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busybox: fix CVE-2017-15873
(From OE-Core rev: 91829d07cdeb42e213500e053e20a9db68848d2e) Signed-off-by: Radovan Scasny <radovan.scasny@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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Richard Purdie
parent
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commit
d7d3d341d2
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
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busybox-1.27.2: Fix CVE-2017-15873
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[No upstream tracking] -- https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=10431
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bunzip2: fix runCnt overflow
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The get_next_block function in archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c
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in BusyBox 1.27.2 has an Integer Overflow that may lead to a write
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access violation.
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=0402cb32df015d9372578e3db27db47b33d5c7b0]
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CVE: CVE-2017-15873
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bug: 10431
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Signed-off-by: Radovan Scasny <radovan.scasny@siemens.com>
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diff --git a/archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c b/archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c
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index 7cd18f5..bec89ed 100644
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--- a/archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c
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+++ b/archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c
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@@ -156,15 +156,15 @@ static unsigned get_bits(bunzip_data *bd, int bits_wanted)
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static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
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{
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struct group_data *hufGroup;
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- int dbufCount, dbufSize, groupCount, *base, *limit, selector,
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- i, j, runPos, symCount, symTotal, nSelectors, byteCount[256];
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- int runCnt = runCnt; /* for compiler */
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+ int groupCount, *base, *limit, selector,
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+ i, j, symCount, symTotal, nSelectors, byteCount[256];
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uint8_t uc, symToByte[256], mtfSymbol[256], *selectors;
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uint32_t *dbuf;
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unsigned origPtr, t;
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+ unsigned dbufCount, runPos;
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+ unsigned runCnt = runCnt; /* for compiler */
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dbuf = bd->dbuf;
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- dbufSize = bd->dbufSize;
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selectors = bd->selectors;
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/* In bbox, we are ok with aborting through setjmp which is set up in start_bunzip */
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@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
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it didn't actually work. */
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if (get_bits(bd, 1)) return RETVAL_OBSOLETE_INPUT;
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origPtr = get_bits(bd, 24);
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- if ((int)origPtr > dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
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+ if (origPtr > bd->dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
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/* mapping table: if some byte values are never used (encoding things
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like ascii text), the compression code removes the gaps to have fewer
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@@ -435,7 +435,14 @@ static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
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symbols, but a run of length 0 doesn't mean anything in this
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context). Thus space is saved. */
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runCnt += (runPos << nextSym); /* +runPos if RUNA; +2*runPos if RUNB */
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- if (runPos < dbufSize) runPos <<= 1;
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+//The 32-bit overflow of runCnt wasn't yet seen, but probably can happen.
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+//This would be the fix (catches too large count way before it can overflow):
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+// if (runCnt > bd->dbufSize) {
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+// dbg("runCnt:%u > dbufSize:%u RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
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+// runCnt, bd->dbufSize);
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+// return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
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+// }
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+ if (runPos < bd->dbufSize) runPos <<= 1;
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goto end_of_huffman_loop;
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}
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@@ -445,14 +452,15 @@ static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
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literal used is the one at the head of the mtfSymbol array.) */
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if (runPos != 0) {
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uint8_t tmp_byte;
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- if (dbufCount + runCnt > dbufSize) {
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- dbg("dbufCount:%d+runCnt:%d %d > dbufSize:%d RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
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- dbufCount, runCnt, dbufCount + runCnt, dbufSize);
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+ if (dbufCount + runCnt > bd->dbufSize) {
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+ dbg("dbufCount:%u+runCnt:%u %u > dbufSize:%u RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
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+ dbufCount, runCnt, dbufCount + runCnt, bd->dbufSize);
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return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
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}
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tmp_byte = symToByte[mtfSymbol[0]];
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byteCount[tmp_byte] += runCnt;
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- while (--runCnt >= 0) dbuf[dbufCount++] = (uint32_t)tmp_byte;
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+ while ((int)--runCnt >= 0)
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+ dbuf[dbufCount++] = (uint32_t)tmp_byte;
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runPos = 0;
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}
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@@ -466,7 +474,7 @@ static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
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first symbol in the mtf array, position 0, would have been handled
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as part of a run above. Therefore 1 unused mtf position minus
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2 non-literal nextSym values equals -1.) */
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- if (dbufCount >= dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
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+ if (dbufCount >= bd->dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
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i = nextSym - 1;
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uc = mtfSymbol[i];
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--
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cgit v0.12
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@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.busybox.net/downloads/busybox-${PV}.tar.bz2;name=tarball \
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file://runlevel \
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file://makefile-libbb-race.patch \
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file://CVE-2011-5325.patch \
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file://CVE-2017-15873.patch \
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file://busybox-CVE-2017-16544.patch \
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"
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SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://musl.cfg "
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