes-bsp/trusted-firmware-m/trusted-firmware-m_%.bbappend`                |
-| Recipe    | `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-bsp/trusted-firmware-m/trusted-firmware-m_2.2.2.bb`                     |
-
-## Build {.reference}
-
-To build the software stack, do the following:
-
-:::note
-Building binaries natively on Windows and AArch64 Linux is not supported. Use an Intel or AMD 64-bit architecture Linux based development machine to build the software stack and transfer the binaries to run the software stack on an FVP in Windows or AArch64 Linux if required.
-:::
-
-1. Create a new folder that will be your workspace:
-
-   ```
-   mkdir ${WORKSPACE}
-   cd ${WORKSPACE}
-   ```
-
-2. Install kas version 4.4 with `sudo` rights:
-
-   ```
-   sudo pip3 install kas==4.4
-   ```
-
-   Ensure the kas installation directory is visible on the `$PATH` environment variable.
-
-3. Clone the `meta-arm` Yocto layer in the workspace `${WORKSPACE}`.
-
-   ```
-   cd ${WORKSPACE}
-   git clone https://git.yoctoproject.org/git/meta-arm -b CORSTONE1000-2026.05
-   ```
-
-4. Accept the EULA on the [Arm Developer](https://developer.arm.com/downloads/-/arm-ecosystem-fvps/eula) site to build a Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 image for FVP as follows:
-
-   ```
-   export ARM_FVP_EULA_ACCEPT="True"
-   ```
-
-5. Build a Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 image:
-
-   ```
-   kas build meta-arm/kas/corstone1000-a320-fvp.yml:meta-arm/ci/debug.yml
-   ```
-
-A clean build takes a significant amount of time given that all of the development machine utilities are also
-built along with the target images. Those development machine utilities include executables (Python,
-CMake, etc.) and the required toolchains.
-
-Once the build succeeds, all output binaries will be placed in `${WORKSPACE}/build/tmp/deploy/images/corstone1000-a320-fvp/`.
-
-Everything apart from the Secure Enclave ROM firmware is bundled into a single binary, the
-`corstone1000-flash-firmware-image-corstone1000-a320-fvp.wic` file.
-
-The output binaries run in the Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 platform are the following:
-
- The Secure Enclave ROM firmware: `${WORKSPACE}/build/tmp/deploy/images/corstone1000-a320-fvp/trusted-firmware-m/bl1.bin`
- The internal firmware flash image: `${WORKSPACE}/build/tmp/deploy/images/corstone1000-a320-fvp/corstone1000-flash-firmware-image-corstone1000-a320-fvp.wic`
-
-## Build with SSH {.reference}
-
-The `meta-arm/kas/corstone1000-a320-fvp.yml` build produces an image for booting from flash.
-
-To build a bootable mass storage OS image with Dropbear SSH enabled, run:
-
-```
-kas build meta-arm/ci/corstone1000-a320-fvp.yml:meta-arm/kas/corstone1000-ssh.yml
-```
-
-The mass storage OS image can be found at `${WORKSPACE}/build/tmp/deploy/images/corstone1000-a320-fvp/core-image-minimal-corstone1000-a320-fvp.wic`
-
-:::note
-The generated `core-image-minimal-corstone1000-a320-fvp.fvpconf` attaches the mass storage OS image to `board.msd_mmc.p_mmc_file`.
-:::
-
-
-## Run {.reference}
-
-Once the platform is turned ON, the Secure Enclave will start to boot, wherein the relevant memory contents of the `*.wic`
-file are copied to their respective memory locations. Firewall policies are enforced
-on memories and peripherals before bringing the Host Processor out of reset.
-
-The Host Processor will boot TrustedFirmware-A, OP-TEE, U-Boot and then Linux before presenting a login prompt.
-
-A Fixed Virtual Platform (FVP) model of the Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 platform must be available to run the
-Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 FVP software image.
-
-A Yocto recipe is provided to download the latest supported FVP version.
-
-The recipe is located at `${WORKSPACE}/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-devtools/fvp/fvp-corstone1000-a320.bb`.
-
-The latest FVP version is `11.31.cs1000_a320_2` for Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320, and the model is automatically downloaded and installed when using the `runfvp` command as follows:
-
-```
-kas shell meta-arm/kas/corstone1000-a320-fvp.yml:meta-arm/ci/debug.yml \
-c "../meta-arm/scripts/runfvp -- --version"
-```
-
-The FVP can also be manually downloaded from [Arm Developer](https://developer.arm.com/downloads/-/arm-ecosystem-fvps) to download the Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 FVP package.
-
-To set up the FVP:
-
-1. Run `tmux`:
-
-   ```
-   cd ${WORKSPACE} && tmux
-   ```
-
-2. Run the FVP within `tmux`:
-
-   ```
-   kas shell meta-arm/kas/corstone1000-a320-fvp.yml:meta-arm/ci/debug.yml \
-   -c "../meta-arm/scripts/runfvp --terminals=tmux"
-   ```
-
-   When the script is executed, three terminal instances will be launched:
-
-   - one for the Secure Enclave processing element
-   - two for the Host processor processing element.
-
-   ```
-   corstone1000-a320-fvp login:
-   ```
-
-3. Log in using the `root` username.
-
-## Security issue reporting {.reference}
-
-To report any security issues identified with Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320, please send an email to [psirt@arm.com](mailto:psirt@arm.com).
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ..
- # Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited.
+ # Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited.
 #
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

@@ -10,202 +10,6 @@ Change Log
 This document contains a summary of the new features, changes and
 fixes in each release of Corstone-1000 software stack.

-***************
-Version 2026.05
-***************
-
-Changes
-=======
-
- Upgraded key Corstone-1000 components to U-Boot 2025.10, TF-A 2.14.1, TF-M 2.2.2, OP-TEE 4.9.0, Trusted Services 1.3.0, and Linux 6.19.
- Added GPT support in TF-M and updated MCUboot to use the GPT library for firmware-update partitions.
- Extended the TF-M firmware update flow with GPT fixes, partition create/remove/duplicate operations, metadata-only handling, flash erase protection, stale partition cleanup, and better handling of older images during PSA FWU.
- Added SSH-enabled build overlay for FVP mass-storage images.
- Removed GRUB from the initramfs boot package set.
-
-Corstone-1000 components versions
-=================================
-
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| linux-yocto                               | 6.19              |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| u-boot                                    | 2025.10           |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| external-system                           | 0.1.0             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| optee-client                              | 4.9.0             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| optee-os                                  | 4.9.0             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| trusted-firmware-a                        | 2.14.1            |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| trusted-firmware-m                        | 2.2.2             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| libts                                     | v1.3.0            |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| ts-sp-{se-proxy, smm-gateway}             | v1.3.0            |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| ts-psa-{crypto, iat, its. ps}-api-test    | 74dc6646ff        |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-
-Yocto distribution components versions
-======================================
-
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-arm                                  | wrynose        |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| bitbake                                   | 22021758e6     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-openembedded                         | 9af4488d46     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| openembedded-core                         | 06dd66e622     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-yocto                                | 8251bdad5f     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-secure-core                          | 07a99ae241     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| busybox                                   | 1.37.0         |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| musl                                      | 1.2.6          |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| gcc-arm-none-eabi                         | 15.2.rel1      |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| gcc-cross-aarch64                         | 15.2.0         |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| openssl                                   | 3.5.6          |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-
-***************
-Version 2025.12
-***************
-
-Changes
-=======
-
- Delivered end-to-end Cortex-A320 enablement across U-Boot, TF-A, TF-M, OP-TEE, Yocto machine layers, and documentation, including device-tree updates, MPIDR handling, and FVP model renaming.
- Rolled out the PSA Firmware Update (DEN0118) pipeline: U-Boot capsule parsing, Bootloader Abstraction Layer in TF-M, ESRT exposure, and Trusted Services IPC bridges replacing legacy capsule code.
- Hardened the new firmware update flow with EFI self-tests, metadata restructuring for partial and multi-image acceptance, and RSE-COMMS gating refinements.
- Upgraded key firmware components (TF-A 2.13.0, TF-M 2.2.1, Trusted Services 1.2.0, OP-TEE OS 4.7.0) and introduced targeted test skips plus integer-only build modes to keep validation green.
- Cleaned and renumbered downstream patch series across Trusted Services and TF-M while removing obsolete integrations to align with upstream baselines.
- Refreshed release material and architecture guides to describe the A320 profile, PSA FWU behavior, and updated software stack.
- Added KAS profiles, machine includes, and automated FVP selection logic to streamline developer workflows for the refreshed platform configuration.
-
-Corstone-1000 components versions
-=================================
-
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| linux-yocto                               | 6.12.60           |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| u-boot                                    | 2025.04           |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| external-system                           | 0.1.0             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| optee-client                              | 4.7.0             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| optee-os                                  | 4.7.0             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| trusted-firmware-a                        | 2.13.0            |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| trusted-firmware-m                        | 2.2.1             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| libts                                     | v1.2.0            |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| ts-sp-{se-proxy, smm-gateway}             | v1.2.0            |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| ts-psa-{crypto, iat, its. ps}-api-test    | 74dc6646ff        |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-
-Yocto distribution components versions
-======================================
-
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-arm                                  | whinlatter     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| bitbake                                   | 0dde1a3ff8     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-openembedded                         | fc0152e434     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| openembedded-core                         | 4bd920ad7d     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-yocto                                | b3b6592635     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-secure-core                          | 63209fb150     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| busybox                                   | 1.37.0         |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| musl                                      | 1.2.5          |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| gcc-arm-none-eabi                         | 13.3.rel1      |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| gcc-cross-aarch64                         | 15.2.0         |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| openssl                                   | 3.5.4          |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-
-***************
-Version 2025.05
-***************
-
-Changes
-=======
-
- OP-TEE OS: Added support for v4.4
- Trusted Services: PSA-Crypto structures aligned with TF-M, added protobuf interface to crypto-sp
- Documentation: fixed typos, added host-level authentication section, enabled fly-out sidebar menu
- Das U-Boot: Reserved memory for RSS communication-pointer access protocol
- Linux Kernel: Upgraded kernel to v6.12, updated Upstream-Status notes for remoteproc patches
- Corstone-1000 image: Implemented IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE workaround
-
-Corstone-1000 components versions
-=================================
-
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| linux-yocto                               | 6.12.30           |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| u-boot                                    | 2023.07.02        |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| external-system                           | 0.1.0             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| optee-client                              | 4.4.0             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| optee-os                                  | 4.4.0             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| trusted-firmware-a                        | 2.11.0            |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| trusted-firmware-m                        | 2.1.1             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| libts                                     | 602be60719        |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| ts-newlib                                 | 4.1.0             |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| ts-psa-{crypto, iat, its. ps}-api-test    | 74dc6646ff        |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-| ts-sp-{se-proxy, smm-gateway}             | 602be60719        |
-+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
-
-Yocto distribution components versions
-======================================
-
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-arm                                  | walnascar      |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| poky                                      | ee0d8d8a61     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-openembedded                         | 2169c9afcc     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| meta-secure-core                          | 423bc85b05     |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| busybox                                   | 1.37.0         |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| musl                                      | 1.2.5          |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| gcc-arm-none-eabi                         | 13.3.rel1      |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| gcc-cross-aarch64                         | 14.2.0         |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-| openssl                                   | 3.4.1          |
-+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
-

