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samba: fix CVE-2023-4091

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A vulnerability was discovered in Samba, where the flaw allows SMB clients to
truncate files, even with read-only permissions when the Samba VFS module
"acl_xattr" is configured with "acl_xattr:ignore system acls = yes". The SMB
protocol allows opening files when the client requests read-only access but
then implicitly truncates the opened file to 0 bytes if the client specifies
a separate OVERWRITE create disposition request. The issue arises in configurations
that bypass kernel file system permissions checks, relying solely on Samba's permissions.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4091

Fix is patched to the function call smbd_check_access_rights_fsp() of open_file(),
But in samba_4.14.14 smbd_check_access_rights() is used, from samba_4.15.0 onwards
smbd_check_access_rights() was replaced with smbd_check_access_rights_fsp() and
samba_4.14.14 is still vulnerable through smbd_check_access_rights().

Ref:
https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/3f61369d153419158c0f223e6f81c0bb07275833
https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/26dc10bdb2cff3eece4a2874931b4058f9f87d68

Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Archana Polampalli
2023-11-23 06:13:07 +00:00
committed by Armin Kuster
parent 01c0aaaf62
commit ad3dc46c87
3 changed files with 254 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
meta-networking/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/CVE-2023-4091-0001.patch
+193
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
From b08a60160e6ab8d982d31844bcbf7ab67ff3a8de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 12:30:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2023-4091: smbtorture: test overwrite dispositions on
read-only file
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15439
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
CVE: CVE-2023-4091
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/b08a60160e6ab8d982d31844bcbf7ab67ff3a8de]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls | 1 +
source4/torture/smb2/acls.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 146 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18df260
--- /dev/null
+++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+^samba3.smb2.acls.OVERWRITE_READ_ONLY_FILE
diff --git a/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c b/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
index 4f4538b..d26caeb 100644
--- a/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
+++ b/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
@@ -3023,6 +3023,149 @@ done:
return ret;
}
+static bool test_overwrite_read_only_file(struct torture_context *tctx,
+ struct smb2_tree *tree)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct smb2_create c;
+ const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\test_overwrite_read_only_file.txt";
+ struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}};
+ union smb_fileinfo q;
+ union smb_setfileinfo set;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL, *sd_orig = NULL;
+ const char *owner_sid = NULL;
+ int i;
+ bool ret = true;
+
+ struct tcase {
+ int disposition;
+ const char *disposition_string;
+ NTSTATUS expected_status;
+ } tcases[] = {
+#define TCASE(d, s) { \
+ .disposition = d, \
+ .disposition_string = #d, \
+ .expected_status = s, \
+ }
+ TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN, NT_STATUS_OK),
+ TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_SUPERSEDE, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED),
+ TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED),
+ TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE_IF, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED),
+ };
+#undef TCASE
+
+ ret = smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR);
+ torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, "smb2_util_setup_dir not ok");
+
+ c = (struct smb2_create) {
+ .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL |
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER,
+ .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
+ .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ |
+ NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE,
+ .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF,
+ .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS,
+ .in.fname = fname,
+ };
+
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_create failed\n");
+ handle = c.out.file.handle;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n");
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(q);
+ q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n");
+ sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+
+ owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
+
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, NULL, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_READ_DATA,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(set);
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n");
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(handle);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tcases); i++) {
+ torture_comment(tctx, "Verify open with %s dispostion\n",
+ tcases[i].disposition_string);
+
+ c = (struct smb2_create) {
+ .in.create_disposition = tcases[i].disposition,
+ .in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA,
+ .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
+ .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK,
+ .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS,
+ .in.fname = fname,
+ };
+
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, c.out.file.handle);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(
+ tctx, status, tcases[i].expected_status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_create failed\n");
+ };
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n");
+
+ c = (struct smb2_create) {
+ .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC,
+ .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
+ .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK,
+ .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF,
+ .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS,
+ .in.fname = fname,
+ };
+
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_create failed\n");
+ handle = c.out.file.handle;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(set);
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig;
+
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n");
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(handle);
+
+done:
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname);
+ smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
/*
basic testing of SMB2 ACLs
*/
@@ -3051,6 +3194,8 @@ struct torture_suite *torture_smb2_acls_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
test_deny1);
torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "MXAC-NOT-GRANTED",
test_mxac_not_granted);
+ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "OVERWRITE_READ_ONLY_FILE",
+ test_overwrite_read_only_file);
suite->description = talloc_strdup(suite, "SMB2-ACLS tests");
--
2.40.0
meta-networking/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/CVE-2023-4091-0002.patch
+59
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
From 8b26f634372f11edcbea33dfd68a3d57889dfcc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 13:04:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-4091: smbd: use open_access_mask for access check in
open_file()
If the client requested FILE_OVERWRITE[_IF], we're implicitly adding
FILE_WRITE_DATA to the open_access_mask in open_file_ntcreate(), but for the
access check we're using access_mask which doesn't contain the additional
right, which means we can end up truncating a file for which the user has
only read-only access via an SD.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15439
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
CVE: CVE-2023-4091
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/8b26f634372f11edcbea33dfd68a3d57889dfcc5]
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
---
selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls | 1 -
source3/smbd/open.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
deleted file mode 100644
index 18df260..0000000
--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-^samba3.smb2.acls.OVERWRITE_READ_ONLY_FILE
diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c
index 2c3bf9e..4bec5cb 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/open.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/open.c
@@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ static NTSTATUS open_file(files_struct *fsp,
conn->cwd_fsp,
smb_fname,
false,
- access_mask);
+ open_access_mask);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(10, ("open_file: "
@@ -1585,7 +1585,7 @@ static NTSTATUS open_file(files_struct *fsp,
conn->cwd_fsp,
smb_fname,
false,
- access_mask);
+ open_access_mask);
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND) &&
(fsp->posix_flags & FSP_POSIX_FLAGS_OPEN) &&
--
2.40.0
meta-networking/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_4.14.14.bb
+2
View File
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${SAMBA_MIRROR}/stable/samba-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://CVE-2023-34968_0009.patch \
file://CVE-2023-34968_0010.patch \
file://CVE-2023-34968_0011.patch \
file://CVE-2023-4091-0001.patch \
file://CVE-2023-4091-0002.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:libc-musl = " \