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openssl: upgrade 3.0.15 -> 3.0.16
Release information: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/openssl-3.0/NEWS.md#major-changes-between-openssl-3015-and-openssl-3016-11-feb-2025 All CVEs were already patched, so this upgrade fixes only minor bugs. Remove CVE patches included in the new version. (From OE-Core rev: 68c01710e3522af317f8fe09465b56e6aca01615) Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Marko
committed by
Steve Sakoman
Steve Sakoman
parent
d49f124652
commit
3d029078fe
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
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From 07272b05b04836a762b4baa874958af51d513844 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 18:27:02 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation
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There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word of
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the inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significant
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probability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particular
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the NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the
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attacker process must either be located in the same physical computer or
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must have a very fast network connection with low latency.
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Attacks on ECDSA nonce are also known as Minerva attack.
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Fixes CVE-2024-13176
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
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(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26429)
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(cherry picked from commit 63c40a66c5dc287485705d06122d3a6e74a6a203)
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CVE: CVE-2024-13176
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/07272b05b04836a762b4baa874958af51d513844]
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Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
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---
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crypto/bn/bn_exp.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
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crypto/ec/ec_lib.c | 7 ++++---
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include/crypto/bn.h | 3 +++
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3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
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index 598a592ca1397..d84c7de18a6b6 100644
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--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
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+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
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@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
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* out by Colin Percival,
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* http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/)
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*/
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-int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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+int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
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BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
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{
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@@ -623,10 +623,6 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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unsigned int t4 = 0;
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#endif
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- bn_check_top(a);
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- bn_check_top(p);
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- bn_check_top(m);
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-
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if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
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return 0;
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@@ -1146,7 +1142,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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goto err;
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} else
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#endif
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- if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
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+ if (!bn_from_mont_fixed_top(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
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goto err;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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@@ -1160,6 +1156,19 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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return ret;
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}
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+int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
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+ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
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+{
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+ bn_check_top(a);
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+ bn_check_top(p);
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+ bn_check_top(m);
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+ if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont))
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+ return 0;
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+ bn_correct_top(rr);
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+ return 1;
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+}
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+
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int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
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const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
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{
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diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
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index b1696d93bd6dd..1f0bf1ec795fa 100644
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--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
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+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
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#include "crypto/ec.h"
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+#include "crypto/bn.h"
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#include "internal/nelem.h"
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#include "ec_local.h"
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@@ -1262,10 +1263,10 @@ static int ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
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if (!BN_sub(e, group->order, e))
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goto err;
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/*-
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- * Exponent e is public.
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- * No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
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+ * Although the exponent is public we want the result to be
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+ * fixed top.
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*/
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- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data))
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+ if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data))
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goto err;
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ret = 1;
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diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
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index c5f328156d3a9..59a629b9f6288 100644
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--- a/include/crypto/bn.h
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+++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
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@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG *words, int num_words);
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*/
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int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
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BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
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+int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
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+ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);
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int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
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BN_CTX *ctx);
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int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
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@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
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From 72ae83ad214d2eef262461365a1975707f862712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse.
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The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field
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(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask,
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to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms.
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These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular
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reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the
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polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as
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its final element).
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Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that
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precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial
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could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr().
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The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the
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standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62).
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See the "Finite Field Identification" section of:
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https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html
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The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial
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basis X9.62 forms.
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This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when
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the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd).
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Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not
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enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value.
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The return value is now always the number of elements (including the
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final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently
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large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has
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just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space
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for non-sentinel values.
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Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose
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degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against
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CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs.
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The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These
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generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1)
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disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this
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constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit
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parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent
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problem values as noted above.
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Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623.
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A closely related issue was earlier reported in
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<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/19826>.
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Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639)
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(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2)
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CVE: CVE-2024-9143
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/72ae83ad214d2eef262461365a1975707f862712]
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Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
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---
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crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------
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test/ec_internal_test.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
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index c811ae82d6b15..bcc66613cc14d 100644
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--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
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+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
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@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
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#include "bn_local.h"
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
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+# include <openssl/ec.h>
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/*
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* Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should
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@@ -1140,16 +1141,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
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/*
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* Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i *
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* x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero
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- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array
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- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would
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- * be filled if array was large enough.
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+ * coefficient. The array is intended to be suitable for use with
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+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be
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+ * zero. This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd.
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+ *
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+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements
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+ * of the array will be filled.
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+ *
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+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if
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+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`. It is `0` when `a`
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+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement.
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+ *
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+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds
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+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks,
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*/
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int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
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{
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int i, j, k = 0;
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BN_ULONG mask;
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- if (BN_is_zero(a))
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+ if (!BN_is_odd(a))
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return 0;
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for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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@@ -1167,12 +1178,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
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}
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}
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- if (k < max) {
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+ if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ if (k < max)
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p[k] = -1;
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- k++;
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- }
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- return k;
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+ return k + 1;
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}
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/*
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diff --git a/test/ec_internal_test.c b/test/ec_internal_test.c
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index 8c2cd05631696..02cfd4e9d8858 100644
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--- a/test/ec_internal_test.c
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+++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c
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@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void)
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
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+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */
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+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void)
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+{
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+ int ret = 0;
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+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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+ BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
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+ EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL;
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+
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+ TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n");
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+
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+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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+ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx))
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+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(a))
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+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(b)))
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */
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+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2)))
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+ goto out;
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+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
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+ TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial");
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+
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+ /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */
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+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3)))
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+ goto out;
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+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
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+ TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial");
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+
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+ /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */
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+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71))
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+ || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1)))
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+ goto out;
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+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
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+ TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted",
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+ OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS);
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+
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+ ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL;
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+
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+ out:
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+ EC_GROUP_free(group1);
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+ EC_GROUP_free(group2);
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+ EC_GROUP_free(group3);
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+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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+
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+ return ret;
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+}
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+
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/* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */
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static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void)
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{
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@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
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ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple);
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ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
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+ ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity);
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ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple);
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#endif
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ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len);
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+1
-3
@@ -12,15 +12,13 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op
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file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \
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file://afalg.patch \
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file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
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file://CVE-2024-9143.patch \
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file://CVE-2024-13176.patch \
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"
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SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
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file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
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"
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SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "23c666d0edf20f14249b3d8f0368acaee9ab585b09e1de82107c66e1f3ec9533"
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SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "57e03c50feab5d31b152af2b764f10379aecd8ee92f16c985983ce4a99f7ef86"
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inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest perlnative
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MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user