 ***************
 Version 2024.11
@@ -629,4 +433,4 @@ Changes

 --------------

-*Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
-# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: <text>Copyright 2020-2024, 2026 Arm Limited and/or its
-# affiliates <open-source-office@arm.com></text>
-#
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
 # Configuration file for the Sphinx documentation builder.
 #
 # This file only contains a selection of the most common options. For a full
@@ -26,8 +21,8 @@ sys.path.append(os.path.dirname(__file__))

 # -- Project information -----------------------------------------------------

-project = 'Corstone-1000'
-copyright = '2020-2026, Arm Limited'
+project = 'corstone1000'
+copyright = '2020-2024, Arm Limited'
 author = 'Arm Limited'


@@ -55,9 +50,6 @@ exclude_patterns = ['_build', 'Thumbs.db', '.DS_Store', 'docs/infra']
 # a list of builtin themes.
 #
 html_theme = 'sphinx_rtd_theme'
-html_theme_options = {
-    'flyout_display': 'attached',
-}

 # Define the canonical URL if you are using a custom domain on Read the Docs
 html_baseurl = os.environ.get("READTHEDOCS_CANONICAL_URL", "")
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ..
- # Copyright (c) 2022, 2024, 2026 Arm Limited.
+ # Copyright (c) 2022, 2024, Arm Limited.
 #
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ..
- # Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited.
+ # Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited.
 #
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

@@ -19,40 +19,6 @@ intended for safety-critical applications. Should Your Software or Your Hardware
 prove defective, you assume the entire cost of all necessary servicing, repair
 or correction.

-***********************
-Release notes - 2026.05
-***********************
-
-The same notes as the 2025.05 release still apply.
-
-***********************
-Release notes - 2025.12
-***********************
-
-The same notes as the 2025.05 release still apply.
-
-Known Issues or Limitations
---------------------------
-
- Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 FVP does not currently support Symmetric Multiprocessing
- Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 FVP becomes unresponsive when the Linux kernel driver for the Ethos-U85 NPU loads automatically after a software reboot.
-
-***********************
-Release notes - 2025.05
-***********************
-
-Known Issues or Limitations
---------------------------
-
- - Crypto isolation is not supported in the Secure world of Corstone-1000. Additionally, clients in
-   the Normal world are not isolated from one another.Therefore, if an end user wants to add a new
-   Secure Partition (SP) (such as a software TPM) that accesses the Crypto service via the SE-Proxy,
-   they are responsible for implementing their own isolation mechanisms to ensure proper security boundaries.
- - DSTREAM debug probe may experience unreliable USB connectivity when used with Arm DS for secure debug.
-   This issue is under active investigation, and we are working to identify and resolve compatibility issues in a future update.
-   As a more stable alternative, the ULINKpro debug probe is recommended for use with Corstone-1000 in secure debug scenarios.
-
-
 ***********************
 Release notes - 2024.11
 ***********************
@@ -78,16 +44,6 @@ Platform Support
 - This software release is tested on Corstone-1000 Fast Model platform (FVP) version 11.23_25
   https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/open-source-software/arm-platforms-software/arm-ecosystem-fvps

-SystemReady IR v2.0 Certification Milestone
-------------------------------------------
-
-As of this release, Corstone-1000 has achieved `SystemReady IR v2.0 certification <https://www.arm.com/architecture/system-architectures/systemready-certification-program/ve>`__.
-This milestone confirms compliance with the SystemReady IR requirements, ensuring broader compatibility and reliability for deployment.
-
-Applied patch `313ad2a0e600 <https://git.yoctoproject.org/meta-arm/commit/?h=scarthgap&id=313ad2a0e600655d9bfbe53646e356372ff02644>`__ to address compatibility requirements for SystemReady IR v2.0.
-
-This update is included in tag `CORSTONE1000-2024.06-systemready-ir-v2.0 <https://git.yoctoproject.org/meta-arm/tag/?h=CORSTONE1000-2024.06-systemready-ir-v2.0>`__ and builds on the `CORSTONE1000-2024.06` release.
-
 ***********************
 Release notes - 2023.11
 ***********************
@@ -286,4 +242,4 @@ For all security issues, contact Arm by email at psirt@arm.com.

 --------------

-*Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2022-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ..
- # Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited.
+ # Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited.
 #
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

@@ -16,266 +16,137 @@ Arm Corstone-1000 is a reference solution for IoT devices. It is part of
 Total Solution for IoT which consists of hardware and software reference
 implementation.

-The combination of Corstone-1000 software and hardware reference solution is `PSA Level-2 ready
-certified <psa_l2-ready_>`__ as well as `Arm SystemReady Devicetree certified <systemready-ir-certification_>`__.
+Corstone-1000 software plus hardware reference solution is PSA Level-2 ready
+certified (`PSA L2 Ready`_) as well as System Ready IR certified(`SRIR cert`_).
+More information on the Corstone-1000 subsystem product and design can be
+found at:
+`Arm Corstone-1000 Software`_ and `Arm Corstone-1000 Technical Overview`_.

-More information on the Corstone-1000 subsystems product and design can be
-found on `Arm Developer <arm-developer-cs1000-website_>`__.
-
-This document explicitly focuses on the software part of the solution and
+This readme explicitly focuses on the software part of the solution and
 provides internal details on the software components. The reference
 software package of the platform can be retrieved following instructions
-present in the user guide document.
+present in the user-guide document.

 ***************
 Design Overview
 ***************

 The software architecture of Corstone-1000 platform is a reference
-implementation of `Platform Security Architecture <psa-certified-website_>`__ which provides
+implementation of Platform Security Architecture (`PSA`_) which provides
 framework to build secure IoT devices.

-The base system architecture of the platform is created from three different types of subsystems:
-
-    - Secure Enclave
-    - Host System
-    - External System
-
-Each subsystem provides different functionality to the overall system on a chip (SoC).
+The base system architecture of the platform is created from three
+different types of systems: Secure Enclave, Host and External System.
+Each subsystem provides different functionality to overall SoC.


