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Author SHA1 Message Date
Ross Burton 23b572c40e meta-arm-systemready/arm-systemready-linux-distros-fedora: remove
Fedora 39 is very obsolete and has been removed from the Fedora mirrors.

If someone needs this then this commit can be reverted and the recipe
upgraded to the latest Fedora release.

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2026-06-18 09:46:22 -04:00
Hugo SIMELIERE c4fd56386e optee-os: Fix CVE-2026-33662
Pick patch from [1] as mentioned in OP-TEE os security report in [2].

[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/caeaa2ae551666068894005387cca4113b10873f
[2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/security/advisories/GHSA-4cf8-v5g3-73gr

Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE (Schneider Electric) <hsimeliere.opensource@witekio.com>
Reviewed-by: Bruno VERNAY <bruno.vernay@se.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2026-05-21 06:00:08 -04:00
Hugo SIMELIERE 313a5da55a optee-os: Fix CVE-2026-33317
Pick patches from [1], [2] and [3] as mentioned in Debian report in [4].

[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/e031c4e562023fd9f199e39fd2e85797e4cbdca9
[2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/16926d5a46934c46e6656246b4fc18385a246900
[3] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/149e8d7ecc4ef8bb00ab4a37fd2ccede6d79e1ca
[4] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-33317

Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE (Schneider Electric) <hsimeliere.opensource@witekio.com>
Reviewed-by: Bruno VERNAY <bruno.vernay@se.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2026-05-21 06:00:08 -04:00
Ross Burton a81c19915b CI: only run pending-updates on master
This job takes a few minutes and isn't useful unless it's being ran for
master, or is being actively worked on.

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-11-05 09:35:03 -05:00
Jon Mason 0f1e7bf92c arm-systemready/ir-acs: Update URL
The github URL where the image was located has gone away on the master
branch.  Update the URL to point to the legacy branch, which should stay
around (according to the documentation).

Fixes: aebe535aa8 ("arm-systemready: Introduce the Arm SystemReady layer")
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-09-08 10:00:15 -04:00
Ross Burton 8e0f8af90f arm/fvp-base-a-aem: remove spurious executable stack from one library
There are some objects in the FVP binary that are assembler source and
fail to declare what permissions the stack needs to have, so GCC falls
back to assuming that the final binary needs an executable stack.

glibc 2.41 (as now used in uninative) introduces changes here[1]: whether
to have an executable stack or not when the binary doesn't specify a
need (defaults to executable, but this is a tunable), and any binaries
that are dlopen()ed that require an executable stack will fail.

Thus, some FVPs on some platforms (notable, fvp-base-a-aem on x86-64)
now fail on startup:

  libarmctmodel.so: cannot enable executable stack as shared object requires: Invalid argument

Luckily the solution here is to simply clear the executable bit, as
an executable stack is not actually needed.  Until a new release of the
FVP is made we can fix the binary in our package using execstack.

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/info-gnu/2025-01/msg00014.html

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-04-29 11:00:13 -04:00
Ross Burton f5f8dfb5a8 arm/execstack-native: add new recipe
Add a recipe for the execstack binary from prelink-cross. This tool is
used to manipulate the GNU_STACK segment in ELF binaries, specifically
to control whether the binary requests an executable stack or not.

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-04-29 11:00:13 -04:00
Ross Burton f3640941c6 CI: use canonical git.yoctoproject.org URLs
The canonical repository URLs don't use /git/.

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-04-04 13:55:39 -04:00
Ross Burton b6e214752a arm-system-ready/arm-systemready-ir-acs: add version to download filename
The download filename wasn't versioned so multiple versions would write
to the same file on disk and conflict, causing repeated downloads and
fetch failures.

Add the PV to the filename on disk to resolve this.

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-04-04 13:00:12 -04:00
Jose Quaresma 3cadb81ffa bsp: optee-client: cleanup old tee-supplicant
The same tee-supplicant is available in the meta-arm layer
along with the recipe.

| meta-arm/recipes-security/optee/optee-client
| meta-arm/recipes-security/optee/optee-client/tee-supplicant.sh
| meta-arm/recipes-security/optee/optee-client/tee-supplicant@.service
| meta-arm/recipes-security/optee/optee-client.inc
| meta-arm/recipes-security/optee/optee-client_4.1.0.bb

Signed-off-by: Jose Quaresma <jose.quaresma@foundries.io>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-02-21 08:00:14 -05:00
Romain Naour a8fe9d22ea external-arm-toolchain: rebuild libmvec.so symlink if any
On some architectures (namely Aarch64), glibc may provide a libmvec
library since glibc 2.22, which programs built with gcc OpenMP
support might get linked to.

In order for these programs to work on the target, we need to copy this
library to the target filesystem.

Make sure that libmvec.so symlink is correct with or without usermerge
enabled otherwise libmvec.so symlink is broken.

For more details on libmvec, see
https://sourceware.org/glibc/wiki/libmvec.

(cherry picked from commit de47f836e2)

Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Acked-by: Denys Dmytriyenko <denys@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-01-06 06:00:11 -05:00
Romain Naour c22b4f89f7 external-arm-toolchain: override dynamic loader path with usrmerge enabled
usrmerge nowaday required by systemd [1] but it broke
external-arm-toolchain in several ways...

When usrmerge is enabled, /lib is no longer part of SYSROOT_DIRS list
while the prebuilt toolchain expect the dynamic loader to be placed in
/lib not /usr/lib.

There is no /lib directory in the per-package sysroot directory
generated to build each package:

  [...]/build/tmp/sysroots-components/<target>/<package>/
  sysroot-providers/ usr/

But the cross-compiler still generate binaries with dynamic loarder
path set to "/lib/ld-linux-<target>.so*"

  strings sanitycheckc_cross.exe | grep ld
  /lib/ld-linux-aarch64.so.1

A symlink /lib -> /usr/lib is crated in the final rootfs image.

But this broke the meson-qemuwrapper used when "qemu-usermode"
(MACHINE_FEATURES) is available:

See [2]:
  do_write_config:append:class-target() {
       # Write out a qemu wrapper that will be used as exe_wrapper so that meson
       # can run target helper binaries through that.
       qemu_binary="${@qemu_wrapper_cmdline(d, '$STAGING_DIR_HOST', ['$STAGING_DIR_HOST/${libdir}','$STAGING_DIR_HOST/${base_libdir}'])}"

It produce a runtime issue while running a meson sanity check:

  meson-qemuwrapper [...]/build/meson-private/sanitycheckc_cross.exe

  qemu-aarch64: Could not open '/lib/ld-linux-aarch64.so.1': No such file or directory

Note: The binaries build by the Yocto internal toolchain seems be "patched" [3]
to look at /usr/lib instead of /lib.

We use -Wl,--dynamic-linker to make sure that the cross-compiler
generate binaries using the dynamic loader path defined by usrmerge
for all packages build by Yocto.

[1] https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/commit/?id=802e853eeddf16d73db1900546cc5f045d1fb7ed
[2] https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/tree/meta/classes-recipe/meson.bbclass?h=2024-04.3-scarthgap#n130
[3] https://github.com/openembedded/openembedded-core/blob/scarthgap/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0007-Define-GLIBC_DYNAMIC_LINKER-and-UCLIBC_DYNAMIC_LINKE.patch

(cherry picked from commit cb4c0c9a93)

Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Acked-by: Denys Dmytriyenko <denys@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-01-06 06:00:11 -05:00
Vasyl Vavrychuk 309d93f9e5 external-arm-toolchain: remove ${base_libdir}/libpthread*.so from FILES:${PN}
When `usrmerge` distro feature is not enabled, then `${base_libdir}`
resolves to `/lib` and `/lib/libpthread*.so` does not match any files.
But, with `usrmerge` distro feature, `${base_libdir}` is `/usr/lib`, so
removed line leads to `/usr/lib/libpthread.so` symlink included in
`${PN}` which causes QA check failure.

(cherry picked from commit 8634bdc2f2)

Signed-off-by: Vasyl Vavrychuk <vvavrychuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Denys Dmytriyenko <denys@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-01-06 06:00:11 -05:00
Vasyl Vavrychuk a6233bf5fd external-arm-toolchain: in libc.so GNU ld script use base_libdir
`base_libdir` gets replaced with `/lib` or `/usr/lib` depending on
`usrmerge` distro feature.

(cherry picked from commit 4b2cef379f)

Signed-off-by: Vasyl Vavrychuk <vvavrychuk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Acked-by: Denys Dmytriyenko <denys@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-01-06 06:00:11 -05:00
Romain Naour 415215c074 external-arm-toolchain: wrap symlink handling under usrmerge check
Rework the symlink handling when usermerge is enabled.
Indeed, "ln -sf ../../lib/librt.so.1 ${D}${libdir}/librt.so" create a
dead link with usermerge...

Based on: https://lists.yoctoproject.org/g/meta-arm/message/5765

(cherry picked from commit a6f44bbb80)

Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Cc: "Parthiban" <parthiban@linumiz.com>
Acked-by: Denys Dmytriyenko <denys@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-01-06 06:00:11 -05:00
Vasyl Vavrychuk a7f27d1641 external-arm-toolchain: wrap base_libdir vs libdir manipulations under usrmerge check
With `usrmerge` disto feature `base_libdir` and `libdir` are the same,
so it does not make sense to:

* removing "duplicates" between them
* move files from `base_libdir` to `libdir`

This fixes build error

| mv: '.../tmp/work/cortexa15t2hf-neon-poky-linux-gnueabi/external-arm-toolchain/12.2.Rel1/image/usr/lib/libasan.a' and '.../tmp/work/cortexa15t2hf-neon-poky-linux-gnueabi/external-arm-toolchain/12.2.Rel1/image/usr/lib/libasan.a' are the same file

in case of `usrmerge` feature enabled.

(cherry picked from commit 98eea62962)

Signed-off-by: Vasyl Vavrychuk <vvavrychuk@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Denys Dmytriyenko <denys@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-01-06 06:00:11 -05:00
Romain Naour acbba48ee5 external-arm-toolchain: remove old sed fixup for libc.so
As reported by Vasyl Vavrychuk [1], /${EAT_LIBDIR}/${EAT_TARGET_SYS}
is not present in libc.so in the latest prebuilt toolchains:

ARM32:
  $ cat ./gcc-arm-8.3-2019.03-x86_64-arm-linux-gnueabihf/arm-linux-gnueabihf/libc/usr/lib/libc.so
  OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf32-littlearm)
  GROUP ( /lib/libc.so.6 /usr/lib/libc_nonshared.a  AS_NEEDED ( /lib/ld-linux-armhf.so.3 ) )

  $ cat ./gcc-arm-9.2-2019.12-x86_64-arm-none-linux-gnueabihf/arm-none-linux-gnueabihf/libc/usr/lib/libc.so
  OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf32-littlearm)
  GROUP ( /lib/libc.so.6 /usr/lib/libc_nonshared.a  AS_NEEDED ( /lib/ld-linux-armhf.so.3 ) )

  $ cat ./arm-gnu-toolchain-12.3.rel1-x86_64-arm-none-linux-gnueabihf/arm-none-linux-gnueabihf/libc/usr/lib/libc.so
  OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf32-littlearm)
  GROUP ( /lib/libc.so.6 /usr/lib/libc_nonshared.a  AS_NEEDED ( /lib/ld-linux-armhf.so.3 ) )

  $ cat ./arm-gnu-toolchain-13.3.rel1-x86_64-arm-none-linux-gnueabihf/arm-none-linux-gnueabihf/libc/usr/lib/libc.so
  OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf32-littlearm)
  GROUP ( /lib/libc.so.6 /usr/lib/libc_nonshared.a  AS_NEEDED ( /lib/ld-linux-armhf.so.3 ) )

Aarch64:
  $ cat ./gcc-linaro-7.3.1-2018.05-x86_64_aarch64-linux-gnu/aarch64-linux-gnu/libc/usr/lib/libc.so
  OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-littleaarch64)
  GROUP ( /lib/libc.so.6 /usr/lib/libc_nonshared.a  AS_NEEDED ( /lib/ld-linux-aarch64.so.1 ) )

  $ cat ./gcc-arm-9.2-2019.12-x86_64-aarch64-none-linux-gnu/aarch64-none-linux-gnu/libc/usr/lib64/libc.so
  OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-littleaarch64)
  GROUP ( /lib64/libc.so.6 /usr/lib64/libc_nonshared.a  AS_NEEDED ( /lib/ld-linux-aarch64.so.1 ) )

  $ cat ./arm-gnu-toolchain-12.3.rel1-x86_64-aarch64-none-linux-gnu/aarch64-none-linux-gnu/libc/usr/lib64/libc.so
  OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-littleaarch64)
  GROUP ( /lib64/libc.so.6 /usr/lib64/libc_nonshared.a  AS_NEEDED ( /lib/ld-linux-aarch64.so.1 ) )

  $ cat ./arm-gnu-toolchain-13.3.rel1-x86_64-aarch64-none-linux-gnu/aarch64-none-linux-gnu/libc/usr/lib64/libc.so
  OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-littleaarch64)
  GROUP ( /lib64/libc.so.6 /usr/lib64/libc_nonshared.a  AS_NEEDED ( /lib/ld-linux-aarch64.so.1 ) )

We can safely remove old sed fixup for libc.so.

[1] https://lists.yoctoproject.org/g/meta-arm/message/5565

(cherry picked from commit 9a0451a959)

Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Acked-by: Denys Dmytriyenko <denys@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2025-01-06 06:00:11 -05:00
Hugues KAMBA MPIANA 7088279c0a arm-bsp/documentation: corstone1000: Add SystemReady IR v2.0 certification
- Add details on SystemReady IR v2.0 certification achievement
- Document additional patch added
- Update release notes with new milestone tag `CORSTONE1000-2024.06-systemready-ir-v2.0`

Signed-off-by: Hugues KAMBA MPIANA <hugues.kambampiana@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-11-06 07:00:12 -05:00
Ross Burton d67a9b6070 arm-base/linux-yocto: revert interim 6.10 patch for fvp-base
oe-core master now has 6.6.54 which incorporates this patch, so we don't
need to carry it anymore.

This reverts commit 60fd47edd0.

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-11-05 10:42:16 -05:00
Jon Mason 60e31ef2c4 arm/linux-yocto: disable CONFIG_MTD_NAND_FSL_IFC
Linux stable kernel v6.6.44 added commit c22649e217457d732a51112aaa8721a0e79e2c30,
which modifies the depends for the Freescale IFC NAND controller.  See
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-6.6.y&id=c22649e217457d732a51112aaa8721a0e79e2c30

Because of this change, do_kernel_configcheck is logging an warning
about values not matching.  To address this issue, disable it manually
in a config fragment, but only for the affected machines in meta-arm.

Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-10-21 12:00:17 -04:00
Jon Mason 0ce566fb86 arm-bsp/fvp-base: Get 6.10 kernel working
Apply upstream patch to get virtio networking functioning again and
switch to the 6.10 kernel.

Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-10-21 12:00:17 -04:00
Ben 218c3bbfea kas: Include unattended openSUSE test
Add unattended installation class to openSUSE target

Signed-off-by: Ben Cownley <ben.cownley@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-10-15 12:00:13 -04:00
Ben 62a4a0a71a arm-systemready/oeqa: Add unattended installation testcase
Add test for openSUSE unattended installation

Signed-off-by: Ben Cownley <ben.cownley@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-10-15 12:00:13 -04:00
Ben ba9451a818 arm-systemready/linux-distros: Implement unattended openSUSE
Implement unattended installation for openSUSE

Signed-off-by: Ben Cownley <ben.cownley@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-10-15 12:00:13 -04:00
Luca Fancellu 950a4afce4 arm/lib: Handle timeout for spawn object on stop()
The current code is waiting 5 seconds to get an EOF on the
console pexpect spawn object, on a particularly slow machine
this timeout was not enough ending up into a TIMEOUT exception.

To solve this, increase the timeout and handle the TIMEOUT exception
by printing an error on the debug console instead of letting the
exception raise up to the stack, force the spawn object close() call
as well, since at this stage we would like the process to terminate
anyway.

Signed-off-by: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-09-23 13:00:14 -04:00
Jon Mason ea21deb5e9 arm-toolchain: remove libmount-mountfd-support when using binary toolchain
util-linux is failing when compiling with:
| configure: error: libmount_mountfd_support selected, but required mount FDs based API not available
Remove this feature when building with the binary toolchain to avoid
this issue.

Acked-by: Denys Dmytriyenko <denys@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-09-20 14:36:14 -04:00
Bence Balogh 1947c00029 arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-m: corstone1000: Fix MPU configuration
The Application Root of Trust and the PSA Root of Trust was not
isolated in TF-M Isolation Level 2 beacuse of the misconfiguration of
the MPU. The added patch fixes this issue.

Fixes: a8f47e9 (arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-m: corstone1000: update to 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-09-17 17:00:19 -04:00
Harsimran Singh Tungal 313ad2a0e6 arm-bsp,kas: corstone1000: enable External System based on new yml file
Create new yml file "corstone1000-extsys.yml" which adds "corstone1000-extsys" as
new MACHINE_FEATURE.
Based on this, external system components can be enabled or disabled from the
Linux Kernel and U-Boot.

Reason for change:
DT-schema test is failing for the SystemReady-IR v2.0 certification because
device tree binding for remoteproc dts node corresponds to external system has
not been upstreamed in the Linux Kernel yet.
So, it has been decided to make enablement of external system configurable in
order to make Corstone1000 FVP SystemReady-IR v2.0 certifiable.

Signed-off-by: Harsimran Singh Tungal <harsimransingh.tungal@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-08-30 05:00:25 -04:00
Luca Fancellu 38bce82e42 arm/oeqa: Introduce retry mechanism for fvp_devices run_cmd
Currently the run_cmd, which is a wrapper for self.target.run()
that uses SSH to spawn commands on the target, can fail spuriously
with error 255 and cause the test to fail on slow systems.

In order to address that, introduce a retry mechanism for the call,
that is able to wait some time for the system to settle and retry
the command when the error code from SSH is 255.

Signed-off-by: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-08-01 11:33:42 -04:00
Amr Mohamed ecece16871 kas: Add new yml file for Distros unattended installation
Define “DISTRO_UNATTENDED_INST_TESTS” variable in meta-arm-systemready
independently from meta-arm-auto-solutions. This will allow running
the unattended installation without meta-arm-auto-solutions.

Signed-off-by: Amr Mohamed <amr.mohamed@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-07-31 11:00:22 -04:00
Amr Mohamed aa85142b5b arm-systemready/oeqa: Add new test for Fedora unattended installation
The oeqa test responds to the boot loader prompt error message and
waits till the distro installation is finished.

Signed-off-by: Amr Mohamed <amr.mohamed@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-07-31 11:00:22 -04:00
Amr Mohamed 54fa370dde arm-systemready/linux-distros: Add kickstart file for Fedora unattended
Add the Fedora kickstart configuration file and define a function to
modify the unpacked ISO image to add the kickstart file inside and
modify the grub.cfg file.

Signed-off-by: Amr Mohamed <amr.mohamed@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-07-31 11:00:22 -04:00
Amr Mohamed 79c41bb917 arm-systemready/linux-distros: new inc file for unattended installation
Add a new inc file to unpack and repack the distro ISO image after
adding the kickstart configuration file inside.

Signed-off-by: Amr Mohamed <amr.mohamed@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-07-31 11:00:22 -04:00
Amr Mohamed 1b85bbb4ca kas: Update kas configuration for fvp-base.yml file
Change defaults repo refspec in fvp-base.yml file from master to
scarthgap.

Signed-off-by: Amr Mohamed <amr.mohamed@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-07-19 10:00:23 -04:00
Ziad Elhanafy 58268ddccb arm/oeqa: Enable pexpect profiling for testcase debugging
This patch enables logging with timestamps for individual pexpect
assertions to ease the debugging of failed tests and the tuning of
timeouts. It measures the execution time of all pexpect calls and logs
the actual duration for each.

Only "callable" pexpect calls are timed (e.g. expect, sendline, but not
before or after).

Signed-off-by: Divin Raj <divin.raj@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ziad Elhanafy <ziad.elhanafy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hoyes <peter.hoyes@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-06-27 10:00:26 -04:00
Ross Burton 29799b787d Revert "CI: temporarily backport the procps fix"
This procps fix has been merged upstream in oe-core aaced482, so we can
remove this patch now.

This reverts commit fef5eafc08.

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
2024-06-20 14:22:59 +01:00
Amr Mohamed a88dd94883 arm-systemready/linux-distros: Add a third Linux distribution installation
Add Fedora distribution version 39.1.5 installation to fulfill
the SystemReady IR.

Signed-off-by: Amr Mohamed <amr.mohamed@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-06-17 14:00:29 -04:00
Abdellatif El Khlifi 38e26f52a8 kas: update the layers SHAs
set the tested SHAs

Signed-off-by: Abdellatif El Khlifi <abdellatif.elkhlifi@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-06-13 13:00:29 -04:00
Bence Balogh 81a24f1aac arm-bsp/documentation: corstone1000: improve tests documentation
Improve the documentation in the user guide of the following tests:

- SystemReady-IR tests
- Manual capsule update and ESRT checks
- Linux distros tests
- UEFI Secureboot (SB) test
- PSA API tests

In addition, we moved the tests in one section for better readability.

Signed-off-by: Delane Brandy <delane.brandy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harsimran Singh Tungal <harsimransingh.tungal@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Abdellatif El Khlifi <abdellatif.elkhlifi@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-06-13 13:00:29 -04:00
Bence Balogh 9f6643c967 arm-bsp/documentation: corstone1000: update the boot chain
The Secure Boot chain section is updated in the architecture document
to reflect the TF-M BL1 design.

Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harsimran Singh Tungal <harsimransingh.tungal@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Delane Brandy <delane.brandy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-06-13 13:00:29 -04:00
Bence Balogh 3922b49529 kas: corstone1000: remove Arm-FVP-EULA flag
This flag should not be set here and the ARM_FVP_EULA_ACCEPT
should be set to True manually before building for the FVP, as it is
mentioned in the Corstone-1000 User guide:
export ARM_FVP_EULA_ACCEPT="True"

Fixes: 6e2a54748 ("kas: Corstone-1000 kas files updated")
Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-06-04 05:00:25 -04:00
Jon Mason 189d473fc9 CI: correct BB_HASHSERVE_UPSTREAM
The BB_HASHSERVE_UPSTREAM has issues which cause significantly less of a
match than expected.  Update with the correct values to get the expected
behavior.

Fixes: 6e9525115b ("CI: add Yocto Project SSTATE Mirror")
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-30 08:50:59 -04:00
Bence Balogh 7728407220 arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-m: corstone1000: remove capsule update reset
The reset has to be removed from the TF-M side after capsule update
because it caused data abort exceptions on the host side.

Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
2024-05-29 14:08:28 -04:00
Delane Brandy e0f39a0a8b arm-bsp/corstone1000: update the documentation
Update the Corstone-1000 Documentation for the
2024.06 release.

Signed-off-by: Delane Brandy <delane.brandy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harsimran Singh Tungal <harsimransingh.tungal@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Emekcan Aras <Emekcan.Aras@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Abdellatif El Khlifi <abdellatif.elkhlifi@arm.com>
2024-05-29 14:08:07 -04:00
Bence Balogh b50f5fb37e kas: corstone1000: set branch to scarthgap
The default branch will be scarthgap so the poky and
openembedded will follow this branch.

Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-23 11:00:24 -04:00
Bence Balogh 1200a59db6 arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-m: corstone1000: increase RSE_COMMS buff size
The buffer size has to be increased to fit the EFI variables which got
increased metadata sizes.

Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-22 14:11:57 -04:00
Bence Balogh a9a3c53ea6 arm-bsp/trusted-services: corstone1000: increase comm buffer size
The increased EFI variable metadata need bigger buffer so it can
be transfered to the Secure Enclave without memory overflow
issues. The heap and buffer sizes had to be aligned with the.

Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-22 14:11:57 -04:00
Bence Balogh 7b6e37a4a3 arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-m: corstone1000: increase PS sizes
The private authenticated variable changes increased the variables
metadata. The PS max asset size and related buffer sizes have to be
increased because of this.

Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-22 14:11:57 -04:00
Bence Balogh 28cc4ca37c arm-bsp/trusted-services: corstone1000: add fixes for private auth vars
Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-22 14:11:57 -04:00
Bence Balogh 1b782e9313 arm-bsp/trusted-services: corstone1000: add EFI var handling fixes
Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-22 14:11:57 -04:00
Jon Mason 36f731e63e arm/oeqa: increase optee and ftpm test timeouts
OPTEE and ftpm tests are failing in CI on slower systems due to timing
out, but actually finish when given enough time to complete.  Increase
the timeout value to be roughly 100 seconds longer than the time it is
currently taking to finish on the slower systems.

