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redis: fix CVE-2026-66373
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1]. [1] https://github.com/redis/redis/commit/4f62a8bf15c634187d8a87d874f8988032f90b6c [2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66373 Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yurade@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@oss.qualcomm.com>
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@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
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From 4f62a8bf15c634187d8a87d874f8988032f90b6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: sggeorgiev <s_ggeorgiev@yahoo.com>
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Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 15:46:48 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH] Reject corrupt stream RDB with shared NACK across consumers
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(#15081)
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**Summary**
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Detects and rejects corrupt stream RDB payloads where the same NACK
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(pending entry) is referenced by more than one consumer, which violates
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a stream data-structure.
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**Changes**
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- **`rdbLoadObject` (stream consumer PEL loading)**: Added a guard that
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checks `nack->consumer != NULL` before assigning the consumer pointer.
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When a second consumer's PEL references a NACK that was already claimed
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by a prior consumer, the loader now reports a corrupt RDB error and
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aborts instead of silently overwriting the pointer. Without this check,
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two consumers share the same `streamNACK`, and freeing the first
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consumer's PEL leaves the second with a dangling pointer.
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- **`corrupt-dump.tcl`**: Added a regression test that crafts a stream
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with two consumers (`consumerA`, `consumerB`) whose PELs both reference
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the same entry (`1-0`). The `RESTORE` command is expected to fail with
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`"Bad data format"`, and the server must remain responsive (`PING`
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succeeds).
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**Benefits**
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- **Fail-fast on corrupt data**: The invariant violation is caught at
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load time with a clear diagnostic message rather than manifesting as a
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crash later during normal operation.
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- **Regression coverage**: The crafted payload in the test ensures this
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class of corruption is permanently guarded against.
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CVE: CVE-2026-66373
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/redis/redis/commit/4f62a8bf15c634187d8a87d874f8988032f90b6c]
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(cherry picked from commit 4f62a8bf15c634187d8a87d874f8988032f90b6c)
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Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yurade@cisco.com>
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---
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src/rdb.c | 8 ++++++++
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tests/integration/corrupt-dump.tcl | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
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2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/src/rdb.c b/src/rdb.c
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index 371353c2c..277ca543c 100644
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--- a/src/rdb.c
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+++ b/src/rdb.c
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@@ -3060,6 +3060,14 @@ robj *rdbLoadObject(int rdbtype, rio *rdb, sds key, int dbid, int *error)
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}
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streamNACK *nack = result;
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+ /* If the NACK already has a consumer assigned, the
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+ * payload is corrupt — each global PEL entry must be
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+ * claimed by exactly one consumer. */
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+ if (nack->consumer != NULL) {
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+ rdbReportCorruptRDB("Stream consumer PEL entry already has a consumer assigned");
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+ decrRefCount(o);
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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/* Set the NACK consumer, that was left to NULL when
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* loading the global PEL. Then set the same shared
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* NACK structure also in the consumer-specific PEL. */
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diff --git a/tests/integration/corrupt-dump.tcl b/tests/integration/corrupt-dump.tcl
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index 6017723e0..b04812e0f 100644
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--- a/tests/integration/corrupt-dump.tcl
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+++ b/tests/integration/corrupt-dump.tcl
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@@ -1020,10 +1020,26 @@ test {corrupt payload: stream - duplicated consumer PEL entry} {
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r restore key 0 "\x15\x01\x10\x00\x00\x01\x9b\x0d\x56\xa9\xb7\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xc3\x39\x40\x42\x15\x42\x00\x00\x00\x11\x00\x02\x01\x00\x01\x01\x01\x86\x66\x69\x65\x6c\x64\x31\x07\x00\x01\x40\x0f\x0a\x00\x01\x86\x76\x61\x6c\x75\x65\x31\x07\x04\x20\x0b\x02\xcd\xd9\x02\xe0\x01\x22\x01\x32\x07\x80\x1a\x04\x32\x07\x06\x01\xff\x02\x81\x00\x00\x01\x9b\x0d\x56\xb7\x90\x00\x81\x00\x00\x01\x9b\x0d\x56\xa9\xb7\x00\x00\x00\x02\x01\x07\x6d\x79\x67\x72\x6f\x75\x70\x81\x00\x00\x01\x9b\x0d\x56\xb7\x90\x00\x02\x02\x00\x00\x01\x9b\x0d\x56\xa9\xb7\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\xd9\x56\x0d\x9b\x01\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x01\x9b\x0d\x56\xb7\x90\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\xd9\x56\x0d\x9b\x01\x00\x00\x01\x01\x09\x63\x6f\x6e\x73\x75\x6d\x65\x72\x31\x80\xd9\x56\x0d\x9b\x01\x00\x00\x80\xd9\x56\x0d\x9b\x01\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x01\x9b\x0d\x56\xa9\xb7\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x9b\x0d\x56\xa9\xb7\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09\x00\x4b\xe0\x99\x30\x67\x4d\xe5\x87"
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} err
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assert_match "*Bad data format*" $err
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- verify_log_message 0 "*Duplicated consumer PEL entry*" 0
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+ verify_log_message 0 "*Stream consumer PEL entry already has a consumer assigned*" 0
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}
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}
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+test {corrupt payload: stream with NACK shared between two consumers} {
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+ start_server [list overrides [list loglevel verbose use-exit-on-panic yes crash-memcheck-enabled no]] {
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+ r debug set-skip-checksum-validation 1
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+ # Payload: stream with entry 1-0, one consumer group (mygroup),
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+ # two consumers whose PELs both reference 1-0 (shared NACK).
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+ # XACK on one consumer frees the NACK, leaving a dangling
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+ # pointer in the other consumer's PEL (use-after-free).
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+ catch {r RESTORE mystream 0 "\x1a\x01\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x1d\x1d\x00\x00\x00\x0a\x00\x01\x01\x00\x01\x01\x01\x81\x6b\x02\x00\x01\x02\x01\x00\x01\x00\x01\x81\x76\x02\x04\x01\xff\x01\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01\x07\x6d\x79\x67\x72\x6f\x75\x70\x01\x00\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x64\x42\xb9\x9d\x01\x00\x00\x01\x02\x09\x63\x6f\x6e\x73\x75\x6d\x65\x72\x41\x01\x64\x42\xb9\x9d\x01\x00\x00\x01\x64\x42\xb9\x9d\x01\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09\x63\x6f\x6e\x73\x75\x6d\x65\x72\x42\x01\x64\x42\xb9\x9d\x01\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x40\x64\x40\x64\x00\x00\x00\x0d\x00\xe7\x12\xf7\xcc\x25\xd5\x0e\x44"} err
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+ catch {r XACK mystream mygroup 1-0} _
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+ catch {r XREADGROUP GROUP mygroup consumerA COUNT 10 STREAMS mystream 0} _
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+ catch {r DEL mystream} _
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+ assert_match "*Bad data format*" $err
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+ r ping
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+ }
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+}
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+
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} ;# tags
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@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.redis.io/releases/${BP}.tar.gz \
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file://CVE-2026-23479.patch \
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file://CVE-2026-23631.patch \
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file://CVE-2026-25243.patch \
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file://CVE-2026-66373.patch \
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"
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SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6d0a9913887a4972536f9da226f1575859c34d86354129163260a5f9c6bd4229"
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