1
0
mirror of https://git.yoctoproject.org/poky synced 2026-06-03 01:40:07 +00:00
Vijay Anusuri
2023-11-15 12:13:44 +05:30
committed by Steve Sakoman
parent 4553984904
commit 63909c1cc6
6 changed files with 272 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
From 6858d468d9ca55fb4c5fd70b223dbc78a3358a7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Sep 2023 14:19:40 -0700
Subject: [PATCH libX11 1/5] CVE-2023-43785: out-of-bounds memory access in
_XkbReadKeySyms()
Make sure we allocate enough memory in the first place, and
also handle error returns from _XkbReadBufferCopyKeySyms() when
it detects out-of-bounds issues.
Reported-by: Gregory James DUCK <gjduck@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libx11/tree/debian/patches/0001-CVE-2023-43785-out-of-bounds-memory-access-in-_XkbRe.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
Upstream commit https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/6858d468d9ca55fb4c5fd70b223dbc78a3358a7f]
CVE: CVE-2023-43785
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/xkb/XKBGetMap.c | 14 +++++++++-----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/xkb/XKBGetMap.c b/src/xkb/XKBGetMap.c
index 2891d21e..31199e4a 100644
--- a/src/xkb/XKBGetMap.c
+++ b/src/xkb/XKBGetMap.c
@@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ _XkbReadKeySyms(XkbReadBufferPtr buf, XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbGetMapReply *rep)
if (offset + newMap->nSyms >= map->size_syms) {
register int sz;
- sz = map->size_syms + 128;
+ sz = offset + newMap->nSyms;
+ sz = ((sz + (unsigned) 128) / 128) * 128;
_XkbResizeArray(map->syms, map->size_syms, sz, KeySym);
if (map->syms == NULL) {
map->size_syms = 0;
@@ -191,8 +192,9 @@ _XkbReadKeySyms(XkbReadBufferPtr buf, XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbGetMapReply *rep)
map->size_syms = sz;
}
if (newMap->nSyms > 0) {
- _XkbReadBufferCopyKeySyms(buf, (KeySym *) &map->syms[offset],
- newMap->nSyms);
+ if (_XkbReadBufferCopyKeySyms(buf, (KeySym *) &map->syms[offset],
+ newMap->nSyms) == 0)
+ return BadLength;
offset += newMap->nSyms;
}
else {
@@ -222,8 +224,10 @@ _XkbReadKeySyms(XkbReadBufferPtr buf, XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbGetMapReply *rep)
newSyms = XkbResizeKeySyms(xkb, i + rep->firstKeySym, tmp);
if (newSyms == NULL)
return BadAlloc;
- if (newMap->nSyms > 0)
- _XkbReadBufferCopyKeySyms(buf, newSyms, newMap->nSyms);
+ if (newMap->nSyms > 0) {
+ if (_XkbReadBufferCopyKeySyms(buf, newSyms, newMap->nSyms) == 0)
+ return BadLength;
+ }
else
newSyms[0] = NoSymbol;
oldMap->kt_index[0] = newMap->ktIndex[0];
--
2.39.3
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 204c3393c4c90a29ed6bef64e43849536e863a86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 15:54:30 -0700
Subject: [PATCH libX11 2/5] CVE-2023-43786: stack exhaustion from infinite
recursion in PutSubImage()
When splitting a single line of pixels into chunks to send to the
X server, be sure to take into account the number of bits per pixel,
so we don't just loop forever trying to send more pixels than fit in
the given request size and not breaking them down into a small enough
chunk to fix.
Fixes: "almost complete rewrite" (Dec. 12, 1987) from X11R2
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libx11/tree/debian/patches/0002-CVE-2023-43786-stack-exhaustion-from-infinite-recurs.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
Upstream commit https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/204c3393c4c90a29ed6bef64e43849536e863a86]
CVE: CVE-2023-43786
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/PutImage.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/PutImage.c b/src/PutImage.c
index 857ee916..a6db7b42 100644
--- a/src/PutImage.c
+++ b/src/PutImage.c
@@ -914,8 +914,9 @@ PutSubImage (
req_width, req_height - SubImageHeight,
dest_bits_per_pixel, dest_scanline_pad);
} else {
- int SubImageWidth = (((Available << 3) / dest_scanline_pad)
- * dest_scanline_pad) - left_pad;
+ int SubImageWidth = ((((Available << 3) / dest_scanline_pad)
+ * dest_scanline_pad) - left_pad)
+ / dest_bits_per_pixel;
PutSubImage(dpy, d, gc, image, req_xoffset, req_yoffset, x, y,
(unsigned int) SubImageWidth, 1,
--
2.39.3
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 73a37d5f2fcadd6540159b432a70d80f442ddf4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 15:55:04 -0700
Subject: [PATCH libX11 3/5] XPutImage: clip images to maximum height & width
allowed by protocol
The PutImage request specifies height & width of the image as CARD16
(unsigned 16-bit integer), same as the maximum dimensions of an X11
Drawable, which the image is being copied to.
