nginx: fix CVE-2026-95101

This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2],
using the commit shown in [1].

[1] https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/90b30edffea4f427608c36e3849643b6f9841bc4
[2] https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-95101

Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@oss.qualcomm.com>

meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/files/CVE-2026-95101.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From 90b30edffea4f427608c36e3849643b6f9841bc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Vadim Zhestikov <v.zhestikov@f5.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 17:48:55 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] HTTP/3: kept the skipped frame length separate from data
+ length
+
+ngx_http_v3_parse_data() stored the remaining length of a skipped
+(unknown) frame in st->length -- the same field the request body
+filter uses for the number of DATA payload bytes to pass on as
+request body.  When an unknown frame was split across parser
+invocations, the skip was interrupted with st->length holding the
+skip remainder; on the next buffer the body filter, which calls
+the parser only while st->length == 0, treated that remainder as
+request body.
+
+When proxying, this could result in sending unframed bytes, potentially
+allowing for bypass of client_max_body_size, which is enforced only on
+the DATA path, or an injection.
+
+The fix is to keep unknown frame payload in a separate st->skip counter.
+
+Reported by Hansol Lee of GOTROOT.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-95101
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/90b30edffea4f427608c36e3849643b6f9841bc4]
+
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
+---
+ src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c | 4 +++-
+ src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c
+index bcbf0dbe12..ffaade8429 100644
+--- a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c
++++ b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.c
+@@ -1837,6 +1837,8 @@ ngx_http_v3_parse_data(ngx_connection_t *c, ngx_http_v3_parse_data_t *st,
+                            st->type, st->length);
+ 
+             if (st->type != NGX_HTTP_V3_FRAME_DATA && st->length > 0) {
++                st->skip = st->length;
++                st->length = 0;
+                 st->state = sw_skip;
+                 break;
+             }
+@@ -1846,7 +1848,7 @@ ngx_http_v3_parse_data(ngx_connection_t *c, ngx_http_v3_parse_data_t *st,
+ 
+         case sw_skip:
+ 
+-            rc = ngx_http_v3_parse_skip(b, &st->length);
++            rc = ngx_http_v3_parse_skip(b, &st->skip);
+             if (rc != NGX_DONE) {
+                 return rc;
+             }
+diff --git a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h
+index ba004db5df..e161cecf7b 100644
+--- a/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h
++++ b/src/http/v3/ngx_http_v3_parse.h
+@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ typedef struct {
+     ngx_uint_t                      state;
+     ngx_uint_t                      type;
+     ngx_uint_t                      length;
++    ngx_uint_t                      skip;
+     ngx_http_v3_parse_varlen_int_t  vlint;
+ } ngx_http_v3_parse_data_t;
+ 
+-- 
+2.35.6

meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.28.3.bb

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ SRC_URI:append = " \
     file://CVE-2026-42533_p4.patch \
     file://CVE-2026-42533_p5.patch \
     file://CVE-2026-56434.patch \
+    file://CVE-2026-95101.patch \
 "
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=3dc49537b08b14c8b66ad247bb4c4593"

meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.29.7.bb

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ SRC_URI:append = " \
     file://CVE-2026-42533_p4.patch \
     file://CVE-2026-42533_p5.patch \
     file://CVE-2026-56434.patch \
+    file://CVE-2026-95101.patch \
 "
 
 # 1.28.x branch is the current stable branch, the recommended default