 .. image:: images/CorstoneSubsystems.png
   :width: 720
   :alt: CorstoneSubsystems

-Secure Enclave
-==============

-The Secure Enclave boots first on system power on, it provides `PSA Root of Trust (RoT) <psa-certified-website_>`__ and
-cryptographic functions. It is based on a Cortex-M0+ processor, CC312 Cryptographic Accelerator and
-peripherals such as watchdog and secure flash.
-
-.. image:: images/Corstone1000SecureFlashMPS3.png
-   :width: 400
-   :alt: Corstone1000SecureFlashMPS3
-
-.. image:: images/Corstone1000SecureFlashFVP.png
-   :width: 400
-   :alt: Corstone1000SecureFlashFVP
-
-Software running on the Secure Enclave is isolated via hardware for enhanced security.
-Communication with the Secure Enclave is achieved using `Message Handling Units (MHUs) <arm-developer-mhu-website_>`__
-and shared memory.
-
-Its software components comprises:
-
-    - `Trusted Firmware-M (TF-M) BL1 <trusted-firmware-m-bl1-website_>`__
-    - `MCUboot <mcuboot-website_>`__
-    - `TrustedFirmware-M <trusted-firmware-m-website_>`__ 
-
-The software design on the Secure Enclave follows `Arm Firmware Framework for M-Profile
-processor <arm-fmw-framework-m-profile-pdf_>`__ (FF-M) specification.
-
-Host System
-===========
+The Secure Enclave System, provides PSA Root of Trust (RoT) and
+cryptographic functions. It is based on an Cortex-M0+ processor,
+CC312 Cryptographic Accelerator and peripherals, such as watchdog and
+secure flash. Software running on the Secure Enclave is isolated via
+hardware for enhanced security. Communication with the Secure Encalve
+is achieved using Message Handling Units (MHUs) and shared memory.
+On system power on, the Secure Enclave boots first. Its software
+comprises of a  ROM code (TF-M BL1), MCUboot BL2, and
+TrustedFirmware-M(`TF-M`_) as runtime software. The software design on
+Secure Enclave follows Firmware Framework for M class
+processor (`FF-M`_) specification.

 The Host System is based on ARM Cortex-A35 processor with standardized
-peripherals to allow booting a Linux-based operating system (OS). The Cortex-A35 has
-the `TrustZone <arm-trustzone-for-cortex-a-website_>`__ technology that allows Secure and Non-secure security
-states in the processor. 
+peripherals to allow for the booting of a Linux OS. The Cortex-A35 has
+the TrustZone technology that allows secure and non-secure security
+states in the processor. The software design in the Host System follows
+Firmware Framework for A class processor (`FF-A`_) specification.
+The boot process follows Trusted Boot Base Requirement (`TBBR`_).
+The Host Subsystem is taken out of reset by the Secure Enclave system
+during its final stages of the initialization. The Host subsystem runs
+FF-A Secure Partitions(based on `Trusted Services`_) and OPTEE-OS
+(`OPTEE-OS`_) in the secure world, and U-Boot(`U-Boot repo`_) and
+linux (`linux repo`_) in the non-secure world. The communication between
+non-secure and the secure world is performed via FF-A messages.

-The boot process follows `Trusted Boot Base Requirements Client <trusted-board-boot-requirements-client-pdf_>`__.
-The Host System is taken out of reset by the Secure Enclave system during its final stages of the
-initialization.
+An external system is intended to implement use-case specific functionality.
+The system is based on Cortex-M3 and run RTX RTOS. Communication between the
+external system and Host (Cortex-A35) can be performed using MHU as transport
+mechanism. The current software release supports switching on and off the
+external system. Support for OpenAMP-based communication is under
+development.

-In the Secure world, the Host System runs:
-
-    - FF-A Secure Partitions (based on `Trusted Services <trusted-services-website_>`__)
-    - `OP-TEE OS <op-tee-os-repository_>`__
-
-In the Non-secure World, the Host System runs:
-
-    - `U-Boot <das-u-boot-repository_>`__
-    - `Linux kernel <linux-repository_>`__
-
-The software design in the Host System follows `Arm Firmware Framework for Arm A-profile 
-<arm-fmw-framework-a-profile-pdf_>`__ (FF-A) specification.
-The communication between Non-secure and the Secure world is performed via FF-A messages.
-
-External System
-===============
-
-The External System is intended to implement use-case specific functionality.
-
-The system is based on Cortex-M3 and runs `Keil RTX5 <keil-rtx5-website_>`__. 
-
-Communication between the external system and Host (Cortex-A35) can be performed using MHU as transport
-mechanism. The current software release supports switching the External System ON and OFF.
-
-The Corstone-1000 architecture is designed to cover a range of
-`Power, Performance, and Area (PPA) <ppa-website_>`__ applications, and enable extension
-for use-case specific applications, for example, sensors, cloud connectivity, and edge computing.
+Overall, the Corstone-1000 architecture is designed to cover a range
+of Power, Performance, and Area (PPA) applications, and enable extension
+for use-case specific applications, for example, sensors, cloud
+connectivitiy, and edge computing.

 *****************
 Secure Boot Chain
 *****************

 For the security of a device, it is essential that only authorized
-software should run on the device.
-
-The Corstone-1000 boot uses a `Secure boot <arm-developer-secureboot-website_>`__ chain process
-where an already authenticated image verifies and loads the following software in the chain.
-
-For the boot chain process to work, the start of the chain should be trusted, forming the
+software should run on the device. The Corstone-1000 boot uses a
+Secure Boot Chain process where an already authenticated image verifies
+and loads the following software in the chain. For the boot chain
+process to work, the start of the chain should be trusted, forming the
 Root of Trust (RoT) of the device. The RoT of the device is immutable in
-nature and encoded into the device by the device manufacturer before it
-is deployed into the field. 
-In Corstone-1000, the content of the ROM and CC312 One Time Programmable (OTP) memory forms the RoT.
+nature and encoded into the device by the device owner before it
+is deployed into the field. In Corstone-1000, the content of the ROM
+and CC312 OTP (One Time Programmable) memory forms the RoT.

-Verification of an image can happen either by comparing the computed and stored hashes, or by
-checking the signature of the image if the image is signed.
+Verification of an image can happen either by comparing the computed and
+stored hashes, or by checking the signature of the image if the image
+is signed.

 .. image:: images/SecureBootChain.png
   :width: 870
   :alt: SecureBootChain

-It is a lengthy chain to boot the software on Corstone-1000.
+It is a lengthy chain to boot the software on Corstone-1000. On power on,
+the Secure Enclave starts executing BL1_1 code from the ROM which is the RoT
+of the device. The BL1_1 is the immutable bootloader of the system, it handles
+the provisioning on the first boot, hardware initialization and verification
+of the next stage.

-TF-M BL1_1
-==========
+The BL1_2 code, hashes and keys are written into the OTP during the provisioning.
+The next bootstage is the BL1_2 which is copied from the OTP into the RAM. The
+BL1_1 also compares the BL1_2 hash with the hash saved to the OTP. The BL1_2
+verifies and transfers control to the next bootstage which is the BL2. During the
+verification, the BL1_2 compares the BL2 image's computed hash with the BL2 hash in
+the OTP. The BL2 is MCUBoot in the system. BL2 can provision additional keys on the
+first boot and it authenticates the initial bootloader of the host (Host TF-A BL2)
+and TF-M by checking the signatures of the images.
+The MCUBoot handles the image verification the following way:

-On power-up, the Secure Enclave begins execution from TF-M BL1_1, which resides in ROM and serves as
-the Root of Trust (RoT) for the device.
-
-TF-M BL1_1 is the immutable bootloader and is responsible for:
-
- Provisioning the device during the first boot
- Performing hardware initialization
- Verifying the integrity and authenticity of the next stage in the boot chain
-
-At boot time, TF-M BL1_1:
-
- Copies the TF-M BL1_2 image from OTP to RAM.
- Verifies the integrity of BL1_2 by comparing its computed hash with the hash stored in OTP.
-
-TF-M BL1_2
-==========
-
-During provisioning, the TF-M BL1_2 binary, along with its hashes and cryptographic keys, is stored
-in One-Time Programmable (OTP) memory.
-
-Once verified, TF-M BL1_2:
-
- Takes control and verifies the next stage in the boot chain, which is TF-M BL2.
- Computes the hash of the BL2 image and compares it with the BL2 hash stored in OTP to ensure
-  integrity before transferring execution to BL2.
-
-.. note::
-
-    The TF-M BL1 design details can be found in the `TF-M design documents <trusted-firmware-m-bl1-website_>`_.
-
-    .. important::
-
-        Corstone-1000 has some differences compared to this design due to memory (OTP/ROM)
-        limitations:
-
-        - BL1_1 code size is larger than needed because it handles most of the hardware initialization instead of the BL1_2.
-        - BL1_2 cannot be updated during provisioning time because the provisioning bundle that contains its code is located in the ROM.
-        - BL1_2 does not use the post-quantum LMS verification.
-        - BL2 cannot be updated because it is verified by comparing the computed hash to the hash stored in the OTP.
-
-TF-M BL2
-========
-
-In this system, TF-M BL2 refers to MCUBoot.
-
-On the first boot, MCUBoot can provision additional cryptographic keys. It is responsible for authenticating both:
-
- TF-M (Trusted Firmware-M), and
- The initial bootloader of the Host system, `Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) BL2 <trusted-firmware-a-bl2-website_>`__
-
-This authentication is done by verifying the digital signatures of the respective images.
-
-MCUBoot performs image verification in the following steps:
-
-#. Load the image from non-volatile memory into RAM.
-#. Validate the image's signature using the corresponding public key.
-
-.. note::
-
-   The public key present in the image header is validated by comparing with the hash.
-   Depending on the image, the hash of the public key is either stored in the OTP or part
-   of the software which is being already verified in the previous stages.
+- Load image from a non-volatile memory to dynamic RAM.
+- The public key present in the image header is validated by comparing with the hash.
+  Depending on the image, the hash of the public key is either stored in the OTP or part
+  of the software which is being already verified in the previous stages.
+- The image is validated using the public key.


