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python3-pyjwt: Fix CVE-2026-48526

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This patch applies the upstream 2.13.0 backport for
CVE-2026-48526. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1],
and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81
[2] https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx

Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@oss.qualcomm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Hetvi Thakar
2026-08-19 04:00:15 -07:00
committed by Anuj Mittal
parent 5fd7815f34
commit 8519105eec
2 changed files with 127 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/files/CVE-2026-48526.patch
+126
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@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
From 336f1a0c18c04b63cab024b9f030af2b6c6b248c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Padilla?= <jpadilla@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 14:11:10 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Bundle security fixes and hardening into 2.13.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Security:
- `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` rejects JWK JSON documents passed as raw
HMAC secrets to close an algorithm-confusion gap not covered by the
existing PEM/SSH guard. Reported by @aradona91 in GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx.
- Bind the JWT header `alg` to `PyJWK.algorithm_name` during verification
so the caller's `algorithms` allow-list cannot be bypassed when decoding
with a `PyJWK` / `PyJWKClient` key. Reported by @sushi-gif in
GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f.
- Skip the unconditional base64 decode of the compact-form payload
segment when `b64=false` is set, and require that segment to be empty
(RFC 7515 Appendix F detached form). Closes an unauthenticated DoS
amplifier. Reported by @thesmartshadow in GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39.
- `PyJWKClient` rejects any URI whose scheme is not `http` or `https` so
attacker-influenced URIs cannot read local files or reach unintended
schemes via urllib's default `file://` / `ftp://` / `data:` handlers.
Reported by @KEIJOT in GHSA-993g-76c3-p5m4.
- Preserve the cached JWK Set on fetch errors in `PyJWKClient.fetch_data`.
The previous `finally`-block `put(None)` pattern cleared the cache on
any transient outage. Reported by @eddieran in GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8.
Fixes:
- Reject empty HMAC keys outright in `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` with
`InvalidKeyError` instead of accepting them with only a warning.
Hardening prompted by reports from @SnailSploit and @spartan8806.
- Forward per-call `options` (including `enforce_minimum_key_length`)
from `PyJWT.decode` through to `PyJWS._verify_signature`. Thanks to
@WLUB.
- RFC 7797 §3 compliance for `b64=false`: encoder auto-adds `"b64"` to
`crit`; decoder rejects tokens that set `b64=false` without listing
it in `crit`. Thanks to @MachineLearning-Nerd.
CVE: CVE-2026-48526
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81]
Backport Changes:
- Split out the raw JWK-as-HMAC-secret rejection because the upstream
commit bundles multiple CVEs.
- Omitted CHANGELOG.rst because it conflicted and is release documentation.
- Carried `test_hmac_prepare_key_rejects_jwk_json` and
`test_hmac_prepare_key_accepts_json_without_kty` regression tests covering
the same JWK-classification security boundary.
- Omitted other tests/test_algorithms.py hunks for separate empty-key and
per-call key-length hardening.
- Omitted the 2.13.0 version bump and other bundled fixes; applicable CVE
fixes are carried in separate patches.
(cherry picked from commit 95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81)
Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
---
jwt/algorithms.py | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
tests/test_algorithms.py | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/jwt/algorithms.py b/jwt/algorithms.py
index 615dcf3..cf6da45 100644
--- a/jwt/algorithms.py
+++ b/jwt/algorithms.py
@@ -331,6 +331,26 @@ class HMACAlgorithm(Algorithm):
" should not be used as an HMAC secret."
)
+ # Defense against algorithm-confusion attacks: an attacker with
+ # control over the token header can force this code path by setting
+ # alg=HS*, and HMACAlgorithm is the only algorithm that accepts
+ # arbitrary bytes as a valid secret. Other algorithms reject
+ # non-key-shaped input naturally. Even a symmetric (kty=oct) JWK
+ # should be loaded via PyJWK / from_jwk rather than fed as raw JSON
+ # bytes (whose contents are not the secret material).
+ stripped = key_bytes.lstrip()
+ if stripped.startswith(b"{"):
+ try:
+ jwk_obj = json.loads(key_bytes)
+ except ValueError:
+ jwk_obj = None
+ if isinstance(jwk_obj, dict) and "kty" in jwk_obj:
+ raise InvalidKeyError(
+ "The specified key looks like a JWK and should not be "
+ "used directly as an HMAC secret. Load it via "
+ "PyJWK / HMACAlgorithm.from_jwk first."
+ )
+
return key_bytes
@overload
diff --git a/tests/test_algorithms.py b/tests/test_algorithms.py
index 5449f3c..82659cf 100644
--- a/tests/test_algorithms.py
+++ b/tests/test_algorithms.py
@@ -122,6 +122,29 @@ class TestAlgorithms:
with pytest.raises(InvalidKeyError):
algo.from_jwk(keyfile.read())
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "jwk_file",
+ [
+ "jwk_rsa_pub.json",
+ "jwk_ec_pub_P-256.json",
+ "jwk_okp_pub_Ed25519.json",
+ "jwk_hmac.json",
+ ],
+ )
+ def test_hmac_prepare_key_rejects_jwk_json(self, jwk_file: str) -> None:
+ algo = HMACAlgorithm(HMACAlgorithm.SHA256)
+
+ with open(key_path(jwk_file)) as keyfile:
+ with pytest.raises(InvalidKeyError, match="looks like a JWK"):
+ algo.prepare_key(keyfile.read())
+
+ def test_hmac_prepare_key_accepts_json_without_kty(self) -> None:
+ # JSON that doesn't look like a JWK (no "kty") should not be misclassified.
+ algo = HMACAlgorithm(HMACAlgorithm.SHA256)
+
+ key = algo.prepare_key('{"this": "is just a json-shaped secret"}')
+ assert key == b'{"this": "is just a json-shaped secret"}'
+
@crypto_required
def test_rsa_should_parse_pem_public_key(self) -> None:
algo = RSAAlgorithm(RSAAlgorithm.SHA256)
meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pyjwt_2.12.1.bb
+1
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-48522.patch \
file://CVE-2026-48523.patch \
file://CVE-2026-48524.patch \
file://CVE-2026-48525.patch \
file://CVE-2026-48526.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c74a7a2adf861c04d002db713dd85f84beb242228e671280bf709d765b03672b"