vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73073

Pick the patch from [1], also referenced in the NVD report [2].

[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/2f628d8104958fa7421664f792ca6d4f7a39a10f
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73073

(From OE-Core rev: a95cfa08584a3b7fc464326fdb382a84ed793034)

Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Paul Barker <paul@pbarker.dev>
This commit is contained in:
Hitendra Prajapati authored and Paul Barker committed 2026-09-28 10:17:42 +01:00
1 parent 50c311f68b
commit f2fcd1c16c
2 files changed
+90

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@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
From 2f628d8104958fa7421664f792ca6d4f7a39a10f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <mattn.jp@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 09:11:42 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0845: [security]: arbitrary Ex command execution
during C omni-completion
Problem: [security]: arbitrary Ex command execution during C
omni-completion (Threonine)
Solution: Match tags typeref literally to block Ex command injection
(Yasuhiro Matsumoto).
Escaping only "/" and "\" left the typeref able to break out of the
:vimgrep pattern without a "/": an unclosed "[" makes vimgrep's pattern
skipping fail, and the parser then treats a following "|" as a command
separator, so the tag value runs as Ex commands during C omni-completion.
Match the field literally with \V so no regex metacharacter can affect
pattern parsing.
Github Security Advisory:
https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-cx73-phcg-3j5g
Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <mattn.jp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
CVE: CVE-2026-73073
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/2f628d8104958fa7421664f792ca6d4f7a39a10f]
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
---
runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim | 5 ++++-
src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim b/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim
index 248d6f2e60..5a48581dcf 100644
--- a/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim
+++ b/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim
@@ -592,8 +592,11 @@ def StructMembers( # {{{1
if complete_check()
return []
endif
+ # Match "typename" literally (\V): escaping alone is not enough, as e.g.
+ # an unclosed "[" makes vimgrep's pattern skipping fail and the rest of
+ # the tag value is then parsed as Ex commands.
execute 'silent! keepjumps noautocmd '
- .. n .. 'vimgrep ' .. '/\t' .. escape(typename, '/\') .. '\(\t\|$\)/j '
+ .. n .. 'vimgrep ' .. '/\t\V' .. escape(typename, '/\') .. '\m\(\t\|$\)/j '
.. fnames
qflist = getqflist()
diff --git a/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim b/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim
index a635bd50bd..c1754d17c1 100644
--- a/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim
+++ b/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim
@@ -31,6 +31,32 @@ func Test_ccomplete_no_exec_via_typeref()
unlet! g:ccomplete_injected
endfunc
+" Escaping "/" and "\" is not enough: with no "/" in the payload, an unclosed
+" "[" makes vimgrep's pattern skipping fail, and the command parser then treats
+" the first "|" as a command separator. The typeref must be matched literally.
+func Test_ccomplete_no_exec_via_typeref_bracket()
+ CheckUnix
+ let sentinel = tempname()
+ call delete(sentinel)
+ let tagsfile = s:WriteTags([
+ \ "myvar\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tv\ttyperef:struct:[|call system('touch " .. sentinel .. "')|####",
+ \ ])
+
+ let save_tags = &tags
+ let &tags = tagsfile
+
+ new
+ call ccomplete#Complete(1, '')
+ call ccomplete#Complete(0, 'myvar.x')
+
+ call assert_false(filereadable(sentinel),
+ \ 'typeref field was executed as an Ex command during omni-completion')
+
+ bwipe!
+ let &tags = save_tags
+ call delete(sentinel)
+endfunc
+
" A legitimate typeref must still drive struct-member completion: escaping the
" field value must not break the normal path.
func Test_ccomplete_typeref_completion_still_works()
--
2.50.1
+1
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
file://CVE-2026-59858.patch \
file://CVE-2026-57456.patch \
file://CVE-2026-73072.patch \
file://CVE-2026-73073.patch \
"
PV .= ".1683"