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libx11/tree/debian/patches/0003-XPutImage-clip-images-to-maximum-height-width-allowe.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
Upstream commit https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/73a37d5f2fcadd6540159b432a70d80f442ddf4a]
CVE: CVE-2023-43786
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/PutImage.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/PutImage.c b/src/PutImage.c
index a6db7b42..ba411e36 100644
--- a/src/PutImage.c
+++ b/src/PutImage.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
#include "Xlibint.h"
#include "Xutil.h"
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "Cr.h"
#include "ImUtil.h"
#include "reallocarray.h"
@@ -962,6 +963,10 @@ XPutImage (
height = image->height - req_yoffset;
if ((width <= 0) || (height <= 0))
return 0;
+ if (width > USHRT_MAX)
+ width = USHRT_MAX;
+ if (height > USHRT_MAX)
+ height = USHRT_MAX;
if ((image->bits_per_pixel == 1) || (image->format != ZPixmap)) {
dest_bits_per_pixel = 1;
--
2.39.3
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From b4031fc023816aca07fbd592ed97010b9b48784b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 16:12:27 -0700
Subject: [PATCH libX11 4/5] XCreatePixmap: trigger BadValue error for
out-of-range dimensions
The CreatePixmap request specifies height & width of the image as CARD16
(unsigned 16-bit integer), so if either is larger than that, set it to 0
so the X server returns a BadValue error as the protocol requires.
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libx11/tree/debian/patches/0004-XCreatePixmap-trigger-BadValue-error-for-out-of-rang.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
Upstream commit https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/b4031fc023816aca07fbd592ed97010b9b48784b]
CVE: CVE-2023-43787
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/CrPixmap.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/CrPixmap.c b/src/CrPixmap.c
index cdf31207..3cb2ca6d 100644
--- a/src/CrPixmap.c
+++ b/src/CrPixmap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
#include <config.h>
#endif
#include "Xlibint.h"
+#include <limits.h>
#ifdef USE_DYNAMIC_XCURSOR
void
@@ -47,6 +48,16 @@ Pixmap XCreatePixmap (
Pixmap pid;
register xCreatePixmapReq *req;
+ /*
+ * Force a BadValue X Error if the requested dimensions are larger
+ * than the X11 protocol has room for, since that's how callers expect
+ * to get notified of errors.
+ */
+ if (width > USHRT_MAX)
+ width = 0;
+ if (height > USHRT_MAX)
+ height = 0;
+
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetReq(CreatePixmap, req);
req->drawable = d;
--
2.39.3
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From 7916869d16bdd115ac5be30a67c3749907aea6a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yair Mizrahi <yairm@jfrog.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 16:15:32 -0700
Subject: [PATCH libX11 5/5] CVE-2023-43787: Integer overflow in XCreateImage()
leading to a heap overflow
When the format is `Pixmap` it calculates the size of the image data as:
ROUNDUP((bits_per_pixel * width), image->bitmap_pad);
There is no validation on the `width` of the image, and so this
calculation exceeds the capacity of a 4-byte integer, causing an overflow.
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libx11/tree/debian/patches/0005-CVE-2023-43787-Integer-overflow-in-XCreateImage-lead.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security
Upstream commit https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libx11/-/commit/7916869d16bdd115ac5be30a67c3749907aea6a0]
CVE: CVE-2023-43787
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
src/ImUtil.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ImUtil.c b/src/ImUtil.c
index 36f08a03..fbfad33e 100644
--- a/src/ImUtil.c
+++ b/src/ImUtil.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
#include <X11/Xlibint.h>
#include <X11/Xutil.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "ImUtil.h"
static int _XDestroyImage(XImage *);
@@ -361,13 +362,22 @@ XImage *XCreateImage (
/*
* compute per line accelerator.
*/
- {
- if (format == ZPixmap)
+ if (format == ZPixmap) {
+ if ((INT_MAX / bits_per_pixel) < width) {
+ Xfree(image);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
min_bytes_per_line =
- ROUNDUP((bits_per_pixel * width), image->bitmap_pad);
- else
+ ROUNDUP((bits_per_pixel * width), image->bitmap_pad);
+ } else {
+ if ((INT_MAX - offset) < width) {
+ Xfree(image);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
min_bytes_per_line =
- ROUNDUP((width + offset), image->bitmap_pad);
+ ROUNDUP((width + offset), image->bitmap_pad);
}
if (image_bytes_per_line == 0) {
image->bytes_per_line = min_bytes_per_line;
--
2.39.3
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ SRC_URI += "file://Fix-hanging-issue-in-_XReply.patch \
file://CVE-2022-3554.patch \
file://CVE-2022-3555.patch \
file://CVE-2023-3138.patch \
file://CVE-2023-43785.patch \
file://CVE-2023-43786-1.patch \
file://CVE-2023-43786-2.patch \
file://CVE-2023-43787-1.patch \
file://CVE-2023-43787-2.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "55adbfb6d4370ecac5e70598c4e7eed2"