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python3-pyjwt: Fix CVE-2026-48524
This patch applies the upstream 2.13.0 backport for CVE-2026-48524. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2]. [1] https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81 [2] https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8 Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@oss.qualcomm.com>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Anuj Mittal
parent
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commit
8a6759f036
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
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From 9d971fad56d6571a3bfc037ca21e3be694b9cabd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Padilla?= <jpadilla@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 14:11:10 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH] Bundle security fixes and hardening into 2.13.0
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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Security:
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- `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` rejects JWK JSON documents passed as raw
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HMAC secrets to close an algorithm-confusion gap not covered by the
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existing PEM/SSH guard. Reported by @aradona91 in GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx.
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- Bind the JWT header `alg` to `PyJWK.algorithm_name` during verification
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so the caller's `algorithms` allow-list cannot be bypassed when decoding
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with a `PyJWK` / `PyJWKClient` key. Reported by @sushi-gif in
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GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f.
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- Skip the unconditional base64 decode of the compact-form payload
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segment when `b64=false` is set, and require that segment to be empty
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(RFC 7515 Appendix F detached form). Closes an unauthenticated DoS
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amplifier. Reported by @thesmartshadow in GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39.
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- `PyJWKClient` rejects any URI whose scheme is not `http` or `https` so
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attacker-influenced URIs cannot read local files or reach unintended
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schemes via urllib's default `file://` / `ftp://` / `data:` handlers.
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Reported by @KEIJOT in GHSA-993g-76c3-p5m4.
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- Preserve the cached JWK Set on fetch errors in `PyJWKClient.fetch_data`.
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The previous `finally`-block `put(None)` pattern cleared the cache on
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any transient outage. Reported by @eddieran in GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8.
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Fixes:
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- Reject empty HMAC keys outright in `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` with
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`InvalidKeyError` instead of accepting them with only a warning.
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Hardening prompted by reports from @SnailSploit and @spartan8806.
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- Forward per-call `options` (including `enforce_minimum_key_length`)
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from `PyJWT.decode` through to `PyJWS._verify_signature`. Thanks to
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@WLUB.
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- RFC 7797 §3 compliance for `b64=false`: encoder auto-adds `"b64"` to
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`crit`; decoder rejects tokens that set `b64=false` without listing
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it in `crit`. Thanks to @MachineLearning-Nerd.
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CVE: CVE-2026-48524
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81]
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Backport Changes:
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- Split out the cached-JWK-set preservation fix because the upstream
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commit bundles multiple CVEs.
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- Omitted CHANGELOG.rst because it conflicted and is release documentation.
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- Omitted the 2.13.0 version bump and other bundled fixes; applicable CVE
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fixes are carried in separate patches.
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(cherry picked from commit 95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81)
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Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
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---
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jwt/jwks_client.py | 14 ++++++++------
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tests/test_jwks_client.py | 16 ++++++++++++++--
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2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/jwt/jwks_client.py b/jwt/jwks_client.py
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index 8d1b0c4..41f333a 100644
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--- a/jwt/jwks_client.py
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+++ b/jwt/jwks_client.py
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@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ class PyJWKClient:
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:returns: The parsed JWK Set as a dictionary.
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:raises PyJWKClientConnectionError: If the HTTP request fails.
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"""
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- jwk_set: Any = None
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try:
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r = urllib.request.Request(url=self.uri, headers=self.headers)
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with urllib.request.urlopen(
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@@ -126,11 +125,14 @@ class PyJWKClient:
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raise PyJWKClientConnectionError(
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f'Fail to fetch data from the url, err: "{e}"'
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) from e
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- else:
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- return jwk_set
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- finally:
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- if self.jwk_set_cache is not None:
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- self.jwk_set_cache.put(jwk_set)
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+
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+ # Only update the cache on a successful fetch. Writing in a
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+ # `finally` block with `jwk_set=None` on error clears any
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+ # previously-cached JWKS, turning a transient outage into a cache
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+ # wipe that breaks legitimate auth.