-The execution control is passed to TF-M after the verification.
-As the runtime executable of the Secure Enclave, TF-M initializes itself before
-bringing the Host system out of reset.
+The execution control is passed to TF-M after the verification. TF-M being
+the runtime executable of the Secure Enclave which initializes itself and, at the end,
+brings the host CPU out of rest.

+The TF-M BL1 design details and reasoning can be found in the `TF-M design documents
+<https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/design_docs/booting/bl1.html>`_.

+The Corstone-1000 has some differences compared to this design due to memory (OTP/ROM)
+limitations:

-Host System Authentication
-==========================
+- The provisioning bundle that contains the BL1_2 code is located in the ROM.
+  This means the BL1_2 cannot be updated during provisioning time.
+- The BL1_1 handles most of the hardware initialization instead of the BL1_2. This
+  results in a bigger BL1_1 code size than needed.
+- The BL1_2 does not use the post-quantum LMS verification. The BL2 is verified by
+  comparing the computed hash to the hash which is stored in the OTP. This means the
+  BL2 is not updatable.

-The Host system follows the boot standard defined in the `Trusted Board Boot Requirements Client <trusted-board-boot-requirements-client-pdf_>`__
-to authenticate the Secure and Non-secure software.
-
-The `Firmware Image Package (FIP) <trusted-firmware-a-fip-guide_>`__ packs bootloader images and
-other payloads into a single archive.
-
-.. image:: images/FIPDiagram.png
-   :alt: FIPDiagram
-
-The FIP for Corstone-1000 contains:
-
- Trusted firmware-A BL2
- AP EL3 Runtime firmware, BL31 image
- AP Secure Payload, BL32 image
- AP Normal world firmware -U-boot, BL33 image
- Trusted OS Firmware configuration file used by Trusted OS (BL32), TOS_FW_CONFIG
- Key certificates
- Content certificates
-
-
-To load and validate TF-A BL2, TF-M BL2 first parses the GUID Partition Table (GPT)
-to locate the FIP. It then determines the offset of TF-A BL2 within the FIP.
-
-.. note::
-
-    TF-M does not check the FIP signature, it only checks the TF-A BL2's signature in the FIP.
-
-
-.. important::
-
-    The implicitly trusted components are:
-
-    - A SHA-256 hash of the Root of Trust Public Key (ROTPK) - 
-      For development purposes, a development ROTPK is used and its hash embedded into the TF-A BL2 image.
-      This public key is provided by the TF-A source code.
-    - TF-A BL2 image - it can be trusted because it has been verified by TF-M BL2 before starting TF-A.
-
-
-The remaining components in the Chain of Trust (CoT) are either certificates or bootloader images.
-
-Bootloader Authentication
-------------------------
-
-The FIP contains two types of certificates:
-
- **Content Certificates** - used to store the hash of a bootloader image.
- **Key Certificates** - used to verify public keys used to sign Content Certificates.
-
-The Host system bootloader images are authenticated by computing their hash and comparing it to the corresponding hash found in the Content Certificate.
-
-Certificates Verification
-------------------------
-
-The public keys defined in the Trusted Key Certificate are used to verify the later certificates in
-the CoT process. The Trusted Key Certificate is verified with the Root of Trust Public Key.
-
-
-UEFI Authenticated Variables
----------------------------
+The host follows the boot standard defined in the `TBBR`_ to authenticate the
+secure and non-secure software.

 For UEFI Secure Boot, authenticated variables can be accessed from the secure flash.
 The feature has been integrated in U-Boot, which authenticates the images as per the UEFI
@@ -285,140 +156,82 @@ specification before executing them.
 Secure Services
 ***************

-Corstone-1000 is unique in offering a secure environment for running trusted workloads.
-While the Host system includes TrustZone technology, the platform also features a hardware-isolated
-Secure Enclave, specifically designed to execute these secure workloads.
-
-In Corstone-1000, essential Secure Services—such as Cryptography, Protected Storage,
-Internal Trusted Storage, and Attestation—are provided through PSA Functional APIs implemented in TF-M.
-
-From the user's perspective, there is no difference when communicating with these services,
-whether they run in the Secure Enclave or in the Secure world of the Host system.
-The diagram below illustrates the data flow for such calls.
+Corstone-1000 is unique in providing a secure environment to run a secure
+workload. The platform has TrustZone technology in the Host subsystem but
+it also has hardware isolated Secure Enclave environment to run such secure
+workloads. In Corstone-1000, known Secure Services such as Crypto, Protected
+Storage, Internal Trusted Storage and Attestation are available via PSA
+Functional APIs in TF-M. There is no difference for a user communicating to
+these services which are running on a Secure Enclave instead of the
+secure world of the host subsystem. The below diagram presents the data
+flow path for such calls.


 .. image:: images/SecureServices.png
   :width: 930
   :alt: SecureServices

-The Secure Enclave Proxy Secure Partition (SE Proxy SP) is a proxy managed by OP-TEE that forwards
-Secure Service calls to the Secure Enclave. This communication uses the `RSE communication protocol <https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/platform/arm/rse/rse_comms.html>`_.
-While the protocol supports shared memory and MHU interrupts as a doorbell mechanism between cores,
-in Corstone-1000, the entire message is currently transmitted through the MHU channels.
-Corstone-1000 implements Isolation Level 2 using the Cortex-M0+ Memory Protection Unit (MPU).

-Users can define their own secure services to run either in the Host system's Secure World or in
-the Secure Enclave. This choice involves a trade-off between latency and security.
-Services running in the Secure Enclave benefit from strong, hardware-enforced isolation,
-offering higher security but at the cost of increased latency. In contrast, services running in the
-Host Secure World experience lower latency, but rely on TrustZone technology for virtualized isolation,
-which offers comparatively less robust security.
+The SE Proxy SP (Secure Enclave Proxy Secure Partition) is a proxy partition
+managed by OPTEE which forwards such calls to the Secure Enclave. The
+solution relies on the `RSE communication protocol
+<https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/platform/arm/rse/rse_comms.html>`_
+which is a lightweight serialization of the psa_call() API. It can use shared
+memory and MHU interrupts as a doorbell for communication between two cores
+but currently the whole message is forwarded through the MHU channels in Corstone-1000.
+Corstone-1000 implements isolation level 2. Cortex-M0+ MPU (Memory Protection
+Unit) is used to implement isolation level 2.
+
+For a user to define its own secure service, both the options of the host
+secure world or secure encalve are available. It's a trade-off between
+lower latency vs higher security. Services running on a Secure Enclave are
+secure by real hardware isolation but have a higher latency path. In the
+second scenario, the services running on the secure world of the host
+subsystem have lower latency but virtual hardware isolation created by
+TrustZone technology.


-**************************
-PSA Secure Firmware Update
-**************************
+**********************
+Secure Firmware Update
+**********************

-The Arm Corstone-1000 platform necessitates a robust, secure, and flexible firmware update mechanism
-including partial capsule update to ensure fielded devices can receive critical patches, feature enhancements,
-and security fixes without compromising system integrity. To meet these requirements, we have implemented the
-Platform Security Architecture (PSA) Firmware Update (FWU) framework on Corstone-1000, leveraging Trusted Firmware-M (TF-M)
-for the Secure Enclave, U-Boot as the host-side client on Cortex-A, and the UEFI capsule update mechanism for payload
-encapsulation. This design supports both the Fixed Virtual Platform (FVP) and the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
-targets, providing consistent behavior across simulation and silicon-based deployments. The Corstone-1000 supports FWU
-which complies with the `Platform Security Firmware Update for the A-profile Arm Architecture <platform-security-fwu-for-a-profile-pdf_>`__
-and `PSA Firmware Update IHI 0093 <psa-firmware-update-ihi-0093-api-reference-website_>`__
-specifications.
+Apart from always booting the authorized images, it is also essential that
+the device only accepts the authorized (signed) images in the firmware update
+process. Corstone-1000 supports OTA (Over the Air) firmware updates and
+follows Platform Security Firmware Update specification (`FWU`_).

