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This patch applies the reviewed upstream fix shown in [1]. The CVE record is referenced in [2]. It also backports the C-parser null-byte validation and adapts its regression test from [3]. [1] https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/9370b9714a7a56003cacd31a9b4ae16eab109ba4 [2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34520 [3] https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/db560cfeab32aa35f3d06f7a24238bedc01ffe2b Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <dkelaiya@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@oss.qualcomm.com>
122 lines
5.2 KiB
Diff
122 lines
5.2 KiB
Diff
From 661f91935d061a3d7d554f2c808c8a14f3122991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Rodrigo Nogueira <rodrigo.b.nogueira@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2026 20:38:17 -0300
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Subject: [PATCH] [PR #12231/7043bc56 backport][3.13] Adjust header value
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character checks to RFC 9110 (#12235)
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CVE: CVE-2026-34520
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/9370b9714a7a56003cacd31a9b4ae16eab109ba4]
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Backport Changes:
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- Included the C-parser null-byte validation from upstream prerequisite
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commit db560cfeab32aa35f3d06f7a24238bedc01ffe2b because the Scarthgap
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3.9.5 recipe patch stack does not contain that prerequisite.
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- Used the target's local `raw_value` bytes object when raising
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`InvalidHeader`, since aiohttp 3.9.5 converts
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`_raw_value` before checking.
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- Added a response-parser regression test for the C-parser validation.
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- Omitted the generated aiohttp/_http_parser.c changes because the
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Scarthgap recipe regenerates this file from _http_parser.pyx with
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Cython.
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Co-authored-by: rodrigo.nogueira <rodrigo.nogueira@prf.gov.br>
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(cherry picked from commit 9370b9714a7a56003cacd31a9b4ae16eab109ba4)
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Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <dkelaiya@cisco.com>
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---
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CHANGES/12231.bugfix.rst | 2 ++
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aiohttp/_http_parser.pyx | 7 +++++++
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aiohttp/http_parser.py | 9 ++++++++-
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tests/test_http_parser.py | 17 +++++++++++++++++
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4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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create mode 100644 CHANGES/12231.bugfix.rst
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diff --git a/CHANGES/12231.bugfix.rst b/CHANGES/12231.bugfix.rst
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new file mode 100644
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index 000000000..cd74bd1e7
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/CHANGES/12231.bugfix.rst
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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+Adjusted pure-Python request header value validation to align with RFC 9110 control-character handling, while preserving lax response parser behavior, and added regression tests for Host/header control-character cases.
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+-- by :user:`rodrigobnogueira`.
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diff --git a/aiohttp/_http_parser.pyx b/aiohttp/_http_parser.pyx
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index cc8b13cfb..496498d6f 100644
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--- a/aiohttp/_http_parser.pyx
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+++ b/aiohttp/_http_parser.pyx
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@@ -387,5 +387,12 @@ cdef class HttpParser:
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value = raw_value.decode('utf-8', 'surrogateescape')
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+ # reject null bytes in header values - matches the Python parser
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+ # check at http_parser.py. llhttp in lenient mode doesn't reject
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+ # these itself, so we need to catch them here.
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+ # ref: RFC 9110 section 5.5 (CTL chars forbidden in field values)
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+ if "\x00" in value:
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+ raise InvalidHeader(raw_value)
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+
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self._headers.add(name, value)
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if len(self._headers) > self._max_headers:
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raise BadHttpMessage("Too many headers received")
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diff --git a/aiohttp/http_parser.py b/aiohttp/http_parser.py
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index 95ac28252..a7fec7f01 100644
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--- a/aiohttp/http_parser.py
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+++ b/aiohttp/http_parser.py
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@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ ASCIISET: Final[Set[str]] = set(string.printable)
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# token = 1*tchar
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_TCHAR_SPECIALS: Final[str] = re.escape("!#$%&'*+-.^_`|~")
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TOKENRE: Final[Pattern[str]] = re.compile(f"[0-9A-Za-z{_TCHAR_SPECIALS}]+")
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+# https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110#section-5.5-5
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+_FIELD_VALUE_FORBIDDEN_CTL_RE: Final[Pattern[str]] = re.compile(
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+ r"[\x00-\x08\x0a-\x1f\x7f]"
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+)
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VERSRE: Final[Pattern[str]] = re.compile(r"HTTP/(\d)\.(\d)", re.ASCII)
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DIGITS: Final[Pattern[str]] = re.compile(r"\d+", re.ASCII)
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HEXDIGITS: Final[Pattern[bytes]] = re.compile(rb"[0-9a-fA-F]+")
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@@ -200,7 +204,10 @@ class HeadersParser:
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value = bvalue.decode("utf-8", "surrogateescape")
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# https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110.html#section-5.5-5
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- if "\n" in value or "\r" in value or "\x00" in value:
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+ if self._lax:
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+ if "\n" in value or "\r" in value or "\x00" in value:
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+ raise InvalidHeader(bvalue)
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+ elif _FIELD_VALUE_FORBIDDEN_CTL_RE.search(value):
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raise InvalidHeader(bvalue)
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headers.add(name, value)
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diff --git a/tests/test_http_parser.py b/tests/test_http_parser.py
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index cb562f598..be7446e0a 100644
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--- a/tests/test_http_parser.py
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+++ b/tests/test_http_parser.py
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@@ -210,6 +210,9 @@ def test_bad_header_name(parser: Any, rfc9110_5_6_2_token_delim: str) -> None:
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"Foo : bar", # https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9112.html#section-5.1-2
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"Foo\t: bar",
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"\xffoo: bar",
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+ "Foo: abc\x01def", # CTL bytes forbidden per RFC 9110 §5.5
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+ "Foo: abc\x7fdef", # DEL is also a CTL byte
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+ "Foo: abc\x1fdef",
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),
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)
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def test_bad_headers(parser: Any, hdr: str) -> None:
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@@ -218,6 +221,20 @@ def test_bad_headers(parser: Any, hdr: str) -> None:
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parser.feed_data(text)
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+def test_ctl_host_header_bad_characters(parser: HttpRequestParser) -> None:
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+ """CTL byte in Host header must be rejected."""
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+ text = b"GET /test HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: trusted.example\x01@bad.test\r\n\r\n"
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+ with pytest.raises(http_exceptions.BadHttpMessage):
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+ parser.feed_data(text)
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+
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+
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+def test_null_byte_in_response_header_value(
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+ response: HttpResponseParser,
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+) -> None:
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+ with pytest.raises(http_exceptions.InvalidHeader):
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+ response.feed_data(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nFoo: abc\x00def\r\n\r\n")
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+
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+
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def test_unpaired_surrogate_in_header_py(loop: Any, protocol: Any) -> None:
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parser = HttpRequestParserPy(
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protocol,
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--
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2.35.6
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