Fixes: d450786667 ("oeqa runtime: add optee.py test")
Fixes: ba315f7242 ("oeqa runtime: add ftpm.py test")
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-21 10:24:43 -04:00
Ben Cownley 9781813a88 arm-systemready/linux-distros: Upgrade the openSUSE version to 15.5
Upgrade the openSUSE distribution from version 15.4 to version 15.5
openSUSE Licenses updated to reflect update from 15.4 to 15.5
License now includes: Apache-1.1, BSL-1.0, IPL-1.0, Sleepycat, Zlib

Signed-off-by: Ben Cownley <ben.cownley@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-21 10:23:24 -04:00
Amr Mohamed ba0f913fb1 arm-systemready/linux-distros: Upgrade the Debian license
Debian Licenses updated to reflect update from 11.7 to 12.4
License now includes: AFL-2.0, AFL-2.1,
GPL-2.0-with-autoconf-exception,
GPL-2.0-with-OpenSSL-exception,
GPL-3.0-with-autoconf-exception,
GPL-3-with-bison-exception, SMAIL_GPL,
BSD-2-Clause, BSD-3-Clause-Clear,
BSD-4-Clause-UC, TCP-wrappers, OLDAP-2.8,
PSF-2.0, BSL-1.0, bzip2-1.0.6, CC0-1.0,
Libpng, Latex2e, Unicode-TOU, Unicode-DFS-2016,
CC-BY-3.0, CC-BY-SA-3.0, CC-BY-SA-4.0, curl,
MS-PL, NTP, FSFAP, FSFUL, FSFULLR, FSF-Unlimited,
EDL-1.0, Vim, FTL, TCL, MPL-1.1, MPL-2.0,
GFDL-1.1-or-later, GFDL-1.2-or-later,
GFDL-1.3-no-invariants-or-later,
GFDL-1.3-no-invariants-only, Artistic-1.0,
Artistic-2.0, Apache-2.0,
Apache-2.0-with-LLVM-exception, Spencer-86,
MIT, MIT-CMU, MIT-advertising, Beerware,
Intel, X11, ISC, IPL-1.0, SSH-OpenSSH, SSH-short,
RSA-MD, OPL-1.0, PD

Licenses removed: Apache-1.0, Apache-1.1, Ruby, PHP-3.01,
W3C-20150513

Signed-off-by: Amr Mohamed <amr.mohamed@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-17 11:07:38 -04:00
Harsimran Singh Tungal d6cd18b600 arm-bsp/documentation: corstone1000: Update user guide for secureboot test
This changeset updates the user guide to test the secureboot for both the
FVP and FPGA.

Signed-off-by: Harsimran Singh Tungal <harsimransingh.tungal@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-17 09:38:51 -04:00
Bence Balogh 093247cdb0 arm-bsp/trusted-services: corstone1000: fix IAT test
The psa-iat-api-test was failing because the PLATFORM_HAS_ATTEST_PK
flag was added to the build for Corstone1000.

Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-17 09:38:51 -04:00
Ali Can Ozaslan 9e316ecc1d arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-m: corstone1000: fix crypto failure on mps3
Crypto-AEAD-APIs tests fails on mps3. Configures CC312 mps3 model
same as predefined cc312 FVP configuration while keeping debug
ports closed.

Signed-off-by: Ali Can Ozaslan <ali.oezaslan@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bence Balogh <bence.balogh@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Emekcan Aras <emekcan.aras@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-17 09:38:51 -04:00
Emekcan Aras 3ce8043bf8 arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-a: corstone1000: fix reset sequence
Corstone1000 does not properly clean the cache and disable gic interrupts
before the reset. This causes a race condition especially in FVP after reset.
This adds proper sequence before resetting the platform.

Signed-off-by: Emekcan Aras <Emekcan.Aras@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-16 11:49:31 -04:00
Ross Burton 69f9ef2fe5 arm/boot-wrapper-aarch64: use https to fetch git source
Some networks limit outgoing git: traffic, so use https:.

