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redis: fix CVE-2021-32625

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CVE: CVE-2021-32625
Upstream-Status: Backport [e9a1438ac4c52aa68dfa2a8324b6419356842116]

Fix integer overflow in STRALGO LCS (CVE-2021-32625) (#9011)
An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer can be exploited using the
STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote code
execution. This is a result of an incomplete fix by CVE-2021-29477.

Signed-off-by: Tony Tascioglu <tony.tascioglu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tony Tascioglu
2021-08-10 11:51:45 -07:00
committed by Armin Kuster
parent b2c8972406
commit acf5769aff
2 changed files with 62 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis/fix-CVE-2021-32625.patch
+61
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
From e9a1438ac4c52aa68dfa2a8324b6419356842116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 09:12:45 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflow in STRALGO LCS (CVE-2021-32625) (#9011)
An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer can be exploited using the
STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote code
execution. This is a result of an incomplete fix by CVE-2021-29477.
(cherry picked from commit 1ddecf1958924b178b76a31d989ef1e05af81964)
CVE: CVE-2021-32625
Upstream-Status: Backport [e9a1438ac4c52aa68dfa2a8324b6419356842116]
Signed-off-by: Tony Tascioglu <tony.tascioglu@windriver.com>
---
src/t_string.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/t_string.c b/src/t_string.c
index 490d5983a..587d3aeb8 100644
--- a/src/t_string.c
+++ b/src/t_string.c
@@ -797,6 +797,12 @@ void stralgoLCS(client *c) {
goto cleanup;
}
+ /* Detect string truncation or later overflows. */
+ if (sdslen(a) >= UINT32_MAX-1 || sdslen(b) >= UINT32_MAX-1) {
+ addReplyError(c, "String too long for LCS");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
/* Compute the LCS using the vanilla dynamic programming technique of
* building a table of LCS(x,y) substrings. */
uint32_t alen = sdslen(a);
@@ -805,9 +811,19 @@ void stralgoLCS(client *c) {
/* Setup an uint32_t array to store at LCS[i,j] the length of the
* LCS A0..i-1, B0..j-1. Note that we have a linear array here, so
* we index it as LCS[j+(blen+1)*j] */
- uint32_t *lcs = zmalloc((size_t)(alen+1)*(blen+1)*sizeof(uint32_t));
#define LCS(A,B) lcs[(B)+((A)*(blen+1))]
+ /* Try to allocate the LCS table, and abort on overflow or insufficient memory. */
+ unsigned long long lcssize = (unsigned long long)(alen+1)*(blen+1); /* Can't overflow due to the size limits above. */
+ unsigned long long lcsalloc = lcssize * sizeof(uint32_t);
+ uint32_t *lcs = NULL;
+ if (lcsalloc < SIZE_MAX && lcsalloc / lcssize == sizeof(uint32_t))
+ lcs = ztrymalloc(lcsalloc);
+ if (!lcs) {
+ addReplyError(c, "Insufficient memory");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
/* Start building the LCS table. */
for (uint32_t i = 0; i <= alen; i++) {
for (uint32_t j = 0; j <= blen; j++) {
--
2.32.0
meta-oe/recipes-extended/redis/redis_6.2.2.bb
+1
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.redis.io/releases/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://0006-Define-correct-gregs-for-RISCV32.patch \
file://fix-CVE-2021-29477.patch \
file://fix-CVE-2021-29478.patch \
file://fix-CVE-2021-32625.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7a260bb74860f1b88c3d5942bf8ba60ca59f121c6dce42d3017bed6add0b9535"