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+ if self.jwk_set_cache is not None:
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+ self.jwk_set_cache.put(jwk_set)
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+ return jwk_set
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def get_jwk_set(self, refresh: bool = False) -> PyJWKSet:
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"""Return the JWK Set, using the cache when available.
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diff --git a/tests/test_jwks_client.py b/tests/test_jwks_client.py
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index d6793cc..da68664 100644
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--- a/tests/test_jwks_client.py
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+++ b/tests/test_jwks_client.py
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@@ -288,18 +288,30 @@ class TestPyJWKClient:
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assert repeated_call.call_count == 1
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- def test_get_jwt_set_failed_request_should_clear_cache(self) -> None:
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+ def test_get_jwt_set_failed_refresh_preserves_cached_jwks(self) -> None:
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+ # Regression: a transient fetch failure used to clear the cache via
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+ # the previous `finally: put(jwk_set=None)` pattern, turning one bad
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+ # request from the JWKS endpoint into application-wide auth failure.
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+ # The cache must survive.
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url = "https://dev-87evx9ru.auth0.com/.well-known/jwks.json"
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jwks_client = PyJWKClient(url)
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with mocked_success_response(RESPONSE_DATA_WITH_MATCHING_KID):
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jwks_client.get_jwk_set()
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+ assert jwks_client.jwk_set_cache is not None
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+ assert jwks_client.jwk_set_cache.get() is not None
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+
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with pytest.raises(PyJWKClientError):
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with mocked_failed_response():
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jwks_client.get_jwk_set(refresh=True)
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- assert jwks_client.jwk_set_cache is None
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+ cached = jwks_client.jwk_set_cache.get()
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+ assert cached is not None
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+ # Subsequent reads still serve from cache without another fetch.
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+ with mocked_success_response(RESPONSE_DATA_WITH_MATCHING_KID) as call:
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+ jwks_client.get_jwk_set()
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+ assert call.call_count == 0
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def test_failed_request_should_raise_connection_error(self) -> None:
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token = "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ik5FRTFRVVJCT1RNNE16STVSa0ZETlRZeE9UVTFNRGcyT0Rnd1EwVXpNVGsxUWpZeVJrUkZRdyJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2Rldi04N2V2eDlydS5hdXRoMC5jb20vIiwic3ViIjoiYVc0Q2NhNzl4UmVMV1V6MGFFMkg2a0QwTzNjWEJWdENAY2xpZW50cyIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vZXhwZW5zZXMtYXBpIiwiaWF0IjoxNTcyMDA2OTU0LCJleHAiOjE1NzIwMDY5NjQsImF6cCI6ImFXNENjYTc5eFJlTFdVejBhRTJINmtEME8zY1hCVnRDIiwiZ3R5IjoiY2xpZW50LWNyZWRlbnRpYWxzIn0.PUxE7xn52aTCohGiWoSdMBZGiYAHwE5FYie0Y1qUT68IHSTXwXVd6hn02HTah6epvHHVKA2FqcFZ4GGv5VTHEvYpeggiiZMgbxFrmTEY0csL6VNkX1eaJGcuehwQCRBKRLL3zKmA5IKGy5GeUnIbpPHLHDxr-GXvgFzsdsyWlVQvPX2xjeaQ217r2PtxDeqjlf66UYl6oY6AqNS8DH3iryCvIfCcybRZkc_hdy-6ZMoKT6Piijvk_aXdm7-QQqKJFHLuEqrVSOuBqqiNfVrG27QzAPuPOxvfXTVLXL2jek5meH6n-VWgrBdoMFH93QEszEDowDAEhQPHVs0xj7SIzA"
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=e4b56d2c9973d8cf54655555be06e551"
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SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-48522.patch \
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file://CVE-2026-48523.patch \
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file://CVE-2026-48524.patch \
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"
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SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c74a7a2adf861c04d002db713dd85f84beb242228e671280bf709d765b03672b"
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