hostapd: patch CVE-2025-24912

Details https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24912

Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ankur Tyagi
2025-10-28 17:32:11 +13:00
committed by Anuj Mittal
parent d18271891f
commit 9fd485ca64
3 changed files with 154 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
From c77bc3f388b81fabc9fa6233caa618c724de8a28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2025 11:21:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response
The case of an invalid authenticator in a RADIUS response could imply
that the response is not from the correct RADIUS server and as such,
such a response should be discarded without changing internal state for
the pending request. The case of an unknown response (RADIUS_RX_UNKNOWN)
is somewhat more complex since it could have been indicated before
validating the authenticator. In any case, it seems better to change the
state for the pending request only when we have fully accepted the
response.
Allowing the internal state of pending RADIUS request to change based on
responses that are not fully validation could have allow at least a
theoretical DoS attack if an attacker were to have means for injecting
RADIUS messages to the network using the IP address of the real RADIUS
server and being able to do so more quickly than the real server and
with the matching identifier from the request header (i.e., either by
flooding 256 responses quickly or by having means to capture the RADIUS
request). These should not really be realistic options in a properly
protected deployment, but nevertheless it is good to be more careful in
processing RADIUS responses.
Remove a pending RADIUS request from the internal list only when having
fully accepted a matching RADIUS response, i.e., after one of the
registered handlers has confirmed that the authenticator is valid and
processing of the response has succeeded.
CVE: CVE-2025-24912
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44]
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
(cherry picked from commit 726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44)
Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com>
---
src/radius/radius_client.c | 15 +++++++--------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c
index ee9e46d2a..8f9332583 100644
--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c
+++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c
@@ -922,13 +922,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
roundtrip / 100, roundtrip % 100);
rconf->round_trip_time = roundtrip;
- /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
- if (prev_req)
- prev_req->next = req->next;
- else
- radius->msgs = req->next;
- radius->num_msgs--;
-
for (i = 0; i < num_handlers; i++) {
RadiusRxResult res;
res = handlers[i].handler(msg, req->msg, req->shared_secret,
@@ -939,6 +932,13 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
radius_msg_free(msg);
/* fall through */
case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED:
+ /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
+ if (prev_req)
+ prev_req->next = req->next;
+ else
+ radius->msgs = req->next;
+ radius->num_msgs--;
+
radius_client_msg_free(req);
return;
case RADIUS_RX_INVALID_AUTHENTICATOR:
@@ -960,7 +960,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
msg_type, hdr->code, hdr->identifier,
invalid_authenticator ? " [INVALID AUTHENTICATOR]" :
"");
- radius_client_msg_free(req);
fail:
radius_msg_free(msg);
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
From fe4d203a300e1eaa1ad7c7bc49e01b9490ab03d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 19:23:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Fix pending request dropping
A recent change to this moved the place where the processed RADIUS
request was removed from the pending list to happen after the message
handler had been called. This did not take into account possibility of
the handler adding a new pending request in the list and the prev_req
pointer not necessarily pointing to the correct entry anymore. As such,
some of the pending requests could have been lost and that would result
in not being able to process responses to those requests and also, to a
memory leak.
Fix this by determining prev_req at the point when the pending request
is being removed, i.e., after the handler function has already added a
new entry.
Fixes: 726432d7622c ("RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response")
CVE: CVE-2025-24912
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109]
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
(cherry picked from commit 339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109)
Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com>
---
src/radius/radius_client.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c
index 8f9332583..a5a6cdfae 100644
--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c
+++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
struct radius_hdr *hdr;
struct radius_rx_handler *handlers;
size_t num_handlers, i;
- struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req;
+ struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req, *r;
struct os_reltime now;
struct hostapd_radius_server *rconf;
int invalid_authenticator = 0;
@@ -887,7 +887,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
break;
}
- prev_req = NULL;
req = radius->msgs;
while (req) {
/* TODO: also match by src addr:port of the packet when using
@@ -899,7 +898,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
hdr->identifier)
break;
- prev_req = req;
req = req->next;
}
@@ -933,6 +931,12 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
/* fall through */
case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED:
/* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
+ prev_req = NULL;
+ for (r = radius->msgs; r; r = r->next) {
+ if (r == req)
+ break;
+ prev_req = r;
+ }
if (prev_req)
prev_req->next = req->next;
else
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ SRC_URI = " \
file://0001-SAE-Check-for-invalid-Rejected-Groups-element-length.patch \
file://0003-SAE-Reject-invalid-Rejected-Groups-element-in-the-pa.patch \
file://CVE-2023-52160.patch \
file://CVE-2025-24912_01.patch \
file://CVE-2025-24912_02.patch \
"