Fixes: 0cec3e5 ("arm/gem5/boot-wrapper-aarch64: Move main recipe to meta-arm")
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
2024-05-08 10:45:41 -04:00
546 changed files with 26047 additions and 23756 deletions
-2
View File
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
[b4]
send-series-to = meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org
+67 -58
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
image: ${MIRROR_GHCR}/siemens/kas/kas:4.7
image: ${MIRROR_GHCR}/siemens/kas/kas:4.3.2
variables:
# These are needed as the k8s executor doesn't respect the container
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ variables:
# The default machine tag for the build jobs
DEFAULT_TAG: ""
# The machine tag for the ACS test jobs
ACS_TAG: "$DEFAULT_TAG"
ACS_TAG: ""
# The directory to use as the persistent cache (the root for DL_DIR, SSTATE_DIR, etc)
CACHE_DIR: $CI_BUILDS_DIR/persist
# The container mirror to use
@@ -33,24 +33,28 @@ stages:
stage: build
interruptible: true
variables:
KUBERNETES_CPU_REQUEST: $CPU_REQUEST
KAS_WORK_DIR: $CI_PROJECT_DIR/work
KAS_BUILD_DIR: $KAS_WORK_DIR/build
# Set this in the environment to enable local repository caches
KAS_REPO_REF_DIR: ""
KAS_REPO_REF_DIR: $CACHE_DIR/repos
SSTATE_DIR: $CACHE_DIR/sstate
DL_DIR: $CACHE_DIR/downloads
BB_LOGCONFIG: $CI_PROJECT_DIR/ci/logging.yml
TOOLCHAIN_DIR: $CACHE_DIR/toolchains
IMAGE_DIR: $KAS_BUILD_DIR/tmp/deploy/images
TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR: $KAS_BUILD_DIR/toolchains
IMAGE_DIR: $CI_PROJECT_DIR/work/build/tmp/deploy/images
TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR: $CI_PROJECT_DIR/work/build/toolchains
before_script:
- echo KAS_WORK_DIR = $KAS_WORK_DIR
- echo SSTATE_DIR = $SSTATE_DIR
- echo DL_DIR = $DL_DIR
- rm -rf $KAS_WORK_DIR
- mkdir --verbose --parents $KAS_WORK_DIR $KAS_REPO_REF_DIR $SSTATE_DIR $DL_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR
# Must do this here, as it's the only way to make sure the toolchain is installed on the same builder
- ./ci/get-binary-toolchains $DL_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR
# Generalised fragment to do a Kas build
.build:
extends: .setup
variables:
KUBERNETES_CPU_REQUEST: $CPU_REQUEST
rules:
# Don't run MR pipelines
- if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
@@ -71,18 +75,13 @@ stages:
- echo KASFILES=$KASFILES
- kas dump --update --force-checkout --resolve-refs --resolve-env $KASFILES
- kas build $KASFILES
- ./ci/check-warnings $KAS_BUILD_DIR/warnings.log
- kas shell ci/base.yml:lockfile.yml --command "$CI_PROJECT_DIR/ci/junit.sh $KAS_WORK_DIR/build"
- ./ci/check-warnings $KAS_WORK_DIR/build/warnings.log
artifacts:
name: "logs"
when: on_failure
expire_in: 1 week
when: always
paths:
- $KAS_BUILD_DIR/tmp*/work*/**/temp/log.do_*.*
- $KAS_BUILD_DIR/tmp*/work*/**/testimage/*
reports:
junit: $KAS_BUILD_DIR/tmp/log/oeqa/junit.xml
- $CI_PROJECT_DIR/work/build/tmp*/work*/**/temp/log.do_*.*
- $CI_PROJECT_DIR/work/build/tmp*/work*/**/testimage/*
#
# Prep stage, update repositories once.
@@ -95,18 +94,7 @@ update-repos:
exit_codes: 128
script:
- |
exit_code=0
# Dump the environment for reference
printenv
# Update the reference repositories if needed
if [ -n "$KAS_REPO_REF_DIR" ]; then
flock --verbose --timeout 60 $KAS_REPO_REF_DIR --command ./ci/update-repos || exit_code=$?
# Exit now if that failed, unless the status was 128 (fetch failed)
test $exit_code != 0 -a $exit_code != 128 && exit 1
fi
flock --verbose --timeout 60 $KAS_REPO_REF_DIR ./ci/update-repos
# Only generate if doesn't already exist, to allow feature branches to drop one in.
if test -f lockfile.yml; then
echo Using existing lockfile.yml
@@ -114,26 +102,23 @@ update-repos:
# Be sure that this is the complete list of layers being fetched
kas dump --lock --update ci/qemuarm64.yml:ci/meta-openembedded.yml:ci/clang.yml:ci/meta-virtualization.yml | tee lockfile.yml
fi
exit $exit_code
artifacts:
name: "lockfile"
when: always
paths:
- lockfile.yml
#
# Build stage, the actual build jobs
#
# Available options for building are (VIRT _must_ be last for ssh override)
# DISTRO: [poky, poky-altcfg, poky-tiny]
# KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-dev]
# TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
# Available options for building are
# DISTRO: [poky, poky-tiny]
# KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-dev, linux-yocto-rt]
# TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang, external-gccarm]
# TCLIBC: [glibc, musl]
# FIRMWARE: [u-boot, edk2]
# TS: [none, trusted-services]
# TESTING: testimage
# SECUREDEBUG: [none, secure-debug]
# VIRT: [none, xen]
# TESTING: testimage
arm-systemready-ir-acs:
extends: .build
@@ -143,7 +128,7 @@ arm-systemready-ir-acs:
# arm-systemready-ir-acs must be specified after fvp-base for ordering
# purposes for the jobs-to-kas output. It is not enough to just have it
# in the job name because fvp-base.yml overwrites the target.
- PLATFORM: [fvp-base, corstone1000-fvp]
- PLATFORM: fvp-base
ARM_SYSTEMREADY_IR_ACS: arm-systemready-ir-acs
tags:
- ${ACS_TAG}
@@ -175,7 +160,6 @@ corstone1000-mps3:
- FIRMWARE: corstone1000-firmware-only
TESTING: [none, tftf]
- FIRMWARE: none
SECUREDEBUG: [none, secure-debug]
documentation:
extends: .setup
@@ -206,10 +190,22 @@ fvp-base:
matrix:
- TS: [none, fvp-base-ts]
TESTING: testimage
- FIRMWARE: [u-boot, edk2]
TESTING: testimage
- FIRMWARE: edk2
- SYSTEMREADY_FIRMWARE: arm-systemready-firmware
arm-systemready-ir-acs:
extends: .build
timeout: 12h
parallel:
matrix:
# arm-systemready-ir-acs must be specified after fvp-base for ordering
# purposes for the jobs-to-kas output. It is not enough to just have it
# in the job name because fvp-base.yml overwrites the target.
- PLATFORM: [fvp-base, corstone1000-fvp]
ARM_SYSTEMREADY_IR_ACS: arm-systemready-ir-acs
tags:
- ${ACS_TAG}
fvps:
extends: .build
@@ -251,6 +247,12 @@ musca-b1:
musca-s1:
extends: .build
n1sdp:
extends: .build
parallel:
matrix:
- TESTING: [none, n1sdp-ts, n1sdp-optee, tftf]
pending-updates:
extends: .setup
# Only run this job for the default branch (master), or if forced with
@@ -266,17 +268,19 @@ pending-updates:
# This configuration has all of the layers we need enabled
- kas shell --update --force-checkout ci/qemuarm64.yml:ci/meta-openembedded.yml:ci/meta-secure-core.yml:lockfile.yml --command \
"$CI_PROJECT_DIR/scripts/machine-summary.py -t report -o $CI_PROJECT_DIR/update-report $($CI_PROJECT_DIR/ci/listmachines.py meta-arm meta-arm-bsp)"
# Do this on x86 whilst the compilers are x86-only
tags:
- x86_64
qemuarm64-secureboot:
extends: .build
parallel:
matrix:
- TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
- KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-rt]
TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
TCLIBC: [glibc, musl]
TS: [none, qemuarm64-secureboot-ts]
TESTING: testimage
- UEFISB: [none, uefi-secureboot]
TESTING: testimage
- KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev
TESTING: testimage
@@ -284,18 +288,26 @@ qemuarm64:
extends: .build
parallel:
matrix:
- DISTRO: poky
KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-rt]
TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
FIRMWARE: [u-boot, edk2]
TESTING: testimage
- DISTRO: poky-tiny
TESTING: testimage
- VIRT: xen
- KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev
TESTING: testimage
qemuarm-secureboot:
extends: .build
parallel:
matrix:
- TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
- KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-rt]
TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
TCLIBC: [glibc, musl]
TESTING: testimage
- DISTRO: [poky, poky-altcfg]
- TOOLCHAINS: external-gccarm
TESTING: testimage
- KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev
TESTING: testimage
@@ -304,19 +316,23 @@ qemuarm:
extends: .build
parallel:
matrix:
- TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
FIRMWARE: edk2
- DISTRO: poky
KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-rt]
TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
FIRMWARE: [u-boot, edk2]
TESTING: testimage
- DISTRO: poky-tiny
TESTING: testimage
- VIRT: xen
- KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev
TESTING: testimage
qemuarmv5:
extends: .build
parallel:
matrix:
- DISTRO: poky
KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-dev]
KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-dev, linux-yocto-rt]
TESTING: testimage
- DISTRO: poky-tiny
TESTING: testimage
@@ -325,9 +341,8 @@ sbsa-ref:
extends: .build
parallel:
matrix:
- TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
TESTING: testimage
- DISTRO: poky-altcfg
- KERNEL: [linux-yocto, linux-yocto-rt]
TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang]
TESTING: testimage
- KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev
TESTING: testimage
@@ -340,12 +355,6 @@ selftest:
sgi575:
extends: .build
parallel:
matrix:
- TESTING: testimage
# FVP binary is x86-only
tags:
- x86_64
toolchains:
extends: .build
+13 -36
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ This repository contains the Arm layers for OpenEmbedded.
* meta-arm-bsp
This layer contains machines for Arm reference platforms, for example FVP Base, Corstone1000, and Juno.
This layer contains machines for Arm reference platforms, for example FVP Base, N1SDP, and Juno.
* meta-arm-toolchain
@@ -19,23 +19,19 @@ Other Directories
* ci
This directory contains gitlab continuous integration configuration files (KAS yaml files) as well as scripts needed for this.
* documentation
This directory contains information on the files in this repository, building, and other relevant documents.
This directory contains gitlab continuous integration configuration files (KAS yaml files) as well as scripts needed for this
* kas
This directory contains KAS yaml files to describe builds for systems not used in CI.
This directory contains KAS yaml files to describe builds for systems not used in CI
* scripts
This directory contains scripts used in running the CI tests.
This directory contains scripts used in running the CI tests
Mailing List
------------
To interact with the meta-arm developer community, please email the meta-arm mailing list at <meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org>.
To interact with the meta-arm developer community, please email the meta-arm mailing list at meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org
Currently, it is configured to only allow emails to members from those subscribed.
To subscribe to the meta-arm mailing list, please go to
https://lists.yoctoproject.org/g/meta-arm
@@ -46,51 +42,32 @@ Currently, we only accept patches from the meta-arm mailing list. For general
information on how to submit a patch, please read
https://www.openembedded.org/wiki/How_to_submit_a_patch_to_OpenEmbedded
E-mail <meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org> with patches created using this process. You can configure git-send-email to automatically use this address for the meta-arm repository with the following git command:
E-mail meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org with patches created using this process. You can configure git-send-email to automatically use this address for the meta-arm repository with the following git command:
`$ git config --local --add sendemail.to meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org`
$ git config --local --add sendemail.to meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org
Commits and patches added should follow the OpenEmbedded patch guidelines:
https://www.openembedded.org/wiki/Commit_Patch_Message_Guidelines
The component being changed in the shortlog should be prefixed with the layer name (without the meta- prefix), for example:
> arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-a: decrease frobbing level
> arm-toolchain/gcc: enable foobar v2
arm-bsp/trusted-firmware-a: decrease frobbing level
All contributions are under the [MIT License](/COPYING.MIT).
For a quick start guide on how to build and use meta-arm, go to [quick-start.md](/documentation/quick-start.md).
For information on the continuous integration done on meta-arm and how to use it, go to [continuous-integration-and-kas.md](/documentation/continuous-integration-and-kas.md).
Backporting
--------------
Backporting patches to older releases may be done upon request, but only after a version of the patch has been accepted into the master branch. This is done by adding the branch name to email subject line. This should be between the square brackets (e.g., "[" and "]"), and before or after the "PATCH". For example,
> [nanbield PATCH] arm/linux-yocto: backport patch to fix 6.5.13 networking issues
Automatic backporting will be done to all branches if the "Fixes: <SHA>" wording is added to the patch commit message. This is similar to how the Linux kernel community does their LTS kernel backporting. For more information see the "Fixes" portion of
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#submittingpatches
arm-toolchain/gcc: enable foobar v2
Releases and Release Schedule
--------------
We follow the Yocto Project release methodology, schedule, and stable/LTS support timelines. For more information on these, please reference:
* https://docs.yoctoproject.org/ref-manual/release-process.html
* https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Releases
* https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Stable_Release_and_LTS
For more in-depth information on the meta-arm release and branch methodology, go to </documentation/releases.md>.
https://docs.yoctoproject.org/ref-manual/release-process.html
https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Releases
https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Stable_Release_and_LTS
Reporting bugs
--------------
E-mail <meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org> with the error encountered and the steps
E-mail meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org with the error encountered and the steps
to reproduce the issue.
Security and Reporting Security Issues
--------------
For information on the security of meta-arm and how to report issues, please consult [SECURITY.md](/SECURITY.md).
Maintainer(s)
-------------
* Jon Mason <jon.mason@arm.com>
+4 -13
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ number), please contact the meta-arm mailing list at
meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org and arm-security@arm.com.
If you are dealing with a not-yet released or urgent issue, please send a mail
to the maintainers \(see [README.md](/README.md)\) and arm-security@arm.com, including as much
to the maintainers (see README.md) and arm-security@arm.com, including as much
detail as possible. Encrypted emails using PGP are welcome.
For more information, please visit https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/report-security-vulnerabilities.
@@ -27,20 +27,11 @@ For more information, please visit https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-securit
## Branches maintained with security fixes
meta-arm follows the Yocto release model, so see
[Stable release and LTS](https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Stable_Release_and_LTS)
for detailed info regarding the policies and maintenance of stable
[https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Stable_Release_and_LTS Stable release and
LTS] for detailed info regarding the policies and maintenance of stable
branches.
The [Release page](https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Releases) contains a list of all
The [https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Releases Release page] contains a list of all
releases of the Yocto Project. Versions in grey are no longer actively maintained with
security patches, but well-tested patches may still be accepted for them for
significant issues.
# Disclaimer
Arm reference solutions are Arm public example software projects that track and
pull upstream components, incorporating their respective security fixes
published over time. Arm partners are responsible for ensuring that the
components they use contain all the required security fixes, if and when they
deploy a product derived from Arm reference solutions.
-1
View File
@@ -16,4 +16,3 @@ target:
- arm-systemready-ir-acs
- arm-systemready-linux-distros-debian
- arm-systemready-linux-distros-opensuse
- arm-systemready-linux-distros-fedora
+12 -19
View File
@@ -7,31 +7,21 @@ distro: poky
defaults:
repos:
branch: whinlatter
branch: scarthgap
repos:
bitbake:
url: https://git.openembedded.org/bitbake
branch: "2.16"
layers:
bitbake: disabled
core:
url: https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core
layers:
meta:
meta-yocto:
url: https://git.yoctoproject.org/meta-yocto
layers:
meta-poky:
meta-arm:
layers:
meta-arm:
meta-arm-bsp:
meta-arm-toolchain:
poky:
url: https://git.yoctoproject.org/poky
layers:
meta:
meta-poky:
env:
BB_LOGCONFIG: ""
TOOLCHAIN_DIR: ""
@@ -39,10 +29,13 @@ env:
local_conf_header:
base: |
CONF_VERSION = "2"
BB_SERVER_TIMEOUT = "300"
setup: |
PACKAGE_CLASSES = "package_ipk"
PACKAGECONFIG:remove:pn-qemu-system-native = "gtk+ sdl"
PACKAGECONFIG:append:pn-perf = " coresight"
INHERIT += "rm_work"
extrapackages: |
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "perf"
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "perf opencsd"
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:append:aarch64 = " gator-daemon"
machine: unset
+14 -1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,19 @@
header:
version: 14
repos:
meta-clang:
url: https://github.com/kraj/meta-clang
local_conf_header:
toolchain: |
PREFERRED_TOOLCHAIN_TARGET = "clang"
TOOLCHAIN = "clang"
PREFERRED_PROVIDER_llvm = "clang"
PREFERRED_PROVIDER_llvm-native = "clang-native"
PREFERRED_PROVIDER_nativesdk-llvm = "nativesdk-clang"
PROVIDES:pn-clang = "llvm"
PROVIDES:pn-clang-native = "llvm-native"
PROVIDES:pn-nativesdk-clang = "nativesdk-llvm"
# This is needed to stop bitbake getting confused about what clang/llvm is
# being used, see https://github.com/kraj/meta-clang/pull/766
BBMASK += "/meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm.*\.bb"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,5 +5,5 @@ header:
# Add universally helpful features when testing boards
local_conf_header:
rootlogin: |
EXTRA_IMAGE_FEATURES:append = " allow-empty-password empty-root-password allow-root-login"
debug: |
EXTRA_IMAGE_FEATURES:append = " debug-tweaks"
+2
View File
@@ -15,3 +15,5 @@ local_conf_header:
QB_DEFAULT_BIOS = "QEMU_EFI.fd"
WKS_FILE ?= "efi-disk.wks.in"
failing_tests: |
TEST_SUITES:remove = "xorg"
+13
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
header:
version: 14
local_conf_header:
cc: |
SKIP_RECIPE[gcc-cross-arm] = "Using external toolchain"
TCMODE = "external-arm"
EXTERNAL_TOOLCHAIN = "${TOPDIR}/toolchains/${TARGET_ARCH}"
# Disable ptest as this pulls target compilers, which don't
# work with external toolchain currently
DISTRO_FEATURES:remove = "ptest"
+4 -5
View File
@@ -5,24 +5,23 @@ header:
includes:
- ci/fvp-base.yml
- ci/meta-openembedded.yml
- ci/testimage.yml
local_conf_header:
trusted_services: |
# Enable the needed test suites
TEST_SUITES:append = " trusted_services"
TEST_SUITES = " ping ssh trusted_services"
# Include all Secure Partitions into the image
MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " arm-ffa ts-crypto ts-storage ts-its"
MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " ts-attestation ts-smm-gateway optee-spmc-test"
MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " ts-block-storage ts-fwu ts-logging"
MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " arm-branch-protection"
SMMGW_AUTH_VAR = "1"
MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " ts-block-storage ts-fwu"
# Include TS demo/test tools into image
IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " packagegroup-ts-tests"
# Include TS PSA Arch tests into image
IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " packagegroup-ts-tests-psa"
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "optee-test"
# Set the TS environment
TS_ENV = "sp"
TS_ENV="sp"
# Enable and configure semihosting
FVP_CONFIG[cluster0.cpu0.semihosting-cwd] = "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}"
FVP_CONFIG[cluster0.cpu1.semihosting-cwd] = "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,5 +9,5 @@ header:
machine: fvp-base
target:
- core-image-full-cmdline
- core-image-sato
- boot-wrapper-aarch64
+5 -3
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ local_conf_header:
testimagefvp: |
LICENSE_FLAGS_ACCEPTED += "Arm-FVP-EULA"
IMAGE_CLASSES += "fvpboot"
networking_failing_tests: |
# These tests currently fail as the wrong IP for the build host is used
TEST_SUITES:remove = "opkg dnf"
failing_tests: |
# This fails but we can't add to the ignorelist from meta-arm yet
# https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14604
TEST_SUITES:remove = "parselogs"
TEST_SUITES:remove = "xorg"
+1 -6
View File
@@ -19,13 +19,8 @@ target:
# Target packages to test aarch64
- fvp-base-a-aem
- fvp-corstone1000
- fvp-rd1-ae
- fvp-v3-r1
# Nativesdk to test x86-64
- nativesdk-fvp-base-a-aem
- nativesdk-fvp-corstone1000
- nativesdk-fvp-rd1-ae
- nativesdk-fvp-v3-r1
# These are x86 only... :(
- nativesdk-fvp-n1-edge
- nativesdk-fvp-sgi575
- nativesdk-fvp-tc3
+2 -2
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
header:
version: 14
#NOTE: This is the default. This is only being added for completeness/clarity
#NOTE: This is the default for poky. This is only being added for completeness/clarity
local_conf_header:
toolchain: |
PREFERRED_TOOLCHAIN_TARGET = "gcc"
TOOLCHAIN = "gcc"
+1 -4
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ header:
- ci/base.yml
repos:
meta-yocto:
poky:
layers:
meta-yocto-bsp:
@@ -14,8 +14,5 @@ local_conf_header:
bootloader: |
# If running genericarm64 in a qemu we need to manually build the bootloader
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "virtual/bootloader"
sshpregen: |
# Allow the use of the pregen keys as this is CI so safe
COMPATIBLE_MACHINE:pn-ssh-pregen-hostkeys:genericarm64 = "genericarm64"
machine: genericarm64
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -u -e
BASENAME=arm-gnu-toolchain
VER=${VER:-13.2.Rel1}
HOST_ARCH=${HOST_ARCH:-$(uname -m)}
# Use the standard kas container locations if nothing is passed into the script
DOWNLOAD_DIR="${1:-/builds/persist/downloads/}"
TOOLCHAIN_DIR="${2:-/builds/persist//toolchains/}"
TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR="${3:-build/toolchains/}"
# These should be already created by .gitlab-ci.yml, but do here if run outside of that env
mkdir -p $DOWNLOAD_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_DIR $TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR
download() {
TRIPLE=$1
URL=https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/downloads/gnu/$VER/binrel/$BASENAME-$VER-$HOST_ARCH-$TRIPLE.tar.xz
wget -P $DOWNLOAD_DIR -nc $URL
}
if [ $HOST_ARCH = "aarch64" ]; then
# AArch64 Linux hosted cross compilers
# AArch32 target with hard float
download arm-none-linux-gnueabihf
elif [ $HOST_ARCH = "x86_64" ]; then
# x86_64 Linux hosted cross compilers
# AArch32 target with hard float
download arm-none-linux-gnueabihf
# AArch64 GNU/Linux target
download aarch64-none-linux-gnu
else
echo "ERROR - Unknown build arch of $HOST_ARCH"
exit 1
fi
for i in arm aarch64; do
if [ ! -d $TOOLCHAIN_DIR/$BASENAME-$VER-$HOST_ARCH-$i-none-linux-gnu*/ ]; then
if [ ! -f $DOWNLOAD_DIR/$BASENAME-$VER-$HOST_ARCH-$i-none-linux-gnu*.tar.xz ]; then
continue
fi
tar -C $TOOLCHAIN_DIR -axvf $DOWNLOAD_DIR/$BASENAME-$VER-$HOST_ARCH-$i-none-linux-gnu*.tar.xz
fi
# Setup a link for the toolchain to use local to the building machine (e.g., not in a shared location)
ln -s $TOOLCHAIN_DIR/$BASENAME-$VER-$HOST_ARCH-$i-none-linux-gnu* $TOOLCHAIN_LINK_DIR/$i
done
-15
View File
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
#! /bin/bash
# $ ci/junit.sh <build directory>
#
# If there is a OEQA test report in JSON format present in the build directory,
# transform it to JUnit XML using resulttool.
set -e -u
BUILDDIR=$1
JSON=$BUILDDIR/tmp/log/oeqa/testresults.json
if test -f $JSON; then
resulttool junit $JSON
fi
+14
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
header:
version: 14
# Config specific for the optee-xtests
local_conf_header:
optee-test: |
# Include ARM FFA
MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " arm-ffa"
# Include trusted services
TEST_SUITES:append = " trusted_services"
# Include Optee xtests
IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " optee-test"
+16
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
header:
version: 14
includes:
- ci/meta-openembedded.yml
local_conf_header:
trusted_services: |
TEST_SUITES:append = " trusted_services"
# Include TS Crypto, TS Protected Storage, TS Internal and Trusted Storage SPs into optee-os image
MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " arm-ffa ts-crypto ts-storage ts-its"
# Include TS demo/test tools into image
IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " packagegroup-ts-tests"
# Include TS PSA Arch tests into image
IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " packagegroup-ts-tests-psa"
@@ -2,7 +2,11 @@
header:
version: 14
includes:
- ci/base.yml
machine: n1sdp
local_conf_header:
fvp-multicore: |
MACHINE_FEATURES += "corstone1000_fvp_smp"
unsupported_trusted_services: |
MACHINE_FEATURES:remove = "ts-smm-gateway"
-4
View File
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
header:
version: 14
distro: poky-altcfg
+2 -3
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,8 @@ header:
local_conf_header:
trusted_services: |
TEST_SUITES:append = " trusted_services"
# Include TS Crypto, TS Protected Storage, and TS Internal Trusted Storage and SPs into optee-os image
# FIXME - remove TS SMM Gateway due to QEMU v9.0.0 test failures
MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " arm-ffa ts-crypto ts-storage ts-its"
# Include TS Crypto, TS Protected Storage, TS Internal Trusted Storage and SMM-Gateway SPs into optee-os image
MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " arm-ffa ts-crypto ts-storage ts-its ts-smm-gateway"
# Include TS demo/test tools into image
IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " packagegroup-ts-tests"
# Include TS PSA Arch tests into image
-1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ machine: qemuarm64-secureboot
target:
- core-image-base
- hafnium
local_conf_header:
optee: |
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
header:
version: 14
local_conf_header:
secure-debug: |
MACHINE_FEATURES += "secure-debug"
-1
View File
@@ -7,4 +7,3 @@ local_conf_header:
setup: |
BB_LOGCONFIG = ""
SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS = ""
INHERIT:remove = "rm_work"
-6
View File
@@ -4,11 +4,5 @@ header:
version: 14
includes:
- ci/base.yml
- ci/fvp.yml
local_conf_header:
sshpregen: |
# Allow the use of the pregen keys as this is CI so safe
COMPATIBLE_MACHINE:pn-ssh-pregen-hostkeys:sgi575 = "sgi575"
machine: sgi575
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,6 @@ header:
local_conf_header:
sstate_mirror: |
BB_HASHSERVE_UPSTREAM = "wss://hashserv.yoctoproject.org/ws"
SSTATE_MIRRORS = "file://.* http://sstate.yoctoproject.org/all/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
SSTATE_MIRRORS = "file://.* http://cdn.jsdelivr.net/yocto/sstate/all/PATH;downloadfilename=PATH"
BB_HASHSERVE = "auto"
BB_SIGNATURE_HANDLER = "OEEquivHash"
+2
View File
@@ -17,3 +17,5 @@ local_conf_header:
IMAGE_FEATURES += "ssh-server-dropbear"
sshkeys: |
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "ssh-pregen-hostkeys"
universally_failing_tests: |
TEST_SUITES:remove = "opkg"
-51
View File
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
# UEFI Secure Boot: A mechanism to ensure that only trusted software is executed
# during the boot process.
header:
version: 14
includes:
- ci/meta-openembedded.yml
- ci/meta-secure-core.yml
local_conf_header:
uefi_secureboot: |
SBSIGN_KEYS_DIR = "${TOPDIR}/sbkeys"
BB_ENV_PASSTHROUGH_ADDITIONS = "SBSIGN_KEYS_DIR"
# Detected by passing kernel parameter
QB_KERNEL_ROOT = ""
# kernel is in the image, should not be loaded separately
QB_DEFAULT_KERNEL = "none"
WKS_FILE = "efi-disk.wks.in"
KERNEL_IMAGETYPE = "Image"
MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " efi uefi-secureboot uefi-http-boot uefi-capsule-updates"
EFI_PROVIDER = "systemd-boot"
# Use systemd as the init system
INIT_MANAGER = "systemd"
IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " systemd systemd-boot util-linux coreutils"
TEST_SUITES:append = " uefi_secureboot uki"
IMAGE_CLASSES += "uki"
IMAGE_CLASSES += "sbsign"
UKI_SB_KEY = "${SBSIGN_KEY}"
UKI_SB_CERT = "${SBSIGN_CERT}"
QB_KERNEL_ROOT = ""
IMAGE_BOOT_FILES:remove = "Image"
INITRAMFS_IMAGE = "core-image-initramfs-boot"
# not for initramfs image recipe
IMAGE_CLASSES:remove:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "uki"
IMAGE_CLASSES:remove:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "sbsign"
IMAGE_CLASSES:remove:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "testimage"
IMAGE_FEATURES:remove:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "ssh-server-dropbear"
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:remove:pn-core-image-initramfs-boot = "ssh-pregen-hostkeys"
+2 -1
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ repositories = (
"https://git.yoctoproject.org/poky",
"https://git.openembedded.org/meta-openembedded",
"https://git.yoctoproject.org/meta-virtualization",
"https://github.com/kraj/meta-clang",
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
if repodir.exists():
try:
print("Updating %s..." % repo)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", repodir, "-c", "gc.autoDetach=false", "fetch", repo], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", repodir, "-c", "gc.autoDetach=false", "fetch"], check=True)
except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
print(e)
failed = True
-3
View File
@@ -4,13 +4,10 @@ header:
version: 14
includes:
- ci/meta-virtualization.yml
- ci/poky-altcfg.yml
local_conf_header:
meta-virt: |
DISTRO_FEATURES:append = " virtualization xen"
sshd: |
IMAGE_FEATURES:append = " ssh-server-openssh"
target:
- xen-image-minimal
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
