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python3-pyjwt: Fix CVE-2026-48523

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This patch applies the upstream 2.13.0 backport for
CVE-2026-48523. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1],
and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81
[2] https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f

Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@oss.qualcomm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Hetvi Thakar
2026-08-19 04:00:12 -07:00
committed by Anuj Mittal
parent 242530c3e4
commit 79accf77d2
2 changed files with 118 additions and 1 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/files/CVE-2026-48523.patch
+115
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
From 6590add3a8d18098b107fe446ff256ae92e7238f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Padilla?= <jpadilla@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 14:11:10 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Bundle security fixes and hardening into 2.13.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Security:
- `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` rejects JWK JSON documents passed as raw
HMAC secrets to close an algorithm-confusion gap not covered by the
existing PEM/SSH guard. Reported by @aradona91 in GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx.
- Bind the JWT header `alg` to `PyJWK.algorithm_name` during verification
so the caller's `algorithms` allow-list cannot be bypassed when decoding
with a `PyJWK` / `PyJWKClient` key. Reported by @sushi-gif in
GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f.
- Skip the unconditional base64 decode of the compact-form payload
segment when `b64=false` is set, and require that segment to be empty
(RFC 7515 Appendix F detached form). Closes an unauthenticated DoS
amplifier. Reported by @thesmartshadow in GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39.
- `PyJWKClient` rejects any URI whose scheme is not `http` or `https` so
attacker-influenced URIs cannot read local files or reach unintended
schemes via urllib's default `file://` / `ftp://` / `data:` handlers.
Reported by @KEIJOT in GHSA-993g-76c3-p5m4.
- Preserve the cached JWK Set on fetch errors in `PyJWKClient.fetch_data`.
The previous `finally`-block `put(None)` pattern cleared the cache on
any transient outage. Reported by @eddieran in GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8.
Fixes:
- Reject empty HMAC keys outright in `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` with
`InvalidKeyError` instead of accepting them with only a warning.
Hardening prompted by reports from @SnailSploit and @spartan8806.
- Forward per-call `options` (including `enforce_minimum_key_length`)
from `PyJWT.decode` through to `PyJWS._verify_signature`. Thanks to
@WLUB.
- RFC 7797 §3 compliance for `b64=false`: encoder auto-adds `"b64"` to
`crit`; decoder rejects tokens that set `b64=false` without listing
it in `crit`. Thanks to @MachineLearning-Nerd.
CVE: CVE-2026-48523
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81]
Backport Changes:
- Split out the PyJWK algorithm-binding validation because the upstream
commit bundles multiple CVEs.
- Omitted CHANGELOG.rst because it conflicted and is release documentation.
- Omitted the 2.13.0 version bump and other bundled fixes; applicable CVE
fixes are carried in separate patches.
(cherry picked from commit 95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81)
Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
---
jwt/api_jws.py | 10 ++++++++++
tests/test_api_jws.py | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
diff --git a/jwt/api_jws.py b/jwt/api_jws.py
index 0ab7e4b..91d2ae3 100644
--- a/jwt/api_jws.py
+++ b/jwt/api_jws.py
@@ -348,6 +348,16 @@ class PyJWS:
raise InvalidAlgorithmError("The specified alg value is not allowed")
if isinstance(key, PyJWK):
+ # The PyJWK has a fixed algorithm bound at construction time.
+ # Verification must use that algorithm, not whatever the token
+ # header advertises, otherwise the caller's allow-list check
+ # above degenerates into a string compare with no behavioural
+ # effect on which algorithm actually verifies the signature.
+ if alg != key.algorithm_name:
+ raise InvalidAlgorithmError(
+ f"Token algorithm {alg!r} does not match the key's "
+ f"algorithm {key.algorithm_name!r}"
+ )
alg_obj = key.Algorithm
prepared_key = key.key
else:
diff --git a/tests/test_api_jws.py b/tests/test_api_jws.py
index 9f7edc0..0715b9e 100644
--- a/tests/test_api_jws.py
+++ b/tests/test_api_jws.py
@@ -397,6 +397,33 @@ class TestJWS:
with pytest.raises(InvalidAlgorithmError):
jws.decode(example_jws, jwk)
+ def test_decodes_with_jwk_rejects_header_alg_outside_jwk_alg(
+ self, jws: PyJWS
+ ) -> None:
+ # Token header says HS256 and the caller's allow-list also accepts
+ # HS256, but the PyJWK is bound to HS512. Even though the allow-list
+ # would pass, verification must be locked to the PyJWK's algorithm
+ # rather than the header's — otherwise an attacker who controls a
+ # registered key can advertise a disallowed algorithm in the header
+ # and have it accepted.
+ jwk = PyJWK(
+ {
+ "kty": "oct",
+ "alg": "HS512",
+ "k": "c2VjcmV0", # "secret"
+ }
+ )
+ example_jws = (
+ b"eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9."
+ b"aGVsbG8gd29ybGQ."
+ b"gEW0pdU4kxPthjtehYdhxB9mMOGajt1xCKlGGXDJ8PM"
+ )
+
+ with pytest.raises(
+ InvalidAlgorithmError, match="does not match the key's algorithm"
+ ):
+ jws.decode(example_jws, jwk, algorithms=["HS256", "HS512"])
+
# 'Control' Elliptic Curve jws created by another library.
# Used to test for regressions that could affect both
# encoding / decoding operations equally (causing tests
meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pyjwt_2.12.1.bb
+3 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt"
LICENSE = "MIT"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=e4b56d2c9973d8cf54655555be06e551"
SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-48522.patch"
SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-48522.patch \
file://CVE-2026-48523.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c74a7a2adf861c04d002db713dd85f84beb242228e671280bf709d765b03672b"