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klibc: patch CVE-2021-31872

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Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31872

Pick the patch mentioned by the nvd report.

Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Gyorgy Sarvari
2025-10-27 15:15:50 +01:00
parent aec3f2b612
commit 23f84ad1b7
2 changed files with 71 additions and 0 deletions
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meta-initramfs/recipes-devtools/klibc/files/CVE-2021-31872.patch
+70
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
From 5e8b9d0c9cef6194b3588b12f04afd617de3587d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 2021 05:16:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cpio: Fix possible integer overflow on 32-bit systems
The maximum name and file sizes in the "new" header format are 32-bit
unsigned values. However, the I/O functions mostly use long for sizes
and offsets, so that sizes >= 2^31 are handled wrongly on 32-bit
systems.
The current GNU cpio code doesn't seem to have this problem, but the
divergence between this version and that is large enough that I can't
simply cherry-pick a fix for it.
As a short-term fix, in read_in_new_ascii(), fail if c_namesize or
c_filesize is > LONG_MAX.
CVE-2021-31872
CVE: CVE-2021-31872
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/klibc/klibc.git/commit/?id=9b1c91577aef7f2e72c3aa11a27749160bd278ff]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
usr/utils/cpio.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/usr/utils/cpio.c b/usr/utils/cpio.c
index a13c876..9b0b6ae 100644
--- a/usr/utils/cpio.c
+++ b/usr/utils/cpio.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -904,6 +905,15 @@ static void read_in_new_ascii(struct new_cpio_header *file_hdr, int in_des)
file_hdr->c_hdr[i] = strtoul(hexbuf, NULL, 16);
ah += 8;
}
+
+ /* Sizes > LONG_MAX can currently result in integer overflow
+ in various places. Fail if name is too large. */
+ if (file_hdr->c_namesize > LONG_MAX) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: name size out of range\n",
+ progname);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
/* Read file name from input. */
free(file_hdr->c_name);
file_hdr->c_name = (char *)xmalloc(file_hdr->c_namesize);
@@ -914,6 +924,14 @@ static void read_in_new_ascii(struct new_cpio_header *file_hdr, int in_des)
is rounded up to the next long-word, so we might need to drop
1-3 bytes. */
tape_skip_padding(in_des, file_hdr->c_namesize + 110);
+
+ /* Fail if file is too large. We could check this earlier
+ but it's helpful to report the name. */
+ if (file_hdr->c_filesize > LONG_MAX) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: file size out of range\n",
+ progname, file_hdr->c_name);
+ exit(1);
+ }
}
/* Return 16-bit integer I with the bytes swapped. */
meta-initramfs/recipes-devtools/klibc/klibc.inc
+1
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@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/libs/klibc/2.0/klibc-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://0001-workaround-for-overlapping-sections-in-binary.patch \
file://CVE-2021-31870.patch \
file://CVE-2021-31871.patch \
file://CVE-2021-31872.patch \
"
ARMPATCHES ?= ""