# **CI for Yocto Project and meta-arm**
# **CI for Yocto Project**
The Yocto Project has an autobuilder that performs nightly builds and image tests on all of the defined QEMU machines, including qemuarm and qemuarm64 Also, it currently runs builds on the hardware reference platforms including genericarm64 and meta-arm mahines fvp-base and sbsa-ref. More information on the autobuilder can be found at <https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/>.
More information on the image tests can be found at <https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Image_tests>.
The Yocto Project also has the ability to have individual package tests, ptests.  For more information on those, go to <https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Ptest>.
# **CI for meta-arm**
meta-arm is using the Gitlab CI infrastructure.  This is currently being done internal to Arm, but an external version can be seen at <https://gitlab.com/jonmason00/meta-arm/-/pipelines>.
This CI is constantly being expanded to provide increased coverage of the software and hardware supported in meta-arm. All platforms are required to add a kas file and `.gitlab-ci.yml` entry as part of the initial patch series. More information on kas can be found at <https://github.com/siemens/kas>.
To this end, it would be wise to run kas locally to verify everything works prior to pushing to the CI build system.
## **Running kas locally**
### **Install kas**
kas can be installed with pip, for example:
```
$ pip3 install --user kas
```
See <https://kas.readthedocs.io/en/latest/userguide/getting-started.html> for information on the dependencies and more.
This assumes that the kas path ($HOME/.local/bin) is in $PATH. If not, the user will need to manually add this or the kas command will not be found.
### **Run kas locally**
```
$ cd ~/meta-arm/
$ kas build kas/juno.yml
```
By default kas will create a build directory under meta-arm to contain the checked out layers, build directory, and downloads.  You can change this by setting environment variables. DL\_DIR and SSTATE\_DIR are respected so these can point at existing directories, and setting KAS\_WORK\_DIR to the directory where repositories are already cloned will save having to re-fetch. This can look something like:
```
$ SSTATE_DIR=/builds/persist/sstate DL_DIR=/builds/persist/downloads kas build ci/qemuarm64.yml:ci/testimage.yml
```
See the [quick start guide](/documentation/quick-start.md) for more information on how to set this up.
## **Locked Revisions in CI with lockfiles**
The CI in meta-arm will generate a kas "lock file" when it starts to ensure that all of the builds checkout the same revision of the various different layers that are used. If this isn't done then there's a chance that a layer will be modified upstream during the CI, which results in some builds failing and some builds passing.
This lock file is saved as an artefact of the update-repos job by the CI, and only generated if it doesn't already exist in the repository. This can be used to force specific revisions of layers to be used instead of HEAD, which can be useful if upstream changes are causing problems in development.
The lockfile.yml can be downloaded manually, but there's a script in meta-arm to fetch the lock file for the latest successful build of the specified branch:
```
$ ./ci/download-lockfile.py --help
usage: download-lockfile.py [-h] server project refspec
positional arguments:
server GitLab server name
project meta-arm project name
refspec Branch/commit
$ ./ci/download-lockfile.py https://gitlab.com/jonmason00/meta-arm master
Fetched lockfile.yml
Commit this lockfile.yml to the top-level of the meta-arm repository and the CI will use it automatically.
```
# **Relevant Links for kas, CI, and testing**
<https://github.com/siemens/kas.git>
<https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Oe-selftest>
<https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Image_tests>
<https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Ptest>
<https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/BSP_Test_Plan>
-105
View File
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
# **Yocto Project quick start for Arm system software developers**
If you want to read the The Yocto Project official quick start documentation, go to <https://docs.yoctoproject.org/brief-yoctoprojectqs/index.html>
If that looks like too much reading, then here is how to do it even faster!
# **Step 0: Install build deps and kas**
```
$ sudo apt install gawk wget git diffstat unzip texinfo gcc build-essential chrpath socat cpio python3 python3-pip python3-pexpect xz-utils debianutils iputils-ping python3-git python3-jinja2 libegl1-mesa libsdl1.2-dev python3-subunit mesa-common-dev zstd liblz4-tool file locales libacl1
$ pip install kas
```
OR, if you prefer to use a docker will all that stuff already installed:
```
$ sudo docker run -it --name kas-test --volume /mnt/yocto/:/builds/persist ghcr.io/siemens/kas/kas /bin/bash
```
> **_NOTE:_**
> the “--volume” is the directory where your persistent stuff (like downloads and build artifacts) will go to help speed up your builds and can be sharable amongst your builds/containers.  If you want to go completely clean-room, feel free to remove it
# **Step 1: clone meta-arm and build meta-arm**
```
$ git clone https://git.yoctoproject.org/meta-arm
$ cd meta-arm/
$ SSTATE_DIR=/builds/persist/sstate DL_DIR=/builds/persist/downloads kas build ci/fvp-base.yml:ci/testimage.yml
```
> **_NOTE:_**
> “ci/testimage.yml” will cause the build to run some basic system tests.  If you dont care about verifying basic functionality, then remove it and it should be faster (a few less programs will be added to the system image and the 2-3mins that it takes to run the test will not happen).
> **_NOTE:_**
> You may wish to add the Yocto Project SSTATE Mirror (especially the first time) to speed up the build by downloading the build fragments (built by the Yocto Project autobuilder) from the internet. This can be done by adding "ci/sstate-mirror.yml" in kas or adding the relevant lines to your local.conf. Using the above example:
```
$ SSTATE_DIR=/builds/persist/sstate DL_DIR=/builds/persist/downloads kas build ci/fvp-base.yml:ci/sstate-mirror.yml
```
> **_NOTE:_**
> This only fetches the parts necessary for your build and may take several minutes depending on your internet connection speed. Also, it only fetches what is available. There may still be a need to build things depending on your configuration.
For more information on kas and various commands, please reference <https://kas.readthedocs.io/en/latest/>.
Depending on what software you are building, fvp-base might not be the machine you want to build for.
The following website provides an EXTREMELY rough way to tell what software is in what machines, and what versions are being run:
<https://gitlab.com/jonmason00/meta-arm/-/jobs/artifacts/master/file/update-report/index.html?job=pending-updates>
If, as an example, were wanting to develop trusted-firmware-a; then fvp-base will work for us. 
### **Okay, you are done!  VICTORY!**
### **Oh, you actually wanted to mess around with the system software source code?**
# **Step 2: use devtool to get your source**
Setup your environment via the (non-kas) Yocto Project tools
```
$ source poky/oe-init-build-env
```
Use devtool to checkout the version of software being used on the machine above (in the above example, this will be trusted-firmware-a for fvp-base).
```
$ devtool modify trusted-firmware-a
```
This will download the source, hopefully in git (depending on how the Yocto Project recipe was written), and should print a path at the end where the source code was checked out.  In the trusted-firmware-a example, I got:
> /builder/meta-arm/build/workspace/sources/trusted-firmware-a
Inside of that directory, you should see the relevant source code.  In this example, it is a standard git tree.  So, you can add remotes, checkout different SHAs, etc
Ok, so you are set with your changes and want to build them.
```
$ devtool build trusted-firmware-a
```
This should build the software in question, but it is not yet integrated into a system image.  To do that, run:
```
$ devtool build-image core-image-sato
```
The image should match the image being used on your machine above.  Most of them in meta-arm are set to core-image-sato.  
Also, if you used testimage above, it will run testimage now
### **Okay, you are done!  VICTORY!**
# **Step 3.  Testing your patches outside of devtool**
At this point I will assume you have a patch and want to add it to the base recipe.  Using the above example, in the devtool directory:
```
$ git format-patch -1
0001-example.patch
$ mv 0001-example.patch ~/meta-arm/meta-arm/recipes-bsp/trusted-firmware-a/files/
$ cd ~/meta-arm
$ devtool reset trusted-firmware-a
$ echo SRC_URI:append = " file://0001-example.patch" >> meta-arm/recipes-bsp/trusted-firmware-a/trusted-firmware-a_2.10.3.bb
```
> **_NOTE:_**
> there is a space before the “file” and yes it matters very much
At this point, you can go back using kas and verify that the patch works in a clean-ish tree.
```
$ SSTATE_DIR=/builds/persist/sstate DL_DIR=/builds/persist/downloads kas build ci/fvp-base.yml:ci/testimage.yml
```
There is obviously much more that can be done and other ways to do similar things.
## **If there are issues or questions then please ask them on the #meta-arm irc channel on libera.chat**
-43
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@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
# **meta-arm Releases and Branching**
## **Release and Branching background**
The Yocto Project releases twice a year (April and October): "stable" releases are made every six months and have a lifetime of seven months to allow for migration, while "long term support" (LTS) releases are picked every two years starting from Dunfell in April 2020. The standard practice for all Yocto Compatible layers is to create a "named" branch consistent with the code name of that release. For example, the “dunfell” release of the Yocto Project will have a branch named “dunfell” in the official git repository, and layers compatible with dunfell will have a branch named “dunfell”. Thus, a customer can easily organize a collection of appropriate layers to make a product.
In the Yocto Project, these named branches are “stable”, and only take bug fixes or security-critical upgrades. Active development occurs on the master branch. However, this methodology can be problematic if mimicked with the compatible layers. Companies, like Arm, may not wish to release a snapshot of the relevant “master” branches under active development, due to the amount of testing, fixing, and hardening necessary to make a product from a non-stable release. Also, changes to keep the master branch of a layer working with the upstream master branch of the Yocto Project may result in that branch no longer being compatible with named branches (e.g., it might not be possible to mix and match master and dunfell). So, a decision must be made on the branching policy of meta-arm.
## **Adding new Hardware or Software features**
There are many different ways to resolve this issue. After some discussion, the best solution for us is to allow new hardware enablement (and relevant software features) to be included in LTS named branches (not just bug fixes). This will allow for a more stable software platform for software to be developed, tested, and released. Also, the single branch allows for focused testing (limiting the amount of resources needed for CI/CD), lessens/eliminates code diverging on various branches, and lessens confusion on which branch to use. The risk of making this choice is a potentially non-stable branch which will require more frequent testing to lessen the risk, and not following the “stable” methodology of the core Yocto Project layers (though it is not uncommon for BSP layers to behave this way).
## **Process**
The process for patches intended on being integrated into only the master branch is the normal internal process of pushing for code review and CI, approval and integration into upstream meta-arm master branch.
For patches intended on being included in an LTS named branch, the preferred process is to upstream via the master branch, rebase the patch (or series against the intended LTS branch) and send email with the release name in the subject line after the "PATCH" (e.g., "[PATCH dunfell] Add foo to bar").
If there is a time crunch and the preferred way above cannot be completed in time, upstreaming via the LTS branch can occur. This follows the normal process above but without the master integration step. However, any patches upstreamed in this manner must be pushed to master in a timely fashion (after the time crunch). Nagging emails will be sent and managers will be involved as the time grows.
## **Testing**
See [continuous-integration-and-kas.md](/documentation/continuous-integration-and-kas.md) for information how the layer is tested and what tests are run. It is presumed that all code will be compiled as part of the CI process of the gerrit code review. Also, testing on virtual platforms and code conformity checks will be run when enabled in the process.
## **Branching strategy and releases**
Named branches for meta-arm will be released as close as possible to the release of the YP LTS release. Meta-arm named branches will be created from the meta-arm master branch.
To minimize the additional work of maintaining multiple branches it is assumed that there will only be two active development branches at any given time: master and the most recent Long Term Stable (LTS) as the named branch. All previous named LTS branches will be EOLed when a new LTS has been released. Any branches that are EOLed will still exist in the meta-arm, but bug fix patches will be accepted. Limited to no testing will occur on EOLed branches. Exceptions to this can be made, but must be sized appropriately and agreed to by the relevant parties.
Named branch release will coincide with Yocto Project releases. These non-LTS branches will be bug fix only and will be EOLed on the next release (similar to the YP branching behavior).
### **Branch transitions**
When YP is approaching release, meta-arm will attempt to stabilize master so that the releases can coincide.
* T-6 weeks - Email is sent to meta-arm mailing list notifying of upcoming code freeze of features to meta-arm
* T-4 weeks - Code freeze to meta-arm. Only bug fixes are taken at this point.
* T-0 - Official upstream release occurs. With no outstanding critical bugs, a new named branch is created based on the current meta-arm master branch. Previous named branches are now frozen and will not accept new patches (but will continue to be present for reference and legacy usage).
## **Tagging**
### **Branch Tagging**
When each branch is released, a git tag with the Yocto Project version number will be added. For example, `4.3`. Also, this tag version number will be prepended with "yocto" in a duplicate tag (e.g., "yocto-4.3").
Conciding with the Yocto Project release schedule, every branch which has one or more changes added to it in the previous 6 months will get a minor versioned tag (e.g., "4.3.1" and "yocto-4.3.1").
### **BSP Release Tagging**
BSP releases for those boards supported in meta-arm-bsp maybe have an additional tag to denote their software releases. The tag will consist of the board name (in all capital letters), year, and month. For example, "CORSTONE1000-2023.11".
The release schedule for this is outside the standard Yocto Project release candence, but is generally encouraged to be as close to these releases as possible. Similarily, it is recommended the BSP releases be based on the latest LTS branch.
# **Relevant Links**
<https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Releases>
+2 -12
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@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ The `runfvp` tool in meta-arm makes it easy to run Yocto Project disk images ins
## Running images with `runfvp`
To build images with the FVP integration, the `fvpboot` image class needs to be inherited. If the machine does not do this explicitly it can be done in `local.conf`:
To build images with the FVP integration, the `fvpboot` class needs to be inherited. If the machine does not do this explicitly it can be done in `local.conf`:
```
IMAGE_CLASSES += "fvpboot"
INHERIT += "fvpboot"
```
The class will download the correct FVP and write a `.fvpconf` configuration file when an image is built.
@@ -59,16 +59,6 @@ There are recipes for common FVPs in meta-arm already, and writing new recipes i
If `FVP_PROVIDER` is not set then it is assumed that `FVP_EXE` is installed on the host already.
### `FVP_BINDIR`
Optional parameter to configure the path of the FVP binary. For example, `fvp-base` uses path from the build host by default. This path can be customized by configuring like below.
```
FVP_BINDIR ?= "utilities/fvp/usr/bin"
```
Potential use case for this parameter configuration is to execute `runfvp` script without the need for bitbake environment initialization.
### `FVP_CONFIG`
Parameters passed to the FVP with the `--parameter`/`-C` option. These are expressed as variable flags so individual parameters can be altered easily. For example:
+4 -15
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@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ features for each [Secure Partition][^2] you would like to include:
| se-proxy | ts-se-proxy |
| smm-gateway | ts-smm-gateway |
| spm-test[1-4] | optee-spmc-test |
| Logging | ts-logging |
Other steps depend on your machine/platform definition:
@@ -38,11 +37,13 @@ Other steps depend on your machine/platform definition:
2. optee-os might require platform specific OP-TEE build parameters (for example what SEL the SPM Core is implemented at).
You can find examples in `meta-arm/recipes-security/optee/optee-os_%.bbappend` for qemuarm64-secureboot machine
and in `meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os-corstone1000-common.inc` for the Corstone1000 platform.
and in `meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os-n1sdp.inc` and `meta-arm-bsp/recipes-security/optee/optee-os-corstone1000-common.inc`
for N1SDP and Corstone1000 platforms accordingly.
3. trusted-firmware-a might require platform specific TF-A build parameters (SPD and SPMC details on the platform).
See `meta-arm/recipes-bsp/trusted-firmware-a/trusted-firmware-a_%.bbappend` for qemuarm64-secureboot machine
and in `meta-arm-bsp/recipes-bsp/trusted-firmware-a/trusted-firmware-a-corstone1000.inc` for theCorstone1000 platform.
and in `meta-arm-bsp/recipes-bsp/trusted-firmware-a/trusted-firmware-a-n1sdp.inc` and
`meta-arm-bsp/recipes-bsp/trusted-firmware-a/trusted-firmware-a-corstone1000.inc` for N1SDP and Corstone1000 platforms.
4. Trusted Services supports an SPMC agonistic binary format. To build SPs to this format the `TS_ENV` variable is to be
set to `sp`. The resulting SP binaries should be able to boot under any FF-A v1.1 compliant SPMC implementation.
@@ -58,18 +59,6 @@ Optionally for testing purposes you can add `packagegroup-ts-tests` into your im
meta-arm also includes Trusted Service OEQA tests which can be used for automated testing.
See `ci/trusted-services.yml` for an example how to include them into an image.
## Configuration options
Some TS recipes support yocto variables to set build configuration. These variables can be set in .conf files (machine
specific or local.conf), or .bbappend files.
SmmGW SP recipe supports the following configuration variables
| Variable name | Type | Description |
|-----------------------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| SMMGW_AUTH_VAR | Bool | Enable Authenticated variable support |
| SMMGW_INTERNAL_CRYPTO | Bool | Use MbedTLS build into SmmGW for authentication related crypto operations. Depends on SMMGW_AUTH_VAR=1 |
------
[^1]: https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/integration/overview/index.html
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ header:
version: 13
includes:
- kas/arm-systemready-firmware.yml
- kas/arm-systemready-linux-distros-unattended-installation.yml
target:
- arm-systemready-linux-distros-debian
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
header:
version: 16
includes:
- kas/arm-systemready-firmware.yml
- kas/arm-systemready-linux-distros-unattended-installation.yml
target:
- arm-systemready-linux-distros-fedora
-19
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@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json
header:
version: 14
local_conf_header:
a320: |
MACHINE_FEATURES += "cortexa320"
OVERRIDES .= ":cortexa320"
repos:
meta-ethos:
url: https://gitlab.arm.com/iot/meta-ethos.git
branch: whinlatter
commit: b919565c36b89af2ba61cc28024da633a9fae0da
meta-sca:
url: https://github.com/priv-kweihmann/meta-sca.git
branch: master
commit: e68f1a9d17553a2a1b5b20962749f90482112a3f
+10 -21
View File
@@ -5,36 +5,25 @@ distro: poky
defaults:
repos:
branch: master
branch: scarthgap
repos:
bitbake:
url: https://git.openembedded.org/bitbake
commit: 0dde1a3ff852be057be40d17f233ecca19e7b389
layers:
bitbake: disabled
core:
url: https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core
commit: 4bd920ad7d7279020ea6e561d0584ae70f33f751
layers:
meta:
meta-yocto:
url: https://git.yoctoproject.org/meta-yocto
commit: b3b659263566c4d2f2813190e72d93f8598a4c47
layers:
meta-poky:
meta-arm:
layers:
meta-arm:
meta-arm-bsp:
meta-arm-toolchain:
poky:
url: https://git.yoctoproject.org/git/poky
commit: c5df9c829a549ca002c36afd6bdf23639831502e
layers:
meta:
meta-poky:
meta-openembedded:
url: https://git.openembedded.org/meta-openembedded
commit: fc0152e434307b98e1d16251f92ed81ac617c1db
commit: 6de0ab744341ad61b0661aa28d78dc6767ce0786
layers:
meta-oe:
meta-python:
@@ -42,7 +31,7 @@ repos:
meta-secure-core:
url: https://github.com/wind-river/meta-secure-core.git
commit: 63209fb1500cee88d5d4d74669bce4b613c03ff7
commit: 13cb4867fb1245581c80da3b94b72c4b4f15d67e
layers:
meta-secure-core-common:
meta-signing-key:
-3
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,3 @@ header:
local_conf_header:
extsys: |
MACHINE_FEATURES += "corstone1000-extsys"
# external system firmware
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:firmware += "external-system-elf"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ local_conf_header:
OVERRIDES .= ":firmware"
# Need to ensure we build with a small libc
TCLIBC = "musl"
TCLIBC="musl"
mass-storage: |
# Ensure the Mass Storage device is absent
+5 -8
View File
@@ -23,11 +23,6 @@ local_conf_header:
INIT_MANAGER:firmware = "mdev-busybox"
VIRTUAL-RUNTIME_init_manager:firmware = "busybox"
# This guarantees module auto-loading support at boot
# by adding /etc/init.d/modutils.sh and /etc/rcS.d/ files
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:append = " modutils-initscripts"
DISTRO_FEATURES:append = " sysvinit"
# prevent the kernel image from being included in the intramfs rootfs
PACKAGE_EXCLUDE:firmware += "kernel-image-*"
@@ -45,8 +40,10 @@ local_conf_header:
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "packagegroup-ts-tests-psa"
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:firmware += "packagegroup-ts-tests-psa"
# external system firmware
CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL:firmware += "external-system-elf"
capsule: |
# These variables are set here since they are not defined in the arm-systemready-firmware recipe or under multiconfig mode.
CAPSULE_EXTENSION = "uefi.capsule"
CAPSULE_VERSION = "6"
CAPSULE_NAME = "${MACHINE}-v${CAPSULE_VERSION}"
CAPSULE_FW_VERSION = "6"
CAPSULE_NAME = "${MACHINE}-v${CAPSULE_FW_VERSION}"
+1 -1
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@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ machine: fvp-base
defaults:
repos:
refspec: master
refspec: scarthgap
repos:
meta-arm:
+1 -4
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@@ -9,12 +9,11 @@ BBFILE_COLLECTIONS += "meta-arm-bsp"
BBFILE_PATTERN_meta-arm-bsp = "^${LAYERDIR}/"
BBFILE_PRIORITY_meta-arm-bsp = "5"
LAYERSERIES_COMPAT_meta-arm-bsp = "walnascar whinlatter"
LAYERSERIES_COMPAT_meta-arm-bsp = "nanbield scarthgap"
LAYERDEPENDS_meta-arm-bsp = "core meta-arm"
# This won't be used by layerindex-fetch, but works everywhere else
LAYERDEPENDS_meta-arm-bsp:append:corstone1000 = " meta-python openembedded-layer efi-secure-boot"
LAYERDEPENDS_meta-arm-bsp:append:corstone1000:cortexa320 = " meta-ethos"
LAYERDEPENDS_meta-arm-bsp:append:musca-b1 = " meta-python"
LAYERDEPENDS_meta-arm-bsp:append:musca-s1 = " meta-python"
@@ -29,5 +28,3 @@ BBFILES_DYNAMIC += " \
WARN_QA:append:layer-meta-arm-bsp = " patch-status"
addpylib ${LAYERDIR}/lib oeqa
IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_ARGS ?= ""
@@ -3,30 +3,21 @@
#@DESCRIPTION: Machine configuration for Corstone1000 64-bit FVP
require conf/machine/include/corstone1000.inc
require ${@bb.utils.contains('MACHINE_FEATURES', 'corstone1000-extsys', \
'conf/machine/include/corstone1000-extsys.inc', '', d)}
require ${@bb.utils.contains('MACHINE_FEATURES', 'cortexa320', \
'conf/machine/include/corstone1000-a320.inc', '', d)}
TFA_TARGET_PLATFORM = "fvp"
TFM_PLATFORM_IS_FVP = "TRUE"
CORSTONE_1000_TYPE = "CORSTONE_1000_TYPE_CORTEX_A35_FVP"
# testimage config
TEST_TARGET = "OEFVPTarget"
TEST_TARGET_IP = "127.0.0.1:2222"
DEFAULT_TEST_SUITES:append = " fvp_boot fvp_devices"
TEST_SUITES = "fvp_boot"
# FVP Config
FVP_PROVIDER ?= "fvp-corstone1000-native"
FVP_EXE ?= "FVP_Corstone-1000"
FVP_EXE:cortexa320 = "FVP_Corstone-1000-A320"
FVP_CONSOLES[default] = "host_terminal_0"
FVP_CONSOLES[tf-a] = "host_terminal_1"
FVP_CONSOLES[se] = "secenc_terminal"
FVP_CONSOLES[extsys] = "extsys_terminal"
#Disable Time Annotation
FASTSIM_DISABLE_TA = "0"
@@ -49,11 +40,14 @@ FVP_CONFIG[se.cryptocell.USER_OTP_FILTERING_DISABLE] ?= "1"
# Boot image
FVP_DATA ?= "board.flash0=corstone1000-flash-firmware-image-${MACHINE}.wic@0x68000000"
# External system (cortex-M3)
FVP_CONFIG[extsys_harness0.extsys_flashloader.fname] ?= "es_flashfw.bin"
# FVP Terminals
FVP_TERMINALS[host.host_terminal_0] ?= "Normal World Console"
FVP_TERMINALS[host.host_terminal_1] ?= "Secure World Console"
FVP_TERMINALS[se.secenc_terminal] ?= "Secure Enclave Console"
FVP_TERMINALS[extsys0.extsys_terminal] ?= "Cortex M3"
# MMC card configuration
FVP_CONFIG[board.msd_mmc.card_type] ?= "SDHC"
@@ -6,7 +6,4 @@ require conf/machine/include/corstone1000.inc
TFA_TARGET_PLATFORM = "fpga"
# Unlike the FVP, MPS3 supports CoreSight
MACHINE_FEATURES += "coresight"
CORSTONE_1000_TYPE = "CORSTONE_1000_TYPE_CORTEX_A35_MPS3"
PLATFORM_IS_FVP = "FALSE"
+8 -18
View File
@@ -4,19 +4,13 @@
#@NAME: Armv8-A Base Platform FVP machine
#@DESCRIPTION: Machine configuration for Armv8-A Base Platform FVP model
require conf/machine/include/arm/arch-armv8-5a.inc
# Set variables here to make it easier to change Instruction Set Architectures
# on the FVP Base machine, which should make it easier to test both the tunes
# and the virtual hardware. These variables are set via the DEFAULT_TUNE
ARM_ISA_MAJOR = "${@int(d.getVar('ARMPKGARCH').split('v')[1][0])}"
ARM_ISA_MINOR = "${@int(d.getVar('ARMPKGARCH')[d.getVar('ARMPKGARCH').find('-')+1]) if '-' in d.getVar('ARMPKGARCH') else 0 }"
require conf/machine/include/arm/arch-armv8-4a.inc
ARM_SYSTEMREADY_FIRMWARE = "trusted-firmware-a:do_deploy"
ARM_SYSTEMREADY_ACS_CONSOLE = "default"
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS = "${ARM_SYSTEMREADY_FIRMWARE}"
MACHINE_FEATURES = "efi vfat"
MACHINE_FEATURES = "efi"
IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX = ""
IMAGE_FSTYPES += "wic"
@@ -25,8 +19,7 @@ WKS_FILE ?= "efi-disk.wks.in"
SERIAL_CONSOLES = "115200;ttyAMA0"
PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel ?= "linux-yocto"
KERNEL_DTB_NAME = "fvp-base-revc.dtb"
KERNEL_DEVICETREE = "arm/${KERNEL_DTB_NAME}"
KERNEL_DEVICETREE = "arm/fvp-base-revc.dtb"
KERNEL_IMAGETYPE = "Image"
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "trusted-firmware-a"
@@ -34,7 +27,7 @@ EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "trusted-firmware-a"
# FVP u-boot configuration
UBOOT_MACHINE = "vexpress_fvp_defconfig"
EFI_PROVIDER ?= "${@bb.utils.contains("DISTRO_FEATURES", "systemd", "systemd-boot", "grub-efi", d)}"
EFI_PROVIDER ?= "grub-efi"
# As this is a virtual target that will not be used in the real world there is
# no need for real SSH keys.
@@ -61,15 +54,12 @@ FVP_CONFIG[cluster1.stage12_tlb_size] ?= "1024"
FVP_CONFIG[bp.secureflashloader.fname] ?= "bl1-fvp.bin"
FVP_CONFIG[bp.flashloader0.fname] ?= "fip-fvp.bin"
FVP_CONFIG[bp.virtioblockdevice.image_path] ?= "${IMAGE_NAME}.wic"
# FVP Base default is 8.0, so there is no has_arm_v8-0 for it. However, this is needed for every version after. So set this accordingly
FVP_EXTRA_ARGS = "--parameter cluster0.has_arm_v${ARM_ISA_MAJOR}-${ARM_ISA_MINOR}=1 --parameter cluster1.has_arm_v${ARM_ISA_MAJOR}-${ARM_ISA_MINOR}=1"
FVP_EXTRA_ARGS += "${@bb.utils.contains('TUNE_FEATURES', 'sve', '--parameter cluster0.has_sve=1 --parameter cluster1.has_sve=1', '', d)}"
FVP_EXTRA_ARGS += "${@bb.utils.contains('TUNE_FEATURES', 'sve2', '--parameter cluster0.sve.has_sve2=1 --parameter cluster1.sve.has_sve2=1', '', d)}"
# Set the baseline to ARMv8.4, as the default is 8.0.
FVP_CONFIG[cluster0.has_arm_v8-4] = "1"
FVP_CONFIG[cluster1.has_arm_v8-4] = "1"
FVP_CONSOLES[default] = "terminal_0"
FVP_TERMINALS[bp.terminal_0] ?= "Console"
FVP_TERMINALS[bp.terminal_1] ?= ""
FVP_TERMINALS[bp.terminal_2] ?= ""
FVP_TERMINALS[bp.terminal_3] ?= ""
FVP_CONFIG[bp.secure_memory] ?= "1"
FVP_CONFIG[bp.secure_memory] ?= "1"
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
ETHOSU_NUM_MACS ?= "256"
FVP_CONFIG[host.ethosu.num_macs] = "${ETHOSU_NUM_MACS}"
IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " arm-npu-ethosu"
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
FVP_CONSOLES[extsys] = "extsys_terminal"
FVP_CONFIG[extsys_harness0.extsys_flashloader.fname] = "es_flashfw.bin"
FVP_TERMINALS[extsys0.extsys_terminal] = "Cortex M3"
@@ -1,23 +1,20 @@
TUNE_FILE = "conf/machine/include/arm/armv8a/tune-cortexa35.inc"
TUNE_FILE:cortexa320 = "conf/machine/include/arm/arch-armv9-2a.inc"
require ${TUNE_FILE}
require conf/machine/include/arm/armv8a/tune-cortexa35.inc
MACHINEOVERRIDES =. "corstone1000:"
# TF-M
PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-m ?= "2.2.1"
PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-m ?= "2.0.%"
