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qemu: fix CVE-2018-17958/17962/17963
(From OE-Core rev: 1bbaf8d198b121a2a6f033350d1de3baa0a1163c) Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Changqing Li
committed by
Richard Purdie
Richard Purdie
parent
0cdcce13bc
commit
87082c60dd
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
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From 06e88ca78d056ea4de885e3a1496805179dc47bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
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Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:33:04 +0800
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Subject: [PATCH] ne2000: fix possible out of bound access in ne2000_receive
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In ne2000_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts
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from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater
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INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass
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the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of
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for both buf and buf1.
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Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t.
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CC: address@hidden
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Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <address@hidden>
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Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
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Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg03273.html]
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CVE: CVE-2018-17958
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Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
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---
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hw/net/ne2000.c | 4 ++--
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/hw/net/ne2000.c b/hw/net/ne2000.c
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index 07d79e3..869518e 100644
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--- a/hw/net/ne2000.c
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+++ b/hw/net/ne2000.c
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@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
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ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
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{
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NE2000State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
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- int size = size_;
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+ size_t size = size_;
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uint8_t *p;
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unsigned int total_len, next, avail, len, index, mcast_idx;
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uint8_t buf1[60];
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@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
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{ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
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#if defined(DEBUG_NE2000)
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- printf("NE2000: received len=%d\n", size);
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+ printf("NE2000: received len=%zu\n", size);
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#endif
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if (s->cmd & E8390_STOP || ne2000_buffer_full(s))
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--
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2.7.4
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@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
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From 20abe443ad9464b18ac494f71f7d53f19ee3748f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
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Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:38:08 +0800
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Subject: [PATCH] rtl8139: fix possible out of bound access
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In rtl8139_do_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts
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from size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater
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INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass
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the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access of
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for both buf and buf1.
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Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t.
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CC: address@hidden
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Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <address@hidden>
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Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
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Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg03269.html]
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CVE: CVE-2018-17962
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Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
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---
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hw/net/rtl8139.c | 8 ++++----
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1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
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index 46daa16..2342a09 100644
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--- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
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+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
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@@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ static ssize_t rtl8139_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t
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RTL8139State *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
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PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
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/* size is the length of the buffer passed to the driver */
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- int size = size_;
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+ size_t size = size_;
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const uint8_t *dot1q_buf = NULL;
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uint32_t packet_header = 0;
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@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static ssize_t rtl8139_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t
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static const uint8_t broadcast_macaddr[6] =
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{ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
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- DPRINTF(">>> received len=%d\n", size);
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+ DPRINTF(">>> received len=%zu\n", size);
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/* test if board clock is stopped */
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if (!s->clock_enabled)
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@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ static ssize_t rtl8139_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t
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if (size+4 > rx_space)
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{
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- DPRINTF("C+ Rx mode : descriptor %d size %d received %d + 4\n",
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+ DPRINTF("C+ Rx mode : descriptor %d size %d received %zu + 4\n",
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descriptor, rx_space, size);
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s->IntrStatus |= RxOverflow;
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@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ static ssize_t rtl8139_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t
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if (avail != 0 && RX_ALIGN(size + 8) >= avail)
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{
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DPRINTF("rx overflow: rx buffer length %d head 0x%04x "
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- "read 0x%04x === available 0x%04x need 0x%04x\n",
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+ "read 0x%04x === available 0x%04x need 0x%04zx\n",
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s->RxBufferSize, s->RxBufAddr, s->RxBufPtr, avail, size + 8);
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s->IntrStatus |= RxOverflow;
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--
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2.7.4
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@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
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From e5ff72a8005dd1d9c0f63f8a9cc4298df5bb7551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
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Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:39:46 +0800
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Subject: [PATCH] pcnet: fix possible buffer overflow
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In pcnet_receive(), we try to assign size_ to size which converts from
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size_t to integer. This will cause troubles when size_ is greater
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INT_MAX, this will lead a negative value in size and it can then pass
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the check of size < MIN_BUF_SIZE which may lead out of bound access
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for both buf and buf1.
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Fixing by converting the type of size to size_t.
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CC: address@hidden
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Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <address@hidden>
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Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <address@hidden>
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Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <address@hidden>
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg03268.html]
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CVE: CVE-2018-17963
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Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
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---
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hw/net/pcnet.c | 4 ++--
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c
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index 0c44554..d9ba04b 100644
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--- a/hw/net/pcnet.c
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+++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c
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@@ -988,14 +988,14 @@ ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
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uint8_t buf1[60];
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int remaining;
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int crc_err = 0;
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- int size = size_;
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+ size_t size = size_;
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if (CSR_DRX(s) || CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s) || !size ||
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(CSR_LOOP(s) && !s->looptest)) {
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return -1;
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}
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#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG
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- printf("pcnet_receive size=%d\n", size);
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+ printf("pcnet_receive size=%zu\n", size);
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#endif
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/* if too small buffer, then expand it */
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--
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2.7.4
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@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
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file://0010-linux-user-Fix-webkitgtk-hangs-on-32-bit-x86-target.patch \
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file://0011-Revert-linux-user-fix-mmap-munmap-mprotect-mremap-sh.patch \
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file://CVE-2018-15746.patch \
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file://CVE-2018-17958.patch \
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file://CVE-2018-17962.patch \
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file://CVE-2018-17963.patch \
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"
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UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
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