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initramfs-framework-ima: introduce IMA_FORCE
Introduce IMA_FORCE to allow the IMA policy be applied forcely even 'no_ima' boot parameter is available. This ensures the end users have a way to disable 'no_ima' support if they want to, because it may expose a security risk if an attacker can find a way to change kernel arguments, it will easily bypass rootfs authenticity checks. Signed-off-by: Sergio Prado <sergio.prado@toradex.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <liu.ming50@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
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@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/COPYING.MIT;md5=3da9cfbcb788c80a0384
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# to this recipe can just point towards one of its own files.
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IMA_POLICY ?= "ima-policy-hashed"
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# Force proceed IMA procedure even 'no_ima' boot parameter is available.
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IMA_FORCE ?= "false"
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SRC_URI = " file://ima"
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inherit features_check
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@@ -23,6 +26,8 @@ do_install () {
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install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima
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install -d ${D}/init.d
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install ${WORKDIR}/ima ${D}/init.d/20-ima
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sed -i "s/@@FORCE_IMA@@/${IMA_FORCE}/g" ${D}/init.d/20-ima
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}
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FILES_${PN} = "/init.d ${sysconfdir}"
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@@ -2,11 +2,16 @@
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#
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# Loads IMA policy into the kernel.
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force_ima=@@FORCE_IMA@@
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ima_enabled() {
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if [ "$bootparam_no_ima" = "true" ]; then
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if [ "$force_ima" = "true" ]; then
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return 0
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elif [ "$bootparam_no_ima" = "true" ]; then
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return 1
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else
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return 0
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fi
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return 0
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}
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ima_run() {
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