# TF-A
TFA_PLATFORM = "corstone1000"
PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-a ?= "2.13.%"
PREFERRED_VERSION_tf-a-tests ?= "2.13.%"
PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-a ?= "2.10.%"
PREFERRED_VERSION_tf-a-tests ?= "2.10.%"
TFA_BL2_BINARY = "bl2-corstone1000.bin"
TFA_FIP_BINARY = "fip-corstone1000.bin"
# optee
PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-os ?= "4.7.%"
PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-client ?= "4.7.%"
PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-os ?= "4.1.%"
# Trusted Services
TS_PLATFORM = "arm/corstone1000"
@@ -25,8 +22,8 @@ TS_SP_SE_PROXY_CONFIG = "corstone1000"
# Include smm-gateway and se-proxy SPs into optee-os binary
MACHINE_FEATURES += "ts-smm-gateway ts-se-proxy"
# U-Boot
PREFERRED_VERSION_u-boot ?= "2025.04%"
# u-boot
PREFERRED_VERSION_u-boot ?= "2023.07%"
MACHINE_FEATURES += "efi"
EFI_PROVIDER ?= "grub-efi"
@@ -37,7 +34,7 @@ IMAGE_CMD:wic[vardeps] += "GRUB_LINUX_APPEND"
# Linux kernel
PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel ?= "linux-yocto"
PREFERRED_VERSION_linux-yocto ?= "6.12.%"
PREFERRED_VERSION_linux-yocto ?= "6.6.%"
KERNEL_IMAGETYPE = "Image"
KERNEL_IMAGETYPE:firmware = "Image.gz"
# add FF-A support in the kernel
@@ -66,11 +63,3 @@ ARM_SYSTEMREADY_FIRMWARE = "${FIRMWARE_DEPLOYMENT}:do_deploy \
corstone1000-esp-image:do_image_complete \
"
ARM_SYSTEMREADY_ACS_CONSOLE ?= "default"
# Workaround IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE being ignored when images are repacked
IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_ARGS += "--extra-filesystem-space ${@${IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE}}K"
# Enable Authenticated variable support in SmmGW
SMMGW_AUTH_VAR = "1"
# Use MbedTLS build into SmmGW for authentication related crypto operations.
SMMGW_INTERNAL_CRYPTO = "1"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ TUNE_FEATURES = "aarch64"
require conf/machine/include/arm/arch-armv8a.inc
MACHINE_FEATURES = "usbhost usbgadget alsa screen wifi bluetooth optee pci coresight"
MACHINE_FEATURES = "usbhost usbgadget alsa screen wifi bluetooth optee pci"
KERNEL_IMAGETYPE = "Image.gz"
KERNEL_DEVICETREE = "arm/juno.dtb arm/juno-r1.dtb arm/juno-r2.dtb"
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
# Configuration for Arm N1SDP development board
#@TYPE: Machine
#@NAME: N1SDP machine
#@DESCRIPTION: Machine configuration for N1SDP
require conf/machine/include/arm/armv8-2a/tune-neoversen1.inc
KERNEL_IMAGETYPE = "Image"
IMAGE_FSTYPES += "wic wic.gz wic.bmap tar.bz2 ext4"
SERIAL_CONSOLES = "115200;ttyAMA0"
# Set default WKS
WKS_FILE ?= "n1sdp-efidisk.wks"
IMAGE_EFI_BOOT_FILES ?= "n1sdp-multi-chip.dtb n1sdp-single-chip.dtb"
WKS_FILE_DEPENDS:append = " ${EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS}"
# Use kernel provided by yocto
PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel ?= "linux-yocto"
PREFERRED_VERSION_linux-yocto ?= "6.6%"
# RTL8168E Gigabit Ethernet Controller is attached to the PCIe interface
MACHINE_ESSENTIAL_EXTRA_RDEPENDS += "linux-firmware-rtl8168"
# TF-A
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "trusted-firmware-a"
TFA_PLATFORM = "n1sdp"
PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-a ?= "2.10.%"
PREFERRED_VERSION_tf-a-tests ?= "2.10.%"
# SCP
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "virtual/control-processor-firmware"
#UEFI EDK2 firmware
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "edk2-firmware"
PREFERRED_VERSION_edk2-firmware ?= "202311"
#optee
PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-os ?= "4.1.%"
PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-os-tadevkit ?= "4.1.%"
PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-test ?= "4.1.%"
PREFERRED_VERSION_optee-client ?= "4.1.%"
#grub-efi
EFI_PROVIDER ?= "grub-efi"
MACHINE_FEATURES += "efi"
# SD-Card firmware
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "sdcard-image-n1sdp"
+2 -6
View File
@@ -26,21 +26,17 @@ EFI_PROVIDER ?= "${@bb.utils.contains("DISTRO_FEATURES", "systemd", "systemd-boo
SERIAL_CONSOLES ?= "115200;ttyAMA0 115200;hvc0"
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "edk2-firmware"
# FIXME - Currently seeing a kernel warning for the CPU topology when bumping
# the version past this. The issue is being tracked in
# https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-platforms/issues/752
PREFERRED_VERSION_edk2-firmware ?= "202408%"
QB_SYSTEM_NAME = "qemu-system-aarch64"
QB_MACHINE = "-machine sbsa-ref"
QB_CPU = "-cpu neoverse-n2"
QB_MEM = "-m 1024"
QB_DEFAULT_FSTYPE = "wic.qcow2"
QB_NETWORK_DEVICE = "-device e1000e,netdev=net0,mac=@MAC@"
QB_NETWORK_DEVICE = "-device virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0,mac=@MAC@"
QB_DRIVE_TYPE = "/dev/hd"
QB_ROOTFS_OPT = "-drive file=@ROOTFS@,if=ide,format=qcow2"
QB_DEFAULT_KERNEL = "none"
QB_OPT_APPEND = "-device usb-tablet -device usb-kbd -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,readonly,file=@DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE@/SBSA_FLASH0.fd -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,readonly,file=@DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE@/SBSA_FLASH1.fd"
QB_OPT_APPEND = "-device usb-tablet -device usb-kbd -pflash @DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE@/SBSA_FLASH0.fd -pflash @DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE@/SBSA_FLASH1.fd"
QB_SERIAL_OPT = "-device virtio-serial-pci -chardev null,id=virtcon -device virtconsole,chardev=virtcon"
QB_TCPSERIAL_OPT = "-device virtio-serial-pci -chardev socket,id=virtcon,port=@PORT@,host=127.0.0.1 -device virtconsole,chardev=virtcon"
# sbsa-ref is a true virtual machine so can't use KVM
+4 -45
View File
@@ -7,59 +7,18 @@
require conf/machine/include/arm/armv8-2a/tune-cortexa75.inc
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "virtual/control-processor-firmware"
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "trusted-firmware-a"
# 2.13.0 removes support for sgi575
PREFERRED_VERSION_trusted-firmware-a ?= "2.12.%"
EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS += "trusted-firmware-a"
KERNEL_IMAGETYPE ?= "Image"
PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel ?= "linux-yocto"
SERIAL_CONSOLES = "115200;ttyAMA0"
EFI_PROVIDER ?= "${@bb.utils.contains("DISTRO_FEATURES", "systemd", "systemd-boot", "grub-efi", d)}"
#grub-efi
EFI_PROVIDER ?= "grub-efi"
MACHINE_FEATURES += "efi"
IMAGE_FSTYPES += "cpio.gz wic"
IMAGE_NAME_SUFFIX = ""
IMAGE_CLASSES += "fvpboot"
WKS_FILE ?= "efi-disk.wks.in"
WKS_FILE ?= "sgi575-efidisk.wks"
WKS_FILE_DEPENDS:append = " ${EXTRA_IMAGEDEPENDS}"
# testimage config
TEST_TARGET = "OEFVPTarget"
#TEST_TARGET_IP = "127.0.0.1:222"
TEST_SUITES = "fvp_boot"
# FVP Config
FVP_PROVIDER ?= "fvp-sgi575-native"
FVP_EXE ?= "FVP_CSS_SGI-575"
# Virtio-Net configuration
FVP_CONFIG[board.virtio_net.enabled] ?= "1"
FVP_CONFIG[board.virtio_net.hostbridge.userNetworking] ?= "1"
FVP_CONFIG[board.virtio_net.hostbridge.userNetPorts] = "2222=22"
FVP_CONFIG[board.virtioblockdevice.image_path] ?= "${IMAGE_NAME}.wic"
#FVP_CONFIG[cache_state_modelled] ?= "0"
FVP_CONFIG[css.cmn600.mesh_config_file] = "SGI-575_cmn600.yml"
FVP_CONFIG[css.cmn600.force_rnsam_internal] ?= "false"
FVP_CONFIG[css.gic_distributor.ITS-device-bits] ?= "20"
FVP_DATA ?= "css.scp.armcortexm7ct=scp_ramfw.bin@0x0BD80000"
FVP_CONFIG[css.mcp.ROMloader.fname] ?= "mcp_romfw.bin"
FVP_CONFIG[css.scp.ROMloader.fname] ?= "scp_romfw.bin"
FVP_CONFIG[css.trustedBootROMloader.fname] ?= "bl1-sgi575.bin"
FVP_CONFIG[board.flashloader0.fname] ?= "fip-sgi575.bin"
FVP_CONSOLES[default] = "terminal_uart_ap"
FVP_TERMINALS[css.scp.terminal_uart_aon] ?= "SCP Console"
FVP_TERMINALS[css.mcp.terminal_uart0] ?= ""
FVP_TERMINALS[css.mcp.terminal_uart1] ?= ""
FVP_TERMINALS[css.terminal_uart_ap] ?= "Console"
FVP_TERMINALS[css.terminal_uart1_ap] ?= ""
FVP_TERMINALS[soc.terminal_s0] ?= ""
FVP_TERMINALS[soc.terminal_s1] ?= ""
FVP_TERMINALS[soc.terminal_mcp] ?= ""
FVP_TERMINALS[board.terminal_0] ?= ""
FVP_TERMINALS[board.terminal_1] ?= ""
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
..
# Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited.
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited.
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
@@ -10,204 +10,6 @@ Change Log
This document contains a summary of the new features, changes and
fixes in each release of Corstone-1000 software stack.
***************
Version 2025.12
***************
Changes
=======
- Delivered end-to-end Cortex-A320 enablement across U-Boot, TF-A, TF-M, OP-TEE, Yocto machine layers, and documentation, including device-tree updates, MPIDR handling, and FVP model renaming.
- Rolled out the PSA Firmware Update (DEN0118) pipeline: U-Boot capsule parsing, Bootloader Abstraction Layer in TF-M, ESRT exposure, and Trusted Services IPC bridges replacing legacy capsule code.
- Hardened the new firmware update flow with EFI self-tests, metadata restructuring for partial and multi-image acceptance, and RSE-COMMS gating refinements.
- Upgraded key firmware components (TF-A 2.13.0, TF-M 2.2.1, Trusted Services 1.2.0, OP-TEE OS 4.7.0) and introduced targeted test skips plus integer-only build modes to keep validation green.
- Cleaned and renumbered downstream patch series across Trusted Services and TF-M while removing obsolete integrations to align with upstream baselines.
- Refreshed release material and architecture guides to describe the A320 profile, PSA FWU behavior, and updated software stack.
- Added KAS profiles, machine includes, and automated FVP selection logic to streamline developer workflows for the refreshed platform configuration.
Corstone-1000 components versions
=================================
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| linux-yocto | 6.12.60 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| u-boot | 2025.04 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| external-system | 0.1.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| optee-client | 4.7.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| optee-os | 4.7.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| trusted-firmware-a | 2.13.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| trusted-firmware-m | 2.2.1 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| libts | v1.2.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| ts-sp-{se-proxy, smm-gateway} | v1.2.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| ts-psa-{crypto, iat, its. ps}-api-test | 74dc6646ff |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
Yocto distribution components versions
======================================
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| meta-arm | whinlatter |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| bitbake | 0dde1a3ff8 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| meta-openembedded | fc0152e434 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| openembedded-core | 4bd920ad7d |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| meta-yocto | b3b6592635 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| meta-secure-core | 63209fb150 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| meta-ethos | aa2504a32f |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| meta-sca | e68f1a9d17 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| busybox | 1.37.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| musl | 1.2.5 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| gcc-arm-none-eabi | 13.3.rel1 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| gcc-cross-aarch64 | 15.2.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| openssl | 3.5.4 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
***************
Version 2025.05
***************
Changes
=======
- OP-TEE OS: Added support for v4.4
- Trusted Services: PSA-Crypto structures aligned with TF-M, added protobuf interface to crypto-sp
- Documentation: fixed typos, added host-level authentication section, enabled fly-out sidebar menu
- Das U-Boot: Reserved memory for RSS communication-pointer access protocol
- Linux Kernel: Upgraded kernel to v6.12, updated Upstream-Status notes for remoteproc patches
- Corstone-1000 image: Implemented IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE workaround
Corstone-1000 components versions
=================================
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| linux-yocto | 6.12.30 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| u-boot | 2023.07.02 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| external-system | 0.1.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| optee-client | 4.4.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| optee-os | 4.4.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| trusted-firmware-a | 2.11.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| trusted-firmware-m | 2.1.1 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| libts | 602be60719 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| ts-newlib | 4.1.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| ts-psa-{crypto, iat, its. ps}-api-test | 74dc6646ff |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| ts-sp-{se-proxy, smm-gateway} | 602be60719 |
+-------------------------------------------+-------------------+
Yocto distribution components versions
======================================
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| meta-arm | walnascar |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| poky | ee0d8d8a61 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| meta-openembedded | 2169c9afcc |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| meta-secure-core | 423bc85b05 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| busybox | 1.37.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| musl | 1.2.5 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| gcc-arm-none-eabi | 13.3.rel1 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| gcc-cross-aarch64 | 14.2.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
| openssl | 3.4.1 |
+-------------------------------------------+----------------+
***************
Version 2024.11
***************
Changes
=======
- Implementation of a replication strategy for FWU metadata in TF-M according to the FWU specification.
- Upgrade to metadata version 2 in TF-M.
- Increase the ITS and PS memory size in Secure Flash for TF-M.
- SW components upgrades.
- Bug fixes.
Corstone-1000 components versions
=================================
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| linux-yocto | 6.10.14 |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| u-boot | 2023.07.02 |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| external-system | 0.1.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| optee-client | 4.2.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| optee-os | 4.2.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| trusted-firmware-a | 2.11.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| trusted-firmware-m | 2.1.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| libts | 602be60719 |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| ts-newlib | 4.1.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| ts-psa-{crypto, iat, its. ps}-api-test | 74dc6646ff |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| ts-sp-{se-proxy, smm-gateway} | 602be60719 |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
Yocto distribution components versions
======================================
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+
| meta-arm | styhead |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+
| poky | 5465094be9 |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+
| meta-openembedded | 461d85a183 |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+
| meta-secure-core | 59d7e90542 |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+
| busybox | 1.36.1 |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+
| musl | 1.2.5 |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+
| gcc-arm-none-eabi | 13.3.rel1 |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+
| gcc-cross-aarch64 | 14.2.0 |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+
| openssl | 3.3.1 |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------------------+
***************
Version 2024.06
@@ -568,4 +370,4 @@ Changes
--------------
*Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
*Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: <text>Copyright 2020-2024, 2026 Arm Limited and/or its
# affiliates <open-source-office@arm.com></text>
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
# Configuration file for the Sphinx documentation builder.
#
# This file only contains a selection of the most common options. For a full
@@ -15,19 +10,15 @@
# add these directories to sys.path here. If the directory is relative to the
# documentation root, use os.path.abspath to make it absolute, like shown here.
#
# import os
# import sys
# sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath('.'))
import os
import sys
# Append the documentation directory to the path, so we can import variables
sys.path.append(os.path.dirname(__file__))
# -- Project information -----------------------------------------------------
project = 'Corstone-1000'
copyright = '2020-2026, Arm Limited'
project = 'corstone1000'
copyright = '2020-2022, Arm Limited'
author = 'Arm Limited'
@@ -37,7 +28,6 @@ author = 'Arm Limited'
# extensions coming with Sphinx (named 'sphinx.ext.*') or your custom
# ones.
extensions = [
'sphinx_rtd_theme',
]
# Add any paths that contain templates here, relative to this directory.
@@ -55,19 +45,6 @@ exclude_patterns = ['_build', 'Thumbs.db', '.DS_Store', 'docs/infra']
# a list of builtin themes.
#
html_theme = 'sphinx_rtd_theme'
html_theme_options = {
'flyout_display': 'attached',
}
# Define the canonical URL if you are using a custom domain on Read the Docs
html_baseurl = os.environ.get("READTHEDOCS_CANONICAL_URL", "")
# Tell Jinja2 templates the build is running on Read the Docs
if os.environ.get("READTHEDOCS", "") == "True":
if "html_context" not in globals():
html_context = {}
html_context["READTHEDOCS"] = True
# Add any paths that contain custom static files (such as style sheets) here,
# relative to this directory. They are copied after the builtin static files,
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
..
# Copyright (c) 2022, 2024, 2026 Arm Limited.
# Copyright (c) 2022, 2024, Arm Limited.
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
..
# Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited.
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited.
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
@@ -19,40 +19,6 @@ intended for safety-critical applications. Should Your Software or Your Hardware
prove defective, you assume the entire cost of all necessary servicing, repair
or correction.
***********************
Release notes - 2025.12
***********************
The same notes as the 2025.05 release still apply.
Known Issues or Limitations
---------------------------
- Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 FVP does not currently support Symmetric Multiprocessing
- Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 FVP becomes unresponsive when the Linux kernel driver for the Ethos-U85 NPU loads automatically after a software reboot.
***********************
Release notes - 2025.05
***********************
Known Issues or Limitations
---------------------------
- Crypto isolation is not supported in the Secure world of Corstone-1000. Additionally, clients in
the Normal world are not isolated from one another.Therefore, if an end user wants to add a new
Secure Partition (SP) (such as a software TPM) that accesses the Crypto service via the SE-Proxy,
they are responsible for implementing their own isolation mechanisms to ensure proper security boundaries.
- DSTREAM debug probe may experience unreliable USB connectivity when used with Arm DS for secure debug.
This issue is under active investigation, and we are working to identify and resolve compatibility issues in a future update.
As a more stable alternative, the ULINKpro debug probe is recommended for use with Corstone-1000 in secure debug scenarios.
***********************
Release notes - 2024.11
***********************
The same notes as the 2024.06 release still apply.
***********************
Release notes - 2024.06
***********************
@@ -280,4 +246,4 @@ For all security issues, contact Arm by email at psirt@arm.com.
--------------
*Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
*Copyright (c) 2022-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
..
# Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited.
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited.
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
######################
Software Architecture
Software architecture
######################
@@ -16,279 +16,137 @@ Arm Corstone-1000 is a reference solution for IoT devices. It is part of
Total Solution for IoT which consists of hardware and software reference
implementation.
The combination of Corstone-1000 software and hardware reference solution is `PSA Level-2 ready
certified <psa_l2-ready_>`__ as well as `Arm SystemReady Devicetree certified <systemready-ir-certification_>`__.
Corstone-1000 software plus hardware reference solution is PSA Level-2 ready
certified (`PSA L2 Ready`_) as well as System Ready IR certified(`SRIR cert`_).
More information on the Corstone-1000 subsystem product and design can be
found at:
`Arm corstone1000 Software`_ and `Arm corstone1000 Technical Overview`_.
More information on the Corstone-1000 subsystems product and design can be
found on `Arm Developer <arm-developer-cs1000-website_>`__.
This document explicitly focuses on the software part of the solution and
This readme explicitly focuses on the software part of the solution and
provides internal details on the software components. The reference
software package of the platform can be retrieved following instructions
present in the user guide document.
present in the user-guide document.
***************
Design Overview
***************
The software architecture of Corstone-1000 platform is a reference
implementation of `Platform Security Architecture <psa-certified-website_>`__ which provides
implementation of Platform Security Architecture (`PSA`_) which provides
framework to build secure IoT devices.
The base system architecture of the platform is created from three different types of subsystems:
- Secure Enclave
- Host System
- External System
Each subsystem provides different functionality to the overall system on a chip (SoC).
The base system architecture of the platform is created from three
different types of systems: Secure Enclave, Host and External System.
Each subsystem provides different functionality to overall SoC.
.. image:: images/CorstoneSubsystems.png
:width: 720
:alt: CorstoneSubsystems
Secure Enclave
==============
The Secure Enclave boots first on system power on, it provides `PSA Root of Trust (RoT) <psa-certified-website_>`__ and
cryptographic functions. It is based on a Cortex-M0+ processor, CC312 Cryptographic Accelerator and
peripherals such as watchdog and secure flash.
The Secure Enclave System, provides PSA Root of Trust (RoT) and
cryptographic functions. It is based on an Cortex-M0+ processor,
CC312 Cryptographic Accelerator and peripherals, such as watchdog and
secure flash. Software running on the Secure Enclave is isolated via
hardware for enhanced security. Communication with the Secure Encalve
is achieved using Message Handling Units (MHUs) and shared memory.
On system power on, the Secure Enclave boots first. Its software
comprises of a ROM code (TF-M BL1), MCUboot BL2, and
TrustedFirmware-M(`TF-M`_) as runtime software. The software design on
Secure Enclave follows Firmware Framework for M class
processor (`FF-M`_) specification.
.. image:: images/Corstone1000SecureFlashMPS3.png
:width: 400
:alt: Corstone1000SecureFlashMPS3
The Host System is based on ARM Cotex-A35 processor with standardized
peripherals to allow for the booting of a Linux OS. The Cortex-A35 has
the TrustZone technology that allows secure and non-secure security
states in the processor. The software design in the Host System follows
Firmware Framework for A class processor (`FF-A`_) specification.
The boot process follows Trusted Boot Base Requirement (`TBBR`_).
The Host Subsystem is taken out of reset by the Secure Enclave system
during its final stages of the initialization. The Host subsystem runs
FF-A Secure Partitions(based on `Trusted Services`_) and OPTEE-OS
(`OPTEE-OS`_) in the secure world, and U-Boot(`U-Boot repo`_) and
linux (`linux repo`_) in the non-secure world. The communication between
non-secure and the secure world is performed via FF-A messages.
.. image:: images/Corstone1000SecureFlashFVP.png
:width: 400
:alt: Corstone1000SecureFlashFVP
An external system is intended to implement use-case specific functionality.
The system is based on Cortex-M3 and run RTX RTOS. Communication between the
external system and Host (Cortex-A35) can be performed using MHU as transport
mechanism. The current software release supports switching on and off the
external system. Support for OpenAMP-based communication is under
development.
Software running on the Secure Enclave is isolated via hardware for enhanced security.
Communication with the Secure Enclave is achieved using `Message Handling Units (MHUs) <arm-developer-mhu-website_>`__
and shared memory.
Its software components comprises:
- `Trusted Firmware-M (TF-M) BL1 <trusted-firmware-m-bl1-website_>`__
- `MCUboot <mcuboot-website_>`__
- `TrustedFirmware-M <trusted-firmware-m-website_>`__
The software design on the Secure Enclave follows `Arm Firmware Framework for M-Profile
processor <arm-fmw-framework-m-profile-pdf_>`__ (FF-M) specification.
Host System
===========
The Host System is based on ARM Cortex-A35 processor with standardized
peripherals to allow booting a Linux-based operating system (OS). The Cortex-A35 has
the `TrustZone <arm-trustzone-for-cortex-a-website_>`__ technology that allows Secure and Non-secure security
states in the processor.
The boot process follows `Trusted Boot Base Requirements Client <trusted-board-boot-requirements-client-pdf_>`__.
The Host System is taken out of reset by the Secure Enclave system during its final stages of the
initialization.
In the Secure world, the Host System runs:
- FF-A Secure Partitions (based on `Trusted Services <trusted-services-website_>`__)
- `OP-TEE OS <op-tee-os-repository_>`__
In the Non-secure World, the Host System runs:
- `U-Boot <das-u-boot-repository_>`__
- `Linux kernel <linux-repository_>`__
The software design in the Host System follows `Arm Firmware Framework for Arm A-profile
<arm-fmw-framework-a-profile-pdf_>`__ (FF-A) specification.
The communication between Non-secure and the Secure world is performed via FF-A messages.
External System
===============
The External System is intended to implement use-case specific functionality.
The system is based on Cortex-M3 and runs `Keil RTX5 <keil-rtx5-website_>`__.
Communication between the external system and Host (Cortex-A35) can be performed using MHU as transport
mechanism. The current software release supports switching the External System ON and OFF.
The Corstone-1000 architecture is designed to cover a range of
`Power, Performance, and Area (PPA) <ppa-website_>`__ applications, and enable extension
for use-case specific applications, for example, sensors, cloud connectivity, and edge computing.
**************************************
Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 Variant
**************************************
This variant of the Corstone-1000 platform replaces the Host System's Cortex-A35 processor
with a Cortex-A320. In this configuration, the optional External System (previously a Cortex-M3)
is replaced by an Arm Ethos-U85 Neural Processing Unit (NPU).
The Ethos-U85 runs in the direct drive configuration, where the Host System is responsible for managing the NPU directly.
.. image:: images/CorstoneA320Subsystems.png
:width: 720
:alt: CorstoneA320Subsystems
Overall, the Corstone-1000 architecture is designed to cover a range
of Power, Performance, and Area (PPA) applications, and enable extension
for use-case specific applications, for example, sensors, cloud
connectivitiy, and edge computing.
*****************
Secure Boot Chain
*****************
For the security of a device, it is essential that only authorized
software should run on the device.
The Corstone-1000 boot uses a `Secure boot <arm-developer-secureboot-website_>`__ chain process
where an already authenticated image verifies and loads the following software in the chain.
For the boot chain process to work, the start of the chain should be trusted, forming the
software should run on the device. The Corstone-1000 boot uses a
Secure Boot Chain process where an already authenticated image verifies
and loads the following software in the chain. For the boot chain
process to work, the start of the chain should be trusted, forming the
Root of Trust (RoT) of the device. The RoT of the device is immutable in
nature and encoded into the device by the device manufacturer before it
is deployed into the field.
In Corstone-1000, the content of the ROM and CC312 One Time Programmable (OTP) memory forms the RoT.
nature and encoded into the device by the device owner before it
is deployed into the field. In Corstone-1000, the content of the ROM
and CC312 OTP (One Time Programmable) memory forms the RoT.
Verification of an image can happen either by comparing the computed and stored hashes, or by
checking the signature of the image if the image is signed.
Verification of an image can happen either by comparing the computed and
stored hashes, or by checking the signature of the image if the image
is signed.
.. image:: images/SecureBootChain.png
:width: 870
:alt: SecureBootChain
It is a lengthy chain to boot the software on Corstone-1000.
It is a lengthy chain to boot the software on Corstone-1000. On power on,
the Secure Enclave starts executing BL1_1 code from the ROM which is the RoT
of the device. The BL1_1 is the immutable bootloader of the system, it handles
the provisioning on the first boot, hardware initialization and verification
of the next stage.
