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libarchive: fix bug929 and CVE-2017-14166

(From OE-Core rev: 9b248a17d60b70cb715f15c0401dc5ddc38eee98)

Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Andrej Valek
2017-09-11 16:20:37 +02:00
committed by Richard Purdie
parent f44dfe63a4
commit fed25846ac
3 changed files with 77 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
libarchive-3.3.2: Fix CVE-2017-14166
[No upstream tracking] -- https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/935
archive_read_support_format_xar: heap-based buffer overflow in xml_data
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/fa7438a0ff4033e4741c807394a9af6207940d71]
CVE: CVE-2017-14166
Bug: 935
Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c
index 7a22beb..93eeacc 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c
@@ -1040,6 +1040,9 @@ atol10(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
uint64_t l;
int digit;
+ if (char_cnt == 0)
+ return (0);
+
l = 0;
digit = *p - '0';
while (digit >= 0 && digit < 10 && char_cnt-- > 0) {
@@ -1054,7 +1057,10 @@ atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
{
int64_t l;
int digit;
-
+
+ if (char_cnt == 0)
+ return (0);
+
l = 0;
while (char_cnt-- > 0) {
if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7')
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
libarchive-3.3.2: Fix bug929
[No upstream tracking] -- https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/929
archive_read_support_format_cpio: header_newc(): Avoid overflow when reading corrupt
cpio archive
A cpio "newc" archive with a namelength of "FFFFFFFF", if read on a
system with a 32-bit size_t, would result in namelength + name_pad
overflowing 32 bits and libarchive attempting to copy 2^32-1 bytes
from a 2-byte buffer, with appropriately hilarious results.
Check for this overflow and fail; there's no legitimate reason for a
cpio archive to contain a file with a name over 4 billion characters
in length.
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/bac4659e0b970990e7e3f3a3d239294e96311630]
Bug: 929
Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c
index ad9f782..1faa64d 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c
@@ -633,6 +633,13 @@ header_newc(struct archive_read *a, struct cpio *cpio,
/* Pad name to 2 more than a multiple of 4. */
*name_pad = (2 - *namelength) & 3;
+ /* Make sure that the padded name length fits into size_t. */
+ if ((size_t)(*namelength + *name_pad) < *namelength) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
+ "cpio archive has invalid namelength");
+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ }
+
/*
* Note: entry_bytes_remaining is at least 64 bits and
* therefore guaranteed to be big enough for a 33-bit file
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[lz4] = "--with-lz4,--without-lz4,lz4,"
EXTRA_OECONF += "--enable-largefile"
SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://bug929.patch \
file://CVE-2017-14166.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4583bd6b2ebf7e0e8963d90879eb1b27"