-To standardize and streamline capsule creation with multiple FMP payloads, the `EDK2 capsule generation tool <edk2-capsule-generation-tool-repository_>`__
-tool has been integrated into the meta-arm Yocto layer for Corstone‑1000. This integration involves defining
-build rules for generating UEFI capsules as part of the firmware image build process. Configuration parameters
-exposed in the recipe allow developers to specify the number of FMP payloads, target image GUIDs, version numbers etc.
-This capsule ensures that all update payloads conform to the UEFI FMP specification and are ready for
-validation and delivery by U‑Boot.
-
-The FWU solution for Corstone-1000 is composed of three primary domains:
-
- Host System
- Trusted Services intermediary
- Secure Enclave
-
-Each domain has distinct responsibilities and communicates through standardized interfaces.
-
-
-.. image:: images/SystemArchitecturePSAFirmwareUpdate.png
-   :width: 690
-   :alt: SystemArchitecturePSAFirmwareUpdate
-
-On the host side, U-Boot functions as the FWU client and orchestrates the update process from capsule retrieval to
-payload delivery based on `PSA FWU DEN0018 specification <psa-fwu-den0018-specification-website_>`__
-via Arm FF-A framework. The Trusted-Services SE Proxy secure partition serves as a gateway between the non-secure host
-environment and the Secure Enclave. The `PSA FWU service <ts-psa-fwu-service-website_>`__ running in the Trusted Services
-implementation forwards the data to the Secure Enclave via MHU-based PSA calls. Within the Secure Enclave, the PSA FWU
-Agent, conforming to `PSA Firmware Update IHI 0093 <psa-firmware-update-ihi-0093-api-reference-website_>`__ specification,
-orchestrates the actual flash programming, metadata management, and rollback protection mechanisms. The agent relies on a
-bespoke `shim layer <tfm-shim-layer-website_>`__ to abstract hardware‑specific flash operations and bootloader interactions.
-
-As defined in the specification, the external flash is divided into two banks: one bank holds the
-currently running images, while the other is used to stage new images.
-
-There are four updatable components: **BL2**, **TF-M**, **the FIP** and **the Kernel Image** (the initramfs bundle).
-New images are delivered and accepted in the form of UEFI capsules.
+As standardized into `FWU`_, the external flash is divided into two
+banks of which one bank has currently running images and the other bank is
+used for staging new images.  There are four updatable units, i.e. Secure
+Enclave's BL2 and TF-M, and Host's FIP (Firmware Image Package) and Kernel
+Image (the initramfs bundle). The new images are accepted in the form of a UEFI capsule.


 .. image:: images/ExternalFlash.png
   :width: 690
   :alt: ExternalFlash

-When a FWU is initiated on Corstone-1000, the following sequence of operations takes place:
+When Firmware update is triggered, U-Boot verifies the capsule by checking the
+capsule signature, version number and size. Then it signals the Secure Enclave
+that can start writing UEFI capsule into the flash.

-#. **Capsule Retrieval and Preparation**
+Once this operation finishes, Secure Enclave resets the entire system.
+The Metadata Block in the flash has the below firmware update state machine.
+TF-M runs an OTA service that is responsible for accepting and updating the
+images in the flash. The communication between the UEFI Capsule update
+subsystem and the OTA service follows the same data path explained above.
+The OTA service writes the new images to the passive bank after successful
+capsule verification. It changes the state of the system to trial state and
+triggers the reset.

-   U-Boot on the host system retrieves the firmware capsule.
-   It validates the capsule header and parses the FMP (Firmware Management Protocol) descriptor list to identify the payloads to be updated.
-
-   For each FMP descriptor, U-Boot:
-
-   Splits the firmware payload into 4 KiB chunks.
-   Invokes the PSA_FWU_Update API for each chunk, transmitting the buffer address via the FF-A (Firmware Framework for Arm) shared memory interface.
-
-#. **Secure Transmission and Forwarding**
-
-   The PSA Firmware Update (FWU) service, running as part of Trusted Services, receives the chunks through Secure Partition Client (SPC) calls.
-   It forwards these chunks to the Secure Enclave using MHU-based PSA calls.
-
-#. **Flashing Within the Secure Enclave**
-
-   Inside the Secure Enclave, the PSA FWU Agent dispatches each chunk to the shim layer.
-
-   The shim layer:
-
-   Erases the corresponding sectors in the non-active flash bank.
-   Writes the received firmware chunks at the correct offsets.
-   During partial updates, it also copies static partitions from the active bank to the non-active one to maintain consistency.
-
-#. **Finalization and Boot Preparation**
-
-   After all chunks are successfully written:
-
-   The shim updates the firmware manifest and the EFI System Resource Table (ESRT) entries to reflect the new image version.
-   This step enables the bootloader to recognize the new firmware for a trial boot.
-   The platform then performs an automatic reset, booting into the non-active bank in trial mode.
-
-#. **Trial Boot and Confirmation**
-
-   In trial mode, U-Boot evaluates the new firmware and issues either an accept or reject command using the PSA FWU ABI.
-   These commands are sent to the Secure Enclave, instructing the shim to update the firmware metadata accordingly.
-
-#. **Recovery and Fallback Mechanism**
-
-   If the trial boot is successful, the host sends an acknowledgment, transitioning the firmware state from 'trial' to 'regular'.
-
-   If the system fails or becomes unresponsive:
-
-   A watchdog timer triggers a system reset.
-   The BL1 firmware in the Secure Enclave detects repeated failures and reverts to the previously known-good flash bank.
-   This rollback mechanism ensures the device remains operational and recoverable, even after a failed update.
+Boot loaders in Secure Enclave and Host read the Metadata
+block to get the information on the boot bank. In the successful trial stage,
+the acknowledgment from the host moves the state of the system from trial to
+regular. Any failure in the trial stage or system hangs leads to a system
+reset. This is made sure by the use of watchdog hardware. The Secure Enclave's
+BL1 has the logic to identify multiple resets and eventually switch back to the
+previous good bank. The ability to revert to the previous bank is crucial to
+guarantee the availability of the device.


 .. image:: images/SecureFirmwareUpdate.png
@@ -431,15 +244,13 @@ When a FWU is initiated on Corstone-1000, the following sequence of operations t
 UEFI Runtime Support in U-Boot
 ******************************

-The implementation of UEFI boot-time and runtime APIs requires persistent variable storage. In
-Corstone-1000, UEFI variables are stored using the Protected Storage (PS) service.
-
-The diagram below illustrates the data flow for storing UEFI variables. U-Boot’s UEFI subsystem
-communicates with the Secure World using the U-Boot FF-A driver, which interfaces with the `UEFI System Management Mode (SMM) service <trusted-services-uefi-smm-website_>`__.
-
-The SMM service provides support for the UEFI System Management Mode. This support is implemented by the SMM Gateway secure partition.
-The SMM service then uses the Proxy Protected Storage (PS) provided by the SE Proxy SP.
-These PS calls are forwarded to the Secure Enclave, following the communication path described earlier.
+Implementation of UEFI boottime and runtime APIs require variable storage.
+In Corstone-1000, these UEFI variables are stored in the Protected Storage
+service. The below diagram presents the data flow to store UEFI variables.
+The U-Boot implementation of the UEFI subsystem uses the U-Boot FF-A driver to
+communicate with the SMM Service in the secure world. The backend of the
+SMM service uses the proxy PS from the SE Proxy SP. From there on, the PS
+calls are forwarded to the Secure Enclave as explained above.


 .. image:: images/UEFISupport.png
@@ -447,43 +258,30 @@ These PS calls are forwarded to the Secure Enclave, following the communication
   :alt: UEFISupport


-**********
+***************
 References
-**********
-* `Arm Developer <arm-developer-cs1000-search_>`__
-* `Arm Security Architectures <arm-architecture-security-features-platform-security_>`_
+***************
+`ARM Corstone-1000 Search`_
+
+`Arm security features`_

 --------------

-*Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*

-.. _arm-developer-cs1000-website: https://developer.arm.com/Tools%20and%20Software/Corstone-1000%20Software
-.. _arm-developer-cs1000-search: https://developer.arm.com/search#q=corstone-1000
-.. _arm-developer-mhu-website: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ka005129/latest/#:~:text=An%20MHU%20is%20a%20device,that%20a%20message%20is%20available
-.. _arm-developer-secureboot-website: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/PRD29-GENC-009492/c/TrustZone-Software-Architecture/Booting-a-secure-system/Secure-boot
-.. _arm-architecture-security-features-platform-security: https://www.arm.com/architecture/security-features/platform-security
-.. _linux-repository: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/
-.. _arm-trustzone-for-cortex-a-website: https://www.arm.com/technologies/trustzone-for-cortex-a
-.. _arm-fmw-framework-a-profile-pdf: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0077/latest
-.. _arm-fmw-framework-m-profile-pdf: https://developer.arm.com/architectures/Firmware%20Framework%20for%20M-Profile
-.. _platform-security-fwu-for-a-profile-pdf: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0118/a/
-.. _psa-firmware-update-ihi-0093-api-reference-website: https://arm-software.github.io/psa-api/fwu/1.0/api/api.html
-.. _edk2-capsule-generation-tool-repository: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/BaseTools/Source/Python/Capsule/GenerateCapsule.py
-.. _psa-fwu-den0018-specification-website: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0118/latest/
-.. _ts-psa-fwu-service-website: https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/stable/services/fwu/psa-fwu-m.html
-.. _tfm-shim-layer-website: https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design_docs/services/tfm_fwu_service.html#shim-layer-between-fwu-and-bootloader
-.. _op-tee-os-repository: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os
-.. _psa-certified-website: https://www.psacertified.org/
-.. _psa_l2-ready: https://www.psacertified.org/products/corstone-1000/
-.. _systemready-ir-certification: https://armkeil.blob.core.windows.net/developer/Files/pdf/certificate-list/arm-systemready-ve-arm-neoverse.pdf
-.. _trusted-board-boot-requirements-client-pdf: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0006/latest
-.. _trusted-firmware-m-website: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m/
-.. _trusted-firmware-m-bl1-website: https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design_docs/booting/bl1.html
-.. _trusted-firmware-a-bl2-website: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/108028/0000/RD-TC22-software/Software-components/AP-firmware/Trusted-firmware-A-BL2
-.. _trusted-firmware-a-fip-guide: https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design/firmware-design.html#firmware-image-package-fip
-.. _trusted-services-website: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/trusted-services/
-.. _trusted-services-uefi-smm-website: https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/integration/services/uefi-smm-services.html#
-.. _das-u-boot-repository: https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot.git
-.. _keil-rtx5-website: https://developer.arm.com/Tools%20and%20Software/Keil%20MDK/RTX5%20RTOS
-.. _ppa-website: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/102738/0100/Power--performance--and-area-analysis
-.. _mcuboot-website: https://docs.mcuboot.com/
+.. _Arm Corstone-1000 Technical Overview: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/102360/0000
+.. _Arm Corstone-1000 Software: https://developer.arm.com/Tools%20and%20Software/Corstone-1000%20Software
+.. _Arm Corstone-1000 Search: https://developer.arm.com/search#q=corstone-1000
+.. _Arm security features: https://www.arm.com/architecture/security-features/platform-security
+.. _linux repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/
+.. _FF-A: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0077/latest
+.. _FF-M: https://developer.arm.com/architectures/Firmware%20Framework%20for%20M-Profile
+.. _FWU: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0118/a/
+.. _OPTEE-OS: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os
+.. _PSA: https://www.psacertified.org/
+.. _PSA L2 Ready: https://www.psacertified.org/products/corstone-1000/
+.. _SRIR cert: https://armkeil.blob.core.windows.net/developer/Files/pdf/certificate-list/arm-systemready-ir-certification-arm-corstone-1000.pdf
+.. _TBBR: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0006/latest
+.. _TF-M: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m/
+.. _Trusted Services: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/trusted-services/
+.. _U-Boot repo: https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot.git
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited.
+# Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited.
 #
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
 jinja2==3.1.1

 # Required to build the documentation
-sphinx==7.1.2
-myst-parser~=3.0.1
-sphinx_rtd_theme~=3.0.0
-docutils~=0.18.1
+sphinx~=5.0
+sphinx_rtd_theme~=2.0.0
+docutils==0.17.1
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+FILESEXTRAPATHS:append := "${THISDIR}/files/${MACHINE}:"
+SRC_URI:append = " file://report.txt"
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+include arm-systemready-ir-acs-${MACHINE}.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+FILESEXTRAPATHS:prepend := "${THISDIR}/files/fvp-base:"
+
+SRC_URI:append = " \
+    file://0001-check-sr-results-Change-the-expected-SR-result-confi.patch \
+"
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+include arm-systemready-scripts-native-${MACHINE}.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+From e3e0465a25f9b1607b2e5ed42afb7b556aa8b9bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Debbie Martin <Debbie.Martin@arm.com>
+Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2023 18:40:18 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] [PATCH] check-sr-results: Change the expected SR result
+ config
+
+Update the check-sr-results.yaml and format-sr-results.yaml files for the
+Systemready IR suite. These changes are required because of the
+following known differences of fvp-base outputs to those expected by the
+SystemReady scripts.
+
+Changes to check-sr-results.yaml:
+  1. acs-console.log:
+      a. must-have-esp: EFI partition/variable persistence not supported due to
+         FVP reset.
+      b. warn-once-if-contains "-dirty": BL1, BL2, and BL31 have dirty versions.
+      c. must-contain "efi: ESRT=0x" and "'esrt: Reserving ESRT space from 0x'":
+         Capsule updates are not supported.
+      d. error-if-contains: "No EFI system partition" and "Failed to persist
+         EFI variables": EFI partition/variable persistence not supported due to
+         FVP reset.
+  2. acs_results/result.md:
+      a. must-contain "Failure: |0|": Capsule and EFI partition failures make
+         the total 20.
+  3. acs_results/CapsuleApp_ESRT_table_info.log:
+      a. capsuleapp-esrt: Capsule updates are not supported.
+      b. must-contain "'EFI_SYSTEM_RESOURCE_TABLE:'" and
+         "EFI_SYSTEM_RESOURCE_ENTRY": EFI partition/variable persistence not
+         supported due to FVP reset.
+      c. must-contain "FwClass": Capsule updates are not supported.
+      d. error-if-contains "ESRT - Not Found": Capsule updates are not
+         supported.
+  4. acs_results/CapsuleApp_FMP_protocol_info.log:
+      a. warn-if-contains "Aborted test": Capsule updates are not supported.
+         This patch also adds must-contain for the specific totals of the test
+         categories due to allowing the "Aborted test" string.
+  5. acs_results/linux_dump/firmware/efi/esrt:
+      a. Remove whole directory because capsule updates are not supported.
+  6. acs_results/uefi/temp:
+      a. Set min-entries to 0: this defaults to 1 despite the directory being
+         optional, so errors if a directory is empty.
+  7. acs_results/uefi_dump:
+      a. min-entries is 13: change this to 11 due to smbiosview.log being
+         optional and the change to make map.log optional.
+  8. acs_results/uefi_dump/dh.log:
+      a. must-contain "EFISystemPartition": EFI partition/variable persistence
+         not supported due to FVP reset.
+      b. must-contain "FirmwareManagement": Capsule updates are not supported.
+  9. acs_results/uefi_dump/map.log:
+      a. Make optional because it isn't populated for IR.
+  10. fw:
+      a. Make optional because capsule updates are not supported.
+  11. os-logs:
+      a. Make optional because distro installation isn't done as part of ACS.
+
+Changes to format-sr-results.yaml:
+  1. Remove the SIE section (not supported on fvp-base and, if present, causes
+     format-sr-results.py to error).
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate
+Signed-off-by: Debbie Martin <Debbie.Martin@arm.com>
+---
+ check-sr-results.yaml  | 34 ++++++++++++++--------------------
+ format-sr-results.yaml | 15 ---------------
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/check-sr-results.yaml b/check-sr-results.yaml
+index a4235de..555fb71 100644
+--- a/check-sr-results.yaml
+++ b/check-sr-results.yaml
+@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ check-sr-results-configuration:
+ # The following tree applies to all ACS-IR 2.0 versions.
+ tree:
+   - file: acs-console.log
+-    must-have-esp:
+     must-contain:
+       - Booting `bbr/bsa'
+       - Press any key to stop the EFI SCT running
+@@ -24,8 +23,6 @@ tree:
+       - 'EFI stub: Booting Linux Kernel...'
+       - 'EFI stub: Using DTB from configuration table'
+       - Linux version
+-      - 'efi: ESRT=0x'
+-      - 'esrt: Reserving ESRT space from 0x'
+       - systemd
+       - Executing FWTS for EBBR
+       - 'Test: UEFI'
+@@ -36,13 +33,9 @@ tree:
+       - ACS run is completed
+       - Please press <Enter> to continue ...
+     warn-once-if-contains:
+-      - -dirty
+       - 'EFI stub: ERROR:'
+       - 'FIRMWARE BUG:'
+       - OVERLAP DETECTED
+-    error-if-contains:
+-      - No EFI system partition
+-      - Failed to persist EFI variables
+   - dir: acs_results
+     min-entries: 8  # Allow missing result.md
+     max-entries: 9
+@@ -53,7 +46,7 @@ tree:
+         must-contain:
+           - SCT Summary
+           - Dropped:|0|
+-          - Failure:|0|
+          - Failure:|20|
+           - Warning:|0|
+           - Dropped by group
+           - Failure by group
+@@ -64,16 +57,11 @@ tree:
+         max-entries: 2
+         tree:
+           - file: CapsuleApp_ESRT_table_info.log
+-            capsuleapp-esrt:
+             must-contain:
+               - ESRT TABLE
+-              - 'EFI_SYSTEM_RESOURCE_TABLE:'
+-              - EFI_SYSTEM_RESOURCE_ENTRY
+-              - FwClass
+             error-if-contains:
+               - FwResourceCount    - 0x0
+               - FwResourceCountMax - 0x0
+-              - ESRT - Not Found
+           - file: CapsuleApp_FMP_protocol_info.log
+             must-contain:
+               - FMP DATA
+@@ -95,9 +83,14 @@ tree:
+               - 'Medium failures: NONE'
+               - 'Low failures: NONE'
+               - 'Other failures: NONE'
+              - 'dt_base        |    3|     |     |     |     |     |'
+              - 'esrt           |     |     |    2|     |     |     |'
+              - 'uefibootpath   |     |     |     |     |     |     |'
+              - 'uefirtmisc     |    1|     |     |     |    8|     |'
+              - 'uefirttime     |    4|     |     |     |   35|     |'
+              - 'uefirtvariable |    2|     |     |     |   10|     |'
+              - 'uefivarinfo    |     |     |     |     |    1|     |'
+               - 'Total:'
+-            warn-if-contains:
+-              - Aborted test
+             error-if-contains:
+               - FAILED
+               - This is an invalid entry.
+@@ -180,6 +173,7 @@ tree:
+                     tree:
+                       - file: OsIndicationsSupported-*
+                   - dir: esrt
+                    optional:
+                     tree:
+                       - dir: entries
+                         tree:
+@@ -314,8 +308,9 @@ tree:
+               - BSA tests complete. Reset the system.
+           - dir: temp   # This sometimes remains; ignore it
+             optional:
+            min-entries: 0
+       - dir: uefi_dump
+-        min-entries: 13
+        min-entries: 11
+         max-entries: 13
+         tree:
+           - file: bcfg.log
+@@ -331,8 +326,6 @@ tree:
+             must-contain:
+               - Handle dump
+               - DevicePath
+-              - EFISystemPartition
+-              - FirmwareManagement
+               - SimpleTextOut
+           - file: dmem.log
+             must-contain:
+@@ -355,6 +348,7 @@ tree:
+               - DRIVER NAME
+           - file: ifconfig.log
+           - file: map.log
+            optional:
+             must-contain:
+               - Mapping table
+               - /HD(1,GPT,
+@@ -392,7 +386,7 @@ tree:
+   - dir: docs
+     optional:
+   - dir: fw
+-    min-entries: 3
+    optional:
+     tree:
+       - file: u-boot-sniff.log
+         must-contain:
+@@ -500,7 +494,7 @@ tree:
+   - dir: manual-results
+     optional:
+   - dir: os-logs
+-    min-entries: 2
+    optional:
+     tree:
+       - file: 'OS-image-download-links.txt'
+         optional:
+diff --git a/format-sr-results.yaml b/format-sr-results.yaml
+index dd34cd6..20b69de 100644
+--- a/format-sr-results.yaml
+++ b/format-sr-results.yaml
+@@ -47,21 +47,6 @@ subs:
+         extract:
+           filename: "acs_results/linux_dump/firmware/devicetree/base/psci/\
+             compatible"
+-  - heading: BBSR Compliance
+-    paragraph: TBD
+-    subs:
+-      - heading: SIE SCT
+-        extract:
+-          filename: acs_results/SIE/result.md
+-          find: '# SCT Summary'
+-          first-line: 4
+-          last-line:
+-        paragraph: TBD
+-      - heading: SIE FWTS
+-        extract:
+-          filename: acs_results/SIE/fwts/FWTSResults.log
+-          find: Test Failure Summary
+-        paragraph: TBD
+   - heading: BSA Compliance (informative)
+     paragraph: TBD
+     subs:
+--
+2.25.1
+
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+General information
+-------------------
+- Arm SystemReady Band: IR
+- System name: FVP Base A AEM
+- Prepared by:
+- E-mail:
+- Date:
+
+System information
+------------------
+- Company: Arm
+- System: FVP Base A AEM
+- SoC:
+- FW version:
+- Memory:
+- Storage devices / disks:
+- Network controllers:
+- Other Hardware information:
+
+Test Logs and Results
+---------------------
+- ACS version used: 2.0
+- ACS URL (if pre-built binary): https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-systemready/blob/v23.03_IR_2.0.0/IR/prebuilt_images/v23.03_2.0.0/ir-acs-live-image-generic-arm64.wic.xz
+- Changes to ACS (if built from source):
+
+- Test Logs collected
+[X] ACS - SCT
+[X] ACS - BSA - UEFI
+[X] ACS - BSA - Linux
+[X] ACS - FWTS
+[X] ACS - Linux boot log
+[X] ACS - Linux dumps
+[X] ACS - UEFI Shell dumps
+[ ] ACS - Capsule Update
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# WIC partitioning for corstone1000 internal flash
-# Layout and maximum sizes (to be defined):
-#
-
-# The entries with --offset parameter should not be relocated
-# because BL1 code is statically configured for the given positions
-# Partition sizes are fixed since corstone1000 does not support partial update
-# and has a limit for each partition to grow.
-
-part --source empty --size 3k --offset 17k --part-name="reserved_1" --uuid B1F2FC8C-A7A3-4485-87CB-16961B8847D7
-
-part --source empty --size 4k --align 4 --offset 20k --part-name="FWU-Metadata" --uuid 3FDFFEE1-3223-4C6B-80F9-B0E7D780C21D --part-type 8A7A84A0-8387-40F6-AB41-A8B9A5A60D23
-part --source empty --size 4k --align 4 --offset 24k --part-name="Bkup-FWU-Metadata" --uuid B3068316-5351-4998-823A-3A7B09133EC1 --part-type 8A7A84A0-8387-40F6-AB41-A8B9A5A60D23
-part --source empty --size 4k --align 4 --offset 28k --part-name="private_metadata_replica_1" --uuid 3CC3B456-DEC8-4CE3-BC5C-965483CE4828 --part-type ECB55DC3-8AB7-4A84-AB56-EB0A9974DB42
-part --source empty --size 4k --align 4 --offset 32k --part-name="private_metadata_replica_2" --uuid DCE9C503-8DFD-4DCB-8889-647E49641552 --part-type ECB55DC3-8AB7-4A84-AB56-EB0A9974DB42
-
-# The partition type of each of these four partitions should match the type of the images
-# in a fiwmare update capsule
-# The size has to be aligned to TF-M's SE_BL2_PARTITION_SIZE (tfm/platform/ext/target/arm/corstone1000/partition/flash_layout.h)
-part --source rawcopy --size 144k --sourceparams="file=trusted-firmware-m/bl2_signed.bin" --offset 36k --align 4 --part-name="bl2_primary" --uuid 9A3A8FBF-55EF-439C-80C9-A3F728033929 --part-type F1D883F9-DFEB-5363-98D8-686EE3B69F4F
-
-# The size has to be aligned to TF-M's TFM_PARTITION_SIZE (tfm/platform/ext/target/arm/corstone1000/partition/flash_layout.h)
-part --source rawcopy --size 320k --sourceparams="file=trusted-firmware-m/tfm_s_signed.bin" --align 4 --part-name="tfm_primary" --uuid 07F9616C-1233-439C-ACBA-72D75421BF70 --part-type 7FAD470E-5EC5-5C03-A2C1-4756B495DE61
-
-# Rawcopy of the FIP binary
-part --source rawcopy --size 2560k --sourceparams="file=signed_fip.bin" --align 4 --part-name="FIP_A" --uuid B9C7AC9D-40FF-4675-956B-EEF4DE9DF1C5 --part-type F1933675-5A8C-5B6D-9EF4-846739E89BC8
-
-# Rawcopy of kernel with initramfs
-part --source rawcopy --size 12 --sourceparams="file=Image.gz-initramfs-${MACHINE}.bin" --align 4 --part-name="kernel_primary" --uuid BF7A6142-0662-47FD-9434-6A8811980816 --part-type F771AFF9-C7E9-5F99-9EDA-2369DD694F61
-
-# This ensures wic sets the size of the flash as 64MiB in the GPT header, despite only half being filled
-part --source empty --size 3k --offset 32748k --part-name="reserved_2" --uuid CCB18569-C0BA-42E0-A429-FE1DC862D660
-
-bootloader --ptable gpt
@@ -6,4 +6,3 @@ psci: failed to boot CPU3 (-95)
 CPU3: failed to boot: -95
 ARM FF-A: Notification setup failed -95, not enabled
 ARM FF-A: Failed to register driver sched callback -95
-basic-mmio-gpio: Failed to locate of_node [id: -2]
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-arch_timer: Failed to initialize memory-mapped timer.
-PCI: OF: of_root node is NULL, cannot create PCI host bridge node
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-can't derive routing for PCI INT A
-jitterentropy: Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: 2
-PCI: OF: of_root node is NULL, cannot create PCI host bridge node
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Hugues KAMBA MPIANA	18bc3f9389	kas: corstone-1000: Pin Yocto layer dependencies for CORSTONE1000-2024.11 release The SHA of the dependent community layers are set to the tested SHA from the `styhead` branch of each layer. Signed-off-by: Hugues KAMBA MPIANA <hugues.kambampiana@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-12-05 12:00:12 -05:00
Hugues KAMBA MPIANA	2d601b02b7	kas: corstone-1000: Update the SHA of the Yocto layer dependencies for the CORSTONE1000-2024.11 release. The SHA of the dependent community layers are commented out and set to the tested SHA from the `styhead` branch of each layer. The set SHAs are to be uncommented in the `styhead` branch which is to be used to create the `CORSTONE1000-2024.11` tag. Signed-off-by: Hugues KAMBA MPIANA <hugues.kambampiana@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-12-05 12:00:12 -05:00
Hugues KAMBA MPIANA	4c490d2c2b	arm-bsp/documentation: corstone1000: Amend documentation for CORSTONE1000-2024.11 release * Fix typographical error in documentation. * Add missing instructions. * Create paragraphs where necessary to improve readability. * Change `note` box to `important` box * Remove verification of arm_tstee driver presence: arm-tstee driver has been integrated in Linux v6.10.14 which is the one used in the software stack. It is built as part of Linux and is no longer a loadable module. The steps to verify the driver presence are no longer applicable. * Standardise naming of the target platform: Consistently use the name `Corstone-1000` to refer to the target platform. * Update Debian OS version from 12.4 to 12.7 Debian version 12.4 has a bug in Shim 15.7. This bug causes a fatal error when attempting to boot media installer for Debian,and resets the platform before installation starts. A patch to skip the Shim was applied to Corstone-1000 to avoid the error. Debian version 12.7 no longer has the bug in the Shim thus making the usage of the patch redundant. Bump Debian installer to version 12.7 and remove usage of the patch for the Debian installation test. * Replace xterm with tmux: Update the user guide to specify tmux instead of xterm. Using tmux as opposed to xterm provides a better user experience when running the commands listed on the user guide. * Use ACS image for FVP SystemReady test: Due to fixed timeout values in the meta-arm-systemready the ACS time test do not complete successfully. Instead, specify commands to use the pre-built ACS image. * List Trusted Services as a host component: Add Trusted Services to the list of components used on the Host processor of the Corstone-1000. The various BitBake recipes and append files used to build Trusted Services are listed for the component. * Update release version to CORSTONE1000-2024.11: All references to the version of the Corstone-1000 software reference stack have been updated from CORSTONE1000-2024.06 to CORSTONE1000-2024.11. Add to the changelog the 2024.11 release information. Add the 2024.11 release notes. Signed-off-by: Hugues KAMBA MPIANA <hugues.kambampiana@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Abdellatif El Khlifi <abdellatif.elkhlifi@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-12-05 12:00:12 -05:00
Bence Balogh	d824ee371a	arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-m: corstone1000: Fix Secure Debug connection due to token version mismatch Due to a mismatch between the ADAC dummy token major version and the version in the secure-debug-manager repository [1]'s submodule [2], the secure debug connection was denied. Update the ADAC token major and minor versions in TF-M to align with the expected dummy token. [1] https://github.com/ARM-software/secure-debug-manager/ [2] https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/shared/psa-adac.git/+/refs/heads/master/psa-adac/core/include/psa_adac.h Fixes: 7e9466 ("arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-m: corstone1000: add Secure Debug") Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-12-02 06:00:12 -05:00
Jon Mason	acafe7c89f	CI: remove branch name The meta-arm styhead branch should be using the styhead branches of meta-clang, meta-virtualization, and meta-secure-core. Remove the master branch specific line to allow for these to be used. Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-11-18 10:34:03 -05:00
Ziad Elhanafy	2a624d2239	arm-systemready/linux-distros: Follow WORKDIR -> UNPACKDIR transition This adapts to the oe-core rework to enforce a separate directory for unpacking local sources (UNPACKDIR) instead of polluting WORKDIR directly. Follows the guidelines from: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-architecture/message/2007 Signed-off-by: Ziad Elhanafy <ziad.elhanafy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-11-06 10:08:08 -05:00
Ben	52b2ad14a8	kas: Include unattended openSUSE test Add unattended installation class to openSUSE target Signed-off-by: Ben Cownley <ben.cownley@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-10-16 07:00:15 -04:00
Ben	a987c321b7	arm-systemready/oeqa: Add unattended installation testcase Add test for openSUSE unattended installation Signed-off-by: Ben Cownley <ben.cownley@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-10-16 07:00:15 -04:00
Ben	b2f0014a48	arm-systemready/linux-distros: Implement unattended openSUSE Implement unattended installation for openSUSE Signed-off-by: Ben Cownley <ben.cownley@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-10-16 07:00:15 -04:00
Jon Mason	ca9375b72d	CI: Rework qemuarm64-secureboot matrix qemuarm64-secureboot is using systemd for uefi-secureboot, which has warnings with musl (and fails to compile with clang and musl). So, modify the matrix to keep the coverage of everything else but musl. Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-10-07 10:17:58 -04:00
Javier Tia	691d479ce4	arm/qemuarm64-secureboot: Enable UEFI Secure Boot Encapsulate all UEFI Secure Boot required settings in one Kas configuration file. Introduce SBSIGN_KEYS_DIR variable where UEFI keys will be generated to sign UEFI binaries. Introduce uefi-secureboot machine feature, which is being used to conditionally set the proper UEFI settings in recipes. Replace Grub bootloader with systemd-boot, which it makes easier to enable Secure Boot. Advantages using systemd as Init Manager: - Extending secure boot to userspace is a lot easier with systemd than with sysvinit where custom scripts will need to be written for all use cases. - systemd supports dm-verity and TPM devices for encryption usecases out of the box. Enabling them is a lot easier than writing custom scripts for sysvinit. - systemd also supports EUFI signing the UKI binaries which merge kernel, command line and initrd which helps in bringing secure boot towards rootfs. - systemd offers a modular structure with unit files that are more predictable and easier to manage than the complex and varied scripts used by SysVinit. This modularity allows for better control and customization of the boot process, which is beneficial in Secure Boot environments. - Add CI settings to build and test UEFI Secure Boot. Add one test to verify Secure Boot using OE Testing infraestructure: $ kas build ci/qemuarm64-secureboot.yml:ci/meta-secure-core.yml:ci/uefi-secureboot.yml:ci/testimage.yml ... RESULTS - uefi_secureboot.UEFI_SB_TestSuite.test_uefi_secureboot: PASSED (0.62s) ... SUMMARY: core-image-base () - Ran 73 tests in 28.281s core-image-base - OK - All required tests passed (successes=19, skipped=54, failures=0, errors=0) Signed-off-by: Javier Tia <javier.tia@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli@linaro.org> [yml file include fix] Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-10-07 10:17:44 -04:00
Javier Tia	67a28fc298	arm: Enable Secure Boot in all required recipes In the target, Secure Boot starts from the firmware (u-boot), adds the signing keys, and verifies the bootloader (systemd-boot) and kernel (Linux). sbsign bbclass is used to sign the binaries. sbsign is the name of the tool used to sign these binaries. Hence the name of this class to sbsign and variables with SBSIGN prefix. Signed-off-by: Javier Tia <javier.tia@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>	2024-10-07 10:17:44 -04:00
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`include arm-systemready-ir-acs-${MACHINE}.inc`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`include arm-systemready-scripts-native-${MACHINE}.inc`