TF-M BL1_1
==========
The BL1_2 code, hashes and keys are written into the OTP during the provisioning.
The next bootstage is the BL1_2 which is copied from the OTP into the RAM. The
BL1_1 also compares the BL1_2 hash with the hash saved to the OTP. The BL1_2
verifies and transfers control to the next bootstage which is the BL2. During the
verification, the BL1_2 compares the BL2 image's computed hash with the BL2 hash in
the OTP. The BL2 is MCUBoot in the system. BL2 can provision additional keys on the
first boot and it authenticates the initial bootloader of the host (Host TF-A BL2)
and TF-M by checking the signatures of the images.
The MCUBoot handles the image verification the following way:
On power-up, the Secure Enclave begins execution from TF-M BL1_1, which resides in ROM and serves as
the Root of Trust (RoT) for the device.
TF-M BL1_1 is the immutable bootloader and is responsible for:
- Provisioning the device during the first boot
- Performing hardware initialization
- Verifying the integrity and authenticity of the next stage in the boot chain
At boot time, TF-M BL1_1:
- Copies the TF-M BL1_2 image from OTP to RAM.
- Verifies the integrity of BL1_2 by comparing its computed hash with the hash stored in OTP.
TF-M BL1_2
==========
During provisioning, the TF-M BL1_2 binary, along with its hashes and cryptographic keys, is stored
in One-Time Programmable (OTP) memory.
Once verified, TF-M BL1_2:
- Takes control and verifies the next stage in the boot chain, which is TF-M BL2.
- Computes the hash of the BL2 image and compares it with the BL2 hash stored in OTP to ensure
integrity before transferring execution to BL2.
.. note::
The TF-M BL1 design details can be found in the `TF-M design documents <trusted-firmware-m-bl1-website_>`_.
.. important::
Corstone-1000 has some differences compared to this design due to memory (OTP/ROM)
limitations:
- BL1_1 code size is larger than needed because it handles most of the hardware initialization instead of the BL1_2.
- BL1_2 cannot be updated during provisioning time because the provisioning bundle that contains its code is located in the ROM.
- BL1_2 does not use the post-quantum LMS verification.
- BL2 cannot be updated because it is verified by comparing the computed hash to the hash stored in the OTP.
TF-M BL2
========
In this system, TF-M BL2 refers to MCUBoot.
On the first boot, MCUBoot can provision additional cryptographic keys. It is responsible for authenticating both:
- TF-M (Trusted Firmware-M), and
- The initial bootloader of the Host system, `Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) BL2 <trusted-firmware-a-bl2-website_>`__
This authentication is done by verifying the digital signatures of the respective images.
MCUBoot performs image verification in the following steps:
#. Load the image from non-volatile memory into RAM.
#. Validate the image's signature using the corresponding public key.
.. note::
The public key present in the image header is validated by comparing with the hash.
Depending on the image, the hash of the public key is either stored in the OTP or part
of the software which is being already verified in the previous stages.
- Load image from a non-volatile memory to dynamic RAM.
- The public key present in the image header is validated by comparing with the hash.
Depending on the image, the hash of the public key is either stored in the OTP or part
of the software which is being already verified in the previous stages.
- The image is validated using the public key.
The execution control is passed to TF-M after the verification.
As the runtime executable of the Secure Enclave, TF-M initializes itself before
bringing the Host system out of reset.
The execution control is passed to TF-M after the verification. TF-M being
the runtime executable of the Secure Enclave which initializes itself and, at the end,
brings the host CPU out of rest.
The TF-M BL1 design details and reasoning can be found in the `TF-M design documents
<https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/design_docs/booting/bl1.html>`_.
The Corstone-1000 has some differences compared to this design due to memory (OTP/ROM)
limitations:
Host System Authentication
==========================
- The provisioning bundle that contains the BL1_2 code is located in the ROM.
This means the BL1_2 cannot be updated during provisioning time.
- The BL1_1 handles most of the hardware initialization instead of the BL1_2. This
results in a bigger BL1_1 code size than needed.
- The BL1_2 does not use the post-quantum LMS verification. The BL2 is verified by
comparing the computed hash to the hash which is stored in the OTP. This means the
BL2 is not updatable.
The Host system follows the boot standard defined in the `Trusted Board Boot Requirements Client <trusted-board-boot-requirements-client-pdf_>`__
to authenticate the Secure and Non-secure software.
The `Firmware Image Package (FIP) <trusted-firmware-a-fip-guide_>`__ packs bootloader images and
other payloads into a single archive.
.. image:: images/FIPDiagram.png
:alt: FIPDiagram
The FIP for Corstone-1000 contains:
- Trusted firmware-A BL2
- AP EL3 Runtime firmware, BL31 image
- AP Secure Payload, BL32 image
- AP Normal world firmware -U-boot, BL33 image
- Trusted OS Firmware configuration file used by Trusted OS (BL32), TOS_FW_CONFIG
- Key certificates
- Content certificates
To load and validate TF-A BL2, TF-M BL2 first parses the GUID Partition Table (GPT)
to locate the FIP. It then determines the offset of TF-A BL2 within the FIP.
.. note::
TF-M does not check the FIP signature, it only checks the TF-A BL2's signature in the FIP.
.. important::
The implicitly trusted components are:
- A SHA-256 hash of the Root of Trust Public Key (ROTPK) -
For development purposes, a development ROTPK is used and its hash embedded into the TF-A BL2 image.
This public key is provided by the TF-A source code.
- TF-A BL2 image - it can be trusted because it has been verified by TF-M BL2 before starting TF-A.
The remaining components in the Chain of Trust (CoT) are either certificates or bootloader images.
Bootloader Authentication
-------------------------
The FIP contains two types of certificates:
- **Content Certificates** - used to store the hash of a bootloader image.
- **Key Certificates** - used to verify public keys used to sign Content Certificates.
The Host system bootloader images are authenticated by computing their hash and comparing it to the corresponding hash found in the Content Certificate.
Certificates Verification
-------------------------
The public keys defined in the Trusted Key Certificate are used to verify the later certificates in
the CoT process. The Trusted Key Certificate is verified with the Root of Trust Public Key.
UEFI Authenticated Variables
----------------------------
The host follows the boot standard defined in the `TBBR`_ to authenticate the
secure and non-secure software.
For UEFI Secure Boot, authenticated variables can be accessed from the secure flash.
The feature has been integrated in U-Boot, which authenticates the images as per the UEFI
@@ -298,140 +156,79 @@ specification before executing them.
Secure Services
***************
Corstone-1000 is unique in offering a secure environment for running trusted workloads.
While the Host system includes TrustZone technology, the platform also features a hardware-isolated
Secure Enclave, specifically designed to execute these secure workloads.
In Corstone-1000, essential Secure Services—such as Cryptography, Protected Storage,
Internal Trusted Storage, and Attestation—are provided through PSA Functional APIs implemented in TF-M.
From the user's perspective, there is no difference when communicating with these services,
whether they run in the Secure Enclave or in the Secure world of the Host system.
The diagram below illustrates the data flow for such calls.
Corstone-1000 is unique in providing a secure environment to run a secure
workload. The platform has TrustZone technology in the Host subsystem but
it also has hardware isolated Secure Enclave environment to run such secure
workloads. In Corstone-1000, known Secure Services such as Crypto, Protected
Storage, Internal Trusted Storage and Attestation are available via PSA
Functional APIs in TF-M. There is no difference for a user communicating to
these services which are running on a Secure Enclave instead of the
secure world of the host subsystem. The below diagram presents the data
flow path for such calls.
.. image:: images/SecureServices.png
:width: 930
:alt: SecureServices
The Secure Enclave Proxy Secure Partition (SE Proxy SP) is a proxy managed by OP-TEE that forwards
Secure Service calls to the Secure Enclave. This communication uses the `RSE communication protocol <https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/platform/arm/rse/rse_comms.html>`_.
While the protocol supports shared memory and MHU interrupts as a doorbell mechanism between cores,
in Corstone-1000, the entire message is currently transmitted through the MHU channels.
Corstone-1000 implements Isolation Level 2 using the Cortex-M0+ Memory Protection Unit (MPU).
Users can define their own secure services to run either in the Host system's Secure World or in
the Secure Enclave. This choice involves a trade-off between latency and security.
Services running in the Secure Enclave benefit from strong, hardware-enforced isolation,
offering higher security but at the cost of increased latency. In contrast, services running in the
Host Secure World experience lower latency, but rely on TrustZone technology for virtualized isolation,
which offers comparatively less robust security.
The SE Proxy SP (Secure Enclave Proxy Secure Partition) is a proxy partition
managed by OPTEE which forwards such calls to the Secure Enclave. The
solution relies on the `RSE communication protocol
<https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/platform/arm/rse/rse_comms.html>`_
which is a lightweight serialization of the psa_call() API. It can use shared
memory and MHU interrupts as a doorbell for communication between two cores
but currently the whole message is forwarded through the MHU channels in Corstone-1000.
Corstone-1000 implements isolation level 2. Cortex-M0+ MPU (Memory Protection
Unit) is used to implement isolation level 2.
For a user to define its own secure service, both the options of the host
secure world or secure encalve are available. It's a trade-off between
lower latency vs higher security. Services running on a Secure Enclave are
secure by real hardware isolation but have a higher latency path. In the
second scenario, the services running on the secure world of the host
subsystem have lower latency but virtual hardware isolation created by
TrustZone technology.
**************************
PSA Secure Firmware Update
**************************
**********************
Secure Firmware Update
**********************
The Arm Corstone-1000 platform necessitates a robust, secure, and flexible firmware update mechanism
including partial capsule update to ensure fielded devices can receive critical patches, feature enhancements,
and security fixes without compromising system integrity. To meet these requirements, we have implemented the
Platform Security Architecture (PSA) Firmware Update (FWU) framework on Corstone-1000, leveraging Trusted Firmware-M (TF-M)
for the Secure Enclave, U-Boot as the host-side client on Cortex-A, and the UEFI capsule update mechanism for payload
encapsulation. This design supports both the Fixed Virtual Platform (FVP) and the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
targets, providing consistent behavior across simulation and silicon-based deployments. The Corstone-1000 supports FWU
which complies with the `Platform Security Firmware Update for the A-profile Arm Architecture <platform-security-fwu-for-a-profile-pdf_>`__
and `PSA Firmware Update IHI 0093 <psa-firmware-update-ihi-0093-api-reference-website_>`__
specifications.
Apart from always booting the authorized images, it is also essential that
the device only accepts the authorized (signed) images in the firmware update
process. Corstone-1000 supports OTA (Over the Air) firmware updates and
follows Platform Security Firmware Update specification (`FWU`_).
To standardize and streamline capsule creation with multiple FMP payloads, the `EDK2 capsule generation tool <edk2-capsule-generation-tool-repository_>`__
tool has been integrated into the meta-arm Yocto layer for Corstone1000. This integration involves defining
build rules for generating UEFI capsules as part of the firmware image build process. Configuration parameters
exposed in the recipe allow developers to specify the number of FMP payloads, target image GUIDs, version numbers etc.
This capsule ensures that all update payloads conform to the UEFI FMP specification and are ready for
validation and delivery by UBoot.
The FWU solution for Corstone-1000 is composed of three primary domains:
- Host System
- Trusted Services intermediary
- Secure Enclave
Each domain has distinct responsibilities and communicates through standardized interfaces.
.. image:: images/SystemArchitecturePSAFirmwareUpdate.png
:width: 690
:alt: SystemArchitecturePSAFirmwareUpdate
On the host side, U-Boot functions as the FWU client and orchestrates the update process from capsule retrieval to
payload delivery based on `PSA FWU DEN0018 specification <psa-fwu-den0018-specification-website_>`__
via Arm FF-A framework. The Trusted-Services SE Proxy secure partition serves as a gateway between the non-secure host
environment and the Secure Enclave. The `PSA FWU service <ts-psa-fwu-service-website_>`__ running in the Trusted Services
implementation forwards the data to the Secure Enclave via MHU-based PSA calls. Within the Secure Enclave, the PSA FWU
Agent, conforming to `PSA Firmware Update IHI 0093 <psa-firmware-update-ihi-0093-api-reference-website_>`__ specification,
orchestrates the actual flash programming, metadata management, and rollback protection mechanisms. The agent relies on a
bespoke `shim layer <tfm-shim-layer-website_>`__ to abstract hardwarespecific flash operations and bootloader interactions.
As defined in the specification, the external flash is divided into two banks: one bank holds the
currently running images, while the other is used to stage new images.
There are four updatable components: **BL2**, **TF-M**, **the FIP** and **the Kernel Image** (the initramfs bundle).
New images are delivered and accepted in the form of UEFI capsules.
As standardized into `FWU`_, the external flash is divided into two
banks of which one bank has currently running images and the other bank is
used for staging new images. There are four updatable units, i.e. Secure
Enclave's BL2 and TF-M, and Host's FIP (Firmware Image Package) and Kernel
Image (the initramfs bundle). The new images are accepted in the form of a UEFI capsule.
.. image:: images/ExternalFlash.png
:width: 690
:alt: ExternalFlash
When a FWU is initiated on Corstone-1000, the following sequence of operations takes place:
#. **Capsule Retrieval and Preparation**
U-Boot on the host system retrieves the firmware capsule.
It validates the capsule header and parses the FMP (Firmware Management Protocol) descriptor list to identify the payloads to be updated.
For each FMP descriptor, U-Boot:
Splits the firmware payload into 4 KiB chunks.
Invokes the PSA_FWU_Update API for each chunk, transmitting the buffer address via the FF-A (Firmware Framework for Arm) shared memory interface.
#. **Secure Transmission and Forwarding**
The PSA Firmware Update (FWU) service, running as part of Trusted Services, receives the chunks through Secure Partition Client (SPC) calls.
It forwards these chunks to the Secure Enclave using MHU-based PSA calls.
#. **Flashing Within the Secure Enclave**
Inside the Secure Enclave, the PSA FWU Agent dispatches each chunk to the shim layer.
The shim layer:
Erases the corresponding sectors in the non-active flash bank.
Writes the received firmware chunks at the correct offsets.
During partial updates, it also copies static partitions from the active bank to the non-active one to maintain consistency.
#. **Finalization and Boot Preparation**
After all chunks are successfully written:
The shim updates the firmware manifest and the EFI System Resource Table (ESRT) entries to reflect the new image version.
This step enables the bootloader to recognize the new firmware for a trial boot.
The platform then performs an automatic reset, booting into the non-active bank in trial mode.
#. **Trial Boot and Confirmation**
In trial mode, U-Boot evaluates the new firmware and issues either an accept or reject command using the PSA FWU ABI.
These commands are sent to the Secure Enclave, instructing the shim to update the firmware metadata accordingly.
#. **Recovery and Fallback Mechanism**
If the trial boot is successful, the host sends an acknowledgment, transitioning the firmware state from 'trial' to 'regular'.
If the system fails or becomes unresponsive:
A watchdog timer triggers a system reset.
The BL1 firmware in the Secure Enclave detects repeated failures and reverts to the previously known-good flash bank.
This rollback mechanism ensures the device remains operational and recoverable, even after a failed update.
When Firmware update is triggered, U-Boot verifies the capsule by checking the
capsule signature, version number and size. Then it signals the Secure Enclave
that can start writing UEFI capsule into the flash. Once this operation finishes
,Secure Enclave resets the entire system.
The Metadata Block in the flash has the below firmware update state machine.
TF-M runs an OTA service that is responsible for accepting and updating the
images in the flash. The communication between the UEFI Capsule update
subsystem and the OTA service follows the same data path explained above.
The OTA service writes the new images to the passive bank after successful
capsule verification. It changes the state of the system to trial state and
triggers the reset. Boot loaders in Secure Enclave and Host read the Metadata
block to get the information on the boot bank. In the successful trial stage,
the acknowledgment from the host moves the state of the system from trial to
regular. Any failure in the trial stage or system hangs leads to a system
reset. This is made sure by the use of watchdog hardware. The Secure Enclave's
BL1 has the logic to identify multiple resets and eventually switch back to the
previous good bank. The ability to revert to the previous bank is crucial to
guarantee the availability of the device.
.. image:: images/SecureFirmwareUpdate.png
@@ -444,15 +241,13 @@ When a FWU is initiated on Corstone-1000, the following sequence of operations t
UEFI Runtime Support in U-Boot
******************************
The implementation of UEFI boot-time and runtime APIs requires persistent variable storage. In
Corstone-1000, UEFI variables are stored using the Protected Storage (PS) service.
The diagram below illustrates the data flow for storing UEFI variables. U-Boots UEFI subsystem
communicates with the Secure World using the U-Boot FF-A driver, which interfaces with the `UEFI System Management Mode (SMM) service <trusted-services-uefi-smm-website_>`__.
The SMM service provides support for the UEFI System Management Mode. This support is implemented by the SMM Gateway secure partition.
The SMM service then uses the Proxy Protected Storage (PS) provided by the SE Proxy SP.
These PS calls are forwarded to the Secure Enclave, following the communication path described earlier.
Implementation of UEFI boottime and runtime APIs require variable storage.
In Corstone-1000, these UEFI variables are stored in the Protected Storage
service. The below diagram presents the data flow to store UEFI variables.
The U-Boot implementation of the UEFI subsystem uses the U-Boot FF-A driver to
communicate with the SMM Service in the secure world. The backend of the
SMM service uses the proxy PS from the SE Proxy SP. From there on, the PS
calls are forwarded to the Secure Enclave as explained above.
.. image:: images/UEFISupport.png
@@ -460,43 +255,30 @@ These PS calls are forwarded to the Secure Enclave, following the communication
:alt: UEFISupport
**********
***************
References
**********
* `Arm Developer <arm-developer-cs1000-search_>`__
* `Arm Security Architectures <arm-architecture-security-features-platform-security_>`_
***************
`ARM corstone1000 Search`_
`Arm security features`_
--------------
*Copyright (c) 2022-2026, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
*Copyright (c) 2022-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
.. _arm-developer-cs1000-website: https://developer.arm.com/Tools%20and%20Software/Corstone-1000%20Software
.. _arm-developer-cs1000-search: https://developer.arm.com/search#q=corstone-1000
.. _arm-developer-mhu-website: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ka005129/latest/#:~:text=An%20MHU%20is%20a%20device,that%20a%20message%20is%20available
.. _arm-developer-secureboot-website: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/PRD29-GENC-009492/c/TrustZone-Software-Architecture/Booting-a-secure-system/Secure-boot
.. _arm-architecture-security-features-platform-security: https://www.arm.com/architecture/security-features/platform-security
.. _linux-repository: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/
.. _arm-trustzone-for-cortex-a-website: https://www.arm.com/technologies/trustzone-for-cortex-a
.. _arm-fmw-framework-a-profile-pdf: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0077/latest
.. _arm-fmw-framework-m-profile-pdf: https://developer.arm.com/architectures/Firmware%20Framework%20for%20M-Profile
.. _platform-security-fwu-for-a-profile-pdf: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0118/a/
.. _psa-firmware-update-ihi-0093-api-reference-website: https://arm-software.github.io/psa-api/fwu/1.0/api/api.html
.. _edk2-capsule-generation-tool-repository: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/BaseTools/Source/Python/Capsule/GenerateCapsule.py
.. _psa-fwu-den0018-specification-website: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0118/latest/
.. _ts-psa-fwu-service-website: https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/stable/services/fwu/psa-fwu-m.html
.. _tfm-shim-layer-website: https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design_docs/services/tfm_fwu_service.html#shim-layer-between-fwu-and-bootloader
.. _op-tee-os-repository: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os
.. _psa-certified-website: https://www.psacertified.org/
.. _psa_l2-ready: https://www.psacertified.org/products/corstone-1000/
.. _systemready-ir-certification: https://armkeil.blob.core.windows.net/developer/Files/pdf/certificate-list/arm-systemready-ve-arm-neoverse.pdf
.. _trusted-board-boot-requirements-client-pdf: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0006/latest
.. _trusted-firmware-m-website: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m/
.. _trusted-firmware-m-bl1-website: https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design_docs/booting/bl1.html
.. _trusted-firmware-a-bl2-website: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/108028/0000/RD-TC22-software/Software-components/AP-firmware/Trusted-firmware-A-BL2
.. _trusted-firmware-a-fip-guide: https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design/firmware-design.html#firmware-image-package-fip
.. _trusted-services-website: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/trusted-services/
.. _trusted-services-uefi-smm-website: https://trusted-services.readthedocs.io/en/integration/services/uefi-smm-services.html#
.. _das-u-boot-repository: https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot.git
.. _keil-rtx5-website: https://developer.arm.com/Tools%20and%20Software/Keil%20MDK/RTX5%20RTOS
.. _ppa-website: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/102738/0100/Power--performance--and-area-analysis
.. _mcuboot-website: https://docs.mcuboot.com/
.. _Arm corstone1000 Technical Overview: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/102360/0000
.. _Arm corstone1000 Software: https://developer.arm.com/Tools%20and%20Software/Corstone-1000%20Software
.. _Arm corstone1000 Search: https://developer.arm.com/search#q=corstone-1000
.. _Arm security features: https://www.arm.com/architecture/security-features/platform-security
.. _linux repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/
.. _FF-A: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0077/latest
.. _FF-M: https://developer.arm.com/architectures/Firmware%20Framework%20for%20M-Profile
.. _FWU: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0118/a/
.. _OPTEE-OS: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os
.. _PSA: https://www.psacertified.org/
.. _PSA L2 Ready: https://www.psacertified.org/products/corstone-1000/
.. _SRIR cert: https://armkeil.blob.core.windows.net/developer/Files/pdf/certificate-list/arm-systemready-ir-certification-arm-corstone-1000.pdf
.. _TBBR: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0006/latest
.. _TF-M: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m/
.. _Trusted Services: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/trusted-services/
.. _U-Boot repo: https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot.git
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+78
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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
# N1SDP Development Platform Support in meta-arm-bsp
## Overview
The N1SDP provides access to the Arm Neoverse N1 SoC. The N1SDP enables software development for key enterprise technology
and general Arm software development. The N1SDP consists of the N1 board containing the N1 SoC.
The N1 SoC contains two dual-core Arm Neoverse N1 processor clusters.
The system demonstrates Arm technology in the context of Cache-Coherent Interconnect for Accelerators (CCIX) protocol by:
- Running coherent traffic between the N1 SoC and an accelerator card.
- Coherent communication between two N1 SoCs.
- Enabling development of CCIX-enabled FPGA accelerators.
Further information on N1SDP can be found at
https://community.arm.com/developer/tools-software/oss-platforms/w/docs/458/neoverse-n1-sdp
## Configuration:
In the local.conf file, MACHINE should be set as follow:
MACHINE ?= "n1sdp"
## Building
```bash$ bitbake core-image-minimal```
## Running
# Update Firmware on SD card:
(*) To use n1sdp board in single chip mode, flash:
n1sdp-board-firmware_primary.tar.gz firmware.
(*) To use n1sdp board in multi chip mode, flash:
n1sdp-board-firmware_primary.tar.gz firmware to primary board,
n1sdp-board-firmware_secondary.tar.gz firmware to secondary board.
The SD card content is generated during the build here:
tmp/deploy/images/n1sdp/n1sdp-board-firmware_primary.tar.gz
tmp/deploy/images/n1sdp/n1sdp-board-firmware_secondary.tar.gz
Its content must be written on the N1SDP firmware SD card.
To do this:
- insert the sdcard of the N1SDP in an SD card reader and mount it:
```bash$ sudo mount /dev/sdx1 /mnt```
(replace sdx by the device of the SD card)
- erase its content and put the new one:
```bash$ sudo rm -rf /mnt/*```
```bash$ sudo tar --no-same-owner -xzf tmp/deploy/images/n1sdp/n1sdp-board-firmware_primary.tar.gz -C /mnt/```
```bash$ sudo umount /mnt```
- reinsert the SD card in the N1SDP board
Firmware tarball contains iofpga configuration files, scp and uefi binaries.
**NOTE**:
If the N1SDP board was manufactured after November 2019 (Serial Number greater
than 36253xxx), a different PMIC firmware image must be used to prevent
potential damage to the board. More details can be found in [1].
The `MB/HBI0316A/io_v123f.txt` file located in the microSD needs to be updated.
To update it, set the PMIC image (300k_8c2.bin) to be used in the newer models
by running the following commands on your host PC:
$ sudo umount /dev/sdx1
$ sudo mount /dev/sdx1 /mnt
$ sudo sed -i '/^MBPMIC: pms_0V85.bin/s/^/;/g' /mnt/MB/HBI0316A/io_v123f.txt
$ sudo sed -i '/^;MBPMIC: 300k_8c2.bin/s/^;//g' /mnt/MB/HBI0316A/io_v123f.txt
$ sudo umount /mnt
# Prepare an USB hard drive:
Grub boot partition is placed on first partition of the *.wic image,
Linux root file system is placed on the second partition of the *.wic image:
tmp/deploy/images/n1sdp/core-image-minimal-n1sdp.wic
This *.wic image should be copied to USB stick with simple dd call.
[1]: https://community.arm.com/developer/tools-software/oss-platforms/w/docs/604/notice-potential-damage-to-n1sdp-boards-if-using-latest-firmware-release
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024, Arm Limited.
# Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited.
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
@@ -6,6 +6,6 @@
jinja2==3.1.1
# Required to build the documentation
sphinx==7.1.2
sphinx_rtd_theme~=3.0.0
docutils~=0.18.1
sphinx~=5.0
sphinx_rtd_theme~=2.0.0
docutils==0.17.1
+1 -1
View File
@@ -16,4 +16,4 @@
*A summary of how to deploy or execute the image*
*For example, an overview of FVP arguments*
*For example, an overview of the N1SDP SD structure, or FVP arguments*
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
FILESEXTRAPATHS:prepend := "${THISDIR}/files/${MACHINE}:"
FILESEXTRAPATHS:append := "${THISDIR}/files/${MACHINE}:"
SRC_URI:append = " file://report.txt"
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
psci: failed to boot CPU1 (-95)
CPU1: failed to boot: -95
psci: failed to boot CPU2 (-95)
CPU2: failed to boot: -95
psci: failed to boot CPU3 (-95)
CPU3: failed to boot: -95
ARM FF-A: Notification setup failed -95, not enabled
ARM FF-A: Failed to register driver sched callback -95
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
basic-mmio-gpio: Failed to locate of_node [id: -2]
@@ -3,6 +3,3 @@ NUMA: Failed to initialise from firmware
# TODO: we should be using bochsdrm over efifb?
efifb: cannot reserve video memory at 0x80000000
# TODO: debug why this sometimes happens
failed to find screen to remove
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ DESCRIPTION = "Firmware to be loaded and run in External System Harness in\
support to the main application CPU."
HOMEPAGE = "https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/external-system.git"
DEPENDS = "gcc-arm-none-eabi-native"
INHIBIT_DEFAULT_DEPS = "1"
INHIBIT_DEFAULT_DEPS="1"
LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause & Apache-2.0"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://license.md;md5=e44b2531cd6ffe9dece394dbe988d9a0 \
file://cmsis/LICENSE.txt;md5=e3fc50a88d0a364313df4b21ef20c29e"
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ PACKAGE_ARCH = "${MACHINE_ARCH}"
# PRODUCT is passed to the Makefile to specify the platform to be used.
PRODUCT = "corstone-1000"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
B = "${WORKDIR}/build"
# remove once arm-none-eabi-gcc updates to 13 or newer like poky
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
# Machine specific configurations
MACHINE_HAFNIUM_REQUIRE ?= ""
MACHINE_HAFNIUM_REQUIRE:tc = "hafnium-tc.inc"
require ${MACHINE_HAFNIUM_REQUIRE}
@@ -2,10 +2,7 @@ COMPATIBLE_MACHINE = "corstone1000"
FIRMWARE_BINARIES = "corstone1000-flash-firmware-image-${MACHINE}.wic \
bl1.bin \
${@bb.utils.contains('MACHINE_FEATURES', \
'corstone1000-extsys', \
'es_flashfw.bin', \
'', d)} \
es_flashfw.bin \
${CAPSULE_NAME}.${CAPSULE_EXTENSION} \
corstone1000_capsule_cert.crt \
corstone1000_capsule_key.key \
@@ -14,8 +14,7 @@ inherit tfm_sign_image
inherit uefi_capsule
inherit deploy
DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('MACHINE_FEATURES', 'corstone1000-extsys', \
'external-system', '', d)} \
DEPENDS += "external-system \
trusted-firmware-a \
trusted-firmware-m \
u-boot \
@@ -26,133 +25,21 @@ IMAGE_LINGUAS = ""
PACKAGE_INSTALL = ""
# The generated ${MACHINE}_image.nopt is used instead of the default wic image
# for the capsule generation. The uefi.capsule image type doesn't have to
# depend on the wic because of this.
#
# The corstone1000_capsule_cert.crt and corstone1000_capsule_key.key are installed
# by the U-Boot recipe so this recipe has to depend on that.
CAPSULE_IMGTYPE = ""
CAPSULE_IMG_LOCATION = "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}"
# User-configurable common capsule settings
CAPSULE_EXTENSION ?= "uefi.capsule"
CAPSULE_VERSION ?= "6"
CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION ?= "6"
CAPSULE_NAME ?= "${MACHINE}-v${CAPSULE_VERSION}"
CAPSULE_SELECTED_COMPONENTS ?= "BL2 TFM_S FIP INITRAMFS"
CAPSULE_EXTRA_ARGS ?= "--capflag PersistAcrossReset"
# Non-configurable common payloads settings
PAYLOAD_CERTIFICATE_PATH = "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/corstone1000_capsule_cert.crt"
PAYLOAD_HARDWARE_INSTANCE = "1"
PAYLOAD_MONOTONIC_COUNT = "1"
PAYLOAD_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH = "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/corstone1000_capsule_key.key"
CAPSULE_SELECTED_COMPONENTS += " DUMMY_START DUMMY_END"
# All capsule fields are reset and initialized with DUMMY_START since it is the first payload
# DUMMY_START
PAYLOAD_DUMMY_START_INDEX ?= "5"
PAYLOAD_DUMMY_START_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_DUMMY_START_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_DUMMY_START_GUID ?= "6f784cbf-7938-5c23-8d6e-24d2f1410fa9"
CAPSULE_ALL_COMPONENTS = "DUMMY_START "
CAPSULE_CERTIFICATE_PATHS = "${PAYLOAD_CERTIFICATE_PATH} "
CAPSULE_GUIDS = "${PAYLOAD_DUMMY_START_GUID} "
CAPSULE_INDEXES = "${PAYLOAD_DUMMY_START_INDEX} "
CAPSULE_HARDWARE_INSTANCES = "${PAYLOAD_HARDWARE_INSTANCE} "
CAPSULE_MONOTONIC_COUNTS = "${PAYLOAD_MONOTONIC_COUNT} "
CAPSULE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHS = "${PAYLOAD_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH} "
UEFI_FIRMWARE_BINARIES = "${B}/dummy.bin "
CAPSULE_FW_VERSIONS = "${PAYLOAD_DUMMY_START_VERSION} "
CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS = "${PAYLOAD_DUMMY_START_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION} "
# BL2
PAYLOAD_BL2_INDEX ?= "1"
PAYLOAD_BL2_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_BL2_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_BL2_GUID:corstone1000-fvp ?= "f1d883f9-dfeb-5363-98d8-686ee3b69f4f"
PAYLOAD_BL2_GUID:corstone1000-mps3 ?= "fbfbefaa-0a56-50d5-b651-74091d3d62cf"
CAPSULE_ALL_COMPONENTS += "BL2 "
CAPSULE_CERTIFICATE_PATHS += "${PAYLOAD_CERTIFICATE_PATH} "
CAPSULE_GUIDS += "${PAYLOAD_BL2_GUID} "
CAPSULE_INDEXES += "${PAYLOAD_BL2_INDEX} "
CAPSULE_HARDWARE_INSTANCES += "${PAYLOAD_HARDWARE_INSTANCE} "
CAPSULE_MONOTONIC_COUNTS += "${PAYLOAD_MONOTONIC_COUNT} "
CAPSULE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHS += "${PAYLOAD_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH} "
UEFI_FIRMWARE_BINARIES += "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/bl2_signed.bin "
CAPSULE_FW_VERSIONS += "${PAYLOAD_BL2_VERSION} "
CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS += "${PAYLOAD_BL2_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION} "
# TFM_S
PAYLOAD_TFM_S_INDEX ?= "2"
PAYLOAD_TFM_S_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_TFM_S_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_TFM_S_GUID:corstone1000-fvp ?= "7fad470e-5ec5-5c03-a2c1-4756b495de61"
PAYLOAD_TFM_S_GUID:corstone1000-mps3 ?= "af4cc7ad-ee2e-5a39-aad5-fac8a1e6173c"
CAPSULE_ALL_COMPONENTS += "TFM_S "
CAPSULE_CERTIFICATE_PATHS += "${PAYLOAD_CERTIFICATE_PATH} "
CAPSULE_GUIDS += "${PAYLOAD_TFM_S_GUID} "
CAPSULE_INDEXES += "${PAYLOAD_TFM_S_INDEX} "
CAPSULE_HARDWARE_INSTANCES += "${PAYLOAD_HARDWARE_INSTANCE} "
CAPSULE_MONOTONIC_COUNTS += "${PAYLOAD_MONOTONIC_COUNT} "
CAPSULE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHS += "${PAYLOAD_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH} "
UEFI_FIRMWARE_BINARIES += "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/tfm_s_signed.bin "
CAPSULE_FW_VERSIONS += "${PAYLOAD_TFM_S_VERSION} "
CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS += "${PAYLOAD_TFM_S_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION} "
# FIP
PAYLOAD_FIP_INDEX ?= "3"
PAYLOAD_FIP_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_FIP_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_FIP_GUID:corstone1000-fvp ?= "f1933675-5a8c-5b6d-9ef4-846739e89bc8"
PAYLOAD_FIP_GUID:corstone1000-mps3 ?= "55302f96-c4f0-5cf9-8624-e7cc388f2b68"
CAPSULE_ALL_COMPONENTS += "FIP "
CAPSULE_CERTIFICATE_PATHS += "${PAYLOAD_CERTIFICATE_PATH} "
CAPSULE_GUIDS += "${PAYLOAD_FIP_GUID} "
CAPSULE_INDEXES += "${PAYLOAD_FIP_INDEX} "
CAPSULE_HARDWARE_INSTANCES += "${PAYLOAD_HARDWARE_INSTANCE} "
CAPSULE_MONOTONIC_COUNTS += "${PAYLOAD_MONOTONIC_COUNT} "
CAPSULE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHS += "${PAYLOAD_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH} "
UEFI_FIRMWARE_BINARIES += "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/signed_fip-corstone1000.bin "
CAPSULE_FW_VERSIONS += "${PAYLOAD_FIP_VERSION} "
CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS += "${PAYLOAD_FIP_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION} "
# INITRAMFS
PAYLOAD_INITRAMFS_INDEX ?= "4"
PAYLOAD_INITRAMFS_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_INITRAMFS_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_INITRAMFS_GUID:corstone1000-fvp ?= "f771aff9-c7e9-5f99-9eda-2369dd694f61"
PAYLOAD_INITRAMFS_GUID:corstone1000-mps3 ?= "3e8ac972-c33c-5cc9-90a0-cdd3159683ea"
CAPSULE_ALL_COMPONENTS += "INITRAMFS "
CAPSULE_CERTIFICATE_PATHS += "${PAYLOAD_CERTIFICATE_PATH} "
CAPSULE_GUIDS += "${PAYLOAD_INITRAMFS_GUID} "
CAPSULE_INDEXES += "${PAYLOAD_INITRAMFS_INDEX} "
CAPSULE_HARDWARE_INSTANCES += "${PAYLOAD_HARDWARE_INSTANCE} "
CAPSULE_MONOTONIC_COUNTS += "${PAYLOAD_MONOTONIC_COUNT} "
CAPSULE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHS += "${PAYLOAD_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH} "
UEFI_FIRMWARE_BINARIES += "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/Image.gz-initramfs-${MACHINE}.bin "
CAPSULE_FW_VERSIONS += "${PAYLOAD_INITRAMFS_VERSION} "
CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS += "${PAYLOAD_INITRAMFS_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION} "
# DUMMY_END
PAYLOAD_DUMMY_END_INDEX ?= "6"
PAYLOAD_DUMMY_END_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_DUMMY_END_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION ?= "${CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION}"
PAYLOAD_DUMMY_END_GUID ?= "b57e432b-a250-5c73-93e3-90205e64baba"
CAPSULE_ALL_COMPONENTS += "DUMMY_END"
CAPSULE_CERTIFICATE_PATHS += "${PAYLOAD_CERTIFICATE_PATH}"
CAPSULE_GUIDS += "${PAYLOAD_DUMMY_END_GUID}"
CAPSULE_INDEXES += "${PAYLOAD_DUMMY_END_INDEX}"
CAPSULE_HARDWARE_INSTANCES += "${PAYLOAD_HARDWARE_INSTANCE}"
CAPSULE_MONOTONIC_COUNTS += "${PAYLOAD_MONOTONIC_COUNT}"
CAPSULE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHS += "${PAYLOAD_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH}"
UEFI_FIRMWARE_BINARIES += "${B}/dummy.bin"
CAPSULE_FW_VERSIONS += "${PAYLOAD_DUMMY_END_VERSION}"
CAPSULE_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS += "${PAYLOAD_DUMMY_END_LOWEST_SUPPORTED_VERSION}"
CAPSULE_CERTIFICATE_PATH = "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/corstone1000_capsule_cert.crt"
CAPSULE_GUID:corstone1000-fvp ?= "989f3a4e-46e0-4cd0-9877-a25c70c01329"
CAPSULE_GUID:corstone1000-mps3 ?= "df1865d1-90fb-4d59-9c38-c9f2c1bba8cc"
CAPSULE_IMGLOCATION = "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}"
CAPSULE_INDEX = "1"
CAPSULE_MONOTONIC_COUNT = "1"
CAPSULE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH = "${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/corstone1000_capsule_key.key"
UEFI_FIRMWARE_BINARY = "${B}/${MACHINE}_image.nopt"
# TF-A settings for signing host images
TFA_BL2_BINARY = "bl2-corstone1000.bin"
@@ -162,9 +49,14 @@ TFA_BL2_RE_SIGN_BIN_SIZE = "0x2d000"
TFA_FIP_RE_IMAGE_LOAD_ADDRESS = "0x68130000"
TFA_FIP_RE_SIGN_BIN_SIZE = "0x00200000"
RE_LAYOUT_WRAPPER_VERSION = "0.0.7"
TFM_SIGN_PRIVATE_KEY = "${libdir}/tfm-scripts/root-EC-P256_1.pem"
TFM_SIGN_PRIVATE_KEY = "${libdir}/tfm-scripts/root-RSA-3072_1.pem"
RE_IMAGE_OFFSET = "0x1000"
# Offsets for the .nopt image generation
TFM_OFFSET = "102400"
FIP_OFFSET = "479232"
KERNEL_OFFSET = "2576384"
do_sign_images() {
# Sign TF-A BL2
sign_host_image ${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/firmware/${TFA_BL2_BINARY} \
@@ -184,11 +76,21 @@ do_sign_images[depends] = "\
fiptool-native:do_populate_sysroot \
"
# Create an empty dummy payload file required for capsule generation
create_dummy_image() {
touch ${B}/dummy.bin
# This .nopt image is not the same as the one which is generated by meta-arm/meta-arm/classes/wic_nopt.bbclass.
# The meta-arm/meta-arm/classes/wic_nopt.bbclass removes the partition table from the wic image, but keeps the
# second bank. This function creates a no-partition image with only the first bank.
create_nopt_image() {
dd conv=notrunc bs=1 if=${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/bl2_signed.bin of=${B}/${MACHINE}_image.nopt
dd conv=notrunc bs=1 if=${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/tfm_s_signed.bin of=${B}/${MACHINE}_image.nopt seek=${TFM_OFFSET}
dd conv=notrunc bs=1 if=${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/signed_fip-corstone1000.bin of=${B}/${MACHINE}_image.nopt seek=${FIP_OFFSET}
dd conv=notrunc bs=1 if=${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/Image.gz-initramfs-${MACHINE}.bin of=${B}/${MACHINE}_image.nopt seek=${KERNEL_OFFSET}
}
do_image_uefi_capsule[depends] += " linux-yocto:do_deploy"
do_image_uefi_capsule[mcdepends] += " ${@bb.utils.contains('BBMULTICONFIG', 'firmware', 'mc::firmware:linux-yocto:do_deploy', '', d)}"
do_image_uefi_capsule[prefuncs] += "create_nopt_image"
do_deploy() {
install -m 0755 ${B}/${MACHINE}_image.nopt ${DEPLOYDIR}
}
do_image_uefi_capsule[depends] += " linux-yocto:do_deploy corstone1000-flash-firmware-image:do_sign_images"
do_image_uefi_capsule[mcdepends] += " ${@bb.utils.contains('BBMULTICONFIG', 'firmware', 'mc::firmware:linux-yocto:do_deploy mc::firmware:corstone1000-flash-firmware-image:do_sign_images', '', d)}"
do_image_uefi_capsule[prefuncs] += "create_dummy_image"
addtask deploy after do_image_uefi_capsule
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ COMPATIBLE_MACHINE = "juno"
LINARO_RELEASE = "19.06"
SRC_URI = "http://releases.linaro.org/members/arm/platforms/${LINARO_RELEASE}/juno-latest-oe-uboot.zip;subdir=${S} \
SRC_URI = "http://releases.linaro.org/members/arm/platforms/${LINARO_RELEASE}/juno-latest-oe-uboot.zip;subdir=${UNPACK_DIR} \
file://images-r0.txt \
file://images-r1.txt \
file://images-r2.txt \
@@ -23,8 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://releases.linaro.org/members/arm/platforms/${LINARO_RELEASE}/ju
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "01b662b81fa409d55ff298238ad24003"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b8a3909bb3bc4350a8771b863193a3e33b358e2a727624a77c9ecf13516cec82"
FIRMWARE_DIR = "juno-firmware-${LINARO_RELEASE}"
S = "${UNPACKDIR}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}"
UNPACK_DIR = "juno-firmware-${LINARO_RELEASE}"
inherit deploy nopackages
@@ -34,23 +33,23 @@ do_compile[noexec] = "1"
# The ${D} is used as a temporary directory and we don't generate any
# packages for this recipe.
do_install() {
cp -a ${S} ${D}/
cp -a ${WORKDIR}/${UNPACK_DIR} ${D}
cp -f ${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/firmware/bl1-juno.bin \
${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/SOFTWARE/bl1.bin
${D}/${UNPACK_DIR}/SOFTWARE/bl1.bin
cp -f ${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/firmware/fip-juno.bin \
${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/SOFTWARE/fip.bin
${D}/${UNPACK_DIR}/SOFTWARE/fip.bin
cp -f ${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/firmware/scp_romfw_bypass.bin \
${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/SOFTWARE/scp_bl1.bin
${D}/${UNPACK_DIR}/SOFTWARE/scp_bl1.bin
# u-boot environment file
cp -f ${UNPACKDIR}/uEnv.txt ${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/SOFTWARE/
cp -f ${WORKDIR}/uEnv.txt ${D}/${UNPACK_DIR}/SOFTWARE/
# Juno images list file
cp -f ${UNPACKDIR}/images-r0.txt ${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/SITE1/HBI0262B/images.txt
cp -f ${UNPACKDIR}/images-r1.txt ${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/SITE1/HBI0262C/images.txt
cp -f ${UNPACKDIR}/images-r2.txt ${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/SITE1/HBI0262D/images.txt
cp -f ${WORKDIR}/images-r0.txt ${D}/${UNPACK_DIR}/SITE1/HBI0262B/images.txt
cp -f ${WORKDIR}/images-r1.txt ${D}/${UNPACK_DIR}/SITE1/HBI0262C/images.txt
cp -f ${WORKDIR}/images-r2.txt ${D}/${UNPACK_DIR}/SITE1/HBI0262D/images.txt
}
do_deploy() {
@@ -60,18 +59,18 @@ do_deploy() {
# task.
for f in ${KERNEL_DEVICETREE}; do
install -m 755 -c ${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/$(basename $f) \
${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/SOFTWARE/
${D}/${UNPACK_DIR}/SOFTWARE/.
done
if [ "${INITRAMFS_IMAGE_BUNDLE}" -eq 1 ]; then
cp -L -f ${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/Image.gz-initramfs-juno.bin \
${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/SOFTWARE/Image
${D}/${UNPACK_DIR}/SOFTWARE/Image
else
cp -L -f ${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE} ${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/SOFTWARE/
cp -L -f ${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE} ${D}/${UNPACK_DIR}/SOFTWARE/
fi
# Compress the files
tar -C ${D}/${FIRMWARE_DIR} -zcvf ${WORKDIR}/${PN}.tar.gz ./
tar -C ${D}/${UNPACK_DIR} -zcvf ${WORKDIR}/${PN}.tar.gz ./
# Deploy the compressed archive to the deploy folder
install -D -p -m0644 ${WORKDIR}/${PN}.tar.gz ${DEPLOYDIR}/${PN}.tar.gz
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
SUMMARY = "Board Firmware binaries for N1SDP"
SECTION = "firmware"
LICENSE = "STM-SLA0044-Rev5"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSES/MB/STM.TXT;md5=1b74d8c842307d03c116f2d71cbf868a"
inherit deploy
INHIBIT_DEFAULT_DEPS = "1"
PACKAGE_ARCH = "${MACHINE_ARCH}"
COMPATIBLE_MACHINE = "n1sdp"
SRC_URI = "git://git.gitlab.arm.com/arm-reference-solutions/board-firmware.git;protocol=https;branch=n1sdp"
SRCREV = "70ba494265eee76747faff38264860c19e214540"
PV .= "+git"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
INSTALL_DIR = "/n1sdp-board-firmware_source"
do_install() {
rm -rf ${S}/SOFTWARE
install -d ${D}${INSTALL_DIR}
cp -Rp --no-preserve=ownership ${S}/* ${D}${INSTALL_DIR}
}
FILES:${PN}-staticdev += " ${INSTALL_DIR}/LIB/sensor.a"
FILES:${PN} = "${INSTALL_DIR}"
SYSROOT_DIRS += "${INSTALL_DIR}"
do_deploy() {
install -d ${DEPLOYDIR}${INSTALL_DIR}
cp -Rp --no-preserve=ownership ${S}/* ${DEPLOYDIR}${INSTALL_DIR}
}
addtask deploy after do_install before do_build
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
SUMMARY = "Firmware image recipe for generating SD-Card artifacts."
inherit deploy nopackages
DEPENDS = "trusted-firmware-a \
virtual/control-processor-firmware \
n1sdp-board-firmware"
LICENSE = "MIT"
PACKAGE_ARCH = "${MACHINE_ARCH}"
COMPATIBLE_MACHINE = "n1sdp"
RM_WORK_EXCLUDE += "${PN}"
do_configure[noexec] = "1"
do_compile[noexec] = "1"
do_install[noexec] = "1"
FIRMWARE_DIR = "n1sdp-board-firmware_source"
PRIMARY_DIR = "${WORKDIR}/n1sdp-board-firmware_primary"
SECONDARY_DIR = "${WORKDIR}/n1sdp-board-firmware_secondary"
SOC_BINARIES = "mcp_fw.bin scp_fw.bin mcp_rom.bin scp_rom.bin"
prepare_package() {
cd ${WORKDIR}
# Master/Primary
cp -av ${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/* ${PRIMARY_DIR}
mkdir -p ${PRIMARY_DIR}/SOFTWARE/
# Copy FIP binary
cp -v ${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/firmware/fip.bin ${PRIMARY_DIR}/SOFTWARE/
# Copy SOC binaries
for f in ${SOC_BINARIES}; do
cp -v ${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/firmware/${f} ${PRIMARY_DIR}/SOFTWARE/
done
sed -i -e 's|^C2C_ENABLE.*|C2C_ENABLE: TRUE ;C2C enable TRUE/FALSE|' \
${PRIMARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/io_v123f.txt
sed -i -e 's|^C2C_SIDE.*|C2C_SIDE: MASTER ;C2C side SLAVE/MASTER|' \
${PRIMARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/io_v123f.txt
sed -i -e 's|.*SOCCON: 0x1170.*PLATFORM_CTRL.*|SOCCON: 0x1170 0x00000100 ;SoC SCC PLATFORM_CTRL|' \
${PRIMARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/io_v123f.txt
# Update load address for trusted boot
sed -i -e '/^IMAGE4ADDRESS:/ s|0x60200000|0x64200000|' ${PRIMARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/images.txt
sed -i -e '/^IMAGE4UPDATE:/ s|FORCE |SCP_AUTO|' ${PRIMARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/images.txt
sed -i -e '/^IMAGE4FILE: \\SOFTWARE\\/s|uefi.bin|fip.bin |' ${PRIMARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/images.txt
# Slave/Secondary
cp -av ${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/${FIRMWARE_DIR}/* ${SECONDARY_DIR}
mkdir -p ${SECONDARY_DIR}/SOFTWARE/
# Copy SOC binaries
for f in ${SOC_BINARIES}; do
cp -v ${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/firmware/${f} ${SECONDARY_DIR}/SOFTWARE/
done
sed -i -e 's|^C2C_ENABLE.*|C2C_ENABLE: TRUE ;C2C enable TRUE/FALSE|' \
${SECONDARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/io_v123f.txt
sed -i -e 's|^C2C_SIDE.*|C2C_SIDE: SLAVE ;C2C side SLAVE/MASTER|' \
${SECONDARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/io_v123f.txt
sed -i -e 's|.*SOCCON: 0x1170.*PLATFORM_CTRL.*|SOCCON: 0x1170 0x00000101 ;SoC SCC PLATFORM_CTRL|' \
${SECONDARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/io_v123f.txt
sed -i -e '/^TOTALIMAGES:/ s|5|4|' ${SECONDARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/images.txt
sed -i -e 's|^IMAGE4|;&|' ${SECONDARY_DIR}/MB/HBI0316A/images.txt
}
do_deploy() {
# prepare Master & Slave packages
prepare_package
for dir in ${PRIMARY_DIR} ${SECONDARY_DIR}; do
dir_name=$(basename ${dir})
mkdir -p ${D}/${dir_name}
cp -av ${dir} ${D}
# Compress the files
tar -C ${D}/${dir_name} -zcvf ${DEPLOYDIR}/${dir_name}.tar.gz ./
done
}
do_deploy[dirs] += "${PRIMARY_DIR} ${SECONDARY_DIR}"
do_deploy[cleandirs] += "${PRIMARY_DIR} ${SECONDARY_DIR}"
do_deploy[umask] = "022"
addtask deploy after do_prepare_recipe_sysroot
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
# N1SDP specific SCP configurations and build instructions
COMPATIBLE_MACHINE:n1sdp = "n1sdp"
SCP_LOG_LEVEL = "INFO"
DEPENDS += "fiptool-native"
DEPENDS += "trusted-firmware-a"
DEPENDS += "n1sdp-board-firmware"
# The n1sdp sensor library is needed for building SCP N1SDP Platform
# https://github.com/ARM-software/SCP-firmware/tree/master/product/n1sdp
EXTRA_OECMAKE:append = " \
-DSCP_N1SDP_SENSOR_LIB_PATH=${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/n1sdp-board-firmware_source/LIB/sensor.a \
"
do_install:append() {
fiptool \
create \
--scp-fw "${D}/firmware/scp_ramfw.bin" \
--blob uuid=cfacc2c4-15e8-4668-82be-430a38fad705,file="${RECIPE_SYSROOT}/firmware/bl1.bin" \
"scp_fw.bin"
# This UUID is FIP_UUID_MCP_BL2 in SCP-Firmware.
fiptool \
create \
--blob uuid=54464222-a4cf-4bf8-b1b6-cee7dade539e,file="${D}/firmware/mcp_ramfw.bin" \
"mcp_fw.bin"
install "scp_fw.bin" "${D}/firmware/scp_fw.bin"
install "mcp_fw.bin" "${D}/firmware/mcp_fw.bin"
ln -sf "scp_romfw.bin" "${D}/firmware/scp_rom.bin"
ln -sf "mcp_romfw.bin" "${D}/firmware/mcp_rom.bin"
}
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
MACHINE_SCP_REQUIRE ?= ""
MACHINE_SCP_REQUIRE:juno = "scp-firmware-juno.inc"
MACHINE_SCP_REQUIRE:n1sdp = "scp-firmware-n1sdp.inc"
MACHINE_SCP_REQUIRE:sgi575 = "scp-firmware-sgi575.inc"
MACHINE_SCP_REQUIRE:tc = "scp-firmware-tc.inc"
require ${MACHINE_SCP_REQUIRE}
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From d70a07562d3b0a7b4441922fd3ce136565927d04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emekcan Aras <Emekcan.Aras@arm.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 07:57:36 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fix(corstone1000): pass spsr value explicitly
Passes spsr value for BL32 (OPTEE) explicitly between different boot
stages.
Upstream-Status: Pending
Signed-off-by: Emekcan Aras <Emekcan.Aras@arm.com>
---
.../corstone1000/common/corstone1000_bl2_mem_params_desc.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_bl2_mem_params_desc.c b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_bl2_mem_params_desc.c
index fe521a9fa..2cc096f38 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_bl2_mem_params_desc.c
+++ b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_bl2_mem_params_desc.c
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ static bl_mem_params_node_t bl2_mem_params_descs[] = {
SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP,
VERSION_2, entry_point_info_t, NON_SECURE | EXECUTABLE),
.ep_info.pc = BL33_BASE,
-
+ .ep_info.spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL2, MODE_SP_ELX,
+ DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS),
SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_EP,
VERSION_2, image_info_t, 0),
.image_info.image_base = BL33_BASE,
--
2.25.1
@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
From 977f06e10e549d01a641a62a1d4850a06d6f0df4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harsimran Singh Tungal <harsimransingh.tungal@arm.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Aug 2025 10:05:02 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] plat: corstone1000: add Cortex-A320 support
Introduce `CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320` to enable Cortex-A320 on
Corstone-1000 while keeping Cortex-A35 as the default. When the
define is enabled, the build switches from `cortex_a35.S` to
`cortex_a320.S`, maintaining compatibility with existing A35-based
designs.
Also add Normal-World mappings for the Ethos-U85 NPU and its SRAM
on Cortex-A320 platforms so U-Boot and other non-secure software
can safely access these regions:
* **Ethos-U85 registers**: base `0x1A050000`, size `0x00004000` (16 KB),
attrs `MT_DEVICE | MT_RW | MT_NS`
* **Non-secure SRAM**: base `0x02400000`, size `0x00400000` (4 MB),
attrs `MT_MEMORY | MT_RW | MT_NS`
Enable GICv3 with GIC-600 when building for Cortex-A320 (retain
GICv2/GIC-400 for Cortex-A35):
* Update `plat_my_core_pos()` and `plat_arm_calc_core_pos()` to use
the Cortex-A320 MPIDR_EL1 affinity layout.
* Add an A320-specific core-position routine in assembly guarded by
`CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320`.
* Switch to the GICv3 driver with GIC-600 extensions: update GIC base
addresses, use GICv3 APIs, and set `USE_GIC_DRIVER=3`,
`GICV3_SUPPORT_GIC600=1`, `GIC_ENABLE_V4_EXTN=1`.
These changes prepare the platform for Cortex-A320 integration and
ensure correct GIC configuration and secondary-core bring-up, while
preserving A35 behavior.
Upstream-Status: Submitted (https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/45729)
Signed-off-by: Harsimran Singh Tungal <harsimransingh.tungal@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frazer Carsley <frazer.carsley@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Safwat <michael.safwat@arm.com>
---
.../common/corstone1000_helpers.S | 35 ++++++++++++++++++-
.../corstone1000/common/corstone1000_plat.c | 4 +++
.../corstone1000/common/corstone1000_pm.c | 8 +++++
.../common/include/platform_def.h | 28 ++++++++++++++-
plat/arm/board/corstone1000/platform.mk | 11 ++++++
5 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_helpers.S b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_helpers.S
index a4ca9fe98..665dbc61a 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_helpers.S
+++ b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_helpers.S
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2021-2024 Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021-2025 Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@@ -13,6 +13,39 @@
.globl plat_is_my_cpu_primary
.globl plat_arm_calc_core_pos
+#ifdef CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320
+ .globl plat_my_core_pos
+
+func plat_my_core_pos
+ mrs x0, mpidr_el1
+ b plat_arm_calc_core_pos
+endfunc plat_my_core_pos
+
+func plat_arm_calc_core_pos
+ /* Aff0 is always 0 for Cortex-A320
+ MPIDR format: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/109551/0001/AArch64-registers/AArch64-Identification-registers-summary/MPIDR-EL1--Multiprocessor-Affinity-Register?lang=en
+ */
+ /* Extract Aff1 (core ID) */
+ ubfx x1, x0, #MPIDR_AFF1_SHIFT, #MPIDR_AFFINITY_BITS
+
+ /* Extract Aff2 (cluster lower bits) */
+ ubfx x2, x0, #MPIDR_AFF2_SHIFT, #MPIDR_AFFINITY_BITS
+
+ /* Extract Aff3 (cluster upper bits) */
+ ubfx x3, x0, #MPIDR_AFF3_SHIFT, #MPIDR_AFFINITY_BITS
+
+ /* cluster_id = (Aff3 << 8) | Aff2 */
+ lsl x3, x3, #MPIDR_AFFINITY_BITS
+ orr x3, x3, x2
+
+ /* core_pos = core_id + (cluster_id * FVP_MAX_CPUS_PER_CLUSTER) */
+ mov x4, #CORSTONE1000_MAX_CPUS_PER_CLUSTER
+ madd x0, x3, x4, x1
+
+ ret
+endfunc plat_arm_calc_core_pos
+#endif
+
/* --------------------------------------------------------------------
* void plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup (void);
*
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_plat.c b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_plat.c
index e388c82f3..d34e80b29 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_plat.c
+++ b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_plat.c
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ const mmap_region_t plat_arm_mmap[] = {
ARM_MAP_NS_DRAM1,
CORSTONE1000_MAP_DEVICE,
CORSTONE1000_EXTERNAL_FLASH,
+#ifdef CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320
+ ARM_MAP_ETHOS_U85,
+ ARM_MAP_NONSECURE_SRAM,
+#endif
{0}
};
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_pm.c b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_pm.c
index ac808873b..a87697e97 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_pm.c
+++ b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_pm.c
@@ -8,7 +8,11 @@
#include <plat/arm/common/plat_arm.h>
#include <platform_def.h>
#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#ifdef CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320
+#include <drivers/arm/gicv3.h>
+#else
#include <drivers/arm/gicv2.h>
+#endif
/*******************************************************************************
* Export the platform handlers via plat_arm_psci_pm_ops. The ARM Standard
* platform layer will take care of registering the handlers with PSCI.
@@ -24,7 +28,11 @@ static void corstone1000_system_reset(void)
* Disable GIC CPU interface to prevent pending interrupt
* from waking up the AP from WFI.
*/
+#ifdef CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320
+ gicv3_cpuif_disable(plat_my_core_pos());
+#else
gicv2_cpuif_disable();
+#endif
/* Flush and invalidate data cache */
dcsw_op_all(DCCISW);
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/include/platform_def.h b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/include/platform_def.h
index caf3d462f..ee0babbf8 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/include/platform_def.h
+++ b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/include/platform_def.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2021-2024, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021-2025, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@@ -112,12 +112,19 @@
#define ARM_SHARED_RAM_SIZE (SZ_8K) /* 8 KB */
#define ARM_SHARED_RAM_BASE ARM_TRUSTED_SRAM_BASE
+#ifdef CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320
+#define TOTAL_SECURE_SRAM_SIZE (SZ_4M)
+#define TOTAL_NONSECURE_SRAM_SIZE (SZ_4M)
+#define PLAT_ARM_TRUSTED_SRAM_SIZE (TOTAL_SECURE_SRAM_SIZE - \
+ ARM_SHARED_RAM_SIZE)
+#else
/* The remaining Trusted SRAM is used to load the BL images */
#define TOTAL_SRAM_SIZE (SZ_4M) /* 4 MB */
#define PLAT_ARM_TRUSTED_SRAM_SIZE (TOTAL_SRAM_SIZE - \
ARM_SHARED_RAM_SIZE)
+#endif
#define PLAT_ARM_MAX_BL2_SIZE (180 * SZ_1K) /* 180 KB */
@@ -209,8 +216,13 @@
#define MAX_IO_BLOCK_DEVICES 1
/* GIC related constants */
+#ifdef CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320
+#define PLAT_ARM_GICD_BASE 0x1C000000
+#define PLAT_ARM_GICR_BASE 0x1C040000
+#else
#define PLAT_ARM_GICD_BASE 0x1C010000
#define PLAT_ARM_GICC_BASE 0x1C02F000
+#endif
/* MHUv2 Secure Channel receiver and sender */
#define PLAT_SDK700_MHU0_SEND 0x1B800000
@@ -335,6 +347,20 @@
CORSTONE1000_DEVICE_BASE, \
CORSTONE1000_DEVICE_SIZE, \
MT_DEVICE | MT_RW | MT_SECURE)
+#ifdef CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320
+#define ARM_ETHOS_U85_BASE UL(0x1A050000)
+#define ARM_ETHOS_U85_SIZE UL(0x4000)
+#define ARM_MAP_ETHOS_U85 MAP_REGION_FLAT( \
+ ARM_ETHOS_U85_BASE, \
+ ARM_ETHOS_U85_SIZE, \
+ MT_DEVICE | MT_RW | MT_NS)
+
+#define ARM_NONSECURE_SRAM_BASE (ARM_TRUSTED_SRAM_BASE + TOTAL_SECURE_SRAM_SIZE)
+#define ARM_MAP_NONSECURE_SRAM MAP_REGION_FLAT( \
+ ARM_NONSECURE_SRAM_BASE, \
+ TOTAL_NONSECURE_SRAM_SIZE, \
+ MT_MEMORY | MT_RW | MT_NS)
+#endif
#define ARM_IRQ_SEC_PHY_TIMER 29
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/platform.mk b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/platform.mk
index 65be9c1f5..fe3e94865 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/platform.mk
+++ b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/platform.mk
@@ -9,7 +9,14 @@ ifeq ($(filter ${TARGET_PLATFORM}, fpga fvp),)
$(error TARGET_PLATFORM must be fpga or fvp)
endif
+ifdef CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320
+CORSTONE1000_CPU_LIBS +=lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a320.S
+$(eval $(call add_define,CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320))
+GIC_ENABLE_V4_EXTN := 1
+GICV3_SUPPORT_GIC600 := 1
+else
CORSTONE1000_CPU_LIBS +=lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a35.S
+endif
PLAT_INCLUDES := -Iplat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/include \
-Iplat/arm/board/corstone1000/include \
@@ -43,7 +50,11 @@ $(eval $(call add_define,CORSTONE1000_FVP_MULTICORE))
endif
endif
+ifdef CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320
+USE_GIC_DRIVER := 3
+else
USE_GIC_DRIVER := 2
+endif
BL2_SOURCES += plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_security.c \
plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_err.c \
--
2.50.1
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
From 684b8f88238f522b52eb102485762e02e6b1671a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emekcan Aras <Emekcan.Aras@arm.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2024 13:17:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fix(spmd): remove EL3 interrupt registration
This configuration should not be done for corstone1000 and similar
platforms. GICv2 systems only support EL3 interrupts and can have SEL1 component
as SPMC.
Signed-off-by: Emekcan Aras <Emekcan.Aras@arm.com>
Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [Discussions of fixing this in a better way is ongoing in upstream]
---
services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c | 24 ------------------------
1 file changed, 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c
index 066571e9b..313f05bf3 100644
--- a/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c
+++ b/services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c
@@ -580,30 +580,6 @@ static int spmd_spmc_init(void *pm_addr)
panic();
}
- /*
- * Permit configurations where the SPM resides at S-EL1/2 and upon a
- * Group0 interrupt triggering while the normal world runs, the
- * interrupt is routed either through the EHF or directly to the SPMD:
- *
- * EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=0: the Group0 interrupt is routed to the SPMD
- * for handling by spmd_group0_interrupt_handler_nwd.
- *
- * EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1: the Group0 interrupt is routed to the EHF.
- *
- */
-#if (EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING == 0)
- /*
- * Register an interrupt handler routing Group0 interrupts to SPMD
- * while the NWd is running.
- */
- rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_EL3,
- spmd_group0_interrupt_handler_nwd,
- flags);
- if (rc != 0) {
- panic();
- }
-#endif
-
return 0;
}
--
2.25.1
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
From 19600e6718e1a5b2ac8ec27d471acdafce0e433e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emekcan Aras <Emekcan.Aras@arm.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 11:30:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fix(corstone1000): remove unused NS_SHARED_RAM region
After enabling additional features in Trusted Services, the size of BL32 image
(OP-TEE + Trusted Services SPs) is larger now. To create more space in secure RAM
for BL32 image, this patch removes NS_SHARED_RAM region which is not currently used by
corstone1000 platform.
Signed-off-by: Emekcan Aras <Emekcan.Aras@arm.com>
Upstream-Status: Pending
---
.../corstone1000/common/corstone1000_plat.c | 1 -
.../common/include/platform_def.h | 19 +------------------
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_plat.c b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_plat.c
index ed3801caa..a9475859a 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_plat.c
+++ b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_plat.c
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
const mmap_region_t plat_arm_mmap[] = {
ARM_MAP_SHARED_RAM,
- ARM_MAP_NS_SHARED_RAM,
ARM_MAP_NS_DRAM1,
CORSTONE1000_MAP_DEVICE,
CORSTONE1000_EXTERNAL_FLASH,
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/include/platform_def.h b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/include/platform_def.h
index 442d187f0..18fce4486 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/include/platform_def.h
+++ b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/include/platform_def.h
@@ -90,9 +90,6 @@
* partition size: 176 KB
* content: BL2
*
- * <ARM_NS_SHARED_RAM_BASE> = <ARM_TRUSTED_SRAM_BASE> + 1 MB
- * partition size: 512 KB
- * content: BL33 (u-boot)
*/
/* DDR memory */
@@ -117,11 +114,7 @@
/* The remaining Trusted SRAM is used to load the BL images */
#define TOTAL_SRAM_SIZE (SZ_4M) /* 4 MB */
-/* Last 512KB of CVM is allocated for shared RAM as an example openAMP */
-#define ARM_NS_SHARED_RAM_SIZE (512 * SZ_1K)
-
#define PLAT_ARM_TRUSTED_SRAM_SIZE (TOTAL_SRAM_SIZE - \
- ARM_NS_SHARED_RAM_SIZE - \
ARM_SHARED_RAM_SIZE)
#define PLAT_ARM_MAX_BL2_SIZE (180 * SZ_1K) /* 180 KB */
@@ -160,11 +153,6 @@
/* NS memory */
-/* The last 512KB of the SRAM is allocated as shared memory */
-#define ARM_NS_SHARED_RAM_BASE (ARM_TRUSTED_SRAM_BASE + TOTAL_SRAM_SIZE - \
- (PLAT_ARM_MAX_BL31_SIZE + \
- PLAT_ARM_MAX_BL32_SIZE))
-
#define BL33_BASE ARM_DRAM1_BASE
#define PLAT_ARM_MAX_BL33_SIZE (12 * SZ_1M) /* 12 MB*/
#define BL33_LIMIT (ARM_DRAM1_BASE + PLAT_ARM_MAX_BL33_SIZE)
@@ -266,7 +254,7 @@
#define PLAT_ARM_TRUSTED_MAILBOX_BASE ARM_TRUSTED_SRAM_BASE
#define PLAT_ARM_NSTIMER_FRAME_ID U(1)
-#define PLAT_ARM_NS_IMAGE_BASE (ARM_NS_SHARED_RAM_BASE)
+#define PLAT_ARM_NS_IMAGE_BASE (BL33_BASE)
#define PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE (1ULL << 32)
#define PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE (1ULL << 32)
@@ -295,11 +283,6 @@
ARM_SHARED_RAM_SIZE, \
MT_MEMORY | MT_RW | MT_SECURE)
-#define ARM_MAP_NS_SHARED_RAM MAP_REGION_FLAT( \
- ARM_NS_SHARED_RAM_BASE, \
- ARM_NS_SHARED_RAM_SIZE, \
- MT_MEMORY | MT_RW | MT_NS)
-
#define ARM_MAP_NS_DRAM1 MAP_REGION_FLAT( \
ARM_NS_DRAM1_BASE, \
ARM_NS_DRAM1_SIZE, \
--
2.25.1
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 37f92eeb4361626072e690adb3b0bb20db7c2fca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emekcan Aras <Emekcan.Aras@arm.com>
Date: Wed, 15 May 2024 13:54:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fix(corstone1000): clean the cache and disable interrupt
before system reset
Corstone1000 does not properly clean the cache and disable gic interrupts
before the reset. This causes a race condition especially in FVP after reset.
This adds proper sequence before resetting the platform.
Signed-off-by: Emekcan Aras <Emekcan.Aras@arm.com>
Upstream-Status: Pending
---
plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_pm.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_pm.c b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_pm.c
index 4b0a791e7..a52e945bf 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_pm.c
+++ b/plat/arm/board/corstone1000/common/corstone1000_pm.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <lib/psci/psci.h>
#include <plat/arm/common/plat_arm.h>
#include <platform_def.h>
+#include <drivers/arm/gicv2.h>
/*******************************************************************************
* Export the platform handlers via plat_arm_psci_pm_ops. The ARM Standard
* platform layer will take care of registering the handlers with PSCI.
@@ -18,6 +19,14 @@ static void __dead2 corstone1000_system_reset(void)
uint32_t volatile * const watchdog_ctrl_reg = (uint32_t *) SECURE_WATCHDOG_ADDR_CTRL_REG;
uint32_t volatile * const watchdog_val_reg = (uint32_t *) SECURE_WATCHDOG_ADDR_VAL_REG;
+ /* Flush and invalidate data cache */
+ dcsw_op_all(DCCISW);
+ /*
+ * Disable GIC CPU interface to prevent pending interrupt
+ * from waking up the AP from WFI.
+ */
+ gicv2_cpuif_disable();
+
*(watchdog_val_reg) = SECURE_WATCHDOG_COUNTDOWN_VAL;
*watchdog_ctrl_reg = SECURE_WATCHDOG_MASK_ENABLE;
while (1) {
--
2.25.1
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 328bfd8cd95bb0973e4966dcb4e3efa05d62f3f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christophe Thiblot <christophe.thiblot@arm.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 15:03:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fix: exclude Boot requirement tests for Corstone-1000
A test compares the value of the Generic Timer register CNTFRQ visible in
two frames CNTBaseN and CNTCTLBase that are linked in Armv8-A and reflect
the same value.
An issue in Corstone-1000 (errata 2142118) makes the CNTFRQ views
inconsistents and the then test fails. There is no workaround and
the test is skipped.
Errata: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/sden2142076/0002/?lang=en
Signed-off-by: Christophe Thiblot <christophe.thiblot@arm.com>
Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/tf-a-tests/+/40810]
---
plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip.txt | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip.txt b/plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip.txt
index d937e42..afa3992 100644
--- a/plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip.txt
+++ b/plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip.txt
@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ PSCI CPU Suspend in OSI mode
PSCI STAT/for valid composite state CPU suspend
FF-A Setup and Discovery/FF-A RXTX remap unmapped region success
FF-A Memory Sharing/Normal World VM retrieve request into SPMC
+Boot requirement tests
--
2.43.0
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
From 82ca3fcf5c323aec4ce8191c349fd7e00a840e02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Safwat <michael.safwat@arm.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2025 11:20:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] plat: corstone1000: Add Cortex-A320 support
Switch platform to GICv3 (GIC-600) for Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320
depending on CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320:
- Define GICD and GICR bases.
- Update the platform sources to include the GIC-V3 files.
Move the NVM offset to prevent overlap with the TFTF firmware,
which starts at 0x80000000 (TFTF_BASE).
Introduce a new skip file tests_to_skip_cortex_a320 to be used when building
TF-A-Tests with CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320=1. This ensures that tests which
are not supported or cause traps on Corstone-1000 with Cortex-A320 are
consistently skipped during execution.
Skipped entries:
CPU extensions/AMUv1 suspend/resume
CPU extensions/Use trace buffer control Registers
Signed-off-by: Michael Safwat <michael.safwat@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harsimran Singh Tungal <harsimransingh.tungal@arm.com>
Upstream-Status: Submitted (https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/tf-a-tests/+/42352)
---
plat/arm/corstone1000/corstone1000_def.h | 12 +++++++++-
plat/arm/corstone1000/include/platform_def.h | 11 +++++----
plat/arm/corstone1000/platform.mk | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
.../tests_to_skip_cortex_a320.txt | 21 +++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip_cortex_a320.txt
diff --git a/plat/arm/corstone1000/corstone1000_def.h b/plat/arm/corstone1000/corstone1000_def.h
index 3e6f036a..c4fa9a3b 100644
--- a/plat/arm/corstone1000/corstone1000_def.h
+++ b/plat/arm/corstone1000/corstone1000_def.h
@@ -26,13 +26,23 @@
* GIC-400 & interrupt handling related constants
******************************************************************************/
/* GIC memory map */
+#ifdef CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320
+#define GICD_BASE 0x1C000000
+#define GICR_BASE 0x1C040000
+
+/* GIC re-distributor doesn't exits on gic-600, but we still need to
+ * provide GICC_BASE as the gic driver needs it
+ */
+#define GICC_BASE 0x0
+#else
+
#define GICD_BASE 0x1C010000
#define GICC_BASE 0x1C02F000
/* GIC re-distributor doesn't exits on gic-400, but we still need to
* provide GICR_BASE as the gic driver needs it
*/
#define GICR_BASE 0x0
-
+#endif
/*******************************************************************************
* PL011 related constants
******************************************************************************/
diff --git a/plat/arm/corstone1000/include/platform_def.h b/plat/arm/corstone1000/include/platform_def.h
index a0d6f7b3..1fc505d0 100644
--- a/plat/arm/corstone1000/include/platform_def.h
+++ b/plat/arm/corstone1000/include/platform_def.h
@@ -98,12 +98,13 @@
#endif
/*
- * USE 0x200000 DRAM offset to store TFTF data
- *
- * Please note that this won't be suitable for all test scenarios and
- * for this reason some tests will be disabled in this configuration.
+ * When USE_NVM = 0, TFTF_NVM_OFFSET marks the DRAM region
+ * used as NVM. This region must not overlap the memory where
+ * the TFTF image is loaded. The load address is given by
+ * the TFTF_BASE macro. Set TFTF_NVM_OFFSET to leave enough
+ * space for the TFTF image.
*/
-#define TFTF_NVM_OFFSET 0x40000
+#define TFTF_NVM_OFFSET 0x80000
#define TFTF_NVM_SIZE (128 * SZ_1M) /* 128 MB */
/*******************************************************************************
diff --git a/plat/arm/corstone1000/platform.mk b/plat/arm/corstone1000/platform.mk
index a5a011d5..fd98724a 100644
--- a/plat/arm/corstone1000/platform.mk
+++ b/plat/arm/corstone1000/platform.mk
@@ -6,6 +6,19 @@
PLAT_INCLUDES := -Iplat/arm/corstone1000/include/
+CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320 := 0
+ifeq (${CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320},1)
+PLAT_SOURCES := drivers/arm/gic/arm_gic_v2v3.c \
+ drivers/arm/gic/gic_v2.c \
+ drivers/arm/gic/gic_v3.c \
+ drivers/arm/timer/private_timer.c \
+ drivers/arm/timer/system_timer.c \
+ plat/arm/corstone1000/plat_helpers.S \
+ plat/arm/corstone1000/corstone1000_pwr_state.c \
+ plat/arm/corstone1000/corstone1000_topology.c \
+ plat/arm/corstone1000/corstone1000_mem_prot.c \
+ plat/arm/corstone1000/plat_setup.c
+else
PLAT_SOURCES := drivers/arm/gic/arm_gic_v2.c \
drivers/arm/gic/gic_v2.c \
drivers/arm/timer/private_timer.c \
@@ -15,6 +28,7 @@ PLAT_SOURCES := drivers/arm/gic/arm_gic_v2.c \
plat/arm/corstone1000/corstone1000_topology.c \
plat/arm/corstone1000/corstone1000_mem_prot.c \
plat/arm/corstone1000/plat_setup.c
+endif
PLAT_SUPPORTS_NS_RESET := 1
@@ -23,6 +37,15 @@ $(eval $(call assert_boolean,PLAT_SUPPORTS_NS_RESET))
$(eval $(call add_define,TFTF_DEFINES,PLAT_SUPPORTS_NS_RESET))
FIRMWARE_UPDATE := 0
+
+ifeq ($(CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320),1)
+$(eval $(call add_define,TFTF_DEFINES,CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320))
+endif
+
+ifeq (${CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320},1)
+PLAT_TESTS_SKIP_LIST := plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip_cortex_a320.txt
+else
PLAT_TESTS_SKIP_LIST := plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip.txt
+endif
include plat/arm/common/arm_common.mk
diff --git a/plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip_cortex_a320.txt b/plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip_cortex_a320.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..87b9241d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/arm/corstone1000/tests_to_skip_cortex_a320.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Realm payload tests
+Realm payload boot
+Realm payload multi CPU request
+Realm payload Delegate and Undelegate
+Multi CPU Realm payload Delegate and Undelegate
+Testing delegation fails
+Realm testing with SPM tests
+PSCI System Suspend Validation
+PSCI STAT/Stats test cases after system suspend
+IRQ support in TSP/Resume preempted STD SMC after PSCI SYSTEM SUSPEND
+PSCI SYSTEM SUSPEND stress tests
+Timer framework Validation/Verify the timer interrupt generation
+CPU Hotplug/CPU hotplug
+PSCI CPU Suspend
+PSCI CPU Suspend in OSI mode
+PSCI STAT/for valid composite state CPU suspend
+FF-A Setup and Discovery/FF-A RXTX remap unmapped region success
+FF-A Memory Sharing/Normal World VM retrieve request into SPMC
+Boot requirement tests
+CPU extensions/AMUv1 suspend/resume
+CPU extensions/Use trace buffer control Registers
--
2.43.0
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From b79d3cf319cc5698311ef83247110c93d3c2de2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <b79d3cf319cc5698311ef83247110c93d3c2de2c.1695834344.git.diego.sueiro@arm.com>
From: Diego Sueiro <diego.sueiro@arm.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2023 18:05:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fdts/fvp-base: Add stdout-path and virtio net and rng nodes
Upstream-Status: Pending
Signed-off-by: Diego Sueiro <diego.sueiro@arm.com>
---
fdts/fvp-base-psci-common.dtsi | 8 ++++++--
fdts/rtsm_ve-motherboard.dtsi | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fdts/fvp-base-psci-common.dtsi b/fdts/fvp-base-psci-common.dtsi
index 79cf37d3b0..b1ba5ce703 100644
--- a/fdts/fvp-base-psci-common.dtsi
+++ b/fdts/fvp-base-psci-common.dtsi
@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@
#if (ENABLE_RME == 1)
chosen { bootargs = "console=ttyAMA0 earlycon=pl011,0x1c090000 root=/dev/vda ip=on";};
#else
- chosen {};
+ chosen {
+ stdout-path = &v2m_serial0;
+ };
#endif
aliases {
@@ -243,6 +245,8 @@
<0 0 39 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 39 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<0 0 40 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 40 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<0 0 41 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 41 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
- <0 0 42 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 42 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+ <0 0 42 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 42 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+ <0 0 44 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 44 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+ <0 0 46 &gic 0 GIC_SPI 46 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
};
};
diff --git a/fdts/rtsm_ve-motherboard.dtsi b/fdts/rtsm_ve-motherboard.dtsi
index 0a824b349a..21a083a51a 100644
--- a/fdts/rtsm_ve-motherboard.dtsi
+++ b/fdts/rtsm_ve-motherboard.dtsi
@@ -230,6 +230,18 @@
interrupts = <42>;
};
+ virtio@150000 {
+ compatible = "virtio,mmio";
+ reg = <0x150000 0x200>;
+ interrupts = <44>;
+ };
+
+ virtio@200000 {
+ compatible = "virtio,mmio";
+ reg = <0x200000 0x200>;
+ interrupts = <46>;
+ };
+
rtc@170000 {
compatible = "arm,pl031", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x170000 0x1000>;
--
2.39.1
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 2d305094f8f500362079e9e7637d46129bf980e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Adam Johnston <adam.johnston@arm.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 16:05:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] n1sdp: Reserve OP-TEE memory from NWd
The physical memory which is used to run OP-TEE on the N1SDP is known
to the secure world via TOS_FW_CONFIG, but it may not be known to the
normal world.
As a precaution, explicitly reserve this memory via NT_FW_CONFIG to
prevent the normal world from using it. This is not required on most
platforms as the Trusted OS is run from secure RAM.
Upstream-Status: Pending (not yet submitted to upstream)
Signed-off-by: Adam Johnston <adam.johnston@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mariam Elshakfy <mariam.elshakfy@arm.com>
---
plat/arm/board/n1sdp/fdts/n1sdp_nt_fw_config.dts | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/fdts/n1sdp_nt_fw_config.dts b/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/fdts/n1sdp_nt_fw_config.dts
index da5e04ddb6..b7e2d4e86f 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/fdts/n1sdp_nt_fw_config.dts
+++ b/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/fdts/n1sdp_nt_fw_config.dts
@@ -20,4 +20,16 @@
local-ddr-size = <0x0>;
remote-ddr-size = <0x0>;
};
+
+ reserved-memory {
+ #address-cells = <2>;
+ #size-cells = <2>;
+ ranges;
+
+ optee@0xDE000000 {
+ compatible = "removed-dma-pool";
+ reg = <0x0 0xDE000000 0x0 0x02000000>;
+ no-map;
+ };
+ };
};
\ No newline at end of file
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From cc0153b56d634aa80b740be5afed15bedb94a2c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harsimran Singh Tungal <harsimransingh.tungal@arm.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 14:19:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] n1sdp patch tests to skip
Upstream-Status: Pending
Signed-off-by: Harsimran Singh Tungal <harsimransingh.tungal@arm.com>
---
plat/arm/n1sdp/tests_to_skip.txt | 15 ++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/plat/arm/n1sdp/tests_to_skip.txt b/plat/arm/n1sdp/tests_to_skip.txt
index b6e87bf..1848408 100644
--- a/plat/arm/n1sdp/tests_to_skip.txt
+++ b/plat/arm/n1sdp/tests_to_skip.txt
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ SMMUv3 tests
PSCI CPU Suspend in OSI mode
# PSCI is enabled but not tested
-PSCI STAT/Stats test cases after system suspend
+PSCI STAT
PSCI System Suspend Validation
# Disable FF-A Interrupt tests as TWDOG is not supported by TC platform
@@ -25,9 +25,14 @@ FF-A Interrupt
# files in TFTF, since the port was done purely to test the spectre workaround
# performance impact. Once that was done no further work was done on the port.
-Timer framework Validation/Target timer to a power down cpu
-Timer framework Validation/Test scenario where multiple CPUs call same timeout
-Timer framework Validation/Stress test the timer framework
+Timer framework Validation
PSCI Affinity Info/Affinity info level0 powerdown
PSCI CPU Suspend
-PSCI STAT/for valid composite state CPU suspend
+Framework Validation/NVM serialisation
+Framework Validation/Events API
+Boot requirement tests
+CPU Hotplug
+ARM_ARCH_SVC/SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 test
+ARM_ARCH_SVC/SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 test
+ARM_ARCH_SVC/SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 test
+FF-A Power management
--
2.34.1
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From 15dab90c3cb8e7677c4f953c2269e8ee1afa01b0 Mon Oct 2 13:45:43 2023
From: Mariam Elshakfy <mariam.elshakfy@arm.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2023 13:45:43 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Modify BL32 Location to DDR4
Since OP-TEE start address is changed to run
from DDR4, this patch changes BL32 entrypoint
to the correct one.
Upstream-Status: Pending (not yet submitted to upstream)
Signed-off-by: Mariam Elshakfy <mariam.elshakfy@arm.com>
---
plat/arm/board/n1sdp/fdts/n1sdp_optee_spmc_manifest.dts | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/fdts/n1sdp_optee_spmc_manifest.dts b/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/fdts/n1sdp_optee_spmc_manifest.dts
index ed870803c..797dfe3a4 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/fdts/n1sdp_optee_spmc_manifest.dts
+++ b/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/fdts/n1sdp_optee_spmc_manifest.dts
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@
maj_ver = <0x1>;
min_ver = <0x0>;
exec_state = <0x0>;
- load_address = <0x0 0x08000000>;
- entrypoint = <0x0 0x08000000>;
+ load_address = <0x0 0xDE000000>;
+ entrypoint = <0x0 0xDE000000>;
binary_size = <0x2000000>;
};
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From 9a1d11b9fbadf740c73aee6dca4fd0370b38e4a8 Tue Oct 3 13:49:13 2023
From: Mariam Elshakfy <mariam.elshakfy@arm.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 13:49:13 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Modify SPMC Base to DDR4
Since OP-TEE start address is changed to run
from DDR4, this patch changes SPMC base to
the correct one.
Upstream-Status: Pending (not yet submitted to upstream)
Signed-off-by: Mariam Elshakfy <mariam.elshakfy@arm.com>
---
plat/arm/board/n1sdp/include/platform_def.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/include/platform_def.h b/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/include/platform_def.h
index b3799a7b2..b12c61b61 100644
--- a/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/include/platform_def.h
+++ b/plat/arm/board/n1sdp/include/platform_def.h
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
#define PLAT_ARM_MAX_BL31_SIZE UL(0x40000)
-#define PLAT_ARM_SPMC_BASE U(0x08000000)
+#define PLAT_ARM_SPMC_BASE U(0xDE000000)
#define PLAT_ARM_SPMC_SIZE UL(0x02000000) /* 32 MB */
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From 051c723a6463a579b05dcaa81f204516737a3645 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2023 15:56:03 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Binutils 2.39 now warns when a segment has RXW
permissions[1]:
aarch64-none-elf-ld.bfd: warning: bl31.elf has a LOAD segment with RWX
permissions
However, TF-A passes --fatal-warnings to LD, so this is a build failure.
There is a ticket filed upstream[2], so until that is resolved just
remove --fatal-warnings.
[1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=ba951afb99912da01a6e8434126b8fac7aa75107
[2] https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/T996
Upstream-Status: Inappropriate
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
---
Makefile | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 1ddb7b84417d..9eae30c923ec 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ TF_LDFLAGS += $(TF_LDFLAGS_$(ARCH))
# LD = gcc (used when GCC LTO is enabled)
else ifneq ($(findstring gcc,$(notdir $(LD))),)
# Pass ld options with Wl or Xlinker switches
-TF_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--fatal-warnings -O1
+TF_LDFLAGS += -O1
TF_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--gc-sections
ifeq ($(ENABLE_LTO),1)
ifeq (${ARCH},aarch64)
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ TF_LDFLAGS += $(subst --,-Xlinker --,$(TF_LDFLAGS_$(ARCH)))
# LD = gcc-ld (ld) or llvm-ld (ld.lld) or other
else
-TF_LDFLAGS += --fatal-warnings -O1
+TF_LDFLAGS += -O1
TF_LDFLAGS += --gc-sections
# ld.lld doesn't recognize the errata flags,
# therefore don't add those in that case
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 6635341615a5bcb36ce71479ee30dae1599081e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Anton Antonov <anrton.antonov@arm.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2023 15:56:03 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Binutils 2.39 now warns when a segment has RXW
permissions[1]:
aarch64-poky-linux-musl-ld: tftf.elf has a LOAD segment with RWX permissions
There is a ticket filed upstream[2], so until that is resolved just
disable the warning
[1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=ba951afb99912da01a6e8434126b8fac7aa75107
[2] https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/T996
Upstream-Status: Inappropriate
Signed-off-by: Anton Antonov <anrton.antonov@arm.com>
---
Makefile | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 286a47c7d454..3481187b62cf 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ TFTF_SOURCES := ${FRAMEWORK_SOURCES} ${TESTS_SOURCES} ${PLAT_SOURCES} ${LIBC_SR
TFTF_INCLUDES += ${PLAT_INCLUDES}
TFTF_CFLAGS += ${COMMON_CFLAGS}
TFTF_ASFLAGS += ${COMMON_ASFLAGS}
-TFTF_LDFLAGS += ${COMMON_LDFLAGS}
+TFTF_LDFLAGS += ${COMMON_LDFLAGS} --no-warn-rwx-segments
TFTF_EXTRA_OBJS :=
ifneq (${BP_OPTION},none)
@@ -5,13 +5,13 @@
DESCRIPTION = "fiptool - Trusted Firmware tool for packaging"
LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
SRC_URI_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_A ?= "git://review.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a;protocol=https"
SRC_URI_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_A ?= "git://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git;protocol=https"
SRC_URI = "${SRC_URI_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_A};destsuffix=fiptool-${PV};branch=${SRCBRANCH}"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://docs/license.rst;md5=1118e32884721c0be33267bd7ae11130"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://docs/license.rst;md5=b2c740efedc159745b9b31f88ff03dde"
# Use fiptool from TF-A v2.13.0
SRCREV = "c17351450c8a513ca3f30f936e26a71db693a145"
SRCBRANCH = "master"
# Use fiptool from TF-A v2.8.6
SRCREV = "ff0bd5f9bb2ba2f31fb9cec96df917747af9e92d"
SRCBRANCH = "lts-v2.8"
DEPENDS += "openssl-native"
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ EXTRA_OEMAKE = "V=1 HOSTCC='${BUILD_CC}' OPENSSL_DIR=${STAGING_DIR_NATIVE}/${pre
do_compile () {
# This is still needed to have the native fiptool executing properly by
# setting the RPATH
sed -i '/^LDOPTS/ s,$, \$\{BUILD_LDFLAGS},' ${S}/tools/fiptool/Makefile
sed -i '/^LDLIBS/ s,$, \$\{BUILD_LDFLAGS},' ${S}/tools/fiptool/Makefile
sed -i '/^INCLUDE_PATHS/ s,$, \$\{BUILD_CFLAGS},' ${S}/tools/fiptool/Makefile
oe_runmake fiptool
@@ -1,20 +1,16 @@
# Machine specific TFAs
FILESEXTRAPATHS:prepend := "${THISDIR}/files:"
COMPATIBLE_MACHINE:corstone1000 = "corstone1000"
EXTRA_OEMAKE:append:corstone1000 = " DEBUG=0"
EXTRA_OEMAKE:append:corstone1000 = " LOG_LEVEL=30"
# Add Cortex-A320 specific configurations
EXTRA_OEMAKE:append:cortexa320 = " \
CORSTONE1000_CORTEX_A320=1 \
"
TFTF_MODE:corstone1000 = "release"
FILESEXTRAPATHS:prepend:corstone1000 := "${THISDIR}/files/corstone1000/tf-a-tests:"
SRC_URI:append:corstone1000 = " \
file://0001-fix-exclude-Boot-requirement-tests-for-Corstone-1000.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:corstone1000 = " \
file://0002-plat-corstone1000-Add-Cortex-A320-support.patch \
"
COMPATIBLE_MACHINE:n1sdp = "n1sdp"
EXTRA_OEMAKE:append:n1sdp = " DEBUG=1"
EXTRA_OEMAKE:append:n1sdp = " LOG_LEVEL=50"
TFTF_MODE:n1sdp = "debug"
SRC_URI:append:n1sdp = " \
file://0001-n1sdp-tftf-tests-to-